2002 - Societe Internationale de Defense Sociale

Transcrição

La Société internationale de défense sociale pour une
politique criminelle humaniste dédie ce Volume à la
mémoire de Adolfo Beria di Argentine, son secrétaire
général puis son vice-président de 1966 à 2000.
The International Society of Social Defence and Humane
Criminal Policy dedicates this Volume to the memory of
Adolfo Beria di Argentine, former ISSD Secretary-General
and Vice-President (1966 to 2000).
DEFENSE SOCIALE ET DROIT PENAL POUR LA PROTECTION
DES GENERATIONS FUTURES, EN PRESENCE DES RISQUES
NOUVEAUX
Actes du XIVème CONGRES INTERNATIONAL DE DEFENSE SOCIALE
SOCIAL DEFENCE AND CRIMINAL LAW FOR THE
PROTECTION OF COMING GENERATIONS, IN VIEW OF THE
NEW RISKS
Proceedings of XIVth INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS ON SOCIAL DEFENCE
Lisbon, Portugal, 17-19 May 2002
Centro Cultural de Belém
à l'initiative de/at the initiative of
Société internationale de défense sociale pour une politique
criminelle humaniste
Centro nazionale di prevenzione e difesa sociale
sous les auspices du/under the auspices of
Ministry of Justice of Portugal
en coopération avec/in co-operation with
Centre for International Crime Prevention (CICP)
of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
(ODCCP)
CAHIERS DE DEFENSE SOCIALE
Direction et Rédaction / Editorial Board
Directeur / Director
Mario PISANI, professeur de procédure pénale à l’Université de Milan
Comité de rédaction / Editorial Committee
Edmondo BRUTI LIBERATI − Adolfo CERETTI − Vitaliano ESPOSITO −
Gioacchino POLIMENI − Giovanni TAMBURINO
Secrétariat de rédaction / Editorial Secretariat
CENTRO NAZIONALE DI PREVENZIONE E DIFESA SOCIALE
Palazzo Comunale delle Scienze Sociali − Piazza Castello, 3 − 20121 MILANO − Italie
Les Cahiers ne sont pas en vente. Ils sont réservés aux membres de la SIDS
The Cahiers are not on sale. Only ISSD Members are entitled to receive them
TABLE DES MATIERES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Présentation/Presentation/ Presentación
Mario PISANI
page
9
Présidence du Congrès/ Chairmanship of the
Congress
«
15
Les participants
Participants
«
17
Commentaire du Thème du Congrès / Overview of
the Theme of the Congress
«
23
Programme du Congrès / Programme of the Congress
«
27
«
«
«
33
37
41
«
43
Le Quatorzième Congrès international de défense
sociale / The Fourteenth International Congress on
Social Defence
au
Congrès/
The
Congress
SEANCE INAUGURALE / OPENING SESSION
Allocutions/ Addresses by:
Simone ROZES
Eduardo VETERE
Mota CAMPOS
RAPPORT
GENERAL
INTRODUCTORY REPORT
INTRODUCTIF/
Jorge DE FIGUEIREDO DIAS
GENERAL
I. LES PROBLEMES POSES PAR LE DEVELOPPEMENT
ET
PAR
L'EVOLUTION
DE
LA
RECHERCHE
SCIENTIFIQUE (NUISANCES DIVERSES, TECHNOLOGIE
GENETIQUE
ET
DEVELOPPEMENT
DURABLE)/
PROBLEMS
POSED BY DEVELOPMENT AND THE
EVOLVING SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH (DIFFERENT KINDS OF
HARMS, GENETIC ENGINEERING AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT)
Miriam BLUMBERG-MOKRI
Manuel DA COSTA ANDRADE
Gustavo GHIDINI
Antonio VERCHER
page
«
«
«
61
89
97
103
«
«
«
129
139
151
«
171
II. LES DEFIS DE LA RESPONSABILITE PENALE:
NOUVELLES ALTERNATIVES ET LIMITES, NOUVELLES
FORMES ET NOUVEAUX OBJECTIFS / THE CHALLENGES
OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY: NEW ALTERNATIVES AND LIMITS,
NEW FORMS AND NEW GOALS
Mariano CIAFARDINI
William S. LAUFER − Gilbert GEIS
Joachim VOGEL
III. LA CHARTE DES DROITS FONDAMENTAUX DE
L'UNION
EUROPEENNE
/ THE CHARTER OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
Rui Manuel MOURA RAMOS
IV.
COURS
PENALES
INTERNATIONALES
ET
COMMISSIONS DE RECONCILIATION: REPONSES
ADAPTEES AUX MENACES DE GUERRES, GENOCIDES
OU DISCRIMINATIONS PESANT SUR LES GENERATIONS
FUTURES / INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS: SUITABLE RESPONSES TO
THREATS OF WARS, GENOCIDES OR DISCRIMINATIONS
FACING COMING GENERATIONS
Adolfo CERETTI − Alberto NOSENZO
Fausto POCAR
page
«
201
261
João TIAGO SILVEIRA
Simone ROZES
«
«
273
275
Les Congrès internationaux de défense sociale / The
International Congresses on Social Defence
«
277
SEANCE DE CLOTURE / CLOSING SESSION
SOCIETE INTERNATIONALE DE DEFENSE SOCIALE POUR UNE
POLITIQUE CRIMINELLE HUMANISTE - SIDS
Organisation dotée de statut consultatif
auprès du Conseil économique et social des Nations Unies
INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY OF SOCIAL DEFENCE AND
HUMANE CRIMINAL POLICY - ISSD
Organization in Consultative Status with the
Economic and Social Council of the United Nations
CONSEIL DE DIRECTION/BOARD
Président / President:
Simone ROZES, premier président honoraire de la Cour de cassation de France
Secrétaire général / Secretary-General:
Edmondo BRUTI LIBERATI, substitut du Procureur général près la Cour d'appel
de Milan
Secrétaire général adjoint / Assistant-Secretary-General:
Adolfo CERETTI, professeur associé de criminologie à l'Université de MilanBicocca
Vice-présidents / Vice-Presidents:
Adedokun A. ADEYEMI, Professor and Dean, Faculty of Law, University of
Lagos
Tolani ASUNI, Psychiatrist; Former Director, United Nations Social Defence
Research Institute
Paolo BERNASCONI, professeur de droit pénal de l'économie aux Universités de
Saint Gall et de Zürich
Pierre-Henri BOLLE, professeur de législations pénales, doyen de l'Université de
Neuchâtel
Jorge DE FIGUEIREDO DIAS, président du Conseil scientifique de la Faculté de
droit de l'Université de Coimbra; ancien président de la Fondation internationale
pénale et pénitentiaire
Elio GOMEZ GRILLO, directeur de l'Institut de sciences pénales et
criminologiques de l'Université Simon Bolivar de Caracas
Vladimir KOUDRIAVTSEV, Vice-President, Russian Academy of Sciences
Gerhard O.W. MUELLER, Distinguished Professor of Criminal Justice, Rutgers
University, Newark, N. J.
Reynald OTTENHOF, professeur à l'Université de Nantes; vice-président de
l'Association internationale de droit pénal; Vice-président de l'Institut supérieur
international de sciences criminelles (ISISC)
Mario PISANI, professeur de procédure pénale à l'Université de Milan; directeur
des "Cahiers de défense sociale"
Constantin VOUYOUCAS, professeur émérite de droit pénal de l'Université
Aristote de Thessalonique
Secrétaires généraux régionaux/ Regional Secretaries-General:
pour l'Afrique / for Africa:
A. Aziz SHIDDO, Advocate and Commissioner for Oaths, Karthoum (Sudan)
Ayodele Victoria OYAYOBI ATSENUWA, Lecturer in the Department of Public
Law, University of Lagos (Nigeria)
Maher ABDEL-WAHED, First Assistant to the Minister of Justice; Vice-President,
Egyptian Cassation Court (Arab Republic of Egypt)
pour l'Amérique Latine / for Latin America:
Bernardo BEIDERMAN, ancien professeur de criminologie et de droit pénal de
l'Université nationale de Buenos Aires (Argentina)
Paulo José DA COSTA, Professor of Penal Law, State University of São Paulo
(Brazil)
Alì LASSER, ex-juez de menores, Caracas (Venezuela)
Louis RODRIGUEZ MANZANERA, Criminológo; Director Academia Nacional
de Seguridad Pública (Mexico)
pour les Etats-Unis d'Amérique / for the United States of America:
Freda ADLER, Distinguished Professor of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University,
Newark, N. J.
Pedro R. DAVID, Juez de la Cámara Nacional de Casación Penal de la República
Argentina y Miembro del Grupo de cinco Expertos, designado por el Secretario
General de la ONU para evaluar el funcionamiento y operatividad de los
Tribunales Penales Internacionales para la Ex-Yugoslavia y Rwanda
pour l'Europe / for Europe:
Luis ARROYO ZAPATERO, recteur de l'Université de Castilla -La Mancha
(Espagne)
Matti JOUTSEN, Director, International Affairs Unit, Ministry of Justice, Helsinki
(Finland)
pour l'Asie / for Asia:
Hira SINGH, Former Consultant, National Human Rights Commission, New Delhi
(India)
Tadashi MORISHITA, Professor Emeritus of Penal Law, Hiroshima University
(Japan)
Membres / Members:
Ljubo BAVCON, professeur émérite de droit pénal de l'Université de Ljubljana
Giacomo CANEPA, professeur émérite de médecine légale et criminologie,
Département de médecine légale, du travail, psychologie médicale et criminologie,
Université de Gênes; président honoraire de la Société internationale de
criminologie
Orlando CONTRERAS PULIDO, professeur de droit pénal et de criminologie à
l'Université centrale du Venezuela
Mireille DELMAS MARTY, professeur à l'Université Paris 1 (PanthéonSorbonne); membre de l'Institut universitaire de France
Giuseppe di GENNARO, président adjoint honoraire de la Cour de cassation
d'Italie
Sergio GARCIA RAMIREZ, professeur de droit pénal à l'Université de Mexique;
procureur général de la République (Mexique)
Giovanni Battista GRAMATICA, avocat à Gênes
Joseph HÄUSSLING, Président honoraire du Sénat de l'Université
Witten/Herdecke; professeur de l'Université
Lodewik H. C. HULSMAN, Professor Emeritus of Penal Law, Nederlande
Economische Hogeschool, Rotterdam
Hans-Heinrich JESCHECK, ancien directeur du "Max-Planck-Institut fuer
auslaendisches und internationales Strafrecht" de Fribourg e. Br.; président
honoraire de l'Association internationale de droit pénal
Zoran KANDUC, professeur agrégé de criminologie à l'Université de Ljubljana
Alvar NELSON, Professor Emeritus of Penal Law, Uppsala University
Raymond SCREVENS, président émérite de la Cour de cassation de Belgique;
directeur du Centre national de criminologie, Bruxelles
Colette SOMERHAUSEN, ancien chef de travaux de recherche de l'Institut de
sociologie de l'Université libre de Bruxelles
Denis SZABO, directeur du Centre international de criminologie comparée de
l'Université de Montréal; président honoraire de la Société internationale de
criminologie
Klaus TIEDEMANN, directeur de l'Institut de criminologie et de droit pénal des
affaires de la Albert-Ludwigs Universität de Fribourg e. Br.
Aglaia TSITSOURA, ancien administrateur principal en charge de la Division des
problèmes criminels du Conseil de l'Europe
Alexander YAKOVLEV, Senior Researcher, Institute of State and Law, Russian
Academy of Sciences
Trésorier / Treasurer:
Luciana MARSELLI MILNER, du "Centro nazionale di prevenzione e difesa
sociale"
Membres honoraires / Honorary Members:
Inkeri ANTTILA, Professor Emeritus of Criminal Law; Former Director, Helsinki
Institute of Crime Prevention and Control affiliated with the United Nations
(HEUNI); Former Minister of Justice of Finland (Vice-President)
Shigemitsu DANDO, Former Justice, Supreme Court of Japan; Member of the
Academy of Japan; Professor Emeritus of the University of Tokyo; Counsellor to
the Crown Prince of Japan
Giuliano VA SSALLI, ancien président de la Cour constitutionnelle d'Italie;
professeur émérite de droit pénal de l'Université de Rome; ancien ministre de la
Justice
Jozsef VIGH, Former Head of the Criminological Department, Eötvos Lörand
University, Budapest
Eduardo Vetere Merci beaucoup, Madame Rozès et chers amis,
chers collégues… first of all I have the honour to convey to you, as all
participants of the 14th Congress, the best regards and the warmest gratitude
of the Secretary General of the Unites Nations , Mister Kofi Annan, for your
important contributions to our work, together with his best wishes for a
most successful Congress.
Secondarily, and before touching on the issues attended, allow me
also to join you, Madame, Chair Person, and President of the Society, in
stressing the importance of continuing in our work having in mind the
heritage of the great founders of our movement: Filippo Grammatica and
Mark Hansell, who have transmitted to us one of their most precious gifts.
Let me also – as you did, Simone – recall here another of our great
friends and personalities, Adolfo Beria d'Argentine, the former Secretary
General of the Society, who really, to the United Nations' programme and
to me for so many years, has been a tremendous, invaluable presence, not
only because he was a fantastic magician – to use your words, Simone –
but also because no doubt he was one of the greatest catalysts for the Social
Defence Movement and for criminal justice reform. Really there is no time
here to recall his role for the organisation of the Congress in Milan, for
organising so many of the preparatory meetings related to the topics of the
Congresses, together with the other big fours… no doubt such contributions
are a demonstration of his commitment to the goals and the objectives
enshrined in the United Nations Charter: peace, justice, respect for human
rights and development. And it is particularly in connection to this later
question of development and also development vis-à-vis human rights that
also the Internationa l Society of Social Defence has made important in the
work of the United Nations and in all our agendas for a number of years
thanks to the contributions of thinkers, of reformers, of scientists like you
here today.
Now, going to the importance of the issue that you are discussing
today, and starting particularly with the question of the problem of
sustainable development and the role of criminal law: when we speak of
sustainable development we should all recall the Bruntland report of '87
according to which development should meet – and I quote: «…the needs
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs». A process of change in which exploitation of
resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological
development and institutional change are all in harmony and then have both
current and future potential to meet human needs and aspirations.
The central rationale for sustainable development has been to
increase people standards of living, especially the well-being of the least
2
advantaged people in societies thus avoiding indiscriminate future costs.
The topics that you are going to treat today, as the previous main issues
dealt by the Congresses of the International Society of Social Defence – I
just remember: marginalization in Caracas, urbanisation in Thessalonica –
are all a demonstration of your global virtue in connection with some of
these crucial issues. And of course, when we speak of development, we
look at the current process of technology and the role of technology in
helping to build prosperity, to make it easier and more comfortable for the
life of the people and to ensure better standards of living.
However, it is also true that technology has given rise to new risks to
the health and the security of individuals, creating also new challenges to
domestic, transborder and transnational crime control. In short there are
new risks which are deriving from the current advances in technologies,
risks which have to be studied, evaluated, interpreted, in order to look at
their implications, both in the legal and the social field.
This applies also to the other topics that are being discussed today,
that are particularly… when, for example, we look at the last topic in
connection with the international criminal court and the fact of how many
members of the society have been closed to this issue and particularly
today, in which just a few weeks ago the Statute of the International
Criminal Court has entered into force. No doubt, while these technological
problems, while today's life of globalization is creating new problems, the
international community is also showing his resolve in order to deal more
appropriately at the global level with such problems, as for example the
example of the establishment of the International Criminal Court, the fact
that its Statute has been ratified and soon should become operational. In our
particular field also tremendous progress can be registered. We were six
years ago in Lecce discussing about corruption and nobody could think that
in very few years the international community would be ready to start
negotiating a comprehensive convention against corruption, but we started
and the first ad hoc Committee which was established by the General
Assembly started to work just last January for the negotiation of a new
convention against corruption. A very comprehensive convention touching
both public and private corruption, up to the conflict of interests and with
so many countries presenting concrete proposals and texts and all this is a
good sign that the international community is not only ready to start
seriously this work but most likely to succeed in completing this work in
the two-year time that was given to the Europe Committee in order to
complete the task. Why two years? Because in two years will be also
successfully completed another very important convention with three
additional protocols. I am speaking of the Convention on Transnational
3
Organised Crime, just negotiated in 1999 and 2000, culminated in the
Palermo Conference in December 2000, in which a record number of
signatures took place: 121 countries signed the Convention during last year
since December 2000, the number of signature has increased to 141 and at
the moment 13 countries have ratified the Convention. So we do hope that
within the next year, or maximum two, we will have the 40 countries
required for the Convention to enter into force as well as the Protocol, so
that the Conference of State parties can start its work in looking forward
and in looking at the implementation of the Convention.
These are just some examples in which the international community,
through its intergovernmental machinery has given follow-up to several of
the recommendations which have emerged from your meeting, from your
conference, from your very important contributions.
And I would like now, as I started in giving you the greetings of Kofi
Annan, to conclude my short address by also quoting his words during his
Nobel lecture when he received the Nobel Prize and I quote, he said:
«Today's real borders are not between nations but between powerful and
powerless, free and fettered, privileged and humiliated. Today no walls can
separate humanitarian or human rights cases on one part and the world
from national security crisis in the other. New threats make no distinction
between races, nations or regions, a new security has entered every mind,
regardless of wealth and status. A deeper awareness of the bond that bind
all of us in pain as in prosperity has gripped young and old».
The coming generations, those for the benefit of whom the
International Society of Social Defence is dedicating this 14th International
Congress, have the right to expect a better future, a future with a new, more
profound and viable framework for development, where crime prevention
and control measures can play their role as a tool of a strengthened, more
modern and more human application of the rule of law.
Thank you very much.
9
P RESENTATION
Le XIVème Congrès international aurait dû avoir lieu à Ponta
Delgada, aux Açores, vers la fin du mois de novembre 2001.
Les tragiques événements qui ont frappé les Etats-Unis le 11
septembre avaient toutefois imposé un renvoi. Grâce toujours aux soins du
Groupe national portugais et tout spécialement à l'inlassable activité de
Jorge De Figueiredo Dias, ledit Congrès a pu être reconvoqué à Lisbonne,
où il s'est déroulé du 17 au 19 mai 2002.
Les Cahiers de défense sociale avaient déjà annoncé dans le numéro
de l'année 2001 (p.159 et suiv.) le thème du Congrès et reproduit son
Commentaire.
Par ce numéro, qui est consacré aux Actes du Congrès, et pour lequel
ils expriment leur remerciement pour avoir pu bénéficier d'une partie des
ressources financières assurées par le Ministère de la Justice du Portugal,
les Cahiers se réjouissent de viser un horizon plus ambitieux, celui
notamment des mémoires durables.
Ce qui se produit c'est donc un élargissement d'horizons et, en
quelque sorte, une transfiguration des Cahiers: les deux conviennent
parfaitement non seulement à la dimension du thème du XIVème Congrès,
penché vers l'avenir et vers des prévisions du futur, mais également à la
personne et à la mémoire de Adolfo Beria di Argentine, auquel le Congrès
de Lisbonne a été, et les Actes sont, tout naturellement dédiés.
Il en avait été de même pour les Cahiers de l'année 2000 pour lui
dire, d'après ses propres paroles: «encore parmi nous et avec nous». (Mario
Pisani)
10
PRESENTATION
The XIVth International Congress of the Society was originally
scheduled to take place towards the end of November 2001, at Ponta
Delgada in the Azores.
The tragic events of 11th September in the United States, however,
compelled it to be postponed, so that - with the Portuguese Group, and
most notably Jorge De Figueiredo Dias still acting as hosts − it was finally
held in Lisbon on 17th -19th May 2002.
The Cahiers − which in its 2001 edition had given an advance review
of the matters to be addressed at the Congress (page 159 and foll.) − are
now very happy and greatly indebted once more to the financial support
from the Ministry of Justice of Portugal − to highlight the enduring
memories to which the Congress gave rise, through the publication of its
Proceedings.
In fact this represents a broadening of the horizons, indeed a sort of
transfiguration, for Cahiers, which in each case, apart from the great
significance of the theme of the XIVth Congress, looking to the future and
its possibilities, stand as memorial to the memory of Adolfo Beria di
Argentine, to whom the Lisbon meeting and all the work transacted there
serve in a way as an act of dedication. The same is true of the 2000 issue
of Cahiers, saying to him, and using words of his own, that he is «encore
parmi nous et avec nous». (Mario Pisani)
11
P RESENTACIÓN
En su día, se había planeado celebrar el XIVº Congreso Internacional
de la Sociedad a finales de noviembre de 2001 en Ponta Delgada (Islas
Azores).
Sin embargo, los trágicos sucesos del 11 de septiembre en Estados
Unidos obligaron a aplazarlo, de modo que, siempre al cuidado del Grupo
Nacional Portugués y de Jorge De Figueiredo Dias en particular, el
Congreso se trasladó a Lisboa, donde se celebró del 17 al 19 de mayo de
2002.
Los Cahiers, que en el número de 2001 (págs. 159 y sigs.) habían
adelantado comentarios sobre los temas del Congreso, tienen ahora el
placer de apuntar a las más lejanas metas de la memoria duraderas,
imprimiendo las actas gracias a una parte de los recursos financieros
asignados por el Ministerio de Justicia de Portugal, por los que desean dejar
patente su agradecimiento una vez más.
De esta forma se ensanchan horizontes y, en cierto modo, se
transfiguran los Cahiers, lo que, tanto en un caso como en el otro,
corresponde perfectamente a lo grandioso del tema del XIVº Congreso,
abierto hacia los confines del futuro y de lo futurible, a la figura y al
recuerdo de Adolfo Beria di Argentine, a quien, en cierto modo, tanto los
encuentros de Lisboa como las actas correspondientes están dedicados,
igual que lo había estado el número de Cahiers de 2000, para decirle,
precisamente con sus propias palabras, «encore parmi nous et avec nous».
(Mario Pisani)
15
PRÉSIDENCE DU CONGRÈS
CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE CONGRESS
Simone ROZÈS, Président de la Société internationale de défense sociale pour
une politique criminelle humaniste -SIDS
Jorge DE FIGUEIREDO DIAS, Vice-président de la Société internationale
de défense sociale pour une politique criminelle humaniste- SIDS
Edmondo BRUTI LIBERATI, Secrétaire général de la Société internationale
de défense sociale pour une politique criminelle humaniste- SIDS
Guido BRIGNONE, Vice-président du Centro nazionale di prevenzione e
difesa sociale
Les participants au Congrès
19
Luis ARROYO ZAPATERO, Recteur de l'Université de Castilla -La
Mancha, Espagne; Secrétaire général régional de la SIDS pour l’Europe –
Session Chair
Mário Silveiro de BARROS, Advogado en Lisboa, Portugal
Rita Brasil de BRITO, Directora-adjunta do Gabinete de Política
Legislativa e Planeamento do Ministério da Justiça, Lisboa, Portugal
Bernardo BEIDERMAN, Former Penal Law Professor, University of
Buenos Aires, Argentina; ISSD Regional Secretary-General for Latin
America – Session Chair
Camilla BERIA di ARGENTINE, Directeur général du Centro nazionale di
prevenzione e difesa sociale, Milan, Italie
Pierre-Henri BOLLE, Professeur titulaire de la Chaire de droit et de
procédure pénale de l'Université de Neuchâtel, Suisse; Vice-président de la
SIDS – Session Chair
Myriam BLUMBERG-MOKRI, Docteur en droit, Avocat à la Cour
d'Appel de Paris, France; Cabinet Herbert Smith – Speaker
Guido BRIGNONE, Vice-président du Centro nazionale di prevenzione e
difesa sociale, Milan, Italie
Edmondo BRUTI LIBERATI, Substitut du Procureur général près la Cour
d'Appel de Milan, Italie; Secrétaire général de la SIDS
Mota CAMPOS, Secrétaire d'Etat adjoint à la Ministre de la Justice du
Portugal
Adolfo CERETTI, Professeur associé de criminologie à l’Université de
Milano-Bicocca, Italie; Secrétaire général adjoint de la SIDS – Speaker
Mariano Alberto CIAFARDINI, Under-Secretary of Criminal Policy and
Penitentiary Affairs, Buenos Aires, Argentina – Speaker
Paulo José DA COSTA, Professeur titulaire de la Chaire de droit pénal à la
Faculté de droit de l'Université de São Paulo, Brésil; Secrétaire général
régional de la SIDS pour l’Amérique Latine
Manuel DA COSTA ANDRADE, Professeur à la Faculté de droit de
l'Université de Coimbra – Speaker
Francesco D'ALESSANDRO, Université Catholique du Sacré Coeur,
Milan, Italie
Jorge DE FIGUEIREDO DIAS, Président du Conseil scientifique de la
Faculté de droit de l'Université de Coimbra, Portugal; Vice-président de la
SIDS – Speaker
António DELICADO, Consultor jurídico, Gabinete de Política Legislativa
e Planeamento do Ministério da Justiça, Lisboa, Portugal
Pedro Simões DIAS, Advogado en Lisboa, Portugal
Hermann FEINER, Chairman, European Police Union – EPU, Vienna,
Austria
20
Fernando FRAGOSO, Professeur de droit pénal; Avocat criminel, Rio de
Janeiro, Brésil
Malgorzata FUSZARA, Dr. Hab., Institute of Applied Social Sciences and
Resocialisation, Warsaw University, Poland
Gustavo GHIDINI, Professeur titulaire de la Chaire de droit industriel et
directeur de l'Observatoire sur la propriété intellectuelle, la concurrence et
les télécommunications de l'Université Luiss de Rome, Italie – Speaker
Giovanni Battista GRAMATICA, Lawyer in Genova; ISSD Board Member
Lodewik H.C. HULSMAN, Professor Emeritus of Penal Law, Nederlande
Economische Hogeschool, Rotterdam, The Netherland; ISSD Board
Member
Ida HYDLE, Associate Professor, Agder University College, Arendal,
Norway
Giulio ILLUMINATI, Professor of Criminal Procedure, University of
Bologna, Italy
Gaetano INSOLERA, Professor of Penal Law, University of Macerata,
Italy
Lazaros KOEMTZOPOULOS, Conseiller de la Cour d'Appel de
Thessalonique, Grèce
Jacek KURCZEWSKI, Professor, Dr. Hab., Faculty of Applied Social
Sciences and Resocialisation, Warsaw University, Poland
William S. LAUFER, Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Sociology;
Director, The Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics
Research, The Wharton School; Associate Director, Jerry Lee Center of
Criminology, University of Pennsylvania, USA – Speaker
Paula Meira LOURENÇO, Advogada en Lisboa, Portugal
Paulo Saragoça da MATTA, Consultor jurídico, Gabinete de Política
Legislativa e Planeamento do Ministério da Justiça, Lisboa, Portugal
Luciana MARSELLI MILNER, Trésorier de la SIDS
Rui MOREIRA, Procurador adjunto do Ministerio Publico, Lisboa,
Portugal
Tadashi MORISHITA, Professeur émérite de l’Université de Hiroshima,
Japan; Secrétaire général régional de la SIDS pour l’Asie
Rui Manuel MOURA RAMOS, Juge du Tribunal de 1ère instance des
Communautés européennes – Speaker
Martin NETTESHEIM, Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Tübingen,
Germany – Speaker
Osamu NIIKURA, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University; Representative
of the Science Council of Japan
Alberto NOSENZO, Judge at the Milan Court, Italy – Co-Speaker
21
Fausto POCAR, Professeur titulaire de la Chaire de droit international de
l'Université de Milan, Italie; Juge du Tribunal pénal international pour l'ExYougoslavie – Speaker
Livia POMODORO, Secrétaire général du Centro nazionale di prevenzione
e difesa sociale, Milan, Italie; Secretary and Standing Coordinator of the
Functional and Resource Committees, ISPAC; Président du Tribunal pour
Enfants de Milan – Session Chair
Domenico PULITANÒ, Professeur titulaire de la Chaire de droit pénal,
Université de Milano-Bicocca, Italie
Serena QUATTROCOLO, Université de Turin, Italy
Miguel ROMÃO, Consultor jurídico, Gabinete de Política Legislativa e
Planeamento do Ministério da Justiça, Lisboa, Portugal
Simone ROZES, Premier président honoraire de la Cour de Cassation de
France; ancien Avocat général de la Cour des Communautés Europénnes;
Président de la SIDS
Leon SHELEFF, Professor, Tel Aviv University, Faculty of Law, Israel
Giuseppe SPAGNOLO, Professor and Holder of the Chair of Penal Law,
Department for the Study of Penal Law, University of Bari, Italy
Arpad Laszlo SZOCS, Department of Criminology, «Eötvos Lörand»
University, Budapest, Hungary
João TIAGO SILVEIRA, Director do Gabinete de Política Legislativa e
Aglaia TSITSOURA, Former Head Division of Crime Problems, Council
of Europe; Lecturer at Panteion University, Athens, Greece; ISSD Board
Member
Antonio VERCHER, Supreme Court Public Prosecutor, Madrid, Spain –
Speaker
Eduardo VETERE, Director, Centre for International Crime Prevention,
United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention
Joaquim VOGEL, Professor and Holder of the Chair of Criminal Law and
Criminal Procedure II, University of Tübingen, Germany; Judge at the
High Court of Appeal Criminal Chambers, Stuttgart – Speaker
Constantin VOUYOUCAS, Professeur émérite de droit pénal de
l'Université Aristote de Thessalonique, Grèce; Vice-président de la SIDS et
Président de sa Section hellénique
Nobuhito YOSHINAKA, Associate Professor, Hiroshima University, Japan
Vassilios ZISSIADIS, Professeur de procédure pénale, Université Aristote
de Thessalonique, Grèce; Secrétaire général de la Section hellénique de la
SIDS
COMMENTAIRE DU THEME DU CONGRES
Le Congrès examinera le rôle du droit pénal dans la protection
des générations futures contre certains risques nouveaux (risques de
santé, nuisances, atteintes au milieu naturel, risques de nature économique, etc...)
Plusieurs problèmes se posent: d’une part le problème de la
légitimité (et, à quel degré) des délits-obstacles (abstrakte Gefährdungsdelikte), dont la réponse se situe entre prévention et répression, d’autre part le problème de la détermination des intérêts et des
biens à protéger (la reconnaissance de biens sociaux distincts de
l'individu renforce-t-elle la protection des personnes?), enfin, le droit
pénal doit-il se limiter au cas individuel ou peut-on envisager une
orientation de type «macro», dans le sens que son intervention apparaît plus limitée que celle du droit administratif qui établit des
contrôles et des interdictions de portée générale à l'égard de tous les
citoyens (alors que le droit pénal ne vise que les délinquants).
Une attention particulière sera portée sur les défis de la mise
en jeu de la responsabilité pénale: nouvelles alternatives et limites,
nouvelles formes et nouveaux objectifs. Cette conception élargie de
la responsabilité pénale classique répond au phénomène souvent décrit par la sociologie moderne de la collectivisation de la vie sociale
contemporaine. Pris dans son sens vertical et partant de la division
du travail, (et de ses tâches), on constate qu’il n’existe plus de responsable pénal dans l’entreprise dès lors que le travailleur ne remplit pas les conditions légales prévues pour qualifier l’auteur de
l’infraction (producteur ou exportateur, etc...) et que les patrons ou
dirigeants ne sont pas les auteurs matériels des faits reprochés par la
loi. D’où l'idée de ne pas renvoyer seulement les personnes physiques devant les juridictions, mais aussi les entreprises (personne morale). Pris dans son sens horizontal, la globalisation des relations internationales a conduit à considérer que l'infraction n'est pas réalisée dans un seul pays, mais résulte de divers faits commis dans plusieurs états. D’où l'idée classique de coopération et d’entraide judiciaire (qui néanmoins présuppose la réalisation «complète» dans un
pays déterminé) et la «création» d’une «entité économique» capable,
24
Commentaire du theme du Congrès
au plan juridique, de comprendre la dispersion des activités entre
plusieurs pays, le choix étant adopté en fonction de diverses considérations: concurrence, fiscalité, etc...
Cette conception des activités économiques ci-dessus décrite
pourrait aussi s’appliquer à d’autres domaines tels ceux de l’atteinte
à l’environnement, de la biogénétique, et de la responsabilité liée
aux produits dangereux ou défectueux, domaine dans lequel la relation entre responsabilité pénale et responsabilité civile pose de délicates questions puisque le plus souvent on est en présence de fautes
de négligence qui relèvent de la loi civile.
En ce qui concerne la protection des générations futures susceptibles de supporter les risques et les menaces de génocides, de
guerres et de toutes sortes de discriminations, le Congrès propose
d’analyser les mécanismes propres à apporter des remèdes, notamment au travers des instruments offerts par les Cours Pénales Internationales et les Commissions de Réconciliation. Ces perspectives
nouvelles, ouvertes aux droits fondamentaux par la Charte Européenne lancée récemment à Nice, feront l’objet de discussions approfondies.
25
OVERVIEW OF THE THEME OF THE CONGRESS
The Congress will focus on the role of Criminal Law in its specific
reference to the protection of coming generations against a number of new
risks – risks of health, of the environment, of the economy, etc.
Several problems arise: on the one hand, the problem of the legitimacy
(and to what degree) of crime-obstacles (abstrakte Gefährdungsdelikte ),
which occur between prevention and repression; on the other hand, the
problem of the determination of the interests and juridical assets to be
protected (does the recognition of supra-individual, social assets enhance the
protection of the individual?); finally, should criminal law focus exclusively
on the intervention in the individual case, or might it have recourse to a
«macro» orientation, in this sense that its intervention could be more limited
than that of administrative law, which establishes strict controls and
prohibitions of general application applicable to all citizens (whereas
criminal law only deals with offenders).
Particular focus will be given to the new challenges facing criminal
liability: new alternatives and limits, new forms and new goals. Such
dilution, or broadening of the scope of classic criminal liability, is in
response to the phenomenon, often described by modern sociology, of the
collectivisation of social life today. Taken in the vertical sense, and starting
from the division of labour (and of its tasks), there is no longer a 'central'
figure to charge with liability within the company, since the company
worker does not meet the legal requirements to qualify as the author of a
crime (producer, exporter, etc.) and company directors or executives
themselves are not the material authors of the facts contested in law. Hence
the idea of not (only) referring natural persons, but (also) corporate entities
to a criminal court. Taken in the horizontal sense, globalisation of
international relations has meant that a criminal offence is no longer
perpetrated in just one country, but rather is made up of diverse facts
carried out by different entities in several countries. Hence the classic idea
of mutual judicial co-operation (which nevertheless presupposes that a
crime has been 'completely' committed in one given country) and the
modern 'construction' of an 'economic entity' to encompass, on the juridical
plane, the dispersion of activities over several countries, a choice adopted
for reasons of competition, taxation etc.
Such dilution of criminal liability described above to envisage
economic activities would also apply to issues such as destruction of the
environment, problems posed by biogenetics and liability for hazardous or
defective products, an area where the relation between criminal and civil
26
Overview of the Theme of the Congress
liability is a delicate question since, being often a case of negligence, it falls
within the scope of civil law.
With regard to protecting future generations that will bear the risks
and threat of genocide, war and all kinds of discrimination, the Congress
proposes to analyse possible remedial mechanisms, namely through the
instruments provided by the International Criminal Courts and
Reconciliation Commissions. The new perspectives opened up to
fundamental human rights by the European Charter recently launched in
Nice will also be a focus of discussion.
PROGRAMME DU CONGRES
PROGRAMME OF THE CONGRESS
•
Friday, 17 May 2002
Opening Session /Séance inaugurale
Addresses by/Allocutions:
Simone ROZÈS, ISSD President
Eduardo VETERE, Director, Centre for International Crime Prevention,
Mota CAMPOS, Secrétaire d'Etat adjoint à la Ministre de la Justice du
Portugal
General Introductory Report/Rapport général introductif:
Jorge DE FIGUEIREDO DIAS, Vice-président de la SIDS; Président du
Conseil scientifique de la Faculté de droit de l'Université de Coimbra,
Portugal
I. PROBLEMS POSED BY DEVELOPMENT AND THE EVOLVING SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH (DIFFERENT KINDS OF HARMS, GENETIC ENGINEERING AND
SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPM ENT)/LES
PROBLEMES
POSES
PAR
LE
DEVELOPPEMENT ET PAR L'EVOLUTION DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE
(NUISANCES DIVERSES, TECHNOLOGIE GENETIQUE ET DEVELOPPEMENT
DURABLE)
Chair/Président:
Luis ARROYO ZAPATERO, Secrétaire général régional de la SIDS (pour
l'Europe); Recteur de l'Université de Castilla-La Mancha, Espagne
Speakers/Rapporteurs:
Myriam BLUMBERG-MOKRI, Docteur en droit, Avocat à la Cour
d'Appel, Paris, France
Manuel DA COSTA ANDRADE, Professeur à la Faculté de droit de
l'Université de Coimbra, Portugal
Gustavo GHIDINI, Professeur titulaire de la Chaire de droit industriel et
directeur de l'Observatoire sur la propriété intellectuelle, la concurrence et
les télécommunications de l'Université LUISS de Rome, Italie
Antonio VERCHER, Supreme Court Public Prosecutor, Madrid, Spain
28
•
Programme of the Congress
Saturday 18 May 2002
II.
THE CHALLENGES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY: NEW ALTERNATIVES AND
LIMITS, NEW FORMS AND NEW GOALS/LES DEFIS DE LA RESPONSABILITE
PENALE: NOUVELLES ALTERNATIVES ET LIMITES, NOUVELLES FORMES ET
NOUVEAUX OBJECTIFS
Chair/Président:
Pierre-Henri BOLLE, Vice-président de la SIDS; titulaire de la Chaire de
droit et de procédure pénale de l'Université de Neuchâtel, Suisse
Mariano CIAFARDINI, Secretary of Criminal Policy and Penitentiary
Affairs, Ministry of Justice, Buenos Aires, Argentina
William S. LAUFER, Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Sociology;
Director, The Carol and Lawrence Zicklin Center for Business Ethics
Research, The Wharton School; Associate Director, Jerry Lee Center of
Criminology, University of Pennsylvania, USA
Joaquim VOGEL, Professor and Holder of the Chair of Criminal Law and
Criminal Procedure II, University of Tübingen; Judge at the High Court of
Appeal Criminal Chambers, Stuttgart, Germany
III.
THE CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION /LA
CHARTE DES DROITS FONDAMENTAUX DE L'UNION EUROPEENNE
Chair/Président:
Livia POMODORO, Secrétaire général du Centro nazionale di prevenzione
e difesa sociale; Président du Tribunal pour Enfants de Milan, Italie
Rui Manuel MOURA RAMOS, Professeur à la Faculté de droit de
l'Université de Coimbra, Portugal; Juge du Tribunal de 1ère instance des
Communautés européennes
Martin NETTESHEIM, Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of
Tübingen, Germany
General Assembly of ISSD Members/Assemblée plénière des Membres de
la SIDS
Official Dinner given by the Ministry of Justice of Portugal/Dîner officiel
offert par le Ministère de la Justice du Portugal
Programme of the Congress
•
29
Sunday 19 May 2002
IV. INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS:
SUITABLE RESPONSES TO THREATS OF WARS, GENOCIDES OR
DISCRIMINATIONS
FACING
COMING
GENERATIONS/COURS
PENALES
INTERNATIONALES ET COMMISSIONS DE RECONCILIATION: REPONSES
ADAPTEES AUX MENACES DE GUERRES, GENOCIDES OU DISCRIMINATIONS
PESANT SUR LES GENERATIONS FUTURES
Chair/Président:
Bernardo BEIDERMAN, Secrétaire général régional de la SIDS (pour
l'Amérique Latine); Former Penal Law Professor, University of Buenos
Aires, Argentina
Adolfo CERETTI, Professor of Criminology, Faculty of Law, MilanoBicocca University, Italy; ISSD Assistant-Secretary-General and
Alberto NOSENZO, Judge, Milan Court, Italy
Fausto POCAR, Professeur titulaire de la Chaire de droit international à
l'Université de Milan, Italie; Juge du Tribunal pénal international pour
l'Ex-Yougoslavie
Closing Session/Session de clôture
SIMONE ROZES
président de la SIDS
Monsieur le Secrétaire d'État à la Justice,
Monsieur le Directeur du Centre de Prévention des Crimes des
Nations Unies,
Mesdames et Messieurs,
Mes chers amis, notre tradition nous rassemble aujourd'hui pour notre quatorzième Congrès quinquennal.
Les tragiques événements du 11 Septembre nous ont contraint à
quelques aménagements de temps et de lieux, mais je tiens à rendre hommage au Gouvernement portugais dont la compréhension et la générosité
nous permettent de nous retrouver ici, à Lisbonne, dans ce cadre prestigieux, et de respecter ainsi la coutume observée par les Nations Unies et
par chacune des quatre grandes associations qui oeuvrent dans le domaine
de la criminologie et qui, vous le savez, se réunissent chaque année à tour
de rôle tous les cinq ans.
C'est en effet à Lecce, en Italie, voici un peu plus de cinq ans, que
s'est tenu notre XIIIème Congrès. C'est le dernier auquel a participé, après
l'avoir organisé avec son efficacité habituelle, notre si regretté Secrétaire
général Adolfo Beria di Argentine. Permettez-moi de saluer ici sa mémoire
et je suis certaine que tous ses amis ici présents conservent avec émotion et
gratitude son souvenir. Nous avons promis de ne pas l'oublier et ce soir
nous lui dédions ce Congrès.
C'est une raison supplémentaire pour adresser de profonds et sincères
remerciements aux autorités portugaises, notamment au Ministère de la Justice, à Mme le Ministre de la Justice, qui, dans une période agitée et difficile de constitution d'un gouvernement, ont maintenu leur invitation et leur
soutien.
J'ai le plaisir aussi de féliciter le Professeur Jorge De Figueiredo
Dias, qui est le Président du Conseil scientifique de la Faculté de Droit de
Coimbra et l'un des nos vice-présidents. Il lu i revient un immense mérite
dans l'organisation de cette journée: il en a été la cheville ouvrière et il a en
même temps accepté d'en être le Rapporteur général. Mais je voudrais aussi
remercier tous ceux qui ont préparé ce Congrès et en particulier Monsieur
Romao, dont le dévouement nous permet d'être ici ce soir.
J'éspère que la qualité de nos travaux viendra récompenser les uns et
les autres de leurs efforts, ces efforts que nous apprécions à leur valeur.
34
Séance inaugurale – Opening Session
En choisissant pour thème «Défense sociale et droit pénal pour la
protection des générations futures», notre mouvement affirme son souci
constant d'accompagner le monde actuel et de faire preuve de vigilance à
un moment où s'affrontent des forces souvent contradictoires, susceptibles
de mettre en péril, si on n'y prend pas garde, les valeurs qui ont toujours été
difficilement acquises. A chaque instant, la presse, la radio, la télévision,
nous présentent de nouvelles découvertes, de nouvelles catastrophes, de
nouveaux drames d'origine technologique, dont les conséquences, amplifiées par les techniques de communication, concernent tous les individus
dans leurs biens, comme dans leur vie et dans leur santé.
Les progrès de la science, qui sont et demeurent incontestables, se
révèlent néanmoins porteurs d'angoisse profonde et de périls pour l'homme
qui découvre ainsi son propre pouvoir sur la nature elle -même et sur ses
tentations: le génie génétique nous donne – n'est-t-il pas vrai – un certain
vertige. Par leurs dimensions, par leurs interactions, les activités humaines
créent des risques dont l'ampleur n'est pas forcément prévisible et peuvent
être porteuses de lourdes conséquences. Dans ce contexte, les mentalités du
public évoluent vers une recherche de normes nationales et internationales
destinées à sa protection, exigeant ainsi la mise en oeuvre de contrôles sérieux. On assiste alors à l'émergence de nouveaux principes, tel le principe
de précaution, par exemple, qui n'est pas limité à l'environnement – contrairement à une idée assez souvent reçue – et face aux incertitudes des scientifiques, il est vrai que des mesures conservatoires doivent intervenir, il est
vrai aussi qu'elles doivent être d’un coût acceptable.
Toutes ces données traduisent bien de difficultés. Dans l'adaptation
de la société à ces changements qui sont inéluctables, nous le savons, je
crois que le juriste a un rôle majeur à jouer. Le symbole de la balance qui
est si cher à son coeur, y tient toute sa place, car il faut en effet équilibrer
les bienfaits du progrès et les risques encourus pour permettre aux générations futures de s'épanouir dans le monde nouveau. Ils paraissent bien simples à enoncer ces propos, mais ils recèlent des dangers considérables pour
la liberté et la défense des valeurs essentielles qui fondent notre Mouvement de défense sociale. C'est donc, tout naturellement, en fonction de ces
considérations que le thème de ce Congrès a été retenu: il s'inscrit dans une
parfaite cohérence avec les précédents, qui ont tous été dévolus, sous une
forme ou sous une autre, à la recherche d'une politique criminelle capable
de lutter contre la délinquance au sein d'une société en constante mutation
depuis le dernier conflit mondial.
Aujourd'hui comme hier, il est nécessaire de tenir compte des évolutions existantes pour rechercher, parfois avec audace, toujours avec ténacité, les moyens propres à parvenir à l'équilibre auquel je faisais allusion tout
35
à l'heure et, pour atteindre ce but, il faut ne pas craindre d'innover dès lors
que les notions classiques se révèlent inadéquates. Le domaine de la responsabilité pénale en offre un bon exemple. Le glissement du fondement
sur la faute subjective vers le risque est l'un des aspects les plus signific atifs, avec pour corollaire la responsabilité des personnes morales, naguère
inimaginable en raison précisément de la notion de faute, élément indispensable à la poursuite. De même, en dépit de tous les freins et de tous les obstacles, dont elle est jalonnée, la voie qui mène à l'intervention des Cours
pénales internationales, chaque jour davantage, encore que bien difficile à
mettre en œuvre.
On peut encore signaler que la Charte des droits fondamentaux dans
l'Union européenne illustre bien les exigences nouvelles de l'opinion publique en ce domaine. Le Mouvement de Défense Sociale, qui a tant inspiré de
législations depuis cinquante ans, est en parfaite harmonie avec ces orientations.
Les rapports qui vont être présentés et les débats qui vont suivre, j'en
suis certaine, vont être riches et passionnants. L'inquiétude éprouvée face à
l'héritage à transmettre aux générations futures est l’enjeu stimulant qui doit
nous guider et il est bien vrai que nous désirons parvenir à surmonter les
dangers réels de l'époque contemporaine et de ses bouleversements pour
que les jeunes générations éprouvent le bonheur de vivre dans la paix en
êtres humains résponsables.
Je vous remercie.
Je donne maintenant la parole à Monsieur le Directeur du Centre international pour la Prévention du Crime des Nations Unies, Monsieur
Eduardo Vetere.
EDUARDO VETERE
Director
Centre for International Crime Prevention
UNODCCP
Merci beaucoup, Madame Rozès. Chers amis, chers collègues,
First of all, I have the honour and the pleasure to convey to all
participants in the 14th Congress the best regards and the warmest gratitude
of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, for your
important contributions to our work, together with his best wishes for a
most successful Congress.
Secondly, and before touching on the issues at hand, allow me to join
you, Madame Chair Person and President of the Society, in stressing the
importance of continuing our work having in mind the heritage of the great
founders of our movement: Filippo Grammatica and Mark Ancel, who have
transmitted to us one of their most precious gifts: their humanism !
Thirdly, let me recall here – as you did, Simone – another of our
great friends and unforgettable personalities, Adolfo Beria di Argentine, the
former Secretary-General of the Society. To the United Nations' Crime
Prevention and Criminal Justice Programme he has been one of its
strongest supporters, and to me for so many years he has been a
tremendous, invaluable source of inspiration: not only because he was a
«fantastic magician» – to use your words, Simone – but also because he
was one of the greatest catalysts for the Social Defence Movement and for
criminal justice reform. There is no time here to highlight his role in the
multiplicity of the activ ities in which he has been involved: from being the
most gracious host of the Seventh United Nations Congress on the
Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held in Milan in 1985,
to organising so many of the preparatory meetings related to the topics of
our quinquennial United Nations Congresses, together with the other «Big
Four«, to being the Founder and First President of ISPAC. No doubt such
contributions are a demonstration of his commitment to the goals and the
objectives enshrined in the United Nations Charter: peace and security,
justice, development and respect for human rights. It is particularly in
connection with these questions that the International Society of Social
Defence has made important inroads to the work of the United Nations,
with a profound impact on our agendas for a number of decades, thanks to
38
the contributions of thinkers, reformers and scientists, among whom
Adolfo Beria di Argentine has been one of the most egregious
representatives!.
Now, going to the substantive issue of this Congress, let me stress
the importance of sustainable development and the role of criminal law.
When we speak of sustainable development we all recall the Bruntland
Report, according to which development should meet «the needs of the
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs». A process of change in which the exploitation of resources,
the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development
and institutional change are all in harmony, having both current and future
potential to meet human needs and aspirations. The central rationale for
sustainable development has been to increase people standards of living,
especially the well-being of the least advantaged people in societies, thus
avoiding indiscriminate future costs. While tremendous progress has been
made during the last decades, as various United Nations Conferences have
noted, still much remains to be done, and the role of criminal law can be
crucial – as is the case, for example, of environmental protection.
The other topics that you are going to consider today, as the main
issues covered by the previous Congresses of the International Society of
Social Defence – I just remember «marginalization» in Caracas and
«urbanisation» in Thessaloniki – are evidence of your global vision in
connection with some of these crucial issues. And of course, when we
speak of development, and we look at the current technological progress,
we have to acknowledge that technology has marked our times, having a
remarkable impact on our life patterns, and thus helping to build prosperity,
by making it easier and more comfortable for the people of this world to
manage their time, their business, their travel and their work.
However, it is also true that technology has given rise to new risks to
the health and the security of individuals, creating also new challenges to
domestic, transborder and transnational crime control. In short, there are
new risks which derive from the current advances in technologies, risks
which have to be studied, evaluated and interpreted, in order to look at their
legal, economic, psychological and social implications.
This applies also to the other issues you are going to discuss: When,
for example, we look at the last topic related to the International Criminal
Court, we should recall that many members of the Society have been
closely associated with this issue. This is particularly rewarding,
considering that just a few weeks ago the Statute of the International
Criminal Court has entered into force. No doubt, while technological
changes may create new risks, and while today's life of globalization is
39
creating new problems, the international community is also showing its
resolve in order to deal more appropriately at the global level with such
problems, as the establishment of the International Criminal Court clearly
shows. The fact that its Statute has been ratified by more than 60 countries,
and that soon the Court will become operational, is further evidence of both
the resolve and the commitment of the international community. This does
not constitute an isolated example as in the field of crime prevention and
criminal justice other tremendous progresses have been made.
We were six years ago in Lecce discussing about corruption and
nobody could think that, in very few years, the international community
would be ready to start negotiating a comprehensive Convention against
corruption. However, this is today's reality! Work has already started in
Vienna last January by an Ad Hoc Committee which was established by the
General Assembly, to negotiate a new Convention against corruption. A
very comprehensive instrument touching both public and private
corruption, including conflict of interest is under consideration, with many
countries presenting concrete proposals and texts. All this is a good sign
that the international community is not only ready to start seriously this
work, but most likely to succeed in completing its task in the two-year time
that was given to it by the General Assembly. Why two years? Because in
two years we were also able to successfully complete the negotiation
process of another very important convention, with three additional
protocols.
I am speaking of the Convention against Transnational Organised
Crime, which was negotiated in 1999 and 2000, culminating in the HighLevel Ministerial Conference in Palermo in December 2000, during which
a record number of 121 countries signed this new instrument. During the
last year, since December 2000, the number of signatures has increased to
141 and, at the moment, 13 countries have also ratified the Convention.
Accordingly, we do hope that, within the next year, we will have the 40
ratifications required for the Convention to enter into force, so that the
Conference of Parties can start its work of reviewing and monitoring its
implementation.
These are just the most emblematic examples of how the
international community, through its intergovernmental machinery, has
given follow-up to several of the recommendations which have emerged
from your meetings, from your congresses, from your very important
contributions.
And I would like now, as I started in conveying to you the greetings
of Kofi Annan, to conclude my short address by quoting some of his words
from his Nobel lecture, when he received the Nobel Prize. He said:
40
«Today's real borders are not between nations but between powerful and
powerless, free and fettered, privileged and humiliated. Today no walls can
separate humanitarian or human rights cases in one part of the world from
national security crisis in the other. New threats make no distinction
between races, nations or regions …. a new sense of insecurity has entered
every mind, regardless of wealth and status. A deeper awareness of the
bond that binds all of us, in pain as in prosperity, has grippled young and
old».
The coming generations, those for the benefit of whom the
International Society of Social Defence is celebrating this 14th International
Congress, have the right to expect a better future, a future with a new, more
profound and more viable framework for development, where crime
prevention measures can play their role as a tool of a strengthened, more
modern and more human application of the rule of law.
Thank you very much for your attention.
MOTA CAMPOS
Secrétaire d'Etat adjoint à la Ministre de la Justice du Portugal
Madame Simone Rozès, Presidente da Sociedade Internacional de
Defesa Social para uma Política Criminal Humanista, permita-me desde já
dirigir-lhe uma calorosa saudação e exprimir o prazer e a honra que o
Governo português tem em acolher o XIV Congresso da vossa organização.
Senhor Vice-Presidente, Senhor Secretário-Geral da Sociedade
Internacional de Defesa Social, Senhor Director do Centro de Prevenção
Criminal das Nações Unidas, Senhoras e Senhores Procuradores, Ilustres
Magistrados, Professores e Advogados,
Minhas Senhoras e meus Senhores, é uma honra estar presente nesta
sessão de abertura do XIV Congresso de Defesa Social, uma iniciativa da
Sociedade Internacional de Defesa Social para uma Política Criminal
Humanista em cooperação com o Centro de Prevenção Criminal das
Nações Unidas, organizado sob os auspícios do Ministério da Justiça de
Portugal.
Congratulo-me pelo facto de a SIDS ter tomado a iniciativa de
organizar este importante Congresso em Portugal e ainda pela pertinência e
actualidade dos temas escolhidos para debate durante os próximos dois dias
e meio, nomeadamente os que incidirão sobre os mecanismos destinados à
protecção das gerações futuras quanto às ameaças de genocídio, guerras e
diferentes formas de discriminação. A recente Carta Europeia dos Direitos
Fundamentais e os diferentes Tribunais Penais Internacionais e Comissões
de Reconciliação fazem advir avanços significativos nesta área. Com efeito,
os chamados Tribunais Penais Internacionais ad hoc colocaram
definitivamente na agenda internacional a questão da justiça penal
internacional e da necessidade de ser posto fim à impunidade dos
responsáveis por violações graves do Direito Internacional Humanitário e
dos Direitos Humanos. Contudo, estes tribunais têm competências
limitadas e uma natureza reactiva, uma vez que foram constituídos como
resposta a crimes praticados depois de ocorridas as tragédias, massacres e
violações sistemáticas dos Direitos Humanos e do Direito Humanitário
num determinado território ou Estado.
Temos de considerar que, neste contexto, a adopção do Estatuto de
Roma do Tribunal Penal Internacional constituíu um marco histórico para o
Text not revised by the Author
42
Direito Penal Internacional. O Tribunal Penal Internacional estabelece pela
primeira vez um enquadramento universal destinado a pôr fim à
impunidade pela prática de crimes como o genocídio, os cimes contra a
Humanidade e os crimes de guerra.
Regozijo-me, pois, com a proximidade da entrada em vigor do
Estatuto do Tribunal e ainda pelo facto de Portugal se encontrar entre o
conjunto de sessenta Estados pioneiros que permitirão esta entrada em
vigor no próximo dia 1 de Julho. O Tribunal Penal Internacional é uma
inspiração para este novo século e um mecanismo incontornável quando
nos referimos à protecção das gerações vindouras, que constitui o motivo
inspirador deste congresso.
Quanto ao tema da impunidade, o Tribunal contribuirá para impor o
respeito pelas regras básicas do Direito Internacional, reforçará o primado
do direito e constituirá um contributo, porventura decisivo, para uma
melhor e mais sã convivência internacional.
Para terminar, parece-me que não podemos esquecer o desafio que a
existência deste tribunal coloca a todos os Estados que dele virão a fazer
parte. No que diz respeito à sua aplicação efectiva, nomeadamente através
da adopção de legislação para a cooperação com o Tribunal e destinada a
incorporar os crimes previstos no Estatuto a nível nacional.
Desejo, portanto, a este XIV Congresso o melhor sucesso e um
trabalho profícuo. Muito obrigado pela vossa atenção.
O PAPEL DO DIREITO PENAL
NA PROTECÇÃO DAS GERAÇÕES FUTURAS
JORGE DE FIGUEIREDO DIAS
Vice-Presidente da
Société internationale de défense sociale pour une
politique criminelle humaniste
Professor Catedrático da Faculdade de Direito
da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal
I. A questão do papel do direito penal na protecção das gerações
futuras constitui um problema novo e controvertido. Ele põe em causa não
aspectos parcelares e de pormenor das concepções político-criminais
estabelecidas, mas nada menos que os fundamentos e a legitimação da
intervenção penal, a idoneidade dos seus instrumentos, os caminhos do
labor jurídico-científico que sobre ela se exerce. Se indagarmos da razão
por que até há poucos anos atrás a questão não era sequer posta e por que
ela se tornou bruscamente numa «questão do destino» do direito penal, a
resposta é incontroversa.
Assistimos ao advento de uma forma nova de sociedade, que
assumiu o significado de uma «ruptura epocal» ( 1) com um passado ainda
recente, face à ameaça global causada por novos e grandes riscos, por
«riscos globais»( 2), que pesam sobre a humanidade: o risco atómico, a
diminuição da camada de ozono e o aquecimento global, a destruição dos
ecossistemas, a engenharia e a manipulação genéticas, a produção maciça
de produtos perigosos ou defeituosos, a criminalidade organizada dos
«senhores do crime», individuais e colectivos – que dominam à escala
planetária o tráfico de armas e de droga, de órgãos e dos próprios seres
humanos –, o terrorismo nacional, regional e internacional, o genocídio, os
crimes contra a paz e a humanidade. Com isto ( 3), é um choque
antropológico brutal que estamos a sofrer, devido ao colapso iminente dos
(1)
A expressão é de STELLA, (2001), Giustizia e modernità, Prefazione.
Sobre eles, na esteira do pensamento de BECK, Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem
Weg in eine andere Moderne, 1986 e Was ist Globalisierung? Irrtümer des
Globalismus − Antworten auf Globalisierung, 1997, v. FIGUEIREDO D IAS , «O direito
penal entre a ‘sociedade industrial’ e a sociedade do risco’, in: Estudos em Homenagem
ao Prof. Doutor Rogério Soares, 2001, p. 583. A generalidade das considerações aí
feitas perpassará por toda a exposição posterior.
(3)
Acompanho de novo STELLA, (nota 1).
(2)
46
O papel do direito penal na protecção das gerações futuras
instrumentos técnico-institucionais de segurança. Choque tornado ainda
mais dramático porque talvez descortinemos os remédios radicais que a
situação exige, mas não temos a coragem (ou a possibilidade...) nem de os
usar, nem de requerer a sua aplicação aos níveis comunitários em que nos
inserimos. Com tudo isto é, em definitivo, o valor da solidariedade que
sofre inapelavelmente.
Perante esta situação, ao pensamento, à ciência, à acção, exige-se
que dêem passos radicais: trata-se de ganhar a consciência, porventura
dolorosa, de que a crença na razão técnico-instrumental calculadora
morreu(4). De uma crença filha da racionalidade que nos iluminou durante
três séculos, trouxe um progresso espiritual e material espantoso à
humanidade e lhe deixou um legado irrenunciável de razão crítica, de
secularização, de direitos humanos; mas que ao mesmo tempo a colocou
nos becos sem saída do modelo do homo œconomicus e da crença ingénua
no progresso material ilimitado. Não é preciso indicar outros exemplos que
o da terrível crise ecológica actual( 5) para oferecer base incontroversa a esta
afirmação.
Torna-se indispensável pois, neste tempo pós-moderno, uma nova
ética, uma nova racionalidade, uma nova política. Porque em causa está a
própria subsistência da vida no planeta e é preciso, se quisermos oferecer
uma chance razoável às gerações vindouras, que a humanidade se torne em
sujeito comum da responsabilidade pela vida ( 6).
II. Perguntar se nesta tarefa existencial cabe algum papel ao direito
penal e aos seus instrumentos na necessária defesa social perante os megariscos enunciados poderá parecer quase absurdo e sem sentido. É à filosofia
que cabe pensar os caminhos necessários de superação dos paradigmas da
modernidade. É às políticas, nacionais e internacional, que pertence
implementar os paradigmas pós-modernos ( 7). É sobre os líderes das
comunidades intermédia s que pesa o dever de promoverem a interiorização
individual das novas ideias e dos novos valores. É sobre os agentes
(4)
Fundamental nesta direcção, STRATENWERTH, «Zukunftssicherung durch die
Mitteln des Strafrechts», Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechyswissenschaft (=ZStW)
105, 1993, p.679. E do mesmo Das Strafrecht in der Krise der Industriegeselschaft,
Rektoratsrede, 1993.
(5)
Recorde-se o impressionante livro de RACHEL CARSON, Silent spring.
(6)
Importante sobre este ponto A NSELMO BORGES , (2000), «O crime ecológico
na perspectiva filosófico-teológica», Revista Portuguesa de Ciência Criminal (=RPCC)
10, p. 7.
(7)
De novo BECK, (1991), Politik in der Risikogesellscaft, p. 23 e s.
47
económicos e sociais que recai a necessidade – para satisfação também dos
seus próprios interesses egoístas! – de se auto-organizarem e autolimitarem.
É numa palavra, uma vez postas as coisas ao nível da intervenção
jurídica, a tese – hoje assaz difundida – da auto-regulação social como
forma por excelência, se não a única viável, de oferecer um futuro à
humanidade perante os novos e grandes riscos que sobre ela pesam(8). É a
predição de que o Direito perderá a palavra na sociedade do futuro; numa
sociedade onde tanto no domínio dos princípios, como no dos efeitos ou
consequências não haverá mais lugar para um pensamento que, como o
mocho, levanta voo só ao anoitecer, que deixa as coisas acontecer para
depois tentar remediá -las e cuja intervenção é por isso por essência
retrospectiva e não prospectiva, conservadora e não propulsora,
aniquiladora e não protectora das vítimas do sistema, que somos todos nós.
Não parece todavia que esta ideia da auto-regulação social atinja
sequer os limiares da utopia (9), antes é bem possível que nela se trate de um
equívoco. Uma verdadeira auto-regulação significaria pedir ao mercado –
na verdade, o mais autêntico produtor das dificuldades e desesperanças da
sociedade técnica industrial – o remédio para a doença que ele próprio
inoculou. Uma verdadeira auto-regulação implicaria pedir a milhões e
milhões de pessoas que se decidissem voluntariamente a renunciar a todo
um modelo de vida que fez do consumo o seu próprio motor e do aumento
da produção o orientador de quase todo o conhecimento. E que para
alcançar esse desiderato se serviria da eliminação de toda a heteroregulamentação e do elemento de coacção que inevitavelmente a
acompanha, conduzindo deste modo à prescindibilidade já não apenas do
direito penal, mas de todo o Direito.
III. Não falta porém quem pense que uma protecção efectiva das
gerações vindouras não exige ir tão longe e pode ainda conservar a função
social do Direito; o que ela impõe, isso sim – diz-se no entanto com cada
vez maior insistência –, é que se recuse ao direito penal um papel na tarefa.
É a velha tese da «abolição» do direito penal que sob esta capa de novo se
perfila. Para além dos meios de política social não jurídica, assim se
(8)
Sobre esta tese e, em definitivo, mostrando-se a ela favorável no que toca à
contenção dos grandes e novos riscos, STELLA, (nota 1), pp. 387 e ss., 414 e ss.
(9)
Sobre o valor positivo da «utopia» também nos domínios da ciência do
direito penal e da política criminal A LBERTO SILVA FRANCO, (2000), «Globalização e
criminalidade dos poderosos», RPCC 10, pp. 183 e ss., 227 e s.
48
argumenta, haverá que fazer intervir meios jurídicos não penais no esforço
de contenção e domínio dos riscos globais, nos quadros daquilo que se vai
chamando o «Estado-prevenção».
A ideia subjacente a esta tese nutre-se do reconhecimento de que a
função do Direito de criador de normas de orientação social e de
comportamento individual é indispensável à conservação e
desenvolvimento de qualquer sociedade, do presente ou do futuro, e que
para ela não existe alternativa. Mas também da convicção de que é
impossível ao direito penal desempenhar qualquer papel na contenção de
fenómenos globais e de massa. Impossibilidade que derivaria da
especificidade dos seus meios de actuação (as penas e as medidas de
segurança) e dos seus modelos de aferição da responsabilidade, tendentes à
individualização da responsabilidade e zeladores até ao limite de direitos
das pessoas que se afirmam perante o Estado e, se necessário, contra o
Estado(10).
Por isso – diz-se – há que conferir a outros ramos de direito a
tarefa de oferecer às gerações vindouras hipóteses acrescidas de
subsistência e de progresso. Logo ao direito civil, muito mais indulgente
que o direito penal na aferição da responsabilidade e muito menos exigente
na sua individualização; e de resto, como direito privado, particularmente
adequado ao tratamento de questões que, na sua grande maioria, emergem
do «mercado» e têm nele a sua origem. Mas sobretudo ao direito
administrativo – porventura intensificado na sua vertente sancionatória, em
nome de um Interventionsrecht(11) –, a quem cabe por excelência, dada a
sua natureza de braço executivo da própria Administração, a ponderação de
milhares e milhares de situações conflituantes entre os interesses mais
vitais da soc iedade e os legítimos interesses dos administrados; e que por
isso estará em posição inigualável para levar a cabo uma política de
prevenção dos riscos globais.
Não negarei o papel fundamental – e em certas situações
insubstituível – que a estes ramos de direito deve conferir-se na tentativa de
resolução do problema. Mas julgo infundado o propósito de com eles
esgotar o papel que ao Direito cabe na matéria; e, sobretudo, de com eles
(10)
Sobre esta tese − cara à que hoje é chamada «Escola de Frankfurt» −
HASSEMER, (1992), «Kennzeichen und Krisen des modernen Strafrechts», Zeitschrift
für Rechtspolitik , p. 10 e «Perspectivas del Derecho penal futuro», Revista Penal 1,
1997, p. 37; e também HERZOG, «Limites del derecho penal para controlar los riesgos
sociales», Poder Judicial 32, 1993 e «Algunos riesgos del derecho penal del riesgo»,
Revista Penal 4, 1999, p. 54.
(11)
De novo HASSEMER, Revista Penal (nota 8), p. 40.
49
substituir a função diferenciada que ao direito penal deve pertencer. É
indiscutível que a força conformadora dos comportamentos do direito civil
e do direito administrativo é menor do que a do direito penal; como menor
é, por isso, a força estabilizadora das expectativas comunitárias na
manutenção da validade da norma violada, neste sentido, a sua força
preventiva ou, mais especificamente, de «prevenção geral positiva ou de
integração»( 12). Este é o fundamento último da máxima – liberal, mas
simultaneamente social – da intervenção jurídico-penal como intervenção
de ultima ratio. Ao que acresce que já não na prevenção, mas na repressão
das violações ocorridas tanto a intervenção jurídico-civil, como a jurídicoadministrativa surgirão as mais das vezes como desajustadas, se não mesmo
inúteis. E se assim é, então esta incapacidade (ou menor capacidade) de
sancionamento do direito civil e do direito administrativo reflecte-se
prognosticamente, com força potenc iada, sobre o efeito preventivo da
norma editada e acaba por aniquilá -lo. Tanto basta, se bem cuido, para que
não possa esperar-se que por estas vias viesse a lograr-se uma mais efectiva
protecção das gerações vindouras.
IV. Assim, pois, ao direito penal não pode negar-se a sua quotaparte de legitimação (e de responsabilidade) na protecção das gerações
futuras. Reconhecê-lo, porém, implica que vejamos com a justeza e a
modéstia possíveis o que dele pode e deve esperar-se.
Desde logo, não faltam os que parece argumentarem baseados num
equívoco( 13). Alega-se que o direito penal não constitui qualquer barreira
intransponível, qualquer defesa destinada ao sucesso na prevenção e
controlo dos riscos globais. Mas com este argumento se esquece que não
pode ser propósito da intervenção penal alcançar uma protecção dos riscos
globais em si mesmos e como um todo, nem, ainda menos, lograr a
«resolução» do problema da subsistência da vida planetária. Não é nada
este o problema da intervenção penal, antes sim, muito mais modestamente,
um problema de ordenação (e de defesa) social; concretamente, o de
oferecer o seu contributo para que os riscos globais se mantenham dentro
de limites ainda comunitariamente suportáveis e, em defin itivo, não
(12)
Conceito, este último, usado pela primeira vez com este significado por
ROXIN , (1979), «Zur jüngsten Diskussion über Schuld, Prävention und
Verantwortlichkeit», Festschrift für Bockelmann, p. 305 e s.
(13)
Sobre o ponto que se segue FIGUEIREDO DIAS , (2001), «Sobre a tutela
jurídico-penal do ambiente − Um quarto de século depois», Estudos em Homenagem a
Cunha Rodrigues, I, p. 376 e ss.
50
ponham em causa os fundamentos naturais da vida. O que está em causa é
(e é só!) a protecção – fragmentária, lacunosa e subsidiária – de bens
jurídico-penais colectivos como tais. Tudo o que vá para além disto
ultrapassa o fundamento legitimador da intervenção penal neste domínio.
Para uma defesa global da humanidade perante os mega-riscos que a
ameaçam – para a tarefa, digamos assim, de protecção global da soc iedade
presente e futura – o direito penal constituiria à partida um meio
democraticamente ilegítimo e, ademais, inadequado e disfunc ional.
Desta consideração logo deriva outra consequência: restringida
embora à tutela fragmentária de bens colectivos, a protecção que o direito
penal está em medida de oferecer às gerações futuras não pode ser absoluta.
Face às condições de complexidade, de massificação e de globalidade da
sociedade contemporânea, às quais estão ligadas uma multiplicidade e uma
diversidade inumeráveis de condutas potencialmente lesivas de valores
fundamentais inerentes à própria existência do Homem, o direito penal tem
de distinguir, para delimitação do âmbito de protecção da norma, entre
ofensas admissíveis e ofensas inadmissíveis, limitando-se à criminalização
destas últimas(14). A distinção entre ofensas admissíveis e inadmissíveis
supõe assim – sobretudo nesta nossa era de mercado global – uma
dificílima ponderação de interesses complexos e diversificados, quantas
vezes de resultado altamente questionável. Esta ponderação, multiplicada
por milhões e milhões de casos atinentes aos âmbitos e às actividades mais
diversas, não pode ser levada a cabo pelo legislador penal: para tal
constituiria ele de novo, sub specie materiæ, entidade incompetente. Aquela
ponderação só pode caber ao direito administrativo e aos agentes
competentes para a sua aplicação. O que conduz à conclusão de que a – por
certos penalistas tão escarmentada – acessoriedade administrativa se
apresenta neste domínio como absolutamente necessária e que para ela se
não divisa alternativa.
Isto dito, falta indagar se eventuais especificidades da tutela no
âmbito questionado se verificam a nível do objecto da tutela, do círculo dos
sujeitos responsáveis e da construção típica dos delitos dos quais se espera
a protecção. Latente ficará a questão de saber se tais especificidades
postulam modificações radicais das concepções dogmáticas jurídico-penais
que dão corpo ao paradigma próprio das sociedades avançadas do nosso
tempo; e se tais modificações, onde e na medida em que porventura se
imponham, se revelam ainda compatíveis com o paradigma penal e
(14)
Tal como o faz, por exemplo, o art. 279º do Código Penal português
relativamente ao crime de poluição.
51
juspublicístico de uma sociedade democrática e liberal. A estes temas
dedicarei, com a brevidade de que for capaz, as considerações seguintes.
V. A questão primordial e decisiva que se suscita é a da definição
do bem jurídico tutelado pelos delitos colectivos, em termos tais que
consiga preservar a função de padrão crítico da incriminação que o bem
jurídico tem de assumir em um direito penal democrático e liberal. A minha
convicção profunda e já antiga é a de que o direito penal serve a tutela
subsidiária, a par de bens jurídicos individuais, de bens jurídicos colectivos
como tais. Que significa isto( 15)?
1. A afirmação feita significa certamente recusar o que por vezes se
chama uma concepção administrativa do bem jurídico colectivo. Mas
convém evitar equívocos. Com uma manifestação incontestável desta
concepção se depararia, segundo alguns, na construção do crime contra
bens jurídicos colectivos – p. ex., na do crime ambiental segundo o Código
Penal português, art. 279º – como crime de desobediência; já uma tal
construção revelaria uma vassalagem tão-só ao valor da fidelidade a
prescrições administrativas, um puro (des)valor de acção sob a forma de
violação do dever de conformidade com injunções validamente prescritas e
recebidas, por conseguinte, uma concepção puramente administrativa do
bem jurídico protegido.
Esta crítica não tem de ser reputada procedente. Bastará para a
elidir compreender que a «desobediência administrativa» pode constituir
tão-só um factor limitativo em nome da certeza da proibição ou imposição
penal da conduta concreta, face à já sublinhada complexidade e diversidade
dos conflitos que em toda esta matéria se deparam; em nome
consequentemente da clara percepção, pelos destinatários da norma, da
fronteira que separa neste domínio o «admissível» do «inadmissível» de
condutas que são, por sua natureza e pelas condições inevitáveis da vida
contemporânea, constantes e diuturnas.
2. Face à tese acima enunciada, prejudicada fica igualmente uma
concepção exasperadamente antropocêntrica dos bens jurídicos colectivos,
ligada a um entendimento «monista-pessoal» do bem jurídico, hoje
doutrinalmente muito preconizado (com particular insistência por Hassemer
e a chamada (16) «Escola de Frankfurt»). Uma concepção, esta, que de bem
(15)
Sobre o que se segue, de novo, os meus artigos citados na nota 2, p. 602 e
ss. e na nota 13, p. 376 e ss., com indicações bibliográficas.
(16)
Ao que parece pela primeira vez por SCHÜNEMANN, GA, (1995), p. 203. Cf.
já supra, nota 10.
52
jurídico só permite em rigor falar quando estejam em causa interesses reais,
tangíveis e, por consequência, também actuais do indivíduo. Como
prejudicada fica igualmente uma concepção antropocêntrica moderada do
bem jurídico colectivo, que conduziria a afirmar a sua existência apenas se
e na medida em que a razão da tutela pudesse ainda ser reconduzida à
protecção de bens jurídicos individuais; nesta acepção se exigindo que os
bens jurídicos colectivos a tutelar se encontrassem de qualquer modo
dotados de um «referente pessoal», possuíssem um «núcleo
personalizável», fossem unicamente «dedutíveis» a partir de bens jurídicos
individuais.
O que parece haver de injustificável nesta limitação (e pode vir a
afectar a efectividade de uma tutela penal das gerações futuras) é que, com
ela, continuam a considerar-se os bens jurídicos colectivos como puros
«derivados» de bens jurídicos individuais; e, deste modo, a perspectivar a
protecção penal colectiva como tutela antecipada de bens jurídicos
individuais, em particular os da vida, da saúde e do património de pessoas
singulares e concretas. Com esta formulação uma tal tese parece
incompatível com o reconhecimento de verdadeiros bens jur ídicos
colectivos. Estes devem ser antes aceites, sem tergiversações, como
autênticos bens jurídicos universais, transpessoais ou supra-individuais.
Que também esta categoria de bens jurídicos possa reconduzir-se, em
último termo, a interesses legítimos da pessoa, eis o que não será lícito
contestar. O carácter supra-individual do bem jurídico não exclui decerto a
existência de interesses indiv iduais que com ele convergem: se todos os
membros da comunidade se vêem prejudic ados por condutas
potencialmente destruidoras da vida, cada um deles não deixa
individualmente de sê-lo também e de ter um interesse legítimo na
preservação das condições vitais. Mas se, por exemplo, uma descarga de
petróleo no mar provoca a morte de milhares de aves marinhas e leva
inclusivamente à extinção de alguma espécie rara, também aí pode
verificar-se a lesão de um bem jur ídico colectivo merecedor e carente de
tutela penal, ainda que tais aves sejam absolutamente insusceptíveis de
utilização por parte do homem. Não parece possível descortinar aqui, ao
menos em via de princípio, ofensa de um qualquer bem jurídico individual,
possibilidade de referência a ele ou cadeia dedutiva que a ele conduza. E
todavia, as aves referidas, se bem que não «utilizáveis» por quem quer que
seja, já nascido ou ainda não nascido, constituem um património de todos.
Se as não protegermos as gerações futuras não terão a possibilidade de as
apreciar, apesar de que nós tenhamos podido fazê-lo!
3. A verdadeira característica do bem jurídico colectivo ou
universal reside pois em que ele deve poder ser gozado por todos e por cada
53
um, sem que ninguém deva ficar excluído desse gozo: nesta possibilidade
de gozo reside o legítimo interesse individual na integridade do bem
jurídico cole ctivo. Certamente, existe neste uma relação difusa com os
usuários, que porém não significa o carácter difuso do bem jurídico
universal enquanto tal; como existe – há que reconhecê-lo – uma certa
funcionalização da noção de bem jurídico, quando comparada com aquele
«monólito jurídico corporizado»( 17) que formou a concepção acirradamente
liberal do bem jurídico. Mas não é esta razão bastante para que a categoria
seja recusada como jurídico-penalmente relevante.
Nesta acepção os bens jurídicos colectivos devem gozar, face aos
bens jurídicos individuais, de verdadeira autonomia. Autonomia que não é
afectada mesmo que deva concluir-se que não existem bens jurídicos
colectivos que não possuam um qualquer suporte em legítimos interesses
individuais, por muito simples que eles se afigurem, como o mero prazer de
contemplar o voo de uma ave marinha. A relevância dos bens jurídicos
colectivos – generosos, em nada egoístas – provirá precisamente da
potencial multiplicação indeterminada de interesses de toda e qualquer
pessoa, se bem que não individualizáveis em concreto.
VI. Assegurada a viabilidade da protecção jurídico-penal de bens
jurídicos colectivos como tais, uma segunda ideia de primordial
importância deve ser aqui acentuada: a de que ao direito penal não poderá
reconhecer-se a mínima capacidade de contenção dos mega-riscos que
ameaçam as gerações futuras se, do mesmo passo, se persistir em manter o
dogma da individualização da responsabilidade penal. Já antes e
independentemente do aparecimento de uma «dogmática do risco» o
preconceito do carácter individual de toda a responsabilidade penal (uma
vez mais, um preconceito de raiz exasperadamente antropocêntrica) havia
sido abalado. E para tanto, peço licença para o afirmar, muito contribuiu a
doutrina penal portuguesa, mais do que outras que só muito recentemente
ultrapassaram (quando tenham já ultrapassado…) os escolhos da
«incapacidade de acção» e da «incapacidade de culpa» jurídico-penais que
tradicional e axiomaticamente se considerava atingirem toda a
responsabilidade penal de entes não individuais.
A uma protecção jurídico-penal das gerações futuras perante os
mega-riscos que pesam sobre a humanidade torna-se pois indispensável a
aceitação, clara e sem tergiversações, de um princípio de responsabilização
(17)
Feliz expressão de
Verwaltungsrechtslehre, p. 224.
RUPP,
(1965),
Grundfragen der heutigen
54
penal dos entes colectivos como tais. Não será, em minha opinião, com
doutrinas como a do reconhecimento da validade do princípio apenas no
âmbito das infracções ditas «penais-administrativas»; ou mesmo com
soluções como a de imputar ao ente colectivo a acção e a culpa dos seus
órgãos responsáveis; ou a de aceitar a sua responsabilidade criminal
unicamente para efeito da aplicação de medidas de segurança, que não de
verdadeiras penas – não será com concepções tais que aquela protecção se
logrará. Isso só se torna possível, repito, aceitando que relativamente a
certos delitos (e, nomeadamente, os que são próprios da «sociedade do
risco») é o ente colectivo como tal que responde também ao nível do direito
penal( 18).
Já em 1977 defendi( 19) que tal se torna possível segundo um
princípio de analogia, quero dizer, atribuindo ao ente colectivo capacidade
de acção e de culpa jurídico-penais na medida em que eles são – como
muito exactamente notou Max Müller invocando neste contexto o princípio
da identidade da liberdade (20) – «obras do homem» e, nesta medida, «obras
da sua liberdade». Com o essenc ial desta ideia da analogia depara-se em
Portugal num estudo de Faria Costa (21) e na Alemanha numa importante
monografia de Heine (22). Mas considere-se ou não procedente uma
fundamentação deste teor, deve esperar-se que este filão não seja
abandonado e, pelo contrário, seja objecto de progressos de quem consiga ir
mais longe e mais fundo. Para que num futuro próximo os códigos penais
não só aceitem o princípio, como sucede com o português, como o
desenvolvam nas suas implicações normativas, como sucede com o francês;
e para que ele passe a constituir uma aquisição consensual da vida
judiciária, como de há muito sucede com os direitos penais inglês e norteamericano.
Decerto, em perspectiva jurídico-penal dogmática torna-se
necessário e urgente saber muito mais sobre ele, sobre as suas implicações
prático-normativa, sobre as suas relações com a responsabilidade
(18)
Sobre cada uma destas posições, com referências bibliográficas, VOGEL,
(2001), «La responsabilidad penal por el producto en Alemania: situación actual y
perspectivas de futuro», Revista Penal 8 , p. 74 e nota 47.
(19)
FIGUEIREDO D IAS , (1977), Para uma Dogmática do Direito Penal
Secundário, p. 35 e ss.
(20)
M AX M ÜLLER, (1959), «Freiheit», in: Staatslexikon, III, 6ª ed., p. 53.
(21)
FARIA COSTA, (1992), «A responsabilidade jurídico-penal da empresa e dos
seus órgãos», RPCC 2 , p. 537.
(22)
HEINE, (1995), Die strafrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit von Unternehmen, p.
271 e ss.
55
individual, sobre o catálogo das penas e medidas aplicáveis. Ver-se-á então
porventura que muitos dos problemas postos pela necessidade de tutela
jurídico-penal das gerações futuras podem encontrar aqui adequadas
soluções, tornando menos instantes alterações, que agora podem afigurar-se
urgentes e indispensáveis, na dogmática da imputação objectiva, da
comprovação do dolo, da negligência e do erro, da autoria e da
cumplicidade. Se por exemplo o fenómeno da chamada «criminalidade
organizada», o que quer que por ela deva entender-se em perspectiva
dogmática, reentra no direito penal de tutela das gerações futuras, então ele
mostra exempla rmente como o progresso da dogmática relativa à
responsabilidade penal dos entes colectivos constitui uma exigência
instante, para a qual não existe alternativa.
VII. Resta encarar a última questão das que atrás ficaram
mencionadas, relativa à estrutura típica que, em geral, devem assumir os
delitos contra bens jurídicos colectivos. Uma protecção penal de bens
jurídicos colectivos legítima e minimamente eficaz supõe que o ilícito
material dos crimes respectivos, cometidos por pessoas individuais ou por
entes colectivos, seja visto como residindo na verificação de condutas que,
em si mesmas consideradas ou em associação a condutas ocorridas em
quantidade inumerável e com uma frequência devastadora, lesam ou põem
em sério perigo aqueles bens juríd icos. Isto significa, em meu modo de ver,
duas coisas(23).
1. A primeira é a de que a multiplicidade de condutas perigosas
para as condições fundamentais de vida das gerações futuras, na
complexidade que podem chegar a assumir e na constante modificação a
que, por força da evolução tecnológica, estão submetidas, conduz
efectivamente a que os delitos colectivos, como quer que em definitivo
tipicamente se construam, se encontrem submetidos a uma cláusula de
acessoriedade administrativa. O que vale por dizer que o conteúdo integral
do ilícito só pode revelar-se, em última análise, também em função de
normas sem dignidade penal.
A acessoriedade administrativa suscita à dogmática jurídico-penal,
é verdade, um longo cortejo de problemas, para alguns dos quais ainda mal
se divisam hoje soluções consensuais. Mas também neste ponto seria
salutar começar por assentar numa tão antiga, como boa verdade: a de que
(23)
Sobre as questões que se seguem o meu estudo (nota 13), p. 385 e ss.; e
também KUHLEN, (1993), «Umweltstrafrecht – auf der Suche nach einer neuen
Dogmatik», ZStW 105, p. 720 e ss.
56
não são as valorações político-criminais que devem subordinar-se ao labor
(e às dificuldades, e às limitações em cada momento histórico) da
dogmática e ser por ele condicionadas, antes sim é a dogmática, como puro
meio construtivo-instrumental, que tem de servir as proposições políticocriminais e a elas se adequar.
Assim postas as coisas, a construção destes delitos como
substancialmente delitos contra bens jurídicos colectivos, mas formalmente
como delitos de desobediência às prescrições emanadas do direito
administrativo e/ou dos seus agentes, parece-me constituir a via talvez mais
correcta de corresponder às necessidades de protecção das gerações futuras.
De desobediência àquelas prescrições, não (se é preciso reacentuá-lo!) em
nome de um mero «dever de fidelidade administrativa», mas sim na medida
em que prescrições tais visem evitar a produção – mais próxima ou mais
longínqua, mas em todo o caso certa ou altamente provável – de danos e
lesões e, por aí, de deteriorações importantes das condições fundamentais
da vida em sociedade.
Que, a partir daqui, tais delitos devam ser construídos como delitos
de perigo abstracto, de perigo concreto ou de perigo abstracto-concreto (de
«idoneidade» ou de «aptidão»), ou mesmo como delitos de lesão, constitui
já somente um problema de relevo subordinado, uma questão dogmática de
segunda ordem. Até porque, seja qual for a arquitectura típica que acabe
por ser eleita, não existem artifícios dogmáticos capazes de ofuscar a
dificuldade real que aqui se perfila; e cuja magnitude em sede de
legitimação as condições da vida social presente (e muito mais as da vida
futura) tornam instante e inquestionável. A saber, a de que a «distância»
entre condutas em si mesmas insignificantes e lesões certas ou prováveis do
bem jurídico colectivo todavia por elas (co)determinadas, a «lonjura» entre
os autores de tais condutas e o resultado lesivo – não importa se sob a
forma de «resultado de lesão» ou de «resultado de perigo» –, são ou podem
ser de tal maneira grandes que, com elas, é a própria referência da conduta
ao bem jurídico protegido que se torna questionável; e, por via disso, são
princípios democráticos e constitucionais unanimemente aceites como
devendo presidir à imputação penal, objectiva e subjectiva, que parecem
abeirar o colapso.
2. Essencial me parece neste contexto – e é esta a segunda ideia
que me proponho acentuar – não perder nunca de vista que em direito penal
colectivo nos deparamos substancialmente (isto é, insisto, segundo o
conteúdo material de ilícito em questão) com delitos que possuem uma
natureza análoga à da categoria dos delitos de perigo abstracto; delitos nos
quais, é bem sabido, a relação entre a acção e o bem jurídico tutelado
surgirá as mais das vezes como longínqua, nebulosa e quase sempre
57
particularmente débil. Se apesar disso se aceita a legitimidade jurídicoconstitucional desta espécie de delitos – como creio dever aceitar-se(24),
suposto que se encontrem respeitados em espécie os parâmetros mínimos
de determinabilidade do tipo de ilícito e a referência ao bem jurídico que
em última instância se visa proteger –, a questão que então se coloca é a de
saber se o aludido «enfraquecimento», em matéria de direito penal
colectivo, da relação entre acção e bem jurídico não tem de ir, para que a
tutela dispensada por um tal direito se revele minimamente eficaz,
demasiado longe e não obriga, por isso, a aceitar «estruturas novas e
atípicas de imputação» particularmente questionáveis (quando não
censuráveis) à luz dos princípios jurídico-constitucionais próprios do
Estado de Direito.
A dificuldade não se desvanecerá, nem sequer se minorará, pela
circunstância de que o delito colectivo seja tipicamente estruturado e
dogmatic amente construído como crime de dano antes que de perigo, como
crime de resultado antes que de mera actividade. O que nesta problemática
substancial está em jogo não é a relação naturalística entre acção e objecto
da acção, mas a relação normativa entre acção e bem jurídico. Aqui julgo
residir mais uma razão em favor da construção do delito colectivo como
delito de desobediência a prescrições ou limitações impostas, de acordo
com a lei, pelas autoridades administrativas competentes; com a precisão
(essencial e imprescindível) de que tais prescrições ou limitações são
editadas em nome de uma tutela de bens jurídicos com suficiente relevância
para se arvorarem em bens colectivos jurídico-penais.
Torna-se de todo o modo instante perguntar se, apesar do que ficou
já dito, não persiste como questionável a relação entre a lesão do bem
jurídico colectivo e uma multidão inumerável de comportamentos que,
quando tomados em si mesmos e na sua singularidade, não são
imediatamente perigosos ou sequer mesmo significativos, mas contribuem
em todo o caso poderosamente para aquela lesão. Aqui se depara, de modo
incontornável, com a necessidade de considerar muitas das ofensas
colectivas jurídico-penalmente relevantes dentro dos quadros dos tipos
chamados aditivos ou cumulativos. Seguro é que, quanto aos
comportamentos susceptíveis de integrarem o fim de protecção da norma
penal a sua punição só se revelará legítima se as condutas que venham a
somar-se à do agente e que contribuem assim para a lesão forem, mais que
(24)
E é doutrina do Tribunal Constitucional português : Acórdãos do tribunal
Constitucional 30, (1995), p. 985.
58
possíveis, indubitavelmente previsíveis e muito prováveis, para não dizer
certas.
Toco, com esta observação, o ponto que se revela certamente mais
difícil, mas simultaneamente mais essencial. É ao legislador ordinário e só
a ele que, dentro dos referidos parâmetros jurídico-constitucionais, pertence
ponderar e decidir a questão político-legislativa de saber se, para uma tutela
dos bens jurídicos cole ctivos (ou de certos deles) minimamente eficaz, se
torna necessário punir comportamentos em razão da sua provável
acumulação e quais deles devem ser puníveis. Esta é a decisão
verdadeiramente difícil e que tem de ser cuidadosamente ponderada,
nomeadamente em função das aquisições parcelares definitivas que vão
sendo feitas pela Ciência. Uma vez, porém, tomada a decisão relativamente
a certos (ou a certas espécies de) comportamentos, não tem qualquer
sentido agitar a crítica de que uma responsabilização por comportamentos
aditivos ou cumulativos significaria sempre uma responsabilização penal
por facto de outrem absolutamente incompatível com o princípio da culpa.
Como igualmente me parece dispensável excogitar ou acolher estruturas
anómalas ou atípicas de imputação, objectiva e subjectiva, da
responsabilidade penal: resultados dogmaticamente aceitáveis podem ser
conseguidos com estruturas já doutrinalmente consolidadas, desde as da
doutrina da adequação às da criação de um risco não permitido, desde as do
dolo e do erro às da negligência.
Neste sentido acabo por me aproximar, de certo modo, da ideia
segundo a qual a tutela jurídico-penal das gerações futuras passa pela
assunção de um direito penal do comportamento em que são penalizadas e
punidas puras relações da vida como tais ( 25). Dizendo-o, porém, não desejo
– como espero ter podido deixar claro – apresentar esta concepção como
uma alternativa ao direito penal do bem jurídico. Bem ao contrário, quero
significar que a punição imediata de certa espécie de comportamentos
como tais é feita em nome da tutela de bens jurídicos colectivos e só nesta
medida se encontra legitimada. Deste modo julgando manter-me ainda fiel
ao paradigma jurídico-penal iluminista que nos acompanha e que confio
que possa continuar a ser fonte de desenvolvimentos e de progressos
mesmo no seio da «sociedade do risco»; e que possa por isso continuar a
assumir o seu papel na insubstituível (se bem que parcial) função tutelar
também dos interesses das gerações futuras.
(25)
STRATENWERTH, ZStW (nota 4 ), p. 692 e ss. Criticamente STELLA, (nota 1),
p. 395 e ss.
UN NOUVEAU DEFI: LA PROTECTION DES GENERATIONS
FUTURES AU REGARD DES SCIENCES DE LA VIE
MYRIAM BLUMBERG-MOKRI
Docteur en droit,
Avocat à la Cour d'Appel, Paris, France
Ce XIVème Congrès international de défense sociale se réunit autour
d’une réflexion qui représente un défi d’envergure pour la rencontre du
Droit avec les Sciences de la vie puisqu’il s’agit de débattre aujourd’hui de
«la protection des générations futures au regard des nouveaux risques».
En effet, les progrès en matière de reproduction des générations futures sont le plus souvent présentés comme la promesse d’une amélioration
de la santé pour leurs bénéficiaires. Mais le mieux se révèle aussi l’ennemi
du bien. En ce sens, les intrusions techno-scientifiques dans le processus de
reproduction des hommes génèrent dans le même temps performances thérapeutiques, risques inédits et interrogations innovantes.
Cette dynamique est notamment à l’œuvre avec l’émergence d’une
thérapie par modification génétique d’un individu à venir. On peut craindre
que cette nouvelle forme thérapeutique ne porte en germe le désir consumériste de parfaire génétiquement les individus afin de les rendre conformes
aux désirs parentaux et/ou à une norme sociale labellisée. Les prochaines
générations auront ainsi la possibilité de choisir pour une large part
l’identité de leur progéniture et consécutivement celles des générations à
venir( 1). D’autres inquiétudes sont également générées par l’éventualité
d’utiliser le clonage humain comme méthode de procréatio n artificielle. En
effet, la création d’un individu génétiquement identique à un de ses géniteurs pourrait être considérée comme la traduction d’une atteinte portée à la
fois à l’unicité des individus et à la diversité du genre humain.
C’est en somme la conjugaison des techniques de procréation artif icielle avec la génétique qui inspire une certaine inquiétude au regard des
générations à venir. Dès lors, on conviendra aisément que l’on est passé de
la protection des générations futures par le savoir-faire biomédical à la protection des générations futures face à ces nouvelles pratiques.
C’est en prenant pour fil conducteur ces deux types d’intrusions
techniques dans le champ de la procréation humaine, à savoir la thérapie
(1)
REICH J., TESTART J., (1997), Pour une éthique planétaire, Paris, Editions
Arte, coll. Mille et une nuits, p. 64.
62
Un nouveau défi
génique germinale d’une part et le clonage reproductif humain d’autre part,
qu’il sera intéressant de s’interroger aujourd’hui sur les réponses que le
paysage normatif a apportées jusqu’ici.
Pour commencer, on appréciera ce que le Droit entend protéger lorsqu’il se soucie des générations à venir face aux applications biomédicales,
c’est-à-dire lorsqu’il met en avant une certaine conception de la notion
d’humanité. La complexité vient de ce que l’humanité présente à la fois un
caractère ordinaire, que l’on pourrait appeler «l’animalité de l’espèce humaine». Elle partage en effet assez banalement avec d’autres formes de vie
sexuée les lois de la transmission de son patrimoine génétique. Mais,
l’espèce humaine possède aussi un caractère extraordinaire, que l’on pourrait nommer «l’humanité du genre humain» et qui la distingue des autres
espèces. Ce caractère spécifique semble relayé au plan juridique par
l’affirmation de la dignité humaine. C’est ainsi que la quête d’un sens jur idique à la notion d’humanité passe par un détour juridique : le principe de
dignité humaine (I).
Toutefois, on verra que ce principe de dignité humaine − incarné en
droit de la santé par l’exigence d’un consentement libre et éclairé aux interventions médicales − lorsqu’on le confronte à la technique de modification
du patrimoine génétique humain n’est pas d’une application évidente. Plus
grave encore, la question se pose de savoir si la manipulation des gènes
humains permettra uniquement de soigner les individus ou débouchera inéluctablement sur la discrimination croissante des individus génétiquement
prédisposés à certaines maladies ou certains handicaps voire même sur la
création de nouvelles lignées d’individus. Dans ce contexte, et malgré
l’écueil de l’exigence du consentement, la mise sous «contrôle génétique»(2) suscitera de nouvelles exigences (II).
Quoiqu’il en soit, la rapidité avec laquelle les techniques biomédic ales font leur apparition ne permet pas de se satisfaire de l’idée selon laquelle une technique qui pose problème aujourd’hui mais qui serait dépassée demain, dans le même temps où elle repousse les limites de la faisabilité technique, se trouve autorisée à redessiner au gré de ses prétentions les
contours de principes juridiques fondamentaux et universellement déclarés,
autrement dit communs à tous les êtres humains.
Certes, pour être parfaitement opportune, la détermination du licite et
de l’illicite doit tenir compte des données scientifiques. Prenons de façon
presque anecdotique l’exemple du Parlement européen qui a été très réactif
(2)
TESTART J., (1997), «Génétique: puissance et illusions», Transversales
Science et Culture, mars/avril No. 44, p. 6.
Un nouveau défi
63
à l’actualité scientifique en prenant position après chaque diffusion à
grande échelle par la presse d’informations alarmantes sur le thème du clonage humain. Ainsi, l’adoption d’une résolution parlementaire condamnant
le clonage de l’embryon humain en 1993( 3) a fait écho aux informations
faisant état de ce qui pouvait médiatiquement passer pour le premier clonage d’un «embryon» humain par une université américaine ( 4). Quatre ans
plus tard en 1997, en plein retentissement de l’affaire Dolly( 5), le Parlement
européen condamne à nouveau le clonage humain à travers une nouvelle
résolution. Ce texte a été élaboré à la suite du clonage réussi d’une brebis −
après 277 tentatives non concluantes − réalisé par un laboratoire écossais au
moyen de la technique de transfert d’un noyau de cellule adulte dans un
ovocyte énucléé(6). Enfin, après l’annonce en 1998 par un physicien américain, Richard Seed, de son intention d’ouvrir une clinique consacrée à la
procréation assistée par la technique du clonage pour pallier la stérilité (7), le
Parlement européen a une fois de plus condamné le clonage humain par une
nouvelle résolution( 8). Cette adhésion des législateurs à l’actualité scientif ique a fait dire à un député européen non dépourvu d’humour que «si l’on
recommence le même débat chaque fois qu’un chercheur dans le monde
raconte aux médias qu’il dépasse ce qui est moralement admissible, il suffira à chaque période de session plénière de cloner une résolution sur la résolution précédente» (9).
Au-delà de cette anecdote, on reconnaîtra que le droit ne peut se satisfaire d’être à la remorque de la norme techno-scientifique ni de tenter de
répondre au coup par coup aux avancées biomédicales. Son rôle est par définition de rappeler l’existence de limites aux activités humaines, autrement
dit d’en réguler les pratiques.
Dans le contexte très particulier des applications biomédicales, on
observe à ce jour qu’à mi-chemin entre une réponse à portée universelle
(3)
Résolution sur le clonage de l’embryon humain, 28 octobre 1993, Parlement
européen, JOCE, 22.11.1993, C315/224.
(4)
George Washington University Medical Center (Etats -Unis).
(5)
Résolution sur le clonage, Parlement européen, 12 mars 1997, JOCE,
14.4.1997, C 115/92.
(6)
M ILLET A., POSTEL-VINAY O., «Comment va Dolly? Le clonage des mammifères passe à la vitesse supérieure», La Recherche, avril 1997, pp. 50-63.
(7)
NAU J.Y., «L’Europe se mobilise contre le clonage des êtres humains», Le
Monde, 13 janvier 1998.
(8)
Résolution sur le clonage humain, Parlement européen, 15 janvier 1998,
JOCE, 2.2.1998, C 34/164.
(9)
Parlement européen, C-R débats, 15.1.1998, p. 53.
64
Un nouveau défi
quelque peu symbolique concernant spécifiquement la protection du génome humain et des encadrements nationaux desservis par leur variété, une
cohérence semble, quoique timidement, se dégager. Cette cohérence est liée
à l’effort d’harmonisation au niveau régional opéré par le droit supranational européen. On sait cependant que ni le droit communautaire ni le droit
du Conseil de l’Europe n’ont de réelle compétence normative dans le domaine pénal, matière qui relève de la souveraineté nationale. Toutefois, le
droit européen supranational entend déterminer un certain nombre d’actes
illégaux. Leur inscription normative sera alors relayée par le droit répressif
des Etats, ceux-ci conservant également le choix des sanctions appropriées.
Dès lors, cette intervention supranationale donne une orientation certaine
aux politiques criminelles des Etats européens en ce qui concerne la protection transfrontière des générations futures.
La tentative d’harmonisation des politiques criminelles qui se construit très timidement encore sous nos yeux avec le domaine des sciences de
la vie prend un intérêt particulier lorsqu’il s’agit du clonage reproductif
humain. Reste à savoir si l’option à portée universelle du crime contre
l’humanité est parfaitement recevable (III).
I − En quête de l’humanité du genre humain: le détour par la dignité humaine
Préliminaires
Le propre de l’individu vivant est de se perpétuer grâce à l’arrivée
d’une nouvelle génération qui se trouve héritière d’un patrimoine génétique
transmis des générations antérieures aux générations futures par le biais de
la génération parentale. C’est en ce sens que «chacun d’entre nous porte un
message de ses ancêtres dans chaque cellule de son corps. C’est l’ADN, le
matériau génétique, qui se transmet de génération en génération. Et dans
cet ADN sont écrites notre histoire en tant qu’individu, mais aussi toute
l’histoire de l’espèce humaine» (10).
Si le propre de la vie est bien de se transmettre de génération en génération, le propre de l’individu sexué est de se perpétuer grâce à un autre
individu dans le but d’en produire un troisième. Ce troisième individu, et
(10)
SYKES B., (2001), Les sept filles d’Eve, Génétique et histoire de nos origines:
une incroyable découverte qui nous mène jusqu’à nos ancêtres, Paris, Albin Michel,
p.9.
Un nouveau défi
65
c’est ce qui importe pour nous de retenir aujourd’hui, n’est selon les termes
du généticien Albert Jacquard, ni la reproduction d’un parent ou de l’autre,
ni même la moyenne des deux; il constitue un ensemble nouveau et unique(11). C’est ce programme de transmission sexuée qui dans le même
temps commande la «constance des espèces» et assure «la variabilité des
individus» (12). Cette variabilité est rendue possible grâce à la combinaison
aléatoire du capital génétique qui s’effectue à chaque fécondation.
En effet, les gènes humains sont portés par 23 paires de chromosomes présentes dans toutes les cellules somatiques de l’espèce humaine. En
revanche, au sein des cellules germinales, à savoir les spermatozoïdes et
ovules, chaque chromosome est présent en un seul exemplaire. Lors de la
fécondation, les jeux des chromosomes du père et de la mère se combinent
pour former les paires de chromosomes qui seront présentes dans le noyau
de chaque cellule du futur individu apportant ainsi la contribution au capital
génétique de la génération suivante.
L’ADN combiné de chaque personne comporte bien sûr des mutations, qui signent son unicité. Cependant, ces mutations peuvent également
être responsables d’une perturbation de l’activité biologique normale, c’està-dire d’une maladie génétique. Toutefois, il faut avoir à l’esprit que tout
individu est porteur de gènes de maladies plus ou moins graves, gènes qui
se transmettent, mais qui ne permettent pas à la maladie de s’exprimer s’ils
sont présents en un seul exemplaire et en l’absence d’un environnement
favorable.
D’une vision biologiste de la protection des générations futures à la
reconnaissance de la dignité humaine
Il est bien évident que cette seule dimension génétique ne saurait
fonder la complexité humaine du genre humain au regard du Droit. Celle -ci
ne se résume en aucun cas à cette simple configuration chromosomique.
Mais l’extrême difficulté à circonscrire juridiquement la notion d’humanité
du genre humain − difficulté annonciatrice d’un accroc redoutable au principe de légalité qui impose une interprétation stricte des termes de la loi
pénale − oblige le juriste épris de définitions ordonnées et précises à se
tourner cette fois du côté d’une représentation sémantique moins rigide.
(11)
JACQUARD A., (1982), «La science face au racisme», in Racisme, science et
pseudo-science, Actes -colloque, Athènes 3.3.1981, Paris, Unesco, p. 16.
(12)
GUERIN-M ARCHAND CL., (1997), Les manipulations génétiques, Paris, Puf,
p. 3.
66
Un nouveau défi
Plus exactement, cette représentation renverrait − pour emprunter
l’expression de Mireille Delmas-Marty – vers l’expression d’un
«irréductible humain » (13).
Certaines dispositions normatives témoignent de cette difficulté à déterminer positivement la notion juridique d’humanité. Croyant ainsi abolir
l’obstacle, elles ont fait prévaloir une vision biologiste de la protection des
générations futures.
Révélatrice de cette option biologiste, la législation répressive française n’intègre pas les dispositions pénales concernant les atteintes à «la
protection de l’espèce humaine» au sein du titre éminemment symbolique
intitulé «des crimes contre l’humanité». Le Code pénal n’assimile donc pas
l’espèce humaine à la notion d’humanité. Il n’autorise pas l’équation entre
l’infraction qui porte atteinte à l’espèce humaine et celle qui relève du
crime contre l’humanité.
Selon ce découpage, la modification délibérée de l’héritage chromosomique de l’espèce humaine constitutive de la mise en œuvre d’une pratique eugénique tendant à l’organisation de la sélection des personnes et qui
porte par là même atteinte à l’espèce humaine (art. 511-1 Code pénal) se
différencie de la destruction arbitraire d’un groupe ethnique ou racial particulier à partir de tout critère arbitraire, cette infraction, relevant du crime
contre l’humanité (art. 211-1 Code pénal). Les peines sont également différentes: le crime contre l’humanité est punissable d’une peine de réclusion
criminelle à perpétuité, le crime d’atteinte à l’espèce humaine est sanctio nné d’une peine de vingt ans de réclusion criminelle.
On le voit, le législateur national a préféré confiner les atteintes à
l’espèce humaine dans un chapitre contenant des infractions techniques et
sectorielles «en matière d’éthique biomédicale» qui relèvent de la santé
publique. Ce faisant, le Code pénal français opte pour une vision biologiste
de la protection des générations futures au détriment d’une approche plus
juridiste qui serait rattachée au droit des droits de l’homme par le biais du
respect dû à l’humanité.
Cette vision biologiste est également affichée du côté de dispositions
à portée universelle. C’est le cas de l’article 1er de la Déclaration universelle sur le génome humain et les droits de l’homme adoptée par l’Unesco
le 11 novembre 1997. Cette déclaration pose d’emblée que «le génome humain sous-tend l’unité fondamentale de tous les membres de la famille hu-
(13)
DELMAS -M ARTY M., (1994), «Le crime contre l’humanité, les droits de
l’homme et l’irréductible humain», Revue de Science Criminelle, p. 477.
Un nouveau défi
67
maine, ainsi que la reconnaissance de leur dignité et de leur diversité.
Dans un sens symbolique, il est le patrimoine de l’humanité ».
L’approche quelque peu restrictive de cette Déclaration sectorielle et
spécifique de 1997 fait dépendre de son patrimoine génétique non seulement «l’unité fondamentale » de la famille humaine mais, plus préoccupant
encore, la «reconnaissance de la dignité intrinsèque» des membres de cette
famille humaine (art. 1 er ). Ce fondement laisse un peu rêveur si l’on songe
que les scientifiques ont montré que le «code génétique est sensiblement
universel» et qu’il est largement commun à toutes les espèces vivantes.
Cette démonstration a eu pour conséquence d’amoindrir considérablement
«le clivage entre humain/non-humain» et a donc «cessé de déterminer
l’avancée de ce type de recherches» (14). Devra-t-elle paradoxalement continuer à déterminer l’«humanité» comprise dans un sens jurid ique?
Cette référence à la notion de patrimoine humain, y compris comme
le prévoit la Déclaration universelle sur le génome humain dans un sens
symbolique, renvoie à la question de savoir si l’humanité peut être considérée comme un sujet de droit international juridiquement titulaire d’un patrimoine ( 15). De plus en plus, cette référence qui se multiplie suppose que
l’humanité soit un sujet de droit appelé à gérer un héritage commun dont
l’objet n’est autre que … l’humanité elle -même ( 16).
Toutefois, ce texte ne renonce pas pour autant à la reconnaissance du
principe de dignité humaine. Il est vrai que ce principe est accrédité d’une
fonction de rempart juridique face au développement des techno-sciences.
C’est ainsi que l’approche biologiste de la Déclaration universelle sur le
génome humain se trouve tempérée par les termes de son article 2 qui retrouve ici le fondement de la dignité humaine en précisant que «chaque
individu a droit au respect de sa dignité et de ses droits, quelles que soient
ses caractéristiques génétiques» et que «cette dignité impose de ne pas réduire les individus à leurs caractéristiques génétiques et de respecter leur
caractère unique et leur diversité».
(14)
HUBER G., (1992), «Vers un anti-destin», in F. GROS , G. HUBER, Vers un
anti-destin? Patrimoine génétique et droits de l’humanité, Paris, ODILE JACOB , p. 24.
(15)
DUPUY R.J., (1984), «La notion de patrimoine commun de l’humanité appliquée aux fonds marins», in Droits et libertés à la fin du XXe siècle. Etudes offertes à A.
Colliard, Paris, Pédone, p. 197.
(16)
Pour la Commission nationale consultative des droits de l'homme, qui s’est
exprimée dans un avis du 23 mai 1996 sur l’avant-projet de la déclaration universelle,
le terme de «patrimoine commun de l'humanité» est ambigu pour désigner l'héritage
génétique. Il paraîtrait préférable dans le contexte d’une Déclaration universelle de
retenir le terme d’ «héritage commun de l'humanité».
68
Un nouveau défi
Dans ce contexte, l’humanité est assimilée à la famille humaine, renouant dans le même temps avec la terminologie de la Déclaration universelle des droits de l’homme de 1948 qui cimente quant à elle tous les membres de la famille humaine par la dignité qui leur est consubstantielle (1er
considérant-Préambule). Que la dignité humaine soit inhérente à l’être humain rend sa protection juridique absolue (17). Le droit des droits de
l’homme lui accorde une place tout à fait particulière et plus précieuse encore que celle du droit à la vie qui n’exclut pas que soit porté atteinte à la
vie par le biais de la légitime défense ou même de la répression d’une insurrection (art. 2 CESDH). Le droit au respect de la dignité humaine apparaît bien comme un droit absolument indérogeable et qui ne souffre
«aucune dérogation, exception ou restriction» (18). Aucune dérogation à la
protection contre les traitements inhumains et dégradants n’est admise, y
compris en cas de danger public menaçant la nation, ce qu’affirment sole nnellement l’article 4 du Pacte international relatif aux droits civils et polit iques de 1966 et l’article 15 de la Convention européenne des droits de
l’homme. Quant à la Charte des droits fondamentaux proclamée par
l’Union européenne en décembre 2000(19), elle identifie la dignité humaine
à «une valeur indivisible et universelle» inviolable (Préambule et art. 1 er).
Un autre texte international mais cette fois à portée plus réduite car
régionale, fait prévaloir l’idée d’une responsabilité transgénérationnelle qui
pourrait être considérée comme une des caractéristiques fondamentales du
concept d’«humanité». La Convention du Conseil de l’Europe pour la protection des droits de l’homme et de la dignité de l’être humain à l’égard des
applications de la biologie et de la médecine ouverte à la signature le 4 avril
1997 à Oviedo( 20), affirme solennellement que «les progrès de la biologie et
(17)
DELMAS -M ARTY M., in DELMAS -M ARTY M., LUCAS DE LEYSSAC C., (2002),
Libertés et droits fondamentaux, Paris, Seuil, 2ème éd., p. 23.
(18)
DELMAS -M ARTY M., in DELMAS -M ARTY M., LUCAS DE LEYSSAC C., Libertés
et droits fondamentaux, op. cit, p. 23.
(19)
Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, JOCE, 18.12.2000,
C 364/1.
(20)
Convention pour la protection des Droits de l’Homme et de la dignité de
l’être humain à l’égard des applications de la biologie et de la médecine: Convention
sur les Droits de l’Homme et la biomédecine, 4 avril 1997, entrée en vigueur le 1er
décembre 1999. A ce jour: 18 Etats membres du Conseil de l’Europe ont signé cette
convention, mais sans l’avoir encore ratifiée ou sans y avoir encore adhéré: Bulgarie,
Croatie, Finlande, France, Islande, Italie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Luxe mbourg, Moldavie,
Pays-Bas, Norvège, Pologne, Suède, Suisse, Ex-République de Yougoslavie de Macédoine, Turquie, Ukraine; 13 Etats l’ont ratifiée ou y ont adhéré: Chypre, Danemark,
Un nouveau défi
69
de la médecine doivent être utilisés pour le bénéfice des générations présentes et futures» et qu’un «usage impropre de la biologie et de la médecine» pourrait mettre en danger la dignité humaine. Dans la mesure où la
Convention de biomédecine reconnaît l’importance d’assurer cette dignité
humaine, elle prévoit également «la nécessité de respecter l’être humain à
la fois comme individu et dans son appartenance à l’espèce humaine»
(Préambule).
Etablissant encore plus fermement la nécessité de s’engager sur la
voie de la dépendance à l’égard des générations à venir, la récente Charte
des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne exprime très clairement
que la jouissance des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine entraîne
des responsabilités et des devoirs «tant à l’égard d’autrui qu’à l’égard de
la communauté humaine et des générations futures» (Préambule).
Le devoir de prise en compte des intérêts futurs du genre humain repose donc sur l’idée d’une forme de «fraternité» universelle qui dépasse les
limites de la génération. En ce sens, les hommes et femmes à venir doivent
être regardés comme des êtres humains «en dépit de leur existence seulement future et donc de leur anonymat. Malgré leur éloignement temporel,
ils entrent dans le cercle des êtres avec lesquels nous estimons devoir établir des rapports définissables en termes de bien et de mal» (21).
II − La thérapie génique germinale ou la modification des générations
futures
Préliminaires
Schématiquement, la thérapie génique consiste en l’introduction d’un
gène normal dans le génome d’un individu à l’aide d’un vecteur viral et ce
dans le but que le gène nouveau prenne en charge les fonctions non assumées par le gène déficient ou anormal( 22). Il existe à ce jour deux types de
thérapies géniques.
Espagne, Estonie, Géorgie, Grèce, Hongrie, Portugal, Roumanie, Saint-Marin, Slovaquie, Slovénie, République Tchèque.
(21)
VISSER’T HOOFT H.PH., (1991), «Développement technologique et responsabilité envers les générations futures», Archives de philosophie du droit, Droit et
science, Paris, Sirey, T. 36, p. 33.
(22)
KEVLES D., (1995), Au nom de l’eugénisme, Paris, Puf, p. XII.
70
Un nouveau défi
La première thérapie est dite «thérapie génique somatique». Elle
consiste à traiter par des modifications génétiques l’organisme d’un malade
en ne traitant que ses propres cellules à l’exclusion des cellules de la reproduction. Dès lors, les corrections du patrimoine génétique des cellules
n’affectent que l’individu traité.
La deuxième correction génétique est dite «thérapie génique germinale». Celle -ci est prévue pour traiter soit les cellules des gamètes c’est-àdire les cellules servant à la reproduction, ovocyte ou spermatozoïde y
compris au stade de leur maturation, soit encore les embryons à un stade
très précoce de formation de l’œuf fécondé par introduction d’un gène qui
au fur et à mesure des divisions cellulaires affectera toutes les cellules du
futur individu. De ce fait, cette thérapie a pour but de transmettre aux générations à venir la correction génétique initialement opérée. C’est essentie llement ce dernier type de thérapie qui en affectant les générations futures
malgré elles pose problème et génère de nouvelles revendications.
Vers de nouvelles exigences
Recourir à cette forme de thérapie signifie qu’un individu pourra volontairement vouloir transmettre la mutation génétique qu’il aura initiée aux
générations futures(23). De cette possibilité technique peuvent découler de
nouvelles exigences dont le non-respect pourrait un jour être sanctionné.
Une personne pourra prétendre à ce qui serait considéré comme le droit de
modifier sa descendance ou le droit d’en déterminer la qualité génétique en
revendiquant une autonomie décisionnelle en matière de santé et une maîtrise des choix qui concernent sa vie (24).
Plus insidieux encore, dans un contexte de pratiques thérapeutiques
germinales banalisées, il pourra être reproché à une personne d’avoir refusé
une thérapie génique qui aurait pu éviter la transmission d’une pathologie
héréditaire. Or, la biologie rend effectivement possible ce nouveau confort.
Un tel droit à un patrimoine génétique non atteint pourrait devenir un droit
à la perfectibilité de son génome. Au droit à l’amélioration de ses gènes et à
la revendication de transmettre un patrimoine génétique performant, pour-
(23)
KNOPPERS B.M., «La génétique humaine: patrimoine et protection», in GROS
F. et HUBER G., Vers un anti-destin? Patrimoine génétique et droits de l’humanité,
ouvrage précité, p. 165.
(24)
CORNAVIN T., (1985), «Théorie des droits de l’homme et progrès de la biologie», Revue française de théorie juridique, Droits, vol. 2, p. 100.
Un nouveau défi
71
rait donc s’adjoindre la possibilité de faire valoir le droit à naître vierge de
toute prédisposition génétique à certaines maladies( 25).
Un tel préjudice pourrait trouver son origine dans la coupable négligence ou le refus des ascendants de se prêter à une modification délibérée
de leurs gènes. D’ores et déjà, le fondement de ce droit se trouve posé par
la doctrine au titre même de la revendication du respect de la dignité humaine sous la forme d’une interrogation essentielle à ce débat. On s’est ainsi interrogé : «entre celui qui refuse le principe eugénique comme attentatoire à la dignité humaine et celui qui place cette dignité dans la maîtrise
par l’homme de son destin, dans sa lutte contre les tares et son combat
pour l’amélioration de l’espèce, lequel est le plus respectueux de la dignité
humaine?» (26). Dans cette perspective, prohiber la thérapie génique germinale précisément au nom de la dignité humaine des générations futures
pourrait signifier la privation d’opportunités d’amélioration de la vie mais
cette fois … au détriment des générations futures.
Cette interrogation est fondamentale et sans aucun doute tout à fait
légitime. Elle vient se greffer sur une notion – celle de la dignité humaine −
qui bien que chargée, voire surchargée, de sens sans jamais être positivement définie par les textes – n’en est pas moins problématique au regard
des bénéfices qu’offrent les nouvelles technologies du vivant lorsqu’il
s’agit de respecter l’exigence fondamentale de consentement aux soins.
L’impossible consentement des générations futures à leur propre
modification
Le principe de dignité humaine se traduit dans la sphère médicale par
le respect de l’intégrité et de l’inviolabilité du corps humain. Dès lors, toute
ingérence dans la sphère personnelle physique ou biologique est a priori
considérée comme une violation du respect des droits fondamentaux de la
personne humaine. Ce qui suppose que l’intégrité corporelle (et psychique)
ne puisse être violée sans le consentement de l’intéressé. Or, pour satisfaire
cette exigence, l’obtention du consentement libre et éclairé se révèle inopérante dans le cadre de la thérapie génique germinale.
La modification génétique se transmettant aux générations futures, se
pose à l’évidence le problème d’une adhésion libre et informée de celles-ci.
(25)
LEMENNICIER B., (1991), «Le corps humain : propriété de l’Etat ou propriété
de soi?», Revue française de théorie juridique – Droits, vol. 13, p. 113.
(26)
CORNAVIN T., «Théorie des droits de l’homme et progrès de la biologie», article précité, p. 101.
72
Un nouveau défi
La difficulté se rencontrera pour celui qui aura subi au stade d’œuf fécondé
une recombinaison de son matériel génétique, recombinaison à son tour
transmise à ses descendants. Il est bien évident, que son consentement
n’aura pas été recueilli. Sa propre descendance n’aura aucun lien immédiat
avec ceux qui auront primitivement donné leur accord à l’acte de modific ation du génome. Ces générations feront en quelque sorte figure d’otage de
l’acceptation initiale donnée par leur aïeux, sans égard pour leur libre arbitre. Sur ce point, la doctrine n’a pu que constater que le rapport entre les
«vivants et ceux qui n’existent pas encore» est forcément vicié puisque par
définition «les vivants occupent à l’égard de la postérité, une position de
force sans limite aucune» (27).
La question de l’ingénierie génétique pose donc un problème crucial
et surtout inédit. Il ne s’agit plus d’atteintes aux corps des individus euxmêmes − ou à un de leurs éléments − mais d’ingérences sur les personnes à
venir, assimilables à des vic times par ricochet en cas d’échec de la correction génétique.
C’est en ce sens qu’aura été porté atteinte à la dignité des êtres humains à venir puisque l’exigence du consentement libre et éclairé trouve ici
ses limites. Or, selon la formule de Catherine Labrusse-Riou, la dignité
humaine suppose que l’homme ne soit pas traité comme un simple objet,
mais «qu’il soit différencié de la chose inerte et vivante, et respecté en sa
personne» ce pour quoi «l’éthique et le droit exigent sa participation volo ntaire, son consentement libre et éclairé» (28) à toute intervention dans la
sphère de la santé.
Ce refus de l’instrumentalisation des êtres humains, y compris pour
les individus à venir, s’est d’abord exprimé à travers le Code de Nuremberg. Pour la première fois, la justice avait été confrontée à des médecins
qui avaient massivement traité des hommes comme de simples sujets
d’expérience. Il a fallu attendre 1966 pour qu’un texte juridique à caractère
universel et à force contraignante face du consentement d’une personne à
une expérimentation médicale la face immédiatement visible de la dignité
humaine. En effet, l’article 7 du Pacte international des droits civils et politiques de 1966 prohibe expressément toute expérience médicale ou scienti(27)
VISSER’T HOOFT H.PH., «Développement technologique et responsabilité envers les générations futures», article précité, p. 34.
(28)
LABRUSSE-RIOU C., (1988), «Les exigences normatives et institutionnelles de
protection des droits de l’homme en matière d’expérimentation», in Expérimentation
biomédicale et droits de l’homme, Fondation Marangopoulos pour les droits de
l’homme, Paris, Puf, p.132.
Un nouveau défi
73
fique qui serait réalisée en l’absence du consentement libre du sujet. Ce
texte fait même de l’expérimentation médicale et scientifique un traitement
cruel, inhumain ou dégradant particulier en posant que «Nul ne sera soumis
à la torture, ni à des peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants. En particulier, il est interdit de soumettre une personne sans son
libre consentement à une expérience médicale ou scientifique».
En 1983, la Commission européenne des droits de l’homme avait affirmé un principe important selon lequel un traitement médical de caractère
expérimental mené sans le consentement du sujet peut, dans certaines
conditions, être considéré comme une atteinte à l’article 3 de la Convention
européenne des droits de l’homme qui prohibe les traitements inhumains ou
dégradants. La Commission s’était alors exprimée dans une décision X.c
Danemark du 2 mars 1983 à propos d’une affaire de stérilisation volontaire.
La requérante avait consenti au principe de l’intervention chirurgicale : une
stérilisation utilisant de nouveaux procédés, qui fut cependant suivie d’une
grossesse. La requérante s’était considérée comme victime d’une part d’un
traitement inhumain et dégradant sous la forme d’une expérience menée
sans son consentement et d’autre part à la suite de l’intervention de tortures
psychologiques ne sachant pas si elle était enceinte ou non. La Commission
écarte en l’espèce la violation de l’article 3 de la Convention mais rappelle
d’une part qu’un traitement dit inhumain suppose un minimum de gravité,
provoquant de vives souffrances physiques et morales, et d’autre part qu’un
traitement dit dégradant suppose une humiliation d’une certaine gravité.
Reste à savoir si une fois devenue une pratique médicale banalisée, la
thérapie génique germinale pourra toujours s’analyser en une expérience
médicale ou scientifique au sens propre, donc comme un cas particulier de
pratiques inhumaines ou dégradantes.
Il faut reconnaître cependant que les conséquences des investigations
sur le génome humain dépassent les seules préoccupations liées à
l’adhésion des futures générations aux soins pratiqués en amont. De la
même façon, elles retentissent beaucoup plus loin au-delà des simples limites du droit à réparation découlant d’un dommage qui serait directement lié
à une intervention sur le génome humain pratiquée sur un ascendant au
«profit» d’un de ses descendants.
En effet, la modification du génome humain transmissible aux générations futures revêt une gravité particulièrement aiguë si l’on considère la
74
Un nouveau défi
question sous l’angle de la mise «sous contrôle génétique» ( 29) des générations futures.
La mise sous contrôle génétique
L’une des conséquences les plus graves de ce type de soins est la
quête de l’enfant idéal qui serait exempt de maladies génétiques voire,
comme on l’entend parfois, de prédisposition à la criminalité, à la timidité,
à l’aptitude à diriger ou encore à des inclinaisons politiques(30). Corrélativement se dessine le danger d’une norme génétique qui serait constituée de
standards adoptés en fonction de critères liés à une prédisposition à certa ines pathologies. Ces critères pourraient parfaitement être dictés par des
exigences de polices d’assurance ou de priorités d’embauche et de licenciements dans certaines branches d’activité.
Le Tribunal de Première Instance des Communautés européennes est
intervenu en 1994 dans un contexte similaire. Les juges ont annulé la décision d’inaptitude à l’embauche fondée sur le risque chiffré par un médecin
à partir d’une biopsie du foie réalisée quatre ans plus tôt et qui révélait la
présence d’antigène de l’hépatite C. Le spécialiste consulté avait apprécié
le risque que le candidat à l’embauche développe une cirrhose du foie à
environ 20 à 25 % sur une évolution de 15 à 20 ans. Les juges communautaires ont estimé que «la maladie dont souffre le requérant ne lui cause aucun trouble et ne l’empêche aucunement, à l’heure actuelle, de remplir to utes les obligations qui sont susceptibles de lui incomber dans le cadre de
ses fonctions» (§43). Par conséquent, pour le Tribunal, le pronostic médical
portant sur l’évolution possible de la maladie ne peut justifier une décision
d’inaptitude ( 31).
Un tel cas de refus d’embauche pour prédisposition génétique qui
s’analyse en une discrimination à l’embauche pourrait être porté devant la
Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur le fondement combiné de
l’article 11 de la Convention sur les droits de l’homme et la biomédecine et
de l’article 14 de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Le
premier interdit expressément toute forme de discrimination à l’encontre
(29)
TESTART J., «Génétique: puissance et illusions», Transversales Science et
Culture, précité.
(30)
GUILLEBAUD J.C., (2001), Le principe d’humanité, Paris, Seuil, p. 230.
(31)
Arrêt, TPI, 9 juin 1994, X. c/ Commission, T94/92 - DE SCHUTTE O., (1995),
«Les examens médicaux à l’embauche de la Commission européenne», Revue trimestrielle des droits de l’homme, p. 108.
Un nouveau défi
75
d’une personne en raison de son patrimoine génétique, le second dispose
que la jouissance des droits et libertés reconnus par la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme doit être assurée sans distinction fondée sur
le sexe, la race, la couleur, la naissance ou toute autre discrimination( 32).
Une porte est ainsi entrouverte au bénéfice des victimes d’applications
biomédicales pour faire valoir leurs droits sur le fondement de la non discrimination inscrite dans la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.
Cependant, il reste regrettable que la condamnation de la modific ation de la lignée germinale n’ait pas été ajoutée aux dispositions de la
Convention européenne des droits de l’homme malgré la proposition émise
en 1982 par l’Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe. Les parlementaires avaient suggéré d’y inscrire expressément le «droit d’hériter des
caractéristiques génétiques n’ayant subi aucune manipulation». Ainsi cla irement énoncé, ce droit additionnel substantiel aurait bénéficié directement
de la jurisprudence évolutive et créatrice de la Cour européenne des droits
de l’homme. Mais cette proposition n’a pas été suivie d’effet.
En outre, cette proposition de l’Assemblée parlementaire présentait
le mérite de couvrir non seulement les modifications thérapeutiques du génome humain mais également les manipulations de convenance touchant
par exemple à la taille du futur individu, à sa couleur d’yeux ou à une prédisposition à l’éthylisme. De son côté, le Parlement européen se prononçait
catégoriquement à travers l’adoption d’une résolution du 16 mars 1989
contre l’utilisation des analyses du génome dans le but de renforcer dans un
sens positif le pool génétique de la population ou de procéder à une sélection négative de caractéristiques génétiques considérées comme indésirables ou dans le but de définir des normes génétiques (point 12) (33).
(32)
Certes, le patrimoine génétique d’une personne n’est pas couvert par les
droits garantis par la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme et la jurisprudence
européenne a considéré, à l’occasion d’une affaire déjà ancienne dite «Linguistique
belge» de 1968, que les termes restrictifs de l’article 14 devaient se lire avec l’un des
autres droits ou libertés garantis par la Convention (CEDH, Affaire linguistique belge,
23 juillet 1968, § 9). Toutefois, cette conception évolue sous l’impulsion des juges de
Strasbourg eux-mêmes. Trente ans après cette décision, les juges ont favorablement
accueilli les moyens de requérants «sans que le lien avec le droit substantiel soit réellement établi» réalisant ainsi une «autonomie grandissante de l’article 14» (PRISOESSAWE S.J., (1998), «Les droits sociaux et l’égalité de traitement dans la jurisprudence
de la cour européenne des droits de l’homme – A propos des arrêts Van Raalte c/ PaysBas et Petro vic c/ Autriche (21 février 1997 et 27 mars 1998)», Revue trimestrielle des
droits de l’homme, pp. 730-731.
(33)
Résolution sur les problèmes éthiques et juridiques de la manipulation génétique du 16 mars 1989, Parlement européen, doc. A2-327/88, JOCE, 17.4.1989, C/96.
76
Un nouveau défi
Il revient cependant à la Convention sur les droits de l’homme et la
biomédecine adoptée par le Conseil de l’Europe en 1997 de prévoir qu’une
intervention ayant pour but de modifier le génome humain ne peut être entreprise que pour des raisons préventives, diagnostiques ou thérapeutiques.
Mais surtout cette intervention ne peut être entreprise qu’à condition de ne
pas avoir pour finalité d’introduire une modification dans le génome de la
descendance (art. 13). Toutefois, cet article n’exclut pas les interventions
sur les cellules somatiques qui pourraient avoir pour effet secondaire non
voulu d’affecter la lignée germinale ( 34). Il convient de souligner qu’une législation nationale a fait de cette manipulation par imprudence une infraction pénale. Il s’agit du Code pénal espagnol de 1995 qui consacre un titre
entier aux «Délits et manipulations génétiques». Une première interdiction
condamne ceux qui, dans un objectif autre que l’élimination ou la réduction
de malformations ou de maladies graves, manipulent les gènes humains en
modifiant le génotype. Suit une deuxième infraction qui vise la modific ation du génotype même lorsqu’elle est imputable à une grave imprudence
(art. 159 Code pénal espagnol).
Quant à l’Europe du marché unique, sa réponse emprunte la voie de
la neutralisation pécuniaire. La Commission européenne refuse en effet de
financer au titre de ses programmes-cadres pluriannuels de recherche et de
développement une activité de recherche qui modifierait ou destinée à modifier le patrimoine génétique d’êtres humains par altération de cellules
germinales ou agissant à tout stade du développement embryonnaire qui
puisse rendre cette altération héréditaire(35). Autre réponse économique, la
directive 98/44/CE adoptée le 6 juillet 1998 relative à la protection jurid ique des inventions biotechnologiques(36) gèle la possibilité d’obtenir un brevet pour un procédé de modification de l’identité génétique germinale de
l’être humain (art. 6). Cette exclusion de la sphère de la brevetabilité repose sur l’idée que l’exploitation commerciale d’un tel procédé – tout
comme le procédé de clonage humain − serait contraire à l’ordre public et
aux bonnes mœurs. Cette exigence de caractère éthique aura certainement
(34)
Rapport explicatif à la Convention sur les droits de l’homme et la biomédecine, Direction des Affaires juridiques, Conseil de l’Europe, janvier 1997, DIR/JUR
(97) 1, p. 21.
(35)
Pour un exemple: Décision, 25 avril 1994, No. 1110/94/CE, JOCE,
18.05.1994, No. L 126; GEE, Avis No. 12, Les aspects éthiques de la recherche impliquant l’utilisation d’embryons humains dans le contexte du 5ème programme-cadre de
recherche, 23 novembre 1998.
(36)
Directive 98/44/CE du Parlement et du Conseil du 6 juillet 1998, JOCE, 30.
07.1998, No. L 213/13.
Un nouveau défi
77
des répercussions conséquentes. En effet, les énormes moyens mis en jeu
par l’industrie des biotechnologies conduisent légitimement à la volonté de
recueillir les fruits des investissements affectés au développement et à la
recherche. L’un des moyens de compenser financièrement ces mises de
fond, souvent très lourdes, injectées dans les circuits de l’innovation, est
l’obtention d’un brevet d’invention qui assure à son titulaire un monopole
temporaire sur cette invention.
A la lumière de ce contexte économique prometteur, il n’est pas inintéressant de rappeler que les rédacteurs de la directive sur la dissémination
volontaire d’organismes génétiquement modifiés adoptée le 12 mars 2001
ont cru devoir préciser que l’être humain n’entrait pas dans la définition
d’un organisme génétiquement modifié (OGM) ( 37). On peut donc encore se
réjouir qu’une réglementation relative à la dissémination volontaire et à la
mise sur le marché d’êtres humains et d’embryons humains génétiquement
modifiés ne soit toujours pas d’actualité !
III − Le clonage reproductif humain: l’hypothèse d’un crime contre
l’humanité
La nécessité d’une harmonisation des législations
Eu égard aux conséquences − tant biologiques que sociales et qui
pour la plupart restent encore inconnues − de la mise en œuvre du clonage
humain à visée reproductive, il est certain qu’une réponse passant par
l’harmonisation des interdits au plan universel représente une option tentante et − peut-être − efficace. Une tentative en ce sens est actuellement
enclenchée puisque l’ONU envisage l’élaboration d’une «Convention internationale contre le clonage d’êtres humains à des fins de reproduction»
contraignante ( 38).
(37)
BLUMBERG-M OKRI M., «Le régime modifié des organismes réglementairement disséminés − Aperçu de la directive 201/18CE du 12 mars 2001 relative à la dissémination volontaire d’organismes génétiquement modifiés dans l’environnement»,
Petites Affiches, 11 septembre 2001, p. 4. Directive 2001/18/CE, JOCE,17.4.2001, L
106/1.
(38)
«La sixième commission recommande la création d’un comité spécial pour
étudier l’élaboration éventuelle d’une convention contre le clonage d’êtres humains»,
19 novembre 2001, Sixième commission, 27e séance, AG/J/367.
78
Un nouveau défi
Pour l’heure, on se trouve en présence d’une production normative
internationale tout à fait embryonnaire et non contraignante pour les Etats:
la Déclaration universelle sur le génome humain du 11 novembre 1997 déjà
évoquée.
Or ce texte à prétention universelle qui identifie dans son article 11 le
clonage à des fins de reproduction d’êtres humains comme une pratique
contraire à la dignité humaine se borne cependant à prévoir qu’une telle
pratique ne doit simplement «pas être permise». La faiblesse de cette expression est d’autant plus surprenante que, comme on l’a vu, le respect de
la dignité humaine ne souffre en droit aucune dérogation.
A l’opposé de la Déclaration universelle sur le génome humain, il
existe des réponses nationales coercitives. Or, celles-ci constituent par nature des réponses disparates. Les Etats n’ont en effet pas tous légiféré sur
les mêmes aspects de la question. Certains n’ont encore pris aucune pos ition législative que ce soit en faveur ou en défaveur du clonage qu’il soit dit
«thérapeutiq ue» ou reproductif.
Car il est convenu aujourd’hui de distinguer deux types de clonage
en fonction de leur finalité respective.
On sait ainsi que le clonage embryonnaire humain peut-être entrepris
dans un but thérapeutique. Il permet dans ce cas la production illimitée de
cellules et tissus génétiquement et immunologiquement identiques à celles
du patient atteint par exemple d’affections neurodégénératives, de cancers
ou d’insuffisances hépatocellulaires(39).
Mais, il serait également envisageable d’entreprendre une pratique de
clonage humain avec pour objectif la naissance d’un enfant. Ce clonage
reproductif impliquant la création d’un double peut se faire classiquement
par scission au stade des toutes premières cellules d’un œuf fécondé in vitro
dans un cas de figure proche de celui de la gémellité naturelle.
Mais une technique plus problématique d’un point de vue éthique a
été mise au jour et rendue publique avec la conception de la brebis Dolly ( 40). Il s’agit de la méthode de clonage reproductif par transfert du noyau
prélevé sur une cellule déjà adulte et intégré dans le cytoplasme d’un ovocyte énuclée après traitement adéquat. L’embryon ainsi produit exclut toute
(39)
KHAN A., (2002), «Le clonage «thérapeutique» et le statut de l’embryon», Le
clonage, coordooné par A. M CLAREN, Editions du Conseil de l’Europe, p. 117.
(40)
CAMPBELL K. H. S., (2002), «Dolly, la brebis clonée», Le clonage, coordooné
par A. M CLAREN, Editions du Conseil de l’Europe, p. pp. 61-71.
Un nouveau défi
79
procréation sexuée autrement dit toute recombinaison aléatoire des gènes
parentaux(41).
Dans sa ferme volonté d’interdire les pratiques de clonage humain
quelle qu’en soit leur finalité, le Parlement européen dans une résolution du
7 septembre 2000 a préféré passer outre une telle distinction entérinée par
les scientifiques et reprise par les juristes. Les députés ont considéré qu’elle
était une distinction technique qui ne faisait que renvoyer à une «stratégie
sémantique» susceptible «d’affaiblir la signification morale du clonage» et
par là-même d’assouplir les interdictions envisageable s (point G; H).
Au niveau des droits nationaux, mis à part le cas de la Constitution
irlandaise qui protège l’embryon humain depuis sa conception, et partant
devrait rendre illégales les recherches sur les embryons, le clonage reproductif humain, voire même les tentatives de manipulation des cellules souches embryonnaires, il est le plus souvent tenu compte de cette distinction
entre clonage reproductif et non reproductif.
C’est le cas du gouvernement britannique qui a publiquement annoncé en avril 2001( 42) sa volonté d’être le premier pays au monde à interdire
légalement le clonage humain reproductif. Posée par la loi «Human Reproductive Cloning Act 2001» du 4 décembre 2001, une telle interdiction a une
valeur juridique déterminante car supérieure à toute interdiction administrative auparavant délivrée par l’Autorité de fécondation humaine et
d’embryologie. Est donc passible d’une peine d’emprisonnement de 10 ans
et/ou d’une sanction pécuniaire la personne qui aura implanté dans une
femme un embryon humain créé autrement que par fertilisation. En revanche, la Grande-Bretagne a donné son feu vert aux médecins afin de pouvoir
créer des embryons à des fins thérapeutiques après obtention d’une licence
délivrée par l’Autorité compétente. Auparavant, les recherches sur les embryons étaient légales jusqu’au 14ème jour après la fécondation. Avec The
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Research Purposes) Regulations
entrés en vigueur le 31 janvier 2001, des cellules souches embryonnaires
seront ainsi rendues accessibles aux chercheurs britanniques par création
d’embryons ( 43).
(41)
A TLAN H., «Possibilités biologiques, impossibilités sociales», in A TLAN H.,
A UGE M., DELMAS -M ARTY M., DROIT R.P., FRESCO N., (1999), Le clonage humain,
Paris, Seuil, p. 17 et s.
(42)
The Guardian Website, 18 avril 2001.
(43)
FRANRENET S., «Repères internationaux», Biofutur – Le mensuel européen de
biotechnologie, No. 223, juin 2002, pp. 38-41.
80
Un nouveau défi
Autre exemple législatif, le cas français. En l’état actuel des lois
bioéthiques de 1994 il n’y a aucune disposition spécifique concernant le
clonage humain. Mais le projet de loi bioéthique du 20 juin 2001 entend
intégrer dans le Code pénal l’interdiction du clonage humain comme méthode de procréation en prévoyant une peine de vingt ans de réclusion criminelle pour «une intervention en vue de faire naître un enfant qui ne serait
pas directement issu des gamètes d’un homme et d’une femme» (art. 511-12°). Quant au clonage non reproductif, et contrairement à la législation br itannique, les possibilités actuelles de constituer des clones d’embryons humains comme source de matériel biologique thérapeutique sont exclues par
l’interdiction pénale de concevoir in vitro des embryons humains à des fins
de recherche ou d’expérimentation (art. 511-18 Code pénal) dont la violation est punie de sept ans d’emprisonnement et de 100 000 Euros
d’amende. Le récent projet de loi bioéthique autoriserait en revanche
l’obtention de cellules souches embryonnaires prélevées sur des embryons
surnuméraires obtenus in vitro et qui ne feraient plus l’objet d’un projet
parental.
Mais l’idée d’une répression adéquate contre la création d’un être
humain par la technique du clonage reproductif implique de s’éloigner du
cadre limité des frontières étatiques. Car, il est clair que l’interdiction du
clonage humain comme pratique de procréation assistée à un endroit du
monde ne prohibe ni la recherche ni les pratiques à un autre endroit ( 44).
Cette hypothèse n’est pas de pure école. Richard Seed, un chercheur américain qui a récolté assez de fonds privés pour envisager la création d’une
clinique spécialisée dans la procréation humaine par clonage à Chicago a
prévu qu’en cas d’interdiction du clonage humain sur le territoire américain, il irait à l’étranger. On connaît déjà des pratiques de recours à des mères de substitution par des couples français hors du territoire national, cette
pratique étant considérée comme contraire à l’ordre public français (art. 167 et 16-9 Code civil; Cour de cassation, Ass. Plén. 31 mai 1991). Ces couples s’en remettent alors à des associations américaines susceptibles de
faire le lien entre l’offre d’une mère porteuse et leur demande. Une telle
mise en relation relèverait en France du droit répressif qui condamne
l’entremise entre une personne ou un couple désireux d’accueillir un enfant
et une femme acceptant de porter en elle cet enfant en vue de leur remettre
(art. 227-12, al. 2 Code pénal).
(44)
Assemblée Parlementaire, Compte-rendu, Session 1997, 26ème séance,
BIRRAUX M., AS (1997), CR 26, p. 3.
Un nouveau défi
81
Cette modulation géographique de la licéité présente un éclairage
tout particulier dans l’Europe des quinze. Car l’adéquation entre un espace
spécifique de liberté de circulation des personnes, des services et des marchandises et les degrés variables des permissivités légales nationales n’est
pas évidente (45). L’affaire Blood (46) en témoigne. En l’espèce, une veuve
britannique avait, après prélèvement au Royaume-Uni des gamètes de son
époux victime d’un coma profond, recouru sur le sol belge à une insémination post-mortem qui lui avait été − administrativement − refusée dans son
pays. Cette pratique a pu être entérinée par les juges britanniques sur le
fondement de la libre prestation de services au sein de l’Union européenne,
les gamètes de son époux défunt étant considérés comme des accessoires
d’un service librement délivré sur le territoire communautaire(47).
Cette mosaïque législative, on s’en doute, ne peut que favoriser ce
qu’il est convenu d’appeler aujourd’hui le «tourisme procréatif». D’où un
souci d’harmonisation au niveau européen de l’interdiction du clonage humain à but reproductif.
Le Conseil de l’Europe s’est prononcé à travers un protocole additionnel à la Convention sur les droits de l’homme et la biomédecine adopté
le 12 janvier 1998 ( 48). Ironie de l’histoire, ce protocole additionnel portant
interdiction du clonage d’êtres humains est entré en vigueur en mars 2001
au moment même où un médecin italien et un médecin américain avaient
déclaré être en mesure d’ici deux ans de pallier la stérilité de leurs patients
en recourant à la technique du clonage ( 49).
(45)
BERNARDI A., (2002), «Europe sans frontières et droit pénal», Revue de
Science Criminelle p. 4 et s.
(46)
R. v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, Court of Appeal,
(1997).
(47)
BERGÉ J-S, (2000), «Le droit communautaire dévoyé – Le cas Blood», La
Semaine Juridique - JCP, pp. 289-293.
(48)
Protocole additionnel à la Convention pour la protection des Droits de
l’homme et la dignité de l’être humain à l’égard des applications de la biologie et de la
médecine, portant interdiction du clonage d’êtres humains, adopté le 12 janvier 1998,
entré en vigueur le 1er mars 2001. A ce jour: 18 Etats membres du Conseil de l’Europe
ont signé cette Convention, mais sans l’avoir encore ratifiée ou sans y avoir encore
adhéré: Croatie, Danemark, Finlande, France, Islande, Italie, Lettonie, Lituanie,
Luxe mbourg, Moldavie, Pays-Bas, Norvège, Pologne, Saint-Marin, Suède, Suisse, ExRépublique de Yougoslavie de Macédoine, Turquie; 11 Etats l’ont ratifiée ou y ont
adhéré: Chypre, Espagne, Estonie, Géorgie, Grèce, Hongrie, Portugal, Roumanie, Slovaquie, Slovénie, République Tchèque.
(49)
Agence France Presse, 9 mars 2001.
82
Un nouveau défi
Ce texte européen interdit cependant expressément toute intervention
ayant pour but de créer un être humain génétiquement identique à un autre
être humain, qu’il soit vivant ou qu’il soit mort. Il s’agit d’interdire la création de deux individus ayant en commun l’ensemble des gènes nucléaires
(art. 1er). Cette prohibition vise donc à garantir l’identité de l’être humain
contre les moyens d’en prédéterminer la constitution génétique (Rapport, §
3)(50). Cette prédétermination médicalement assistée serait une sorte de
«bombe à retardement» pour les générations futures. Dans l’hypothèse
d’une utilisation banalisée de ce mode de reproduction des êtres humains,
le risque est en effet à terme de mettre en échec la diversité de l’espèce humaine par la remise en cause de la recombinaison naturelle et aléatoire des
gènes issue de la reproduction sexuée (Rapport § 3 ).
En dépit du caractère contraignant pour les Etats ayant ratifié ce protocole additionnel portant interdiction du clonage, le choix est laissé aux
législateurs nationaux de prévoir des sanctions dites appropriées pour la
violation d’une telle interdiction (art. 25 Convention sur les droits de
l’homme et la biomédecine). Ces sanctions appropriées pourront donc être,
selon les politiques législatives des Etats, des sanctions professionnelles,
disciplinaires ou ordinales contre les médecins par exemple, des sanctions
pécuniaires visant à la réparation d’un dommage causé par l’intervention
médicale, ou encore des sanctions administratives de fermeture
d’établissements. Mais eu égard à la gravité des atteintes, il est prévisible
que les Etats Parties envisageront de les incriminer pénalement. Toutefois,
le risque d’amoindrir l’effectivité d’un tel interdit posé par le texte européen est accentué par le fait qu’il revient aux Parties, dans le cadre de la
Convention sur les droits de l’homme et la biomédecine, d’assurer la protection juridictionnelle appropr iée afin de faire cesser une atteinte illicite
aux droits et principes reconnus par ce texte et ses protocoles additionnels
(art. 23). Sont ainsi posées les limites d’un texte international dont
l’application des clauses dépend in fine de la bonne volonté des Etats signataires. D’où un risque d’ineffectivité de ce texte, risque accru puisque ce
texte international est chargé de limiter les divergences nationales dans un
domaine d’activité – la biomédecine – qui représente un secteur économiquement très prometteur et déjà hautement concurrentiel.
(50)
Projet de Rapport explicatif au projet de protocole additionnel à la Convention sur les droits de l’homme et la biomédecine portant interdiction du clonage d’êtres
humains, Direction des Affaires juridiques, juillet 1997, DIR/JUR (97) 9.
Un nouveau défi
83
La prohibition du clonage reproductif humain au titre du crime
contre l’humanité
L’interdiction du clonage reproductif reposerait essentiellement sur
le risque d’instrumentalisation des êtres humains. On songe à l’hypothèse
de la création par clonage d’embryons in vitro à des fins de constitution de
pièces de rechange. Des scientifiques ont déjà émis le projet de la conservation par congélation des embryons humains qui permettrait après fraction
de l’amas cellulaire embryonnaire d’en implanter immédiatement la moitié
dans un utérus maternel pour donner naissance à un enfant et de différer
l’utilisation de l’autre moitié afin de donner artificiellement à cet individu
un jumeau, une réplique génétique qui constituerait une réserve de cellules,
tissus ou organes immunocompatibles( 51).
L’instrumentalisation des êtres humains se trouve amplifiée par
l’aspect encore expérimental du clonage humain. En effet, les faibles taux
de réussite de cette technique entraîneraient une mise en danger de
l’intégrité physique, voire de la vie, des personnes ainsi produites (vieillissement précoce des cellules; risque de malformation et de stérilité etc.) (52).
Ce solde négatif est encore aggravé par la mise en danger de
l’intégrité psychique des individus clonés. En effet, les clones vivront selon
toute vraisemblance en sachant que leur constitution génétique a déjà vécu
dans un autre individu. On peut encore supposer qu’ils subiront les décalages dus au bouleversement de la filiation ma is également de graves conflits
d’identification selon la place assumée dans la famille par la personne sur
laquelle aura été prélevée la cellule initiale. Ainsi, le père génétique pourra
aussi bien être considéré comme le frère du clone que son grand-père. Enfin, ils vivront en partageant la même apparence physique que le donneur
de noyau cellulaire, voire que des personnes reproduites en nombre illimité
dans l’hypothèse (pour l’heure futuriste) de multiplication massive de clones.
(51)
A LEXANDRE H., (1990), «L’expérimentation sur les embryons de mammifères», in C. SUSANNE, Les manipulations génétiques – Jusqu’où aller?, Bruxelles, De
Boeck Université, p. 82.; KHAN A., PAPILLON F., (1998), Copies conformes – Le clonage en question, Paris, Nil éditions, p. 196-197.
(52)
En dépit de ces inconnues et de ces risques, le gynécologue italien S. Antinori a annoncé que trois femmes dans le monde, «deux en Russie et une dans un autre
pays», étaient enceintes «après implantation in utero d’embryons humains obtenus à
partir de la technique du transfert nucléaire, et que les naissances devraient survenir
en décembre 2002 ou en janvier 2003», J.Y. NAU, «La naissance annoncée des premiers clones humains», Le Monde, 25 mai 2002, p. 23.
84
Un nouveau défi
A fortiori dans cette dernière hypothèse, mais plus simplement dans
le cas du recours à la procréation scientifiquement assistée par la méthode
du clonage, cette technique de reproduction porterait atteinte à la singularité
de chacun emportant ainsi violation du fondement de «l’humanité comme
pluralité d’êtres uniques» (53).
D’où l’éventualité de qualifier la pratique du clonage reproductif
comme un crime contre l’humanité.
Cette éventualité repose sur l’idée que le clonage reproductif humain
est clairement répertorié comme une violation grave des droits fondamentaux de la personne humaine. Outre qu’il exige une expérimentation sur
l’homme contraire à la dignité humaine (expérimentation menée sans le
consentement de l’intéressé et non dépourvu de dangers pour celui-ci), le
clonage humain reproductif est un comportement violant le principe
d’égalité en droit des êtres humains. Il induit la possibilité technique et
normative d’une sélection eugénique et raciste de l’espèce humaine.
Précisément, la stigmatisation des pratiques eugénistes en vue de la
sélection des êtres humains est l’une des indications du crime contre
l’humanité. Elle renvoie à l’atteinte à la singularité des individus tout en se
fondant sur une volonté de sélectionner les hommes. Or, c’est bien «la pratique délibérée, politique, juridique, […] médicale ou scientifique, comportant soit la violation du principe de singularité, soit celle du principe
d’égale appartenance à la communauté» (54) humaine qui justifie la notion
de crime contre l’humanité.
Cependant, le problème du sens d’une telle répression reste posé et
notamment au regard de l’auteur d’une telle infraction. En effet, «le crime
contre l’humanité est toujours la conséquence d’un plan concerté, c’est-àdire de la volonté proclamée plus ou moins ouvertement, généralement par
les plus hautes autorités de l’Etat de détruire ou pour le moins asservir, de
façon systématique et rationnelle un groupe» (55) humain.
Caractérisé à la fois par l’effet massif de la destruction et par son organisation systématique, ce crime ne peut se départir d’une politique étati-
(53)
DELMAS -M ARTY M., (1996), Vers un droit commun de l’humanité, Paris, éditions Textuel, p. 87.
(54)
DELMAS -M ARTY M., Vers un droit commun de l’humanité, ouvrage précité,
p. 87.
(55)
CLERGERIE J.L., (1988), «La notion de crime contre l’humanité», Revue du
droit public, p. 1259.
Un nouveau défi
85
que, ou quasi-étatique ( 56). Dès lors, dans le cadre précis du clonage humain,
la désignation de l’auteur prend un éclairage particulier.
Techniquement, il serait possible à un biologiste ou à un médecin de
s’adonner en solitaire à la fabrication de clones humains. A l’opposé, il lui
serait difficile, en agissant seul, de mettre en œuvre une politique concertée
de sélection eugénique de l’espèce humaine. Or dans le cadre du crime
contre l’humanité, cette séle ction est menée au nom d’un «intérêt général»
déterminé par un «groupe-auteur», par exemple un gouvernement, qui seul
a les moyens d’imposer et de mettre en œuvre une telle politique de séle ction eugénique. La spécificité du crime contre l’humanité, vu par exemple
depuis le droit pénal français, impose de «subordonner l’incrimination à
l’existence d’une entreprise collective de domination de l’homme concrétisée par un ensemble de pratiques accomplies de manière systématique» (57).
Dès lors, comment envisager d’impliquer un individu isolé en tant
qu’auteur d’un tel plan concerté qui suppose par définition une entente?
Complice certes. Mais l’agent clonant un embryon humain de façon isolée
serait en réalité poursuivi sous l’empire de la législation pénale française
existante pour avoir pratiqué des recherches et expérimentations illégales
sur un embryon humain.
Par ailleurs, un individu œuvrant de manière isolée pourra difficilement se prévaloir d’un agissement involontaire. Pour reprendre les termes
de Mireille Delmas-Marty, il est évident que l’on ne réduit pas en esclavage
une population de clones produite dans un but prédéterminé, que l’on ne
commet pas un génocide, que l’on ne procède pas à des pratiques eugénistes à grande échelle, bref que l’on ne commet pas un crime contre
l’humanité par imprudence ou simple négligence(58).
Du point de vue des poursuites judiciaires, il est possible d’envisager
au plan international l’assistance d’une cour répressive internationale sur le
fondement par exemple de la Convention sur le génocide adoptée par les
Nations-Unies en 1948. Au plan régional, et à condition de rattacher cette
infraction à la violation d’un des droits garantis par la Convention euro(56)
A SCENSIO H., MAISON R., (1997), «L’activité des tribunaux pénaux internationaux pour l’ex-Yougoslavie (1995-1997) et pour le Rwanda (1994-1997)», Annuaire
français de droit international, p. 392-393.
(57)
FRANCILLON J., Commentaires sous les articles 211-1 à 213-5 du Code pénal
français :«Des crimes contre l’humanité», Code pénal commenté –ROUJOU DE BOUBEE
G., BOULOC B., FRANCILLON J., M AYAUD Y., P ARIS , DALLOZ , (1996), p. 119.
(58)
DELMAS -M ARTY M., «Certitudes et incertitudes du droit», in ATLAN H.,
A UGÉ M., DELMAS -M ARTY M., DROIT R.P., FRESCO N., Le clonage humain, ouvrage
précité, p. 92.
86
Un nouveau défi
péenne des droits de l’homme, il serait possible de recourir à la Cour eur opéenne de Strasbourg sur le fondement de l’article 33 de la convention. Cet
article prévoit en effet le recours d’un Etat contre un autre sans lien de nationalité entre l’Etat requérant et les victimes individuelles de la violation
des droits conventionnels ( 59). Reste que les victimes sont ici individuelles
sans être encore aujourd’hui un groupe humain caractérisé par leur qualité
de «clones».
Quoiqu’il en soit, puisqu’en matière de clonage nous naviguons sur
du long terme, la qualification de crime contre l’humanité présenterait le
mérite de rendre imprescriptible la violation de l’interdiction de dupliquer
des personnes dans les Etats ayant consacré cette imprescriptibilité.
Le droit pénal de la bioéthique, un «droit pénal magique» (60)?
En guise de conclusion, je m’interroge sur la portée de l’interdiction
pénale portant sur des actes encore rares et qui de ce fait appartiennent encore aujourd’hui à la science du futur. En revanche, et en dépit de cette
appartenance encore avérée à la sphère de la science-fiction, la prohibition
de tels actes figure d’ores et déjà dans le droit positif. Cette particularité,
voire ce paradoxe, donne une dimension éminemment symbolique à cette
incrimination.
Ainsi, très clairement, l’interdiction pénale de création de clones ou
de modification du génome de la descendance, actes qui relèvent encore
exclusivement à ce jour du domaine expérimental, est inscrite dans nombre
de textes normatifs dont on a pu apprécier dans cet exposé la variété. Dès
lors, plutôt que préventif ou dissuasif, ce type d’incriminations pourrait
jouer le rôle d’interdit de «pur affichage» (61) au service d’une volonté visant
à rassurer une opinion publique (62) fort peu consultée sur des questions aussi
graves.
(59)
LABAYLE H., «Article 24», in DECAUX E., IMBERT P.H., PETTITI L.-E., (sous
la dir.) (1995),, La convention européenne des droits de l’homme – Commentaire article par article, Paris, Economica, p. 572.
(60)
L’expression est une fois de plus empruntée à DELMAS -M ARTY M., (1985),
«L’enjeu d’un Code pénal: réflexions à propos de l’inflation des lois pénales en
France», Mélanges Legros, Bruxelles, p. 165 et s.
(61)
RASSAT M.L., (1994), «Les nouvelles mœurs législatives à la lumière du
nouveau Code pénal français», Revue Droits.
(62)
PROTHAIS A LAIN, (1997), «Les paradoxes de la pénalisation – enquête en
matière d’assistance médicale à la procréation et d’adoption», La Semaine juridique −
JCP, Doctrine, 4055, p. 430.
Un nouveau défi
87
Cette tendance générale à légiférer avait déjà été décrite il y a une
vingtaine d’années par le Conseil de l’Europe dans un Rapport du Comité
européen pour les problèmes criminels consacrés à la décriminalisation:
«Le législateur peut avoir recours à la criminalisation en tant que solution
apparente d’un problème social. Il subit souvent la pression de «l’opinion
publique» ou de groupes qui l’incitent à maîtriser certains phénomènes
indésirables alors qu’il ne dispose d’aucun moyen efficace pour le faire ou
qu’il ne veut pas subvenir aux frais ainsi engendrés. Dans ces conditions, il
peut criminaliser l’action afin d’apaiser l’opinion. L’opération réussit souvent en raison des croyances peu réalistes largement répandues dans la
société au sujet du fonctionnement du système pénal»(63).
Ce mode de régulation juridique appliqué aux activités biomédicales
de fabrication de la vie humaine ne risque-t-il pas de traduire une «sorte
d’exorcisme législatif où le texte de loi n’aura plus qu’une valeur incantatoire» (64), une tendance à légiférer au nom d’un «droit pénal magique» ?
Il est vrai que la matière elle -même, autrement dit la transmission de
la vie humaine et les moyens techniques que les hommes ont acquis d’en
modifier le parcours, ayant une forte charge symbolique, s’y prête
aisément. Dans ce cas, la décision d’incriminer joue un rôle d’apaisement
social certainement aussi important, voire plus important, que la mise en
application qui pourra être faite de la norme pénale elle-même.
(63)
Conseil de l’Europe, Rapport sur la décriminalisation, Strasbourg, 1980.
DELMAS -M ARTY M., L’enjeu d’un Code pénal: réflexions à propos de
l’inflation des lois pénales en France, article précité, p. 165 et s.
(64)
DIREITO PENAL MÉDICO EM MUDANÇA
MANUEL DA COSTA ANDRADE
Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal
I. Introduçao
1. Há mais de um século lançou o penalista alemão Merkel a sua
alegoria sobre o direito penal. Que comparava a uma árvore, que perde as
folhas no Outono, mas que na Primavera aparece sempre vestida de folhas
novas. Pelo menos do lado do Direito penal médico estaremos seguramente
a viver o Outono de um paradigma e a Primavera de um outro.
Não è ainda possível referenciar com segurança, na plenitude das
suas singularidades, o paradigma emergente. Além do mais porque o
mocho das ciências normativas − morais, éticas ou jurídicas − voa sempre
ao entardecer. Sobre o crepúsculo das novas «construções sociais da
realidade» (Berger/Luckmann) e, particularmente, das realizações das
ciências e técnicas médicas. Se è assim, em geral, por maioria de razão terá
de sê-lo para o direito penal, instrumento de protecção subsidiária de bens
jurídicos e de reafirmação contrafáctica da validade das normas. Que só
está legitimado a intervir face a manifestações reais e intoleráveis de
danosidade social e não para esconjurar os fantasmas da futurologia.
2. Tudo permite antecipar que no futuro − pelo menos no futuro ao
alcance do nosso olhar − sobrará sempre um espaço para a intervenção
legítima do direito penal para proteger os bens jurídicos mais «expostos às
intempéries» (Binding) das intervenções e agressões abusivas feitas à
sombra da Medicina.
De qualquer forma e à vista das transformações a que assistimos,
tudo leva a crer que a sobrevivência do direito penal médico será
acompanhada pela crise − irreversível ao que parece − do paradigma que
chegou aos nossos dias. E que conheceu o seu triunfo e estabilização
generalizada a partir sobretudo dos meados do século passado.
Text not revised by the Author.
90
Direito penal médico em mudança
II. Tópicos do (Velho) Paradigma Herdado
3. Na sua expressão eidéctica e canónica aquele paradigma analisa-se
em dois enunciados basilares e complementares:
a) A intervenção médico-cirúrgica − medicamente indicada,
realizada por médico, segundo as leges artis e com animus
curandi − não preenche, qualquer que seja o seu resultado, a
factualidade típica das Ofensas corporais ou do Homicídio.
b) A intervenção médico-cirúrgica realizada sem o consentimento
livre e esclarecido do paciente, é incriminada e punida como um
crime autónomo contra a liberdade. O crime de Intervenções ou
tratamentos médico-cirúrgicos arbitrários (a eigenmächtige
Heilbehandlung na linguagem germânica).
Devido, no essencial, à elaboração doutrinal alemã, este modelo
dogmático e normativo generalizou-se no plano comparatístico. E conheceu
mesmo a expressão positivada em ordenamentos jurídicos como o
português (artigos 150°, 156° e 157° do Código Penal) e austríaco (§ 110
do ÖStGB).
4. Numa caracterização sumária, este paradigma polariza-se em torno
de duas constelações de bens jurídicos diferentes, com exigências, em
princípio, antinómicas e conflituantes. De um lado a vida e a integridade
física; do outro lado, a «liberdade de dispor do corpo e da própria vida«
(Figueiredo Dias), ou, na expressiva formulação do tribunal Federal
Alemão, o «livre direito de autodeterminação da pessoa sobre o seu corpo
(freien Selbstbestimmungsrecht des Menschen über sein Körper«).
A par do hipocrático salus aegroti suprema lex esto , o médico tem
também de respeitar o imperativo voluntas aegroti suprema lex esto . Este
último um axioma que significa a prevalência de princípio da
autodeterminação sobre a saúde e a vida. E reversamente a denegação à
sociedade, ao Estado e ao médico de qualquer Vernunfthoheit sobre a
«irracionalidade« da escolha do paciente. A recusa do paciente tem de ser
respeitada qualquer que sejam as suas consequências. Por vias disso, não é
punível a chamada eutanásia passiva. Não é, noutros termos, punível o
médico que, correspondendo á vontade livre, esclarecida e inequívoca do
paciente, omite ou interrompe o tratamento indispensável para lhe salvar a
vida.
5. Este compreensão doutrinal e normativa tinha subjacente uma
representação estabilizada e quase «natural« da realidade, em geral, e do
91
acto médico, em particular. Numa redução arquetípica: uma relação de
comunicabilidade e confiança entre um médico e um paciente.
Numa aproximação mais analítica:
a) De um lado estava um − um só − médico. Livremente escolhido
pelo paciente, que nele depositava a sua confiança e que tornava
em confidente exclusivo das suas angústias e sofrimento. Por
vias disso, um médico que obedecia a uma única lealdade. Na
síntese de Fletcher: «o compromisso é com os pacientes…não
com aqueles à espera, nem com a sociedade no seu conjunto».
b) Do outro lado, um – e um só – paciente. Um paciente
representado com mónada isolada ou como sistema
autorreferente e autopoiético, em cujo horizonte se inscrevem as
decisões e as acções médicas. Que esgotam a sua relevância e
significado na direcção da vida, da saúde e da autonomia do
paciente.
c) Em terceiro lugar, um médico e um paciente ligados por uma
relação contínua de díalogo e comunicação. No sentido de que é
sempre possível comunicar com o paciente, informá-lo e obter a
expressão actualizada da sua decisão esclarecida e livre.
III. Nova Realidade. Novo Direito Penal?
6. Tal como o conhecemos, o Direito Penal Médico continua a ter
como referente esta «construção social da realidade». Uma realidade
hipostasiada, que pouco terá de comun com o quotidiano dos médicos e dos
doentes que protagonizam a medicina nos nossos dias.
Onde o quadro tende a ser outro.
a) Em primeiro lugar, é cada vez mais rara a experiência de um
médico livremente escolhido, como depositário exclusivo da
confiança e do segredo do paciente. Cada vez mais, o doente
interage com organizações burocráticas: hospitais, clínicas e
serviços de saúde, em geral. Os seus médicos são em boa medida
ditados pela álea da organização dos serviços. Por seu turno, o
tratamento decompõe-se numa sequência de actos atomizados, a
cargo dos diferentes especialistas. Por vias disso, não sobra lugar
para a confiança. Alarga-se incontroladamente o universo dos
profissionais − a Kreis der Wissenden de que falam os alemães −
a ter legitimamente acesso ao segredo e à privacidade. E estreita-
92
se drasticamente o âmbito de uma eficaz autodeterminação
informacional (informationelle Selbsbestimmungsrecht).
b) Em segundo lugar, o acto médico é joje, em grande medida
empreendido à margem do diálogo e da comunicação. São de
todos os dias as situações em que, no contexto de uma cirurgia, e
já com o paciente anestesiado, é urgente alargar a intervenção a
domínios que não foram abrangidos pelo esclarecimento e pelo
consentimento. Por outro lado e com uma frequência cada vez
maior, a sociedade do risco (Risikogesellschaft) faz chegar aos
hospitais caudais massificados de sinistrados, anónimos,
inconscientes e sós, a necessitarem de intervenções que não é
possível legitimar em nome do consentimento expresso ou, ao
menos, concludente do paciente. Recordem-se ainda os
progressos realizados ao nível do prolongamento da «vida«. Que
vêm multiplicando as situações marginais, de fronteira entre a
vida e a morte. E onde as exigências da vida, da dignidade e da
indizibilidade da dor reclamam a decisão do médico à margem de
qualquer comunicação com o paciente. O médico poderá saber −
nomeadamente através do chamado Patiententestament − o que
ele terá querido em momento anterior; antes, mas não è possível
saber o que ele quererá agora, depois de «vividos« os instantes
densificados «entre a vida e a morte«. Acolhendo-nos à lição do
Ivan Illich de Tolstoi, que no leito da agonia se interrogava:
«onde é que eu estarei, quando já aqui não estiver?». É o que
pode ilustrar-se com a decisão de recusa ou interrupção de
tratamento destinado a prolongar a «vida» do paciente que
perdeu irreversivelmente a consciência, mas a propósito do qual
não pode ainda falar-se de auxílio médico à morte (Sterbehilfe).
Como acontece com os casos do que na Alemanha se designa por
appalischer Syndrom ou, em linguagem anglossaxónica, o
chamado persistent vegetative state (PVS).
c) Em terceiro lugar, as novas realizações da ciência médica
abriram a porta a intervenções cujas consequências, os custos e
as vantagens se projectam para além dos limites do
autorreferente sistema pessoal. Tenham-se em vista as
intervenções médicas em benefício de um feto em gestação, que
só é possível levar a cabo à custa do sacrifício de autonomia e da
integridade física da mulher grávida. Pense-se no teste do HIV,
realizado sobre uma pessoa, mas cujo resultado pode ditar a sorte
de outros: nascituros, parceiros sexuais, médicos, etc. Uma
93
consideração das coisas à vista da qual pode já pertinentemente
falar-se de um dever de saber (duty to disclosure), contraposto ao
emergente direito a não saber (right not to know ou Recht auf
Nichtwissen). Por seu turno, os avanços da medicina predictiva
ou predizente (sprechende Medizin) permitem antecipar
«situações de risco« que lançam a sua sombra sobre o destino de
muitas pessoas. Na expressão mais simples e óbvia: a descoberta
de que A se mostra geneticamente propenso a contrair cancro,
pode, se tempestivamente comunicada a B, seu parente, permitir
levar a cabo oportunas medidas de profilaxia e prevenção. Tudo
permite assim antecipar que o acto médico venha a ganhar uma
cada vez mais exposta e ponderosa mais decisiva valência
sistémico-social. E será seguramente assim mesmo postos entre
parênteses os movimentos com maior conotação ideológica, que
à sombra de um communitarian thinking − como o que vem
sendo protagonizado por Amitai Etzioni − reivindicam uma ética
e um direito da medicina voltados para a consideração
privilegiada da public safety e do common good.
7. Esta nova experiência da medicina faz naturalmente adivinhar um
novo − ou ao menos renovado − Direito Penal Médico. Um direito penal
em decantação mas de que é possível desvelar sinais ou mostrações.
A título de ilustração.
a) A emergência de novos bens jurídicos, a elevar à constelação dos
bens jurídico-criminais. Muitos deles bens de índole supraindividual, como a tantas vezes referenciado direito à identidade
genética. Nesta linha não será arriscado questionar a elevação do
já citado direito a não saber à categoria de autónomo bem
jurídic o-criminal. Um direito que presta homenagem ao interesse
legítimo do Homem em conduzir os trabalhos e os dias sem ter
de sofrer em cada dia a dor e a morte que se antecipa. Desvelado
e reconhecido a partir do «espanto» das realizações da medicina
predictiva, não pode, em rigor, afirmar-se que ele seja, em toda a
linha, uma criação recente. Como Gadamer recorda, na tragédia
de Ésquilo (Prometeu agrilhoado), Prometeu, o amigo dos
homens, declara que o grande benefício que lhes legou não foi
tanto o fogo que abriu a porta de todas as artes. Mais importante
do que isso, foi ter privado os homens de saber quando chegaria
a hora da morte. Na interpretação do filósofo da hermenêutica:
«é a motivação ligada à morte que dá à tragédia de Ésquilo a sua
94
profundidade. O dom consiste em que vislumbre, do futuro que o
Homen tem, o futuro que lhe confere o carácter de um presente
tão apreensível que o fim se torna inconcebível. Alguém tem
futuro enquanto não sabe que o não tem». Ou, dando a palavra ao
próprio Ésquilo: «mais vale morrer de uma só vez do que ser
infeliz todos os dias« (v.750).
b) A re-conformação de bens jurídicos, ou, ao menos, a
problematização da sua dimensão e recorte. Mesmo de bens
jurídicos que pareciam gozar da estabilidade e definitividade das
coisa cosmogonizadas. Como o próprio conceito de corpo
humano, bem jurídico protegido pelo crime de Ofensas
corporais. Recorda-se que à vista das descobertas das ciências
genéticas sobra cada vez mais problemática a ideia
consensualizada de tratamento partes separadas do corpo
(tecidos, órgãos, matérias de extirpações, etc) como meras e
vulgares coisas: E isto porquanto elas são portadores de um
acervo incalculável de informação de óbvia dimensão pessoal.
Por seu turno, a importância e a frequência crescentes dos
transplantes na medicina dos nossos dias, obrigam a repensar o
significado da danificação ou destruição dos órgãos e tecidos
destinados a reimplante ou transplante. E que dizer da destruição
de óvulos ou esperma crioconservados, que representavam a
única possib ilidade de procriação de uma pessoa, em casos como
o que foi recentemente (9.11.1993) decidido pelo Tribunal
Federal alemão?
c) Invenção ou redescoberta de novas figuras de legitimação do
acto médico. Com destaque para o consentimento presumido, a
ocupar cada vez mais o espaço do consentimento espresso ou
concludente. Na certeza de que se trata de um «normatives
Konstrukt» (Roxin) que legitima a intromissão na esfera jurídica
de outrem em nome da sua vontade hipotética, aceitando-se o
risco de ex post se concluir que a acção não correspondia à
vontade do paciente. O que naturalmente obriga à definição
exigente do regime jurídico da figura. Em que sobressai, por um
lado, a subsidiaridade face ao consentimento espresso ou
concludente, E, por outro lado, a vontade hipotética do paciente
come matriz de legitimação axiológica e político-criminal.
Vontade qe prevalence sobre a solução alternativa que, em
concreto, possa considerar-se mais racional, segundo padrões de
normalidade.
95
IV. Conclusão
8.
O registo das transformações assinaladas e a convicção de que
outras, de maior amplitude e profundidadade, se deixam adivinhar, não
levam consigo qualquer juízo de apoucamento da eminência e dignidade
dos valores ao serviço dos quais se ergueu o Direito Penal Médico que
chegou até aqui.
Nomeadamente da vida, da integridade física e da autonomia do
paciente. Eles continuam, pelo contrário, a cintilar como estrelas de
primeira grandeza na constelação dos bens jurídico-criminais. Só que agora
uma constelação densificada pela emergência de novos valores e bens
jurídicos. O que significa que os bens jurídicos originários têm agora de
realizar-se no contexto de novas e mais complexas relações de
conflitualidade.
De qualquer forma, mais do que de um novo Direito Penal Médico,
talvez deva falar-se de un Direito renovado. É que, revertendo à alegoria de
MERKEL, por detrás da nova folhagem com que a Primavera vai vestindo
o Direito Penal Médico, persiste a mesma árvore. Ontem como hoje
alimentada pela seiva dos mesmos e últimos valores: a preservação da vida
e a libertação da dor no respeito pela autonomia e pela intangível
dignidade da pessoa.
«EQUITABLE SHARING» OF BENEFITS
OF BIODIVERSITY-RELATED INNOVATION
GUSTAVO GHIDINI
Professor of Intellectual Property and Competition Law
Luiss Guido Carli University, Rome, Italy
1. It is well known that much innovation in the pharmaceutical
sector, as well as in the agricultural field (concerning seeds, in particular) is
based on germplasm provided by plant and animal genetic resources: a
«wealth» often referred to as «biodiversity», and which − while rarely and
exceptionally surviving in Western in dustrialized countries (IC), has been
fundamentally preserved by farmers of Developing Countries (DC) − «for
cultural reasons which may escape those of us who equate wisdom to
economic calculus»1 .
Now, the innovation I am referring to stems typically from a
«collaboration» between industrial countries and developing countries
(DC). The former possess the technology which enables to develop new
products for mass consumption (more advanced and efficient drugs and
healthier and more resistant and/or abundant food) from the germplasm
preserved, and provided, by the latter.
And, of course, such innovation can be patented by its developers. In
particular, it is well known the patenting of «an invention based on
biological material of plant or animal origin» is expressly granted by
European Directive No. 98/44.
Thus, even thanks to patent protection, the biodiversity-related
innovation can yeld potentially very high benefits both in strictly economic
terms (return from sales and/or royalties in exclusive règime) as well as in
techno-scientific progress (further impulse to R&D activities) and
industrial and commercial advancement.
2. I will here examine, under a legal viewpoint, the problem of the
«equitable sharing» of benefits accrued by biodiversity related innovation −
chiefly in the pharmaceutical and food industry.
This problem, as you know, is addressed by the Rio de Janeiro 1992
Convention on Biodiversity. Said Convention aims, on one hand, to grant
the States sovereign rights to exploit their biological and genetic resources
(1)
RICOLFI, (2001), Biotechnology, Patents and Epistemic Approaches
98
«Equitable sharing» of benefits of biodiversity- related innovation
(see Artt. 3 and 2), and therefore dictates that said States shall have the
«authority to determine access to their genetic resources» (Art.15). On the
other hand, the Convention sets as another fundamental goal of its «the fair
and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out the utilization of genetic
resources» (Art. 1). And to this end, it furtherly provides, i.a., that «Each
Contracting Party (emphasis added) shall take legislative, administrative or
policy measures, as appropriate, and in accordance with Articles 16 and 19,
with the aim of sharing in a fair and equitable way the results of research
and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other
utilization of genetic resources with the Contracting party providing such
resources. Such sharing shall be upon mutually agreed terms.»
3. Accordingly, the «cooperation» between industrial and developing
countries has been based on contractual relationships − directly with local
rural communities, sometimes with the Governments, usually in form of a
licence for exploitation of biological material granted by a rural community
of a DC to a firm of an IC. Some, maybe most of such agreements usually
attribute to the provider country a simple financial return, be it a lump sum
and/or a royalty, from commercial exploitation of the new biodiversity
based drug or food produce. Other agreements are more generous, in that
they place a duty on the «industrial party», license of the biodiversity
material and developer and owner of the patent on the new drug or seed, to
«grant back» to the «provider» licensor (DC) a non-exclusive license «for
research use» (see e.g. Art. 6.03 of the Agreement between the Peruvian
Aguaruna and Huambisa Communities and G. D. Searle & Company
(Monsanto) − text provided by Professor Charles McManis of Washington
University, Mo., USA, and published in ATRIP's 1999 Annual Papers, 71).
But please note:
a) such license is «not for any commercial use» (ibidem) −
and thus it could not be conferred to, and shared with, a locally
operating industry;
b) it is expressly foreseen that, whereas the indigenous people
are free to continue to make and sell their traditional products, by
no means the new drugs developed and patented by the industrial
licensor can be deemed as an expression of «indigenous
knowledge», and thus, obviously;
c) there is no provision of co-ownership of the patents and/or
know-how developed.
«Equitable sharing» of benefits of biodiversity-related innovation
99
As a result, the biodiversity-related innovation, be it patented or not,
will not pertain, even in part, to the indigenous people provider of the
biodiversity (see. Art. 6.05).
4. In my opinion, such kind of agreements reflect and consolidate a
substantial disproportion of contractual and economic power in that they do
not grant a really «fair and equitable sharing» of «the results of research
and development and the benefits arising from the commercial and other
utilization of genetic resources», and thus also do not comply with the Rio
Convention principles.
I expressly leave aside the question of the intrinsic «fairness» of the
entity of financial return usually granted to DC. What I assume here is that
the concept of «fair and equitable sharing» should embrace the provider
country's chance to participate in the industrial and commercial
exploitation of biodiversity-related innovation (and thus, particularly, of
related patents and know-how).
Indeed, the Rio Convention's concept (as well as the commonsense
concept) of «the results of research and development and the benefits
arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic resources», to
which the principle of «fair and equitable sharing» applies, seems to me
wide enough as to embrace that «spread» of scientific knowledge and
(applied) know-how, and that development of new industrial and
commercial activities, which embody the main social benefits related with
actual exploitation of the achieved innovation. (Benefits which, always in
my opinion, cannot be substituted by simple «abstract» knowledge, and
thus simply by the grant of a sort of «fair use» right, such as the one
foreseen in the Searle -Aguarunas Agreement I referred to above).
Thus, I assume that a fully equitable sharing of benefits stemming
from biodiversity − related innovation would be achieved only if the
provider country could be given also the chance to «host» a direct
exploitation − directly by the patent owner or, at its choice, through local
licensees (even direct production in situ by the foreign − based firm does
help the growth of a local, domestic «industrial know-how acquisition» (let
aside employment-related benefits) of the innovation developed thanks also
to its essential contribution. Thus the biodiversity providing country would
be put in condition to progressively «grow» to R&D own capacity and
develop (even in view of the time when the patent will be elapsed) a
domestic industry and a domestic trade of new goods which it has helped to
create.
100
Should the patent owner refuse either to produce or to appoint a
license of its choice, an ad hoc measure of the provider country could
foresee a compulsory license, which, according to TRIPs rules should be
non-exclusive, non-discriminatory, based on fair terms (here taking into
consideration the provider country's essential contribution to the developed
innovation), and fundamentally focused to the supply of that very domestic
market − thus not, if not marginally, to export (see TRIPs rules).
This proposal seems consistent, even as far as IP is concerned, with
Rio Convention. As recalled, same Convention empowers «Each
Contracting Party» (emphasis added) to adopt legislative, administrative or
policy measures aimed to achieve the fair sharing of results of R&D and the
benefits arising from the commercial and other utilization of genetic
resources (Art.1). Such adoption must be (see same Art.1) «in accordance»
with Articles 16 and 19 of the Convention. Now, the former engages the
parties to the Convention − thus including provider (DC) and recipient (IC)
countries − to cooperate, subject to national legislation and international
law, in order to ensure that patents and other IPRs «are supportive and do
not run counter to its objectives. The latter, Art.19, provides that all parties
to the Convention «shall take all practical measures to promote and
advance priority access on a fair and equitable basis by Contracting parties,
especially developing countries, to the results and benefits arising from
biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided by those
Contracting parties» (emphasis added).
5. Nevertheless, the aforesaid proposal may seem unviable in legally
positive terms − and thus, merely utopian − in view of the fact that the
«universal IP law» of the WTO countries, i.e. the TRIPs agreement, 1996
(thence followed by national patent laws) has rejected (doesn't matter, here,
under whose pressures) the long-time widely established principle of the so
called «working requirements» of patent protection at national level, that is
the duty to produce the patented goods in the country where patent
protection is sought (see Art.27.1 ).
This rejection, one might well argue, empowers the companies
belonging to IC, recipient of the biodiversity, to sell exclusively
everywhere − including the biodiversity providing country − the patented
biodiversity − originated products, while retaining manufacture, hence
actual capability to implement the relevant know-how, in their own
homeland or in any other country where they find most convenient to set up
production − thus, if they so wish, excluding the biodiversity providing
country. In other words, TRIPs would allow that the provider country be
«Equitable sharing» of benefits of biodiversity-related innovation
101
«reduced» to a mere import country, thus just be enabled to receive a
monetary compensation (royalty), without any participation to the
industrial development of the innovative products realized thanks − and
first of all − to the biodiversity it preserved and provided.
Should such interpretation be confirmed, the practical result would
be bitter indeed. It would validate a commercial format that strongly
reminds the good old typical colonial trade − off: the developing country
«exporting» its «raw materials», and the industrialized countries
«returning» their finished goods. A trade-off, of course, that − aside any
other considerations, such as the ones referring to the traditionally strong
price imbalance between DC «raw materials» and IC «finished products» −
substantially delays the spreading and acquisition of industrial know-how
amongst developing countries, and thus keeps same in a long term
condition of economic and technical dependence.
6. Dura lex, sed lex? Shall we give up that proposal, at least under
positive law? I don't think so. I do not share the view that Art. 27.1 of
TRIPs constitutes an absolute bar to that proposal.
Indeed, TRIPs' rejection of the «working requirements» expresses a
general principle, whereas same Agreement allows, although exceptionally,
and for reasons of public interest, the very imposition of compulsory
licences on IPR's holders. See in particular Art. 31, providing for
exceptional imposition of compulsory licenses («Other Use Without
Authorization of the Right Holder») in connection with Art. 8.1, which
states that «Members may, in formulating or amending their laws and
regulations, adopt measures necessary to promote the public interest in
sectors of vital importance to their socio − economic and technological
development». (Please note that the compulsory license would be issued, as
recalled, «predominantly for the supply of the domestic market», therefore
basically not for export: see TRIPs Art. 31, f).
Thus, should the biodiversity providing countries «take profit», so to
say, of aforesaid rules (in connection with the powers they are granted
under afore quoted norms of Rio Convention), the rejection of the working
requirements would be respected in principle, i.e. in general perspective −
vis-à-vis all other countries. The exception would accrue to the sole benefit
of the biodiversity providing country, thus enabled to participate to the
industrial and commercial utilization of the biodiversity − related
innovation it has decisively helped to realize.
102
Thus, the proposal I outlined can be accepted, I believe, under
existing legal regime. Its accomplishment, and no less, will achieve a truly
«fair and equitable» sharing of the benefits − of all kinds − arising from the
innovation the DC contributed to create.
SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE USE OF CRIMINAL LAW
FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT(1)
ANTONIO VERCHER
Supreme Court Public Prosecutor, Madrid, Spain
«We must sincerely pity our
economists who doggedly debate the
costs of the furniture of a house that
has already burnt down»
Anatole France
(The Opinion of Jerome Coignard)
I. Some Historical Considerations
There are two historical periods which could be considered as real
milestones in the evolution of the legal protection of the environment.
These two periods are the so called Industrial Revolution, which took place
in the first half of the 19th century, and the period of economic recovery
that followed World War II. That second period lasted until the 70's in the
20th century.
The clear connection that exists between economic development and
the use of natural resources is well known. It is a truism that the more we
develop industry, commerce, and other economic sectors, the more natural
resources are needed. Human beings have been exploiting natural resources
for centuries without nature having been seriously affected(2). Minerals, raw
materials, water, air, etc., have been used in all sort of industrial activities
(1)
I would like to thank to my friend Mr. LIAM CASHMAN , Principal
Administrator of the European Commission, for reading a draft of this paper.
However, all errors and omissions remain my responsibility.
(2)
There were exceptional cases, however, of environmental problems and the
subsequent social or political reaction. According to KISS and SHELTON, even in Fifth
Century Rome, there were complaints that the Tiber river was seriously polluted by the
filth of the city, as well as protests against odours emanating from various homes. One
of the earliest known environmental measures is an ordinance adopted by Edward I in
1306 to prohibit the use of coal in open furnaces in London. Also in the Fourteenth
Century, Charles VI forbade in Paris bad smelling and nauseating smoke. Vide KISS A.
and SHELTON D., (1993), Manual of European Environmental Law, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, page 9.
104
Some Reflections on the Use of Criminal Law
throughout history without having seriously impinged on nature or natural
resources. Traditionally, nature could easily recover without too many
negative effects. Serious problems began when, as a result of the Industrial
Revolution, natural resources began to be exploited, not lightly or
occasionally as before, but in a systematic and significant manner. That
situation provoked a sort of initial environmental protectionist approach
and drove some European countries to enact environmental laws(3).
Accordingly, it could be said, roughly speaking, that the Industrial
Revolution was the starting point for the system of legal protection of the
environment as it is known today.
The laws enacted were basically civil and administrative, and were
aimed at providing proper compensation when cases of pollution occurred,
as well as at introducing an initial regulatory scheme to avoid damage and
safeguard public health. It was generally not considered necessary to resort
to criminal law, since instances of serious environmental disruptions were
still not too widespread (although it is worth noting that early industrial
towns suffered serious pollution), technology was still not advanced and
the value attached to a clean environment was still limited.
The situation changed radically with the reconstruction following
World War II and the Marshall Plan, and the subsequent increase in
exploitation of the natural resources. For the first time international public
opinion began to demonstrate concern over the general state of the
environment. It was a widespread movement developed in response to a
visible envir onmental deterioration. Not coincidentally the concept of
«ecological pessimism» also emerged. Not coincidentally either some
literary works began to be published questioning the human behaviour
affecting an important number of environmental aspects, such as Bertrand
Russell's Has a Man Future? (4). The catalyst for many individuals and
groups was the Torre Canyon accident in 1967, the first of a series of major
oil tanker spills ( 5).
This led to the search for new measures to combat environmental
destruction. One of these measures was to resort to criminal environmental
law and soon an increasing number of countries resorted to criminal law as
a way of assuring environmental protection. The Japanese Diet was the first
to come up with a truly criminal law for the punishment of environmental
(3)
The British Waterwork Clauses Act of 1845, the German General Industrial
Code of 1845, etc.
(4)
I have been using the Spanish translation of the book. RUSSELL B., (1982),
¿Tiene el Hombre Futuro ? (Barcelona, Editorial Bruguera).
(5)
KISS A. and SHELTON D., Op. cit. pags. 9 and 10.
105
pollution offences, by its pioneering law, the Law for the Punishment of
Pollution Offences, 1970. Several countries, following the Japanese
example, enacted criminal environmental provisions in the form of special
provisions or as a special part of their penal codes(6).
Accordingly, serious environmental infractions or behaviour
presumed to be hazardous to the environment have become criminal
offences. This is an understandable reaction to a behaviour considered
highly intolerable to society( 7).
However, this criminalisation of actions which were not previously
criminal offences, poses an important number of problems. It is, to a certain
extent, understandable since there is a lack of precedents in relation to
environmental crimes within criminal legal systems. This entails the need
to face the whole subject-matter with a pioneer's perspective, since part of
it is still an unexplored field.
Let us see where the aforementioned problems lie, focusing on the
more relevant. Some problems are of a general or abstract kind; others,
however, are of a more practical character and are specifically connected to
the day-to-day application of the law.
The approach taken in this article is firstly, to describe and examine
these problems, and secondly, to analyse the future perspectives of the use
of criminal law for the protection of environment.
II. General Aspects Regarding Problems of an Abstract Nature
It could be said, first of all, that there is a key difference between
what could be called the traditional or classical criminal law and the new
area of criminal law aimed at avoiding environmental degradation.
(6)
PRABHU M., (1994), «General Report. Crimes against the Environment.
Preparatory Colloquium», in International Review of Penal Law, vol. 65. Nos. 3-4,
page 700.
(7)
«…there is a widespread concern that available regulatory instruments are not
adequate to attack the ongoing threat posed by pollution to environment. The view has
been expressed by the Law Reform Commission of Canada in Working Paper 44, that
the pollution control armoury needs to be augmented by providing in the Criminal
Code a separated new offence entitled crimes against the environment» in Pollution
Control in Canada: the Regulatory Approach in the 1980s, Law Reform Commission
of Canada, Administrative Law Series. Study Paper, 1988, page 69.
106
Roughly speaking, the traditional or classical criminal law tries to
obtain «a certain degree of social stability ( 8)», using for that purpose
methods of social control and, occasionally, prevention( 9). The expression
«a certain degree of social stability» is used since it is commonly assumed
that delinquency has never, and probably will never be completely
eradicated from the social context. This is probably due to the fact that
delinquency is inherent to society itself. Accordingly, wherever any social
structure emerges, criminal actions cannot be ruled out.
Environmental crimes, however, introduce a completely different
perspective into the criminal legal system. While traditional criminality
poses a menace to social stability, environmental crimes do not so much
threaten social stability as pose a threat to the survival of human beings
themselves. As a result, it is not the maintenance of social stability but the
survival of society itself which is at stake. In this regard Commoner has
noted that «The survival of all living things – including man – depends on
the integrity of the complex web of biological processes which comprise
the earth's ecosystem. However, what man is doing on the earth violates
this fundamental requisite of human existence. For modern technologies act
on the ecosystem which supports us in ways that threaten its stability; with
tragic perversity we have linked much of our productive economy to
precisely those features of technology which are ecologically destructive.
These powerful, deeply entrenched relationships have locked us into a selfdestructive course(10)». This is the reason why Commoner describes this
(8)
This is why criminal law is, generally speaking, concerned with acts or
omissions which are contrary to public order an society as a whole and which render
the guilty person liable to punishment. Vide FARRAR J., (1977), Introduction to Legal
Method, London, Sweet and Maxwell, page 16. Denham asserts that «Social deviance
in general may be viewed as a failure to change society in a particular way, and
criminal behaviour in particular is an acute form of deviance» DENHAM. P., (1983), A
Modern Introduction to Law (London, Edward Arnold) page 150.
(9)
As SMITH and HOGAN indicated «While the definition of offences can
adequately forbid unjustifiable and inexcusable conduct, it can rarely prevent it. The
Children and Young Persons (Harmful Publications ) Act 1955 was said to have been
completely successful at a time when no prosecution has been brought under it. But this
is unusual». Vide SMITH J.C. and HOGAN B., (1983), Criminal Law, London,
Butterworths page 5.
(10)
COMMONER B., (1975), The Ecological Facts of Life. in SHAW , B.,
Enviro nmental Law. People, Pollution and Land Use (St. Paul, Minn) West Publishing
CO) pages 11-12.
107
process by resorting to the very strong expression, «suicidal track(11)». It is,
nonetheless, an evolutionary and quite complex suicidal track(12).
Secondly, it is also important to make clear that environmental
crimes are «real» crimes. As has been stated before, there is at present
considerable concern about the criminal nature of some serious
environmental degradation. This concern reflects a new and widespread
public ethic that demands a strong response to environmental abuse(13). This
is why an important list of countries have criminalized serious
environmental infractions, creating in that way a new specialised area
within the criminal law system as a way of confronting serious
environmental degradation.
However, states initially resorted to criminal law as an alternative to
solve social problems when other legal mechanisms had previously failed.
In fact, some legal systems began to make use of criminal law as an
alternative to protect the environment when no other options were left. In
France, for instance, the crime of poaching, regulated by the Law of 15
April 1829 on «river fishing» was applied by the courts after 1859 to
manufacturers who discharged any pollutant into the water, since there was
not any other effective legislation to repress this type of behaviour. In the
United States the potential significance of the Refuse Act of 1899, which
made it a crime to discharge any refuse matter into the navigable waters of
the United States without the permission of the Army Corp. of Engineers,
was recognised by the Waters and Wetlands Report in 1970. In fact, it was
the starting point for the use of Criminal Law for the protection of the
environment in the United States. After the rediscovery of the Act there
was a spate of criminal prosecutions aimed at avoiding environmental
pollution( 14). More recently, it has been argued that the new crime related to
(11)
COMMONER B., Op. cit. page.12.
«When the first cannons were fired, in the early fourteenth century, they
affected ecology by sending workers scrambling to the forest and mountains for more
potash, sulfur, iron, ore and charcoal, with some resulting erosion and defo restation.
Hydrogen bombs are of a different order: a war fought with them might alter the
genetics of all life on this planet». Vide W HITE LYNN Jr., The Historical Roots of Our
Ecologic Crisis, in edit. by LORI GRUEN and DALE JAMIESON (Oxford, New York,
Oxford University Press 1994) page 6.
(13)
«The (United States) Government's Memorandum» in Aid of Sentencing
cited in the case United States v. Holley Electric Corp, Case No. 83-119-CR-J-6.
(14)
«After the 1970 Waters and Wetlands Report (...) prosecutors across the
country began to wield the sword of strict criminal liability in the battle against water
pollution.» Vide Mc NOLD D., UNKOVIC J.C. and LEVIN J.L., «Thoughts on the Role of
(12)
108
land planning introduced in the recent 1995 Spanish Criminal Code enacted
in 1995( 15) was an alternative to the lack of efficiency of the administrative
sanctions which were normally being applied to serious land planning
abuses.
This is why environmental crimes have occasionally been defined as
a sort of utilitarian solution( 16) to remedy the lack of efficient administrative
measures to protect the environment. The fact is that criminal offences,
especially environmental criminal offences, should not only be considered
in terms of efficiency or utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. Whether efficient
or inefficient, criminal provisions express society's moral condemnation of
pollution. As Heine has very accurately indicated, circumstances such as
the greenhouse effect, changes in climate, acid rain, etc., have all become
part of a new scenario which ultimately involves the course of
developments on which the future of human beings may depend.
Accordingly, «it may appear as a necessity, even a duty for government to
provide the criminal law with adequate instruments for the protection of the
environment( 17)».
However, this is not the only problem. It has been generally accepted
that a «crime» means a serious breach of the criminal law. Nonetheless,
when it comes to analysis of environmental crimes, there is a certain
tendency to downgrade this specific type of criminality. Walker, for
instances, asserts that «Nowadays there is a tendency to use «crime» to
stigmatise almost any intentional behaviour of which the speaker
disapproves. Calling a rubbish-dump a crime is a conservationist's way of
stimulating public protest against something which is deplorable ( 18)...».
Penalties in the Enforcement of the Clean Air and the Clean Water Acts». in Duquese
Law Review, volume 17, No. 1, 1977-1978, page 4 .
(15)
Article 319 of the Spanish criminal code.
(16)
The classical utilitarian theories took the fundamental basis of morality to
be a requirement that happiness should be maximised: the basic principle of utility
required as to weight up the consequences , in terms of happiness or unhappiness, of
various alternative actions, and choose that action which would, on balance, have the
best consequences, in the sense of producing the largest net balance of happiness.
Utilitarianism holds that, in deciding what we should do, we should consider only the
consequences our actions: an action cannot be justified purely by its relationship to
past facts. Vide SIMMONDS N.E., (1987), Central Issues in Jurisprudence. Justice, Law
and Rights, London, Sweet and Maxwell, pages 15 and 17.
(17)
HEINE G., «Environmental Protection and Criminal Law», in Frontiers of
Environmental Law, edit. By OWEN LOMAS , (1991), London, Chancery Law
Publishingpages, 76-77.
(18)
W ALKER N., (1987), Crime and Criminology. A Critical Introduction,
Oxford, New York, Oxford University Press, page 1.
109
Environmental crimes represent a new type of criminality, but nevertheless
environmental crimes are real crimes. Judge Charles M. Allen expressed at
the time of sentencing in the United States v. Donald Distler, that «It was
and is the opinion of this court that business and industries who pollute our
environment are guilty of grave crimes against man and nature themselves.
Such crimes, if allowed to continue, will soon reach the point where their
effects are irreversible by any known technology…( 19)».
III. Some Practical Problems Posed by the Penal Protection of the
Environment
The penal protection of the environment raises some very interesting
questions, some of which will be outlined in the following paragraphs. As
has already been indicated, it is necessary to select those questions which
appear to be more relevant. Otherwise, one runs the risk of getting involved
in endless discussions, mainly taking into consideration the understandable
limited character and nature of the Congress in which this paper will be
submitted.
III.1. Conceptual Problems Raised by the Criminal Protection of the
Environment and the Need of Special Courts
It has been previously asserted that the penal protection of the
environment is relatively new. This is completely logical since
environmental law itself is basically «virgin law», unprecedented in history.
In fact, as has been observed, most environmental legislation has emerged
in these last decades(20). Besides, environmental matters constitute a
specialised area of science which has its own terminology, its own
technical concepts, etc.. This means that the judiciary will have to deal with
some special aspects with which it will not be familiar. Examples include
pollution of the atmosphere, discharges to water, noise, waste, land
planning, protected areas and release of poisonous substances. The
emergence of certain fundamental principles underpinning environmental
protection policy (such as the principle of preventing damage and the
precautionary and polluter pays principles) also deserved recognition.
(19)
United States v. Donald F. Distler. Cr. No. 77-00108 (W.D. Ky. 1979).
KRAMER L., (1989), «The Open Society, its Lawyers and its Environment»,
in Journal of Environmental Law, vol. 1, No. 1, page 9.
(20)
110
For instance, the concept of environment itself was subject to strong
discussion by the Spanish judiciary when it came to apply the first
environmental offence introduced in the Spanish criminal code ( 21). This
type of difficulty led the British Labour Party Policy Commission to
recommend in 1994 in the United Kingdom an environmental division of
the High Court ( 22). As De Prez asserted, such a court with a specialist bench
would be better equipped to deal with the technical matters often raised in
environmental disputes, and would perhaps have a better idea of what is
reasonable or feasible to expect of industry in terms of pollution
abatement(23).
This explains as well why in the European context the Council of
Europe Resolution (77) 28, on the Contribution of Criminal Law to the
Protection of the Environment, recommended the establishment of
specialist branches of courts and offices of public prosecution to be able to
deal properly with environmental cases(24).
From what has been said, it is evident that special courts will be
better equipped to face technical matters. However special environmental
courts will also be better prepared to avoid situations were environmental
crimes could be treated as a sort of privileged crime. These situations may
appear in cases were the courts lack the appropriate guidance or knowledge
(21)
The issue was finally resolved by the Spanish Supreme Court in a decision
of November 30, 1990, which interpreted the term «environment» in a limited sense.
According to the Supreme Court, criminal law protects the «ecological balance» from a
human perspective and not in a general way. It is an anthropocentric view of
environment and not an ecocentric one.
(22)
In Trust for Tomorrow. Labour Party Commission Report on the
Environment. 1994, page. 50. This was previously recommended by Sir HARRY W OLF ,
Vide W OLF , Sir HARRY, Are the Judiciary Environmentally Myopic? in "Journal of
Environmental Law, volume 4, No.1, 1992, page 13.
(23)
DE PREZ P., (2000), «Excuses, Excuses: The Ritual Trivialisation of
Environmental Prosecutions», in Journal of Environmental Law, volume 12, No.1,
page 76.
(24)
The Committee of Ministers made the following recommendations:
«4. Re-examination of criminal procedure in matters of environmental protection and in
particular:
a) creation of specialist branches of courts and offices of public prosecution to deal with
environmental cases;
b) means of providing persons or gro ups the right to become associated with criminal
proceedings for the defence of the interests of the community;
c) creation of a special criminal register of persons convicted for pollution,
independently of the general criminal register;
d) exclusion from amnesty of serious criminal offences…».
111
on environmental matters. In this regard, the words of Michel Brown, the
American EPA's (25) enforcement counsel, are expressive: «You have got
judges out there who will put a man behind bars for shooting someone, but
if the same guy dumps three buckets of stuff in a town's water supply that
will destroy the guts of all of the people of that town for generations, he
will draw a suspended sentence(26)».
III.2. The Coexistence between Administrative and Criminal
Environmental Law
This is probably one of the most important obstacles when it comes
to applying most criminal environmental provisions in countries with civil
law jurisdictions. This is so because, as it will be seen, administrative law
plays an essential role in the definition of environmental criminal offences.
The situation varies in the United Kingdom − which is part of the common
law legal system −, since its administrative justice approach is completely
different from any civil law jurisdiction. Grottanelli de Santi, when
comparing the systems of administrative justice in England and Italy,
observes that «In Italy indeed, we speak of administrative justice, as in
France, whereas the English speak of justice without attributes, and become
suspicious and perplexed when faced with any special sort of justice such
as military or ecclesiastical justice(27)». As a result, in the United Kingdom,
the distinction between regulatory or administrative infractions and «real»
crimes is not as clear as in countries like Germany or Spain 28 .
Due to the fact that administrative law is not consistently defined in
the different civil law countries(29) it is difficult to apply to them a common
(25)
Environmental Protection Agency, United States.
The ORLANDO S ENTINEL . Sunday, October 9, 1983, page A-7.
(27)
GROTTANELLI goes saying, however, that despite the apparent differences
between both systems (civil and common law), the real differences «lie less in the
institutions or statutory texts than in the approach and way of thinking of judges». Vide
GROTTANELLI DE SANTI G., (1986), «An Italian Looks at English Administrative Law»,
in Public Law, Spring, page.115.
(28)
Editor's note in Heine's article on Environmental Protection and Criminal
Law. Vide HEINE G., Op. cit., page. 76. There are other differences, though. For
instances, in the United Kingdom environmental criminal law is dominated by strict
liability offences with prosecution generally undertaken by the Environmental Agency
in front of a local lay magistrate.
(29)
HEINE G., Op. cit., pags. 82-86. Heine refers to four basic models in the
relationship between criminal law and administrative law in the field of environmental
protection. Those are as follows: criminal offences which are absolute independent of
(26)
112
description. However, as a general rule, in these countries behaviour
presumed hazardous to the environment may be subject to administrative
legal rules as well as to repressive criminal law. This is so since «Most of
the measures for environmental protection form part of the administrative
law in order to submit harmful behaviour to prior control. These
administrative devices are usually completed by repressive means which
enable administrative agencies to ban unlawful activities (…) Whereas
criminal prosecution is intended as reaction highly intolerable to society,
these administrative offences are designed to suppressing mere
unlawfulness not requiring an express moral verdict( 30)».
Besides, administrative law uses concepts which have traditionally
been outside the criminal legal system. Logically, a criminal law court may
have problems to interpret them. Moreover, since the terms of
administrative law serve different purposes in different contexts to those of
criminal law, they lead to inappropriate results if adopted uncritically by
criminal law.
This coexistence, which frequently becomes an overlapping tension,
between both sets of legal norms (administrative and criminal), is basically
due to the fact that before it became common practice to draft criminal
environmental legislation there were only administrative violations.
Accordingly, what was a purely administrative field, is now a mixed
administrative-criminal one. Previously, it was left to the administrative
agency to lay down the permissible level of pollution through
administrative regulations. Now, the criminal judicial authorities also
intervene to decide whether the pollution caused is acceptable under the
criminal law standards.
Another very important problem that arises from that relationship is
the incapability of the Public Administration to cope with the enormous
control programme related to environment in the wider sense(31). However,
very often, in order to determine the scope of criminal liability, penal law
has, therefore, generally deferred to the definition of socially
acceptable/unacceptable behaviour, made by the administrative law.
administrative law (Model 1), criminal provisions absolutely dependent
of
administrative law (model 2), criminal law relatively dependent on administrative law
(model 3) and environmental offences separated from the real crimes of the penal code
(model 4).
(30)
PAEFFGEN H.U., «Overlapping Tensions between Criminal and
Administrative Law: The Experience of West German Environmental Law», in Journal
of Environmental Law, vol. 3, No.2, pages 247-248.
(31)
W INTER G., (1989), «Perspectives for Environmental Law – Entering the
Fourth Phase», in Journal of Environmental Law, vol. 1, No.1, page 45.
113
Legal commentators have referred to a set of different questions
which appears as a result of the coexistence of both set of legal norms. For
instance, and according to the undeniable influence of administrative
decisions on criminal liability, under certain circumstances an
administrative decision, or even a lack of decision, may leave unapplied a
criminal law provision. This is, for example, the case of what has been
called «active tole ration» of pollution by administrative authorities.
Paeffegen defines active toleration «when the applicant, relying on the
permissibility of his purpose begins to pollute a river, etc., before actually
receiving a formal consent, and when the administrative authority
knowingly fails to take against him( 32)». Using other words, toleration is
when administration, in the general pursuit of economic growth, declines to
discipline one who breaches pollution regulations. Toleration is thus
postulated to legitimise such offences and to avoid sanctions (33).
It may also happen that in the discussion between the administrative
authority and the public prosecutor, regarding the criminal character of the
environmental infraction, if they do not reach an agreement there is always
a risk of passivity on both sides, which is not so rare, for instances, in
Holland, as Fangman pointed out( 34).
In other cases, if the administrative authority intervenes with an
administrative act that entirely covers the relevant criminal activity, then
the author has committed no offence, since one of the definitional elements
of the crime is missing( 35) or the administrative act is considered a defence
justifying the author's action( 36).
There are some other examples of this type of abuse and all them
prove that in that sort of cases modern states − and their administrations −
very often do not take a too «active» position in the protection of
environment( 37). Moreover, they are occasionally capable of breaking the
rules and of subverting the institutional order(38). Occasionally, as it is the
case, in Germany the competent public authorities, following a purely
(32)
PAEFFGEN H.U., Op. cit., page 260.
W INTER G., Op. cit., page 45.
(34)
FANGMAN N., (1990), Criminal Enforcement on Environmental Legislation.
Environmental Enforcement Workshop. May 8-10, Utrecht, The Netherlands, page 131.
(35)
Since it is not an illegal act from the administrative point of view.
(36)
PAEFFGEN H.U., Op. cit., page 231.
(37)
LEPAGE JESSUA, C., «L'Etat ennemi ou protecteur de l'environnement», in La
Vie Judiciaire, Du 19 au 25 Septembre 1988, page 9.
(38)
VERCHER A., (1990), «The Use of Criminal Law for the Protection of the
Environment in Europe», Council of Europe Resolution (77) 28, in Northwestern
Journal of International Law and Business,. Winter, vol. 10. No. 3, page 457.
(33)
114
utilitarian strategy and even knowing the existence of a serious infraction,
may enter into «futile and endless negotiations with the polluter (…)
intervening for years. The motive of this strategy is to achieve better
compliance with environmental provisions by imposing mutually agreed
conditions than by the threat of punishment – the results often are poor
nonetheless(39)». This type of negotiations has been equally problematic in
Spain ( 40) and in Holland, although in the last case judicial authorities may
participate in the negotiations themselves(41).
Under these circumstances, can we make use of criminal prosecution
against members of public administration for this kind of abuse? It is
certainly possible, although it has to be admitted that it is extremely
difficult to obtain a conviction. Up to the present, there is a limited number
of convictions in Germany and none in Spain, although in the Spanish legal
system new legal criminal provisions have recently been created to
confront the possible criminal responsibility of administrative authorities in
this sort of case(42). The reasons are obvious: very often the public
administrative authorities carry on investigations, or even negotiations,
without providing the proper information to the police or to the judicial
authority. Moreover, a recent Spanish constitutional case(43) left open the
possibility for administrative authorities to infringe the well known
principle of «double jeopardy», also known in civil law jurisdiction as the
«non bis in idem» principle. According to the Spanish Constitutional Court,
the administrative authorities are allowed to sanction an environmental
infraction from the administrative point of view and, after punishing it, to
refer the case to the judicial authorities «in case there were any criminal
responsibilities for the commission of a possible environmental penal
offence(44)». In fact, the judicial authorities convicted the accused of
(39)
PAEFFEGEN H.U., Op.cit., page 261.
That type of initiatives, as described in PAEFFGEN's quotation, are known in
the Spanish legal system as «Programas de descontaminación gradual».
(41)
«There is an enormous investment in time for talks, often without matching
results». FANGMAN N., Op. cit., page 134.
(42)
Articles 319, 321 and 329 of the 1995 Spanish penal law.
(43)
Court decisión 177/1999, of October 11th.
(44)
Vide TORRES FERNÁNDEZ M.E., «El Principio non bis in idem en la
Jurisprudencia Constitucional», La Ley, 7 de junio de 2000. page 1 et seq.; DE VICENTE
M ARTÍNEZ R., Teoría y Práctica o el Dr. Jekyll y Mr. Hyde (a Propósito de la Sentencia
del Tribunal Constitucional 177/1999, de 11 de Octubre, sobre el Principio ne bis in idem.
In: Actualidad Penal. No. 22. Semana de 29 de mayo al 4 de junio de 2000. También
CORCOY BIDASOLO M. y GALLEGO SOLER J.I., «Infracción Administrativa e Infracción
Penal en el Ambito del Delito Ambiental: ne bis in idem Material y Procesal», in
(40)
115
releasing serious polluting substances into a river, an action that had been
already sanctioned by the administrative authorities.
III.3. Corporations and the Protection of the Environment
The question could be put in the following way: A Corporation or a
legal person, is an organised group of persons. If a person individually
considered can be criminally and civilly liable for any kind of action, why
when that person combines with some other persons, should that capacity
disappear?
Certainly there are not too many countries which adhered to the
principle «Societas delinquere non potest(45)». For instance, France
eliminated the aforementioned principle in its last penal code, as did
Portugal. However, some other countries, and Spain is a good example,
kept adhering to it. There are some important arguments to take into
consideration when analysing the need to admit or to reject the adherence
to the principle «Societas delinquere non potest», at least in cases of
environmental crimes.
First of all, as Hazlitt argued, «Corporate bodies are more corrupt and
profligate than individuals, because they have more power to do mischief
and are less amenable to disgrace or punishment. They feel neither shame,
remorse, gratitude or good will… »( 46). Accordingly, the corporations'
capacity to commit environmental offences must not be underestimated.
Secondly, we must keep in mind that an environmental crime is a
crime like any other, albeith a new crime born as a consequence of social,
economical and industrial development. To consider it as a crime we must
expand the stereotypical traditional definition of crime and the traditionally
portrayed criminal, to embrace those who break this new form of socioeconomic and industrial wrong against society.
Thirdly, reflecting the early and crucial role of corporations in anglosaxon economic development (now exported worldwide), the American
Supreme Court long ago held that «It is true that there are some crimes
which in their nature can be committed by corporations but there is a large
Actualidad Penal,. No. 8. Semana de 21 al 27 de febrero de 2000. Also, VERCHER
NOGUERA A., «La Incorporación del Principio "el que no corre vuela" en Derecho
Constitucional», in Derecho y Medio Ambiente. Revista Jurídica para el Desarrollo
Sostenible. vol. 1. No. 2. Abril-junio 2000, p age 67 et seq.
(45)
Civil law jurisdictions are based on Roman law and Roman law traditionally
established the principle «societas delinquere non potest», that is, societies are unable
to commit a criminal action and so only physical individuals have the capacity to
infringe criminal law.
(46)
HAZLITT W., (1952), Table Talk , London, Everyman Editions, page 254.
116
class of offences (…) where in the crime consists in purposely doing the
things prohibited by statutes. In that class of crimes we see not good reason
why corporations may not be held responsible for and charged with the
knowledge and purposes of their agents, acting within the authority
conferred upon them(47)».
Fourthly, perhaps the type of punishment applicable to corporations
is the most complex point. The fact that a fine is the only type of
punishment applicable to corporations is totally unfair. That is not only
because managers and executives can go to jail for the commission of the
same kind of crimes when their culpability is individual, but also because a
fine does not have a properly deterrent effect on a corporation, considering
that the amount of the fine can, like any other cost, be included in the
cost/benefit balance. Judge Donald W. Van Artsdalen stated as follows:
«As to the defendant there are two types of effective deterrents. One of
course is imprisonment of the responsible official. The other is that the law
provides for either or both, in cases of this sort. If the only punishment is a
fine, the person might be inclined to violate the law and tend to look at it as
being a bad business investment and they must pay a fine and thereafter can
forget about any other type of restrain upon them48 ».
Considering those facts, the research for new types of punishment
applicable to corporations is not merely a theoretical problem but also a
practical concern for schola rs and legal practitioners. Likely effective types
of punishment that have been proposed include management intervention,
community service order and adverse publicity. Management intervention
may take the form of internal discipline and organizational reform orders.
A community service order consists of requiring a corporate offender to
undertake socially useful work projects tailored to the corporate offender
capacity and resources. Finally, regarding adverse publicity it consists of
publishing in the current press the court decision against the corporation.
Of all them, adverse publicity (name and shame) could perhaps be
the most effective, considering the nature and characteristics of
corporations. In fact, according to Fisse, adverse publicity is «the
quintessentially stigmatic corporate sanction( 49)». It is the type of sanction
(47)
New York Cent. H. R.R. Co. v. United States 212 U.S. 489, 494-495 (1909).
United States v. Lanigen, Cr. No. 81-297 (E.D. PA. 1982). The owner and
operator of a sanitary landfill was convicted for negligent violations of the American
Clean Water Act and violations of the Refuse Act.
(49)
FISSE BRENT , (1982), «Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence,
Retribution, Fault and Sanctions», in Southern California Law Review, vol. 36, No. 4,
page 1229.
(48)
117
that has enjoyed the most considerable support because it affects the
corporation's prestige as well as its financial success. In that regard, Fisse
added: «…to attach the marke of Cain to a corporation is to strike at an
organizational mantle which shields individual persons from being
subjected to the stigma ( 50)».
Corporate criminal law is, nonetheless, surrounded by complexities.
It is important to point out that in some countries, such as the United States,
China or Japan, where corporations can be prosecuted, to prosecute a
corporation does not exonerate individuals implicated in the offence from
criminal liability. However, it is often expedient to prosecute only the
corporation because it spares the investigating and prosecuting officials the
trouble of going behind the corporate veil and identifying the actual
director, manager or other employee responsible for the crime. Such a task
is particularly difficult in large and complex organisations ( 51).
However, this is not the most important problem. The greatest lies in
the fact that, as Laufer points out, referring to United States, corporate
criminal law has moved through different phases, the last one being
characterised by a novel sort of partnership of corporations with the
government. This means a worrying Government-corporate cooperation
where command and control strategies of corporate regulation has been
replaced by negotiated compliance, coerced cooperation and regulatory
persuasion( 52).
IV. Recent Evolution of the System of Criminal Law for the Protection of
the Environment in the European Context
As is widely known, national and international environmental law
have taken giant steps in the last decades. During this period of time, many
countries, inspired by Principle I of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,
amended their Constitutions, thereby providing their citizens a guaranteed
right to a safe and healthy environment or imposing on the state an
obligation or duty to protect the environment, or in some cases imposing a
similar obligation or duty on citizens.
(50)
FISSE BRENT , Op. cit., page. 1230.
PRABHU M., Op. cit., page. 717.
(52)
LAUFER W. and GEIS G., (2001), «Corporate Criminal Law, Cooperative
Regulation and the Parting of Paths», in Cahiers de Defense Sociale. Bulletin de la
Société Internationale de Defense Sociale, pag. 103 et seq.
(51)
118
The European continent has witnessed some important developments
not only in the protection of the environment in general, but also in the use
of criminal law for the protection of the environment. The legal
developments which have taken place within the European Union on the
protection of the environment are well known. It is a process that has been
defined as «The emergence of the Community as an environmental
actor (53)». The same could be said of the Council of Europe, especially
taking into consideration its efforts to transform the right to a decent
environment into a «real» human right( 54).
It is not surprising, therefore, that both the Council of Europe and the
European Union, have resorted, at a certain stage, to the criminal law for
the protection of the environment. Let us analyze the use of criminal law
for the protection of the environment separately in both organizations. We
will begin, following a chronological order, with the Council of Europe.
IV.1. The Council of Europe
The penal protection of the environment became a matter of real
concern in the Council of Europe in 1978, when the Committee of
Ministers adopted Resolution (77)88 on the contribution of criminal law to
the protection of the environment. The Committee of Ministers first
considered the need to protect the health of human beings, animals and
plants, and the beauty of landscapes. Second, the Committee considered
that various aspects of present-day life, especially industrial development,
entail a degree of pollution which is especially dangerous to the
community. Finally, the Committee concluded that a need to resort to
criminal law as an «ultima ratio» existed when other measures are ignored,
ineffective or inappropr iate. Based on these conclusions, the Ministers
made a number of recommendations to member state governments(55).
(53)
SCOTT J., (1998), EC Environmental Law, London and New York,
Longman, page 4.
(54)
VERCHER NOGUERA A., «Derechos Humanos y Medio Ambiente», in Claves
de Razón Práctica No.84. Julio/Agosto 1998. Page 14 and seq.
(55)
«1. Examination of criminal penalties for damage to the environment and
whilst maintaining the traditional penalties of fine and imprisonment (possibly
conditional) in the most serious cases:
a)
introduction in this field of particular forms of pecuniary penalty,
such as daily fines (astreintes), day fines, s uspended fines and conditional fines;
b)
allocation of proceeds from pecuniary penalties for pollution to
environmental uses;
119
Later on, the Council of Europe Justice Ministers' Resolution No 1
(1990) reaffirming Resolution (77)28, called upon Member States «…to
examine the advisability of (i) drawing up a list of offences the purpose of
which would be to provide adequate criminal law protection for water, soil,
the air, and another components of the environment meriting protection,
and also for man and in its environment; (ii) applying the concept of
endangerment offences irrespective of the damage actually done, and (iii)
making environmental impairment a criminal offence liable to prosecution
not only in the country where the offence is committed but also in all
countries where the offence had consequences, subject to the principle of
avoiding double jeopardy».
Following the adoption of the Resolution No.1 (1990), the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe established a new select
committee of experts in 1991 under the name of the Group of Specialists on
the protection of the environment through criminal law(56). On 4 November
1998 the Convention on the Protection of the Environment through
Criminal Law opened for signature(57).
The most outstanding points could be described as follows:
1) Article 2 of the Convention requires signatory countries to
criminalise various serious offences(58).
c)
introduction in this field of measures such as restoration of the
former state possibly ordered in connection with a suspended custodial penalty,
work for the benefit of the community (as principal penalties) and publication of
convictions:
2. Re-examination of the principles of criminal liability, with a view, in
particular, to the possible introduction in certain cases of the liability of corporate
bodies, public or private.
3. Examination of the advisability of criminalizing acts and omissions which
culpably (intentionally or negligently) expose the life or health of human beings or
property of substantial value to potential danger…». Vide as well note 19 supra, on the
recommendation to introduce environmentally specialized courts and prosecutors.
(56)
In October 1991 it started to work and completed the new Convention for the
protection of environment through criminal law in December 1995, after holding seven
plenary and ten working group meetings.
57
For an analysis and discussion of the Convention vide CHAMOT C., «La
Convention du Conseil de l'Europe sur la protection de l'environnement par le droit
penal» (Strasbourg, 4 novembre 1998), in L'effectivité de Droit européen de
l'environnement, edited by SANDRINE M ALJEAN-DUBOIS , (2000), Paris, La
Documentation Francaise, page 199 et seq.
(58)
Release of substances or ionising radiation into air, soil, or water which
causes death or serious injury to any person or creates a significant risk of causing
death or serious injury.
120
2) Article 4 extends the scope of the Convention to a wide range of
environment-related illegal conduct by a reference to «infringement of the
law, an administrative regulation or a decision taken by a competent
authority». Signatories can choose to impose criminal sanctions and/or
measures, or administrative sanctions and/or measures. Other measures of a
punitive nature may be the withdrawal of a permit, the prohibition to
continue environmentally dangerous processes, etc., etc.
3) Article 9 requires signatories to impose corporate liability, without
excluding criminal proceedings against natural persons.
Through those, and other non-referred provisions, the Convention's
basic aim is to approach the signatories' penal legislations on the protection
of the environment, contributing in that way to increase its practical
effectiveness(59).
IV.2. The European Union
International conventions constitute an important step towards the
establishment of a real «system» of international penal law for the
protection of the environment, rather than mere «principles(60)» the
European Union has also open up new possibilities. These have been
expressed throughout two different initiatives.
On the one hand, Denmark presented an initiative for a framework
Decision on combating serious environmental crime ( 61) in March 2000. The
framework Decision is aimed at introducing minimum standards on
prosecution and sanctions for major offences, looking as well an enhanced
- Unlawful release of substances or ionising radiation into air, soil, or
water which causes or is likely to cause their lasting deterioration or death or
serious injury to any person or substantial damage to protected monuments,
other protected objects, property, animals or plants.
- Unlawful disposal, treatment, storage, transport, export, or import of
hazardous waste, which causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to
any person or substantial damage to the quality of air, soil, water, animals or
plants and unlawful operation of a in which a dangerous activity is carried out
presenting the same risk, and
- Unlawful manufacture, treatment, storage, use, transport, export or
import of nuclear materials or other hazardous radioactive substances which
causes or is likely to cause death or serious injury to any person or substantial
damage to the quality of air, soil, water, animals or plants.
(59)
CHAMOT C., Op. cit., page 200.
(60)
BYUNG-SUN CHO, «¿El Surgimiento de un Derecho Penal Internacional del
Medio Ambiente?», in Revista Penal, No.8, July 2001, page 22.
(61)
OJ C 39/4 of February 2000.
121
cooperation between Member States for detention and apprehension of
offenders.
Besides the Danish initiative, the European Commission presented a
proposal for a Directive of the Parliament and of the Council on the
Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law(62), which was
published on 13 March 2001.
IV.2.1 The Proposed Directive on the Protection of the Environment
through Criminal Law
The Explanatory Memorandum of the proposed Directive is quite
clear when establishing the aims of the proposal and the reasons according
to which the Commission decided to prepare it. The Explanatory
Memorandum points out that «Experience has shown that the sanctions
currently established by the Member States are nor always sufficient to
achieve full compliance with Community law (…) In many cases, only
criminal penalties will provide a sufficient dissuasive effect. First, the
imposition of criminal sanctions demonstrates a social disapproval of a
qualitatively different nature compared to administrative sanctions or a
compensation mechanism under civil law. It sends a strong signal, with a
much greater dissuasive effect, to offenders. For instance, administrative or
other financial sanctions may not be dissuasive in cases where the offenders
are impecunious or, on the contrary, financially very strong. Second, the
means of criminal prosecution and investigation (and assistance between
Member States) are more powerful than tools of administrative or civil law
and can enhance effectiveness of investigation. Furthermore, there is an
additional guarantee of impartiality of investigating authorities, because
other author ities than those administrative authorities that have granted
exploitation licences or authorizations to pollute will be involved in a
criminal investigation».
Let us to analyse the most outstanding points of the proposed
directive.
IV.2.1.a. A Minimum Standard in Criminal Offences
The Explanatory Memorandum continues «Therefore, a minimum
standard on constituent elements of criminal offences in breach of
Community law protecting the environment needs to be established».
Accordingly, the proposal does not cover all activities regulated by
Community law, but only important types of pollution which can be
(62)
2001.
Commission proposal COM (2001)139 final., OJ C 180/238 E, of 26 June
122
attributed to individuals or legal persons. These are breaches of Community
environmental law which constitute «serious impairments of the
environment» and are listed in article 3( 63).
It is evident that in the case of the proposed directive the role of
administrative law, as a base for environmental offences, will be played by
the Community's own environmental law. That is the reason why the
Explanatory Memorandum states that «For reasons of legal certainty, the
Annex to the proposed directive sets out exhaustively the relevant
Community provisions, which prohibit the activities described in Article
3».
However, this minimum standard may vary according to the
development of environmental law. So, «For the purposes of this directive,
any future modifications of the directive listed in the Annex will
automatically apply to this directive. As regards future Community
legislation each text will regulate itself to which extent criminal sanctions
shall have to be provided for». This has the advantage that any criminal
offence will be treated more thoroughly in each environmental directive
and according to the different circumstances at any specific time.
There are other important advantages. For instances, we said before
that, occasionally, in the discussion between the administrative authority
and the public prosecutor, regarding the criminal character of the
environmental infraction, if they do not reach an agreement there is always
a risk of passivity on both sides. It will be possible to avoid cases of
administrative toleration. It is evident that the possibility to refer points of
interpretation to the European Community Court, outside the administrative
(63)
According to article 3:
«Member States shall ensure that the following activities are criminal
offences, when committed intentionally or with serious negligence, as far as they
breach the rules of Community law protecting the environment as set out in the Annex
and/or rules adopted by Member States in order to comply with such Community law:
a) the discharge of hydrocarbons, waste oil or sewage into water;
b) the discharge, emission or introduction of a quantity of materials into
air, soil or water and the treatment, disposal, storage, transport, export or import
of hazardous waste;
c) the discharge of waste on or into land or into water, including the
operation of a landfill;
d) the possession, taking, damaging, killing or trading of or in protected
wild fauna and flora species or parts thereof;
e) the significant deterioration of a protected habitat;
f) trade in ozone-depleting substances;
g) the operation of a plant in which a dangerous activity is carried out
or in which dangerous substances or preparations are stored or used".
123
legal system of each Member State, and the fact that there will be an
European directive at stake, may bring interesting new perspectives.
Moreover, the Explanatory Memorandum also refers to new possibilities of
judicial cooperation, which certainly may well improve the whole system
itself ( 64).
IV.2.1.b Corporations
The proposed directive also refers to corporations, or legal
persons (65), and the problem posed by the principle societas delinquere non
potest, is still admitted by some Member States. Looking for a solution, the
Explanatory Memorandum seeks for an intermediate way: «As concerns
legal persons, it is essential for effective enforcement of Community law
protecting the environment that legal persons can be held liable and that
sanctions against legal persons are taken throughout the Community.
However, for some Member States it might be difficult to provide for
criminal sanctions against legal persons without changing fundamental
principles of their national legal systems. Therefore, Member States would
be able to foresee sanctions other than of criminal nature, as long as they
are effective, proportionate and dissuasive. For instance, they could impose
non-criminal fines, judicial supervision, judicial winding-up orders or
exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid». Accordingly, article 4
provides, regarding natural persons, that «Member States shall provide for
criminal penalties, involving in serious cases deprivation of liberty».
However, when it comes to provide sanctions for legal persons (although it
is applicable to natural persons as well), article 4 b) indicates that «Member
States shall provide for fines, exclusion from entitlement to public benefits
or aid, temporary or permanent disqualification from the practice of
commercial activities, placing under judicial supervision winding up
orders». In that way, the European proposal avoids corporations escaping
environmental sanctions simply because they are not natural persons.
It is easy to observe that the proposed directive has adopted an
extremely pragmatic attitude, trying to obtain solutions to the problems
(64)
«Beyond the rules of this directive, further steps might have to be taken
under the EU-Treaty, with regard to improved judicial cooperation. On the basis of the
current discussion in the Council following the initiative of the Kingdom of Denmark,
it may be envisaged to set up in addition a framework decision according to article 32
(2) b EU. It could concern criminal jurisdiction, measures guaranteeing mutual
extradition and/or coordination of prosecutions and investigations»
(65)
Article 2 a) defines «legal persons» as «any legal entity having such status
under the applicable national law, except for States or other public bodies acting in the
exercise of their sovereign rights and for public international organizations».
124
which have been posed by different legislations. In fact, the various legal
systems of the European Union Member States probably cover the majority
of the abovementioned problems. To provide a minimum standard for
environmental crimes; to base criminal offences on environmental
directives, listed in the Annex, which may increase in number with the
different amendments of the directives; the introduction of a flexible
system of sanctions for legal persons or corporations: all this implies a high
level of flexibility and a powerful instrument towards harmonising the
environmental penal system in Europe. The possibility to refer to the
European Community Court of Justice is another positive aspect to take
into consideration in the future development of this legal area.
IV.2.2. The Present Situation
At the time of writing, there seems to be certain conflict between the
European Parliament and the European Commission, on the one hand, who
support the proposed Directive and some Member States and the European
Council, on the other, who support the Danish initiative. The reason for this
different attitude on the use of criminal law for the protection of
environment is rather obvious: whereas the proposed Directive is subject to
full co-decision under the European Union's «first pillar», Denmark's «third
pillar plan would be adopted by Governments alone, nor would the
European Court of Justice have jurisdiction over its implementation.
There are similarities, nonetheless, between both initiatives. Both
would harmonise the definition of crimes against the environment and
require Member States to put in place «effective and dissuasive» penalties
against them. Neither would stipulate the precise punishment that offenders
should receive. However, though the effects of the initiatives would be
similar in practice, Member States fear the Commission proposal would set
a precedent for further proposals in other areas of criminal law. This is
perhaps be biggest obstacle. Accordingly, the conflict remains unsolved at
present.
V. Conclusions
It is evident that environmental criminal law is undergoing an
unstoppable evolution. In fact, although it practically did not exist at the
beginning of the 70's, right now it is even proposed to be introduced in the
European Union, something which was almost inconceivable just a few
years ago. However, its unavoidable evolution is completely logical since it
is an essential instrument to achieve effective protection of the
125
environment. The newly created environmental criminal law had to face an
important number of problems, due to its characteristics and nature. Recent
developments, especially the proposed directive on the protection of the
environment through criminal law and the Danish proposal on the same
matter, have introduced new and interesting perspectives. In fact, both
initiatives within the European Union had to search for new solutions as a
way to harmonise the different penal legal systems existing within the
European Union. This may represent – whatever be the solution adopted
within the European Union – a force for innovation in this new legal area.
THE CHALLENGES OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY.
NEW ALTERNATIVES, LIMITS, FORMS AND GOALS
MARIANO CIAFARDINI
Secretary of Criminal Policy and Penitentiary Affairs,
Ministry of Justice, Buenos Aires, Argentina
Modern society imposes upon the actors of the criminal system of
justice (jurists, legislators and judges, in that order) the adoption of
measures oriented toward the achievement of the ends that characterize
criminal law. It is essential that today's dogmatics of the illicit act aim at
normatizing categories within the theory of punishable acts with a view to
providing an answer to new social phenomena, without relaxing any
individual rights guaranteed in the law.
The proposed normatization is the basis for the full operation and
respect for a democratic state and the rule of law. It is not unusual among
us to hear arguments against the normatization of criminal law as a guiding
instrument of state punishment. Those who oppose the normatization of
criminal law maintain that the introduction of normative criteria in the
various categories of the theory of the offence carries with it lesser
guaranties for the individual. This idea, equally widespread and wrong,
fails to take into account the social configuration of the end of the XXth
century and the beginning of the XXI st . It seems that a new era has begun:
that of special prevention; the end of criminal law is no longer the
protection of legal interests but the validity of the norm.
With respect to the definition of the offence, it is necessary to
abandon the old causal-naturalistic doctrine to ascribe results to conduct.
The analysis should not be one of a casuistic but of a regulatory nature. As
to culpability, individuals must begin to be seen not as flesh-and-blood
beings − as beings who are part of the natural world −, but as citizens with
a social role to play. By this, I intend to provide grounds for a functional
concept of culpability, forsaking all naturalist notions in this area as well.
This functionalist criterion of culpability allows the introduction of
the imposition of sanctions to collective legal entities into the criminal
system; these legal persons, being entitled to rights and constrained by
obligations, have a social role to play and actual capacity to threaten
property or interests protected by the state (or, as I maintain here, to
challenge the validity of the norm).
130
The Challenges of Criminal Liability
a) The Protection of the Validity of the Norm and Special Prevention
The new dogmatic conception has evolved around two axes: (1) a
different notion regarding the ends of state punishment and (2) a focus on
the question of whether the main purpose of criminal law is the protection
of legal interests or the validity of the norm.
Thus, those who see the mission of criminal law as the protection of
legal interests and define these as «every desirable social state which the
law wants to shield from harm(1)», adhere either to a retributive theory of
the sanction or – and they constitute a vast majority today – to a relative
theory of the sanction (and usually, general prevention). I cannot − and not
only because of the importance that Professor Roxin has had in the
Spanish-speaking academic world and especially in my country, but also
because this will probably become the prevalent view in a few decades −, I
cannot, then, not draw attention to this respected German professor's
opinion in that it is primarily special prevention what is to prevail as the
grounds for the imposition of sanctions by the state.
«My conclusion is that, when it comes to fair sanctions, that is, those
that do not go beyond the limits to fair punishment that arise from the
principle of culpability, special and general prevention certainly still
dominate the theory of the ends of the sanction, although these ends have
found today a much richer content and a much more detailed scope for
application than in the past. Also, and contrary to the current trend, special
prevention has shown to play, as always, a central role in the theory of the
ends of the sanction, while general prevention, which has been brought to
the forefront these days, though certainly still deemed equally important,
has been considered of relative importance with regard to the ends of the
sanction, since its methods and scope are for the most part outside criminal
law( 2)» .
I hope I am not mistaken (and this is probably a wishful thinking) in
asserting that special prevention will become the foundation on which the
modern conception of the ends of the sanction shall develop. However, I
think the view that advocates replacing the protection of legal interests as
the mission of criminal law for the protection of the validity of the norm is
regaining momentum today. With this I am trying to introduce a much-
(1)
W ELZEL HANS , (1987), Derecho penal aleman, Trad. Juan Bustos y Sergio
Yánez Pérez, Santiago de Chile, pág.15.
(2)
ROXIN CLAUS , (2001), «Transformación de la teoría de los fines de la pena»,
publicado en Nuevas formulaciones en las ciencias penales, Córdoba, págs. 225 y sig.
131
debated issue on the ends of criminal law and whether these lie in the
protection of legal interests or rather, the validity of the norm.
The social order cannot be exclusively defined in terms of goods but
it also has to be defined in terms of the roles of legal persons. It is clear that
criminal law has never restored a legal interest that has been harmed. Also,
whenever a legal interest is irremediably lost (for example, in the case of a
patient who, it has been established, will die in a few minutes due to poor
medical assistance) the conduct that constitutes an attack on the patient's
life, such as the firing of a gun still must be punished; but then (say
functionalists) it is not a matter of legal interest but of guaranteeing those
who are members of a society the expectancy that the norm banning
homicide is valid, even when the legal interest it aims at protecting has
been irremediably lost.
It is not a question of protecting the legal interests of individual
persons (who may, in fact, consent to the destruction of a legal interest,
thus turning a conduct licit, for example, by consenting to somebody else's
trespassing their property) but of guaranteeing society's expectancy as
regards the validity of the norm. In this last example, we cannot say the
legal interest has not been hurt, but rather, that the action carried out by the
social agent does not challenge the validity of the norm and that, therefore,
it cannot be sanctioned although the legal interest has actually been
affected.
«Society maintains norms and refuses to think of itself in any
different way. According to this conception, the sanction is not just a means
to maintain social identity but it constitutes that maintenance itself (…) The
answer to a social problem through the application of criminal law is given
through the application of the legal system as a partial social system, and
this means that the answer is given within society. Thus, it is impossible to
separate the criminal law from society ( 3)».
The usual objection to this theory, i.e. that the theory could offer
protection to any legal order is, in my view, invalid. Advocates of the
theory of the legal interest maintain it would be impossible to turn state
protection per se, the existence of a given political party or even, the purity
of the human race, into a legal interest. These objections may seem sound
enough, but from the perspective of the theory of the legal interest one can
also choose norms to regulate people's lives. The theory of the legal interest
(3)
JACOBS GÜNTER, (1996), Sociedad, norma y persona en una teoría de un
derecho penal funcional, Bogotá, pág. 14.
132
shares with the functionalist theory the same critical starting point. The
objection is a political, not a scientif ic one (4).
The advocates of the theory of legal interests also reject
functionalism on the basis that this theory, in its conviction about the value
of legal norms, has raised them to the concept of legal interest and it is the
legal interest − «respect for the validity of the norm» −, what criminal law
protects.
Time will show whether any of these conceptions (special prevention
– protection of the validity of the norm) prevails over the other, since the
protection of the validity of the norm is not compatible with special
prevention and viceversa.
The debate about the ends and meaning of state punishment is not
over. And it will never be, since it is practically impossible to find the right
answer. I have only attempted here to highlight the new trends that have
developed over the past years (special prevention and protection of the
validity of the norm). To sum up: «The discourse on the meaning and ends
of the sanction is not an affair to which an end could have been put if we
had found once and for all th e «right» answer to it, but one of those tasks
for which there shall never be a final answer (5)».
b) The Acceptance of Normative Limits to Causality
The old theory of causality laid down naturalistic parameters for the
imputation of a result to a given conduct. Thus, according to the traditional
theory of equivalence every conduct is a cause providing that the result
does not disappear if the cause is mentally suppressed. The simplicity of
this theory, advocated by Julius Glaser in 1858 and by one of the members
of the Reich's Supreme Tribunal in Germany, Justice von Buri, caused it to
be rapidly accepted by jurisprudence and books of authority, a situation
which lasted into the 1960's. The extent to which this theory could be
stretched was (from its inception) clearly disproportionate to its intended
aim. For example, if there was a road accident, the cause of the result (in
the sense given it by the theory of the condition) was not only the driver's
imprudence but also the car maker, the building company responsible for
the construction of the freeway, the driver's parents, etc.
(4)
JAKOBS GÜNTER, (2000), ¿Qué protege el derecho penal: bienes jurídicos o
la vigencia de la norma ?, Mendoza, pág. 54.
(5)
STRATENWERTH GÜNTER, (1996), ¿Qué aporta la teoría de los fines de la
pena?, Bogotá, pág. 38.
133
An attempt (naturalistic, of course) to limit causality was made by
the theory of social adequacy. According to this theory (put forward by v.
Kries) a cause will only be legally relevant if it is not improbable. This
theory qualifies causal processes according to statistical criteria (was the
result likely to happen?) and to criteria based on general perceptibility (did
it happen in the usual way?); however, there are cases when certain causes
can be normatively relevant even if the events in question did not occur in
the usual way.
The main shortcoming of the theory of equivalence (and of its
corrective theory, the theory of social adequacy) is that it relies,
erroneously, on statistics, experience and models that can be perceived
through the senses instead of being based on the aim of criminal laws(6).
Welzel's final − conduct doctrine brought about dramatic changes for
several aspects of the theory of the offence and the resulting crisis of the
concept of conduct is no other than a crisis revolving around the concept of
subject that had served as a model. Up to then, the model of subject of
criminal law was an individual whose behavior was determined by the
influence of the method of analysis of natural sciences. In this sense, all
human behavior was studied in the light of the law of causation, which
gave way to a notion of conduct in which human beings were nothing more
than a causal factor mediating between conduct and result. Welzel not only
changed the concept of conduct and, consequently, that of culpability, but
he also changed the notion of subject as such and the notion of society(7).
From here, Honig took a critical step forward and denied that the
ontological category of causality reflected the relationship between conduct
and result correctly. In his view and bearing in mind the general ideas set
forth by Larenz about imputation, what really counted for the law and for
the definitions of the offence was something completely different: whether
the result could be seen as the workings of a person and, consequently,
whether it could be attributed to them(8).
It is the modern theory of objective imputation that laid the
foundations for the attribution of human conduct to legal subjects − and for
the ascription of results to conduct − by acknowledging that individuals live
today in a complex society, where everyone has a social role to play and
(6)
JAKOBS GÜNTER, (1995), Derecho Penal. Parte general. Fundamentos y
teoría de la imputación, Madrid, pág. 243.
(7)
W ELZEL HANS , (1975), (Kausalität und Handlung), in «Abhandlungen zum
System des Strafrechts und zur Rechtsphilosophie», Berlin/New York.
(8)
KHÖLER M ICHAEL, (2000), La imputación subjetiva: estado de la cuestión,
Sobre el estado de la teoría del delito, Madrid, pág. 23 y ss.
134
expects others to behave according to their own social role. Criminal laws
do not govern human behavior arbitrarily but they do so in order to make
social life possible, which cannot exist without the safety of expectations.
In a highly industralized society, characterized by modern sociology
as the collectivization of social life, we are faced with a situation in which
it is necessary, on the one hand, to set limits to the liability of social actors,
and, on the other, − if we accept a functionalist notion of culpability − to
admit that not only physical persons can be criminally liable but collective
legal entities as well.
As regards the limits modern criminal law must set for the
imputation of results to conduct, there are cases when, although the
perpetrator creates a risk that may endanger other people's property (for
example, the car maker's) such behavior falls outside the protective scope
of criminal law since the benefits of societies having a car industry
outweigh the drawbacks. Today life without the automobile has become
inconceivable and since a society without risks is equally inconceivable and
nobody is seriously thinking of living outside society, a normative
guarantee entailing no risks has also become impossible: on the contrary,
risks inherent to social life have to be irremediably tolerated, as an allowed
risk(9).
It goes without saying that a free society can only tolerate certain
risks if the activity that creates the risk is justifiable to whoever will bear
the costs: in a free society, freedom of behavior cannot be accepted to the
detriment of others.
Social cohabitation has to be built upon a consensus between coassociates, a consensus that certain parameters of behavior need to be
followed since, otherwise, their existence would hinder rather than allow a
harmonious social life. As a consequence of this consensus, whic h, at least
at the theoretical level, must underlie norms of social behavior, it becomes
essential that each individual be able to organize their activities on the
assumption that others will also act in conformity with the law(10).
I have said that there are some risks it is necessary for individuals to
bear if they are to live in society. I would like to add that social life is
impossible without division of labor. No individual can be in charge of
everything. Think of complex medical equipment or aircraft maintenance,
cases in which if each of the participants had to supervise everybody else's
(9)
JAKOBS GÜNTER, (1996), La imputación objetiva en derecho penal, Madrid,
pág. 118 y sig.
(10)
A LVARADO YESID REYES , (1994), La imputación objetiva, Bogotá, pág. 141
y ss.
135
work, they would not be able to perform their own tasks. Modern society
cannot be conceived without the division of labor: if each social actor were
answerable for everything, then there would be no benefits in the allotment
of tasks − to say the least − since citizens would constantly be under the
threat of criminal sanctions. No modern criminal law is possible without a
principle of trust.
c) Liability for the Event Based on a Functional Theory of Culpability.
Criminal Liability of Collective Legal Entities
As it has already been explained, modern dogmatic trends tend to
maintain that the aim of criminal law is not the defense of property or other
values protected by the law but the reaffirmation of the validity of the
norm.
Thus, Jakobs explains his position by means of the following
example: a driver who is aware he is drunk when he drives his car and does
not take into account the prejudicial consequences his conduct may have on
the lives of others is expressing through his behavior complete disregard for
the life of others. What this kind of behavior confirms is just the opposite of
what is specifically provided in the criminal law for negligence cases. This
contradiction of norm through conduct is a breach of the norm. This
disregard for the norm – Jakobs goes on to explain – gives way to a social
conflict in that it challenges the norm as an orientation model. The sanction
is not an outside event, it is meaningful, i.e. the meaning of the deviant
behavior is not determinant, what continues to be determinant is the
norm(11). To sum up: the end of punishment is to help maintain the norm as
an orientation model for social relationships. The content of the sanction is
a response, imposed on whoever has challenged the norm(12).
This view has substantially modified the concept of culpability. The
paradigm of free will as an inescapable prerequisite of culpability based on
the assumption that human beings are totally free to decide how to behave
cannot be demonstrated empirically (13). The flaw in the old criterion has
been to regard human beings and their freedom as they exist in the natural
(11)
teoría de la imputación, Madrid, pág. 13.
(12)
teoría de la imputación, Madrid, pág.14.
(13)
For details see FERNANDO CÓRDOBA, (2001), La capacidad de motivación y
la imputación de responsabilidad, pág. 175 y ss., in "Nuevas formulaciones en las
ciencias penales", Córdoba.
136
world and to have been completely oblivious of the dimension of their
social meaning(14). What is taken into consideration today to measure the
existence or lack of culpability is the more comprehensive social role of the
individual: its role as a law-abiding citizen(15).
Instead of the objective value relationship jurists now resort to
society's function (the system's). The presuppositions underlying culpability
end up being determined according to teleological derivations of positive
general prevention, thus losing their significance vis à vis legal subjects.
The notion of culpability has to be functional, i.e., it has to be in line with
certain normative principles. The evolution of the notion of subject – from
subject in the natural world to subject in society − has paved the way for
the discussion of criminal liability of collective legal entities and
organizations.
Modern theoreticians have found justification for the criminalization
of organizations in ideas such as the need to protect legal values or the
validity of the norm, without forsaking the principle of culpability as the
sole source of legitimacy for sanctions or punishment. There is no doubt
that an organization as such can challenge the validity of the norm,
regardless of whether physical persons are criminally liable or not.
In order to hold a legal entity criminally responsible it is necessary to
verify whether a physical person has committed a crime while conducting
transactions within the scope of the entity's business − from which the
business should benefit − and also whether surveillance measures have
been lacking or been inadequate to avoid the commission of the illegal act.
It should also be mentioned that even those not personally involved would
be criminally liable, according to the current theories on authorship and
participation(16).
There is also a need, from a political-criminal perspective, for the
introduction of criminal liability of organizations. Several authors
understand that criminal responsibility should only fall on those individuals
whose conduct may be attributed to the organization on whose behalf they
(14)
CÓRDOBA FERNANDO, (2001), «La capacidad de motivación y la imputación
de responsabilidad», Pág. 175 y ss in Nuevas formulaciones en las ciencias penales,
Córdoba.
(15)
KHÖLER M ICHAEL, (2000), La imputación subjetiva: estado de la cuestión.
Sobre el estado de la teoría del delito, Madrid, pág. 79 y ss.
(16)
SCHÜNEMAN B., (1979), Unternehmenskriminalität und Strafrecht – Eine
Untersuchung der Verantwortlichkeit der Unternehmen und ihre Führungskräfte nach
geltendem und geplanten Straf − und Ordnungswidrigkeitenrecht, Köln/Berlin/Bonn/
München.
137
act, namely actions carried out by its organs, through its legal
representatives or managers. Another condition is that the act in question
should yield benefits for the organization (either actual or potential): the socalled 'functional relationship' between the act and the organization's scope
of business, a normative relationship that does away with any remains of
objective liability.
The criminal system has reacted so far by resorting to parameters of
individual authorship to address systematically organized crime. These
parameters have to be supplemented with a doctrine based on social
systems arising from the relationship between society and wrongdoing. By
system I mean a set of organized relationships which may adopt legal form
through the issuance of a charter.
Just as there is personal liability and there are individual sanctions
through which an individual's character may be improved, a sanction may
also perform a social function and serve the purpose of improving the ends
and organization of the social system. Criminal liability may be attributed
to any unit taking part in social life, a physical person or an organization
made up of physical persons. In other words, even if an organization is
fictional as a phenomenon, it is not fictional as social system. It is for this
reason that either individuals or social systems may be blamed from a
social and ethical perspective, since a social system, as human institution,
must produce, accept and fulfill ethical obligations (17). A functional concept
of culpability must necessarily acknowledge criminal liability for
organizations, as subjects with a role to play in the social system.
At this point I would like to make it clear that what has been
suggested here is, in my view, the paradigm of a liberal de jure State of the
XXIst century. It should also be pointed out that the modern social
configuration cannot relax in any way any of the individual rights
guaranteed by international instruments and conventions, which have been
incorporated into positive law by most states. In sum, I think this is a
criminal law that has adjusted itself to today's world, a citizen's criminal
law, as opposed to an enemy's criminal law. An enemy's criminal law
optimizes the protection of legal values; a citizen's criminal law optimizes
spheres of freedom(18). Criminal law is not so much about protecting legal
values anymore, but about reestablishing the validity of the norm.
Individuals are not regarded as flesh-and-blood beings but as legal subjects
(17)
LAMPE E.J., (1994), «Systemunrecht und Unrechtsysteme», Zeitschrift für
die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, pág. 106.
(18)
JAKOBS GÜNTER, Estudios de Derecho Penal, en el artículo Criminalización
en el estado previo a la lesión de un bien jurídico, pág. 298 y ss.
138
fulfilling a social function. It is not possible to set naturalistic parameters to
attribute conduct to results: the criterion has to be a normative one.
CORPORATE CRIME AND A NEW BRAND OF
COOPERATIVE REGULATION∗
WILLIAM S. LAUFER
Associate Professor of Legal Studies and Sociology
The Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania, USA
GILBERT GEIS
Professor Emeritus
Department of Criminology
Law and Society, University of California, Irvine, USA
I. Introduction
It cannot be denied that the rapid development of the United States,
which has astounded the world, has been largely due to
combinations of individual wealth collected in large corporations for
the purposes of enterprise. We owe much as a new country to them,
but it is also true that as a country develops more fully, becomes
more thickly settled and the individuals accumulate more wealth, the
corporations seek to overstep the bounds of their charters and the
laws of the country, and commit crimes( 1).
Over a hundred years ago, Judge Cicero J. Lindley admonished
members of the States Attorney's Association of Illinois to consider an
emerging threat that will only increase as commercial life in the United
States matures.
Concentrated private wealth, large corporate
conglomerates, and the prospect of intense commercial activity in interstate
commerce, combine to pose a distinct challenge to law and law
enforcement. Add to this the appearance of large trusts, powerful
monopolies, and widespread corruption in certain industries. It is no
wonder that courts and le gislatures regularly debated how best to control
abuses of corporate power.
(∗)
An earlier version of this paper appeared in: Cahiers de défense sociale,
2001. That paper was an expanded version of «Corporate Prosecution, Cooperation,
and the Trading of Favors », 87, Iowa L. Rev. (2002).
(1)
CICERO J. LINDLEY, (1899), «Criminal Acts of Corporations and Their
Punishment», 7 Am. Lawyer, 564.
140
Corporate Crime and a New Brand of Cooperative Regulation
Lindley's words came at a distinct turning point in the history of the
criminal law. By the beginning of the Twentieth Century courts were
frequently hearing cases of corporate nuisance and corporate misfeasance
with a common law heritage that, for reasons having much to do with
conceptions of corporate personhood, did not contemplate a role for the
criminal law(2). It soon became clear, however, that the metaphysics of
personhood was an insufficient obstacle. Logic and the absence of biology
gave way to the necessity of criminal regulation, or at least the perception
of its necessity(3).
As Justice Day reasoned in the 1909 watershed case of New York
Central Railroad, corporations make up much of the activity in interstate
commerce. Restricting the criminal law in the regulation of interstate
commerce would essentia lly immunize corporations and «virtually take
away the only means of effectually controlling the subject matter and
correcting the abuses aimed at it»( 4). With New York Central Railroad, the
corporate criminal law was elevated above failed regulatory polic ies and
practices. In the ensuing years, however, the divergence between the literal
requirements of New York Central Railroad and actual regulatory practice
grew dramatically. How and why this divergence took place will be briefly
discussed in Part I of this paper.
It would be a misstatement to conclude, however, that the corporate
criminal law and, thus, corporate criminal liability, became something of a
relic. Resort to the criminal law moved in an out of favor over the past
Century. In recent years, the conventional wisdom endorses the coexistence
of cooperative models of regulation and corporate criminal liability where
(2)
See, e.g., KATHLEEN F. BRICKEY, (1984), Corporate Criminal Liability.
See, STEVEN D. WALT & W ILLIAM S. LAUFER, (1991), «Why Personhood
Doesn't Matter: Corporate Criminal Liability and Sanctions », 18, Am. J. Crim. L., 263;
STEVEN D. WALT and W ILLIAM S. LAUFER, (1992), «Corporate Criminal Liability and
the Comparative Mix of Sanctions, in White Collar Crime Reconsidered, ed. Kip
Schlegel and David Weisburd. For a lively debate on corporate personhood, see
DONALD R. CRESSEY, (1988), «The Poverty of Theory in Corporate Crime Research»,
in 1 Advances in Criminological Theory» 31; JOHN BRAITHWAITE and BRENT FISSE,
(1990), «On the Plausibility of Corporate Crime Control», in 2 Advances in
Criminological Theory, 15; and GILBERT GEIS , (1994), «A Review, Rebuttal, and
Reconciliation of Cressey and Braithwaite & Fisse on Criminological Theory and
Corporate Crime », in 5 Advances in Criminological Theory, 321.
(4)
New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company v. United States, 212
U.S., 481 (1909).
(3)
141
resort to the criminal law is literally the last resort(5). In Part II of this
paper, we raise one of a number of limitations that plague this coexistence.
Scholars have recognized the theoretical risks and limitations of complete
reliance on the criminal law. Others have documented the distinct
weaknesses of cooperative regulation. We restrict our discussion to the
difficulties of protecting «blended» regulatory regimes from corporate
abuses or «gaming.»
Finally, we conclude that the evolution away from reliance on
criminal law and command and control regulatory strategies in recent years
requires either abiding faith in the character of compliance or, alternatively,
a disinterested vigilance to ensure its integrity. We deny having the former
and question, albeit optimistically, how this vigilance might be achieved
when the interests of regulators and the regulated are so much aligned.
I. Phases of Corporate Criminal Law
The corporate criminal law has moved through five distinct phases
(Figure 1). In the first phase, courts obsessed over the importance and
meaning of corporate personhood. The individ ualistic bias of common law
crimes made the attribution of liability seem both strange and wrong.
Courts could only go so far. Without a soul, judges concluded that the idea
of corporate mens rea was too much of a fiction. Between 1850 and 1910,
however, rising concerns over new forms of market power and rapid
market integration captured the public's attention. Corporate criminal
liability, no matter how illusory or seemingly illogical, became increasingly
appealing as a hedge against this power.
In the second phase, initiated by the decision of New York Central
Railroad, courts abandoned the nonfeasance-misfeasance distinction for
reasons of practicality( 6). Corporate regulation in this new world of
(5)
See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, (1990), « Convergence in Models of Regulatory
Strategy », 2 Current Issue Crim. Just., 59; see also IAN A YRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE,
(1992), Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (articulating a
new paradigm for regulatory cooperation); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, (1985), To Punish or
Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety (extending theories of self-regulation to
the coal industry); JOHN BRAITHWAITE, (1982), « Enforced Self-Regulation: A New
Strategy for Corporate Crime Control», 80 Mich. L. Rev. 1466 (proposing a new
concept of regulatory cooperation).
(6)
W ILLIAM S. LAUFER, (1994), «Corporate Bodies and Guilty Minds », 43,
EMORY L.J., 647, 651 − 58 (discussing origins of corporate criminal liability).
142
interstate commerce necessitated a powerful and more formal social
control. This was all the more true as the first merger wave ended and
large corporations became increasingly decentralized.
Centralized
functions were now specialized and complex. In the years leading up to
New York Central Railroad unease over loss of control across the
managerial hierarchy invited the formality of criminal law(7). Vicarious
corporate criminal liability soon became the rule of law in all federal
courts.
The phase that began with a set of clearly defined liability rules,
derived from the tort law doctrine of respondeat superior, evolved into a
protracted period of strategic risk shifting by employers and employees.
Perceptions that vicarious fault was unduly strict and harsh prompted pleas
by firms for a better understanding of the complexity of the corporate form
and the diligence of management in promoting law abidance(8). No fewer
than four years after New York Central Railroad, corporations were raising
due diligence defenses. One cannot imagine a greater slight to the
substantive law. How can corporations assume risks for the acts of their
agents and, yet, avoid liability if they did their best to ensure compliance. A
host of other risk shifting mechanisms, from fidelity bonds and a variety of
other insurance products, characterized the liability posturing of both
employers and employees.
This posturing continued into the third phase distinct phase of the
corporate criminal law, where there was a marked rise in regulatory power
and regulatory law. Compliance replaced punishment as the preferred
sanction in a regulatory era where the locus of enforcement was found in
sweeping legislation, codified in a host of federal and state regulatory
statutes. Labeled the Environmental-Consumerist Period by legal scholars,
Congress and state legislatures turned their attention to «social costs of a
successful industrial economy»( 9). By the end of this period, and the
beginning of a subsequent phase of deregulation, literally thousands of
criminal provisions were found in a wide range of federal statutory law(10).
Marshall Clinard and his colleagues captured a glimpse of the effects of
(7)
See generally RICHARD S. GRUNER, (1994), Corporate Crime and Sentencing.
W ILLIAM S. LAUFER, (1999), «Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the
Paradox of Compliance», 52, VAND. L. REV., 1343.
(9)
HARRY FIRST , (1990), Business Crimes, 4.
(10)
W ILLIAM S. LAUFER, Culpability and the Sentencing of Corporations, 71,
«Neb. L. Rev. », 1049 (1992)
(8)
143
this new regulatory state on large corporations in their much-heralded work
Illegal Corporate Behavior(11).
In the fourth phase, spurred by the passage of the Sentencing
Guidelines for Organizations, corporations were seduced into a novel
partnership with government (see Figure 2). Following significant
lobbying from bus iness associations, a congressionally appointed body −
the United States Sentencing Commission − announced guidelines that
govern the sentencing of corporations in federal courts. The timing of the
release of the Sentencing Guidelines could not have been better. Congress
approved the Sentencing Guidelines when dissatisfaction with the
remaining command and control strategies of corporate regulation was
paramount. Drafters of the Se ntencing Guidelines wanted corporations to
face the threat of signif icant punishment and, at the same time, the
possibility of mitigation, leniency, and amnesty. Theories of cooperative
regulation and negotiated compliance, blended theories, could easily
accommodate.
The Sentencing Guidelines require judges to consider a base fine
multiplied by a mitigation score. A corporation's willingness to accept
responsibility, cooperate with author ities, and implement a compliance plan
reveal due diligence. Of course, knowing the Sentencing Guidelines
prescription for organizational due diligence in advance gives corporations
incentive to demonstrate compliance so that, in the very unlikely event of a
criminal investigation, liability is avoided or at least minimized. None of
this logic was lost on a cottage industry of consultancies that soon after the
passage of the Sentencing Guidelines turned corporate compliance into a
large and, at least initially, profitable industry − all in the name of the Good
Corporate Citizenship movement.
The compliance industry deftly markets the story that evidence of
organizational due diligence likely forestalls a criminal investigation,
minimizes the likelihood of a criminal indictment, and regularly leads to a
grant of governmental leniency, if not amnesty. Regulators and prosecutors
decline cases involving corporations that demonstrate a commitment to
compliance and actively cooperative with authorities. Declinations reward
firms for their proactive, reactive, and cooperative efforts, reserving
resources for the most abusive firms.
Policy statements issued by the largest regulatory agencies reinforce
the move away from command and control strategies to a brand of
negotiated compliance, coerced cooperation, and regulatory persuasion.
(11)
M ARSHALL CLINARD, PETER C. YEAGER, JEANNE BRISSETTE, DAVID
PETRASHEK and ELIZABETH HARRIES , (1979), Illegal Corporate Behavior.
144
Most offer generous leniency and amnesty programs for corporate
cooperators. Organizational cooperation and acceptance of responsibility
are exchanged by corporations for mitigation, exculpation, or absolution. In
fact, corporations have little choice but to trade favors with authorities with
the threat of significant Guideline-prescribed fines.
The result is a new enforcement landscape − one of substantial
assistance, mitigation credits, and voluntary disclosure. In theory, the
substantive corporate criminal law is unchanged since New York Central &
Hudson River Railroad. In practice, negotiated compliance has all but
replaced the substantive law. Corporate cooperation that facilitates the flow
of evidence to authorities is the crit ical feature of this regulatory strategy.
In the final and most recent phase, characterized by the high profile
criminal cases against Arthur Andersen and Sotheby's; settlements with
Merrill Lynch, Piper Jaffray, Xerox; and pending investigations against
Enron, Worldcom, Qwest, Tyco, ImClone, Martha Stewart, Global
Crossing, Dynegy, CMS Energy, El Paso Corp., Halliburton , and Williams
Cos., calls for reforms − with a focus on greater individual accountability −
have changed little in this landscape.
II. Gaming the Partnership
Critics of cooperative models credit their ineffectiveness to a
combination of «structural constraints of regulatory agencies and the
ideological, political, and economic consequences of these constraints»(12).
Others focus on the inevitability of collusion and ask, «Who controls the
controllers?»(13) We ask similar questions. Our focus, however, is on the
effects of gaming «blended» regimes, particularly when regulatory
incentives align corporate and governmental interests and create a
partnership. The motives behind the creation of this partnership were
entirely transparent.
«The Guidelines' carrot and stick approach,» according to a former
United States Attorney, «represents an unprecedented offer by the
government for business to become the government's «partner» in
(12)
LAUREN SNIDER, «Regulating Corporate Behavior», in M.B. BLANKENSHIP ,
(1995), Understanding Corporate Criminality, 202.
(13)
GRAT VAN DEN HEUVEL, Corporate Crimes in the East and West: In Search
of ‘Collusion.'
145
controlling crime»( 14). This partnership is designed to increase compliance
with laws and regulation; support proactive approaches to preventing
unethical and illegal acts; open lines of communication about compliance
concerns and failures; and align the interests of government with those of
business.
Can this partnership ever be too close? In what ways may
corporations exploit this partnership to further shift liability risks? One
disturbing trend, «Reverse whistleblowing» (RWB), provides answers to
both of these questions.
RWB is a risk shifting game that is played when an organization,
through the actions of senior management, identifies culpable employees
and offers evidence against them in a trade with prosecutors for corporate
leniency or possible amnesty. RWB is the inverse of the familiar practice of
employee whistleblowing. Instead of employees identifying corporate
deviance, the practice of RWB identifies deviant employees. In law-abiding
organizations, RWB is often justified as a strategy necessary for survival.
Unfortunately, however, corporations that share culpability practice RWB
to displace blame.
In the consensual form of RWB, or consensual «scapegoating,» a
corporate agent willingly takes responsibility for a «corporate» wrong. In
the more disturbing nonconsensual form, credible though not entirely
deserving agents are blamed. In both cases, RWB is rationalized as a
necessary compromise to maintain the viability and health of the entity. In
both cases, RWB often produces a divergence of interests between
management and employees that inevitably leads to actions that appear far
less than fair, such as the scapegoating of subordinate employees for the
acts of the company.
The concern is that subordinate employees with a peripheral
connection to organizational deviance will be treated as expendable,
particularly when corporate counsel and regulators begin bargaining over
criminal liability. «Corporations, if left to their own devices,» according to
Brent Fisse and John Braithwaite, «will try to deflect responsibility to a
select group of sacrificial personnel, often at a lower level than the actual
source of skullduggery»( 15).
Blaming subordinates may be nothing more than shielding senior
managers and the entity from criminal liability. Harsh and unjustified
(14)
OTTO G. OBERMAIER, (1991), «A Practical Partnership », National Law
Journal, Nov. 11, at 13.
(15)
BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, (1983), Corporations, Crime and
Accountability, 29.
146
discipline of employees may be practiced only to satisfy perceptions of
Guidelines' compliance. The focus on securing evidence of wrongdoing
routinely compromises the rights of employees, including the right against
self-incrimination. Prosecutors are known to have coerced employers to
pressure suspected employees. Concerns over waivers of attorney-client
privilege chill internal investigations. The mad dash to the prosecutor's
office by organizations to self-report can compromise the quality of
information tendered. Finally, all of this has led to a discernable shift in the
role of corporate counsel, from employee advocate to government agent or
informant
Five factors determine whether the practice of RWB raise
fundamental questions of fairness? First, the relationship between the
criminal act alleged and the actions of the entity. The greatest risk lies
where a signif icant connection exists between the acts of an employee and
the actions (or inactions) of the entity converge. For example, fairness
concerns are magnified where top management is complicit or where
middle management tacitly encourages employees.
Organizations that are tightly coupled face increased risks of
criminal liability. Corporations tend toward decentralized, divisionalized,
loosely coupled structures as they mature in size and specialization. This
evolution, some claim, «allows the corporation to take advantage of
opportunities as they arise and react quickly to threats, in and from the task
environment. It also allows the organization to distance itself from illegal
actions, illegal actors, and undesirable attention»( 16). Determining a
significant connection between the actions of the corporation and an
employee's act, therefore, is often extremely difficult. Loosely coupled
organizations are well designed to scapegoat employees without detection.
Second, fairness concerns raise the extent to which officers, senior
executives, and senior managers condoned the commission of the offense
or knew or consciously disregarded knowledge of the illegality. Where
senior managers instructed others to commit the offense, were aware of the
illegalities, or consciously disregarded the commission of the offense, the
risk is greatest. This state of mind variable, like the action variable
discussed above, is related to firm size and decentralization. Evidence of
corporate knowledge or action is much more difficult to obtain in
(16)
CARL KEANE, (1995), « Loosely Coupled Systems and Unlawful Behaviour:
Organization Theory and Corporate Crime », in Corporate Crime: Contemporary
Debates, 168, 169 (Frank Pearce et al. eds.).
147
organizations where decision making is tied to an informal culture of
«nudges and winks, of rules which are not really meant to be obeyed»(17).
A third variable is the relationship of offending employees to those
cooperating with the government. Fairness concerns are greatest where the
status of the employee being investigated or charged is far subordinate to
those offering cooperation. The notion of scapegoating requires more than
mere substitution; scapegoats must be disposable and worthy of being
disposed. Ideally, from the perspective of the corporation, a scapegoat
should be weak and unable to retaliate.
Fourth, the character and quality of compliance initiatives are
crit ical. Nonconsensual RWB appears that much more likely in cases where
firms purchase compliance to the minimum requirements of prevailing laws
− purchases that go to satisfy the impressions of regulators. Finally, the
existence of a corporate culture embraced by leadership and committed to
organizational integrity minimizes fairness concerns.
III. Conclusion
The practice of RWB provides a glimpse of the limitations of a
cooperative regulation in a blended regime. It is but one unfortunate
artifact of a growing trend to exalt the value of corporate cooperation. What
signal is sent to employees when it becomes clear that the loyalties of
corporate counsel, outside counsel, and prosecutors continue to converge?
The answer seems clear.
Every year following passage of the Sentencing Guidelines, there has
been a noticeable escalation in prosecutorial expectations of organizational
cooperation − an escalation made public in the criminal investigations of
Prudential Securities, Salomon Brothers, and Sequa Corporation. In each
case, crimes were ultimately recast as actions of wayward employees,
rather than those of the organization after these targeted corporations
satisfied prosecutorial demands for cooperation.
The lesson was simple − in the unlikely event that criminal activity is
identified in an organization, joining with prosecutors in offering boundless
cooperation may very well avert even a near death experience. Without the
pressures from this partnership and with unwavering faith in the character
of corporate compliance, no one would doubt the integrity of blended
(17)
BRENT FISSE & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, (1983), Corporations, Crime and
Accountability, 184.
148
cooperative regimes. But the pressures are real and the metrics for
assessing corporate compliance are far from perfect.
To address the pressures and the prospects of gaming, there appears
one simple solution: increase organizational transparency. Braithwaite's
notion of tripartism and Shearing's model of constitutive regulation
leverage the power and place of consumer lobbies, unions, and
nongovernmental organizations ( 18). Third party participation in the
regulatory process may be the most elegant solution to ensure a true
compliance and, yet, genuinely combat deviance. Proposals to leverage
public interest groups and their capability to more formally monitor the
regulated and regulators may hold the greatest promise.
(18)
See A YRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 7, at 54 («[T]ripatism might prevent
harmful capture, identify and encourage efficient capture, enhance the attainment of
regulatory goals, and strengthen d emocracy.»)
HOW TO DETERMINE INDIVIDUAL CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN SYSTEMIC CONTEXTS: TWELVE MODELS
JOACHIM VOGEL
Professor and Holder of the Chair of Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure
University of Tuebingen
Justice at the High Court of Appeal, Criminal Division,
Stuttgart, Germany
I. Introduction
It is agreed that criminal responsibility is individual responsibility.
But who is an individual? And who exactly is responsible? The traditional
answer to the first question is: a natural person; the traditional answer to the
second question: a natural person who voluntarily did an act and knowingly
contributed to the criminal result. However, the problem arises whether
these traditional answers reflect the systemic structures of modern society.
To quote my esteemed colleagues Simone Rozès and Edmondo BrutiLiberati (Provisional Programme):
Starting from the division of labour …, there is no longer a
‘central’ figure to charge with liability within the company, since
the company worker does not meet the legal requirements to
qualify as the author of a crime (producer, exporter, etc.), and
company directors or executives themselves are not the material
authors of the facts contested in law. Hence the idea of not (only)
referring natural persons, but (also) corporate entities to a
criminal court.
Indeed, there are at least three areas of crime where such problems
arise: economic and environmental crime which is typically committed
within the framework of companies; organized crime which is committed
within the framework of criminal organisations; and last but not least «state
crime» which is committed within the framework of governments, armies,
police bodies, bureaucracies etc.
In these areas many legal systems all over the world have developed
special legal regimes to cope with the problem of how to determine
individual criminal responsibility in systemic contexts. These legal regimes
are partly based on statute law – e.g. the statutory provisions on criminal
responsibility of legal persons in the French Nouveau Code Penal – and
partly on case law – e.g. the German figure of «Organisationsherrschaft»
152
Individual Criminal Responsibility in Systemic Contexts
(dominion of an organisation), the French «responsabilité pour fait
d’autrui» or the common law «strict» or «vicarious liability» and, in
military contexts, the «respondeat superior»-principle. It is absolutely
impossible to present even a small fraction of these many and different
legal regimes during a 30 minutes lecture. Therefore, I would like to go to a
more theoretical, more abstract level and present twelve models of how we
can possibly determine individual criminal responsibility in systemic
contexts. My analysis differs significantly from the traditional analysis of
legal regimes on individual criminal responsibility. Therefore, I would like
to start with a short criticism of the traditional analysis and only afterwards
turn to my own, new analysis.
II. The traditional analysis: «monistic» vs. «dualistic/pluralistic» model
In Germany as well as in other Member States of the European
Union, we find a classical analysis of the law of individual responsibility,
parties to the offence and participation in the offence. According to that
analysis, there are only two possible models of legal rules in this area(1):
Either a criminal law system is based on a «monistic model» (in
German legal terminology: «Einheitstätersystem»). Its basic idea is that
each individual contributing to an offence is liable as perpetrator and
responsible as such – regardless of the significance of the contribution. Its
significance may of course influence the sentencing process but not the
responsibility as such. A monistic system can be found, for instance, in
Austrian criminal law and – although contested in the legal discussion – in
Italian criminal law (Art. 110 Criminal Code).
Or a legal system makes use of the «dualistic/pluralistic model» (in
German legal terminology: «Beteiligungs» or «Teilnahmesystem»). The
basic idea is to distinguish at least two types of parties to the offence: main
offenders or perpetrators or authors on the one hand; mere accomplices,
instigators, aiders and abettors on the other hand. Such a system can be
found, for instance, in German, Spanish or English criminal law. The
(1)
BAUMANN/W EBER /M ITSCH, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 10. Aufl. (1995), §
28 margin Nos. 10 et seq.; JAKOBS, Stra frecht Allgemeiner Teil, 2. Aufl., (1991), 21/1
et seq.; KÜHL, Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, 3. Aufl., (2000), § 20 margin Nos. 8 et seq.;
SCHÖNKE/SCHRÖDER-CRAMER/HEINE, Aufl., (2001), StGB, 26. vor § 25 margin Nos. 6
et seq. – RENZIKOWSKI (1997), Restriktiver Täterbegriff und fahrlässige Beteiligung, p.
10, presumes that in the concept of participation − only? − two terms for distinction are
available: «System of participation» and «monolistic model» («Einheitstäterbegriff»).
153
dualistic/pluralistic model is said to be closer to social reality where
primary and secondary responsibility are distinguished. ( 2) However, the
question arises which are the legal criteria to distinguish between main
offenders and secondary parties. Traditionally, the distinction is based on
subjective elements: the intention of the person contributing to the offence
as an author or only as an accomplice («animus auctoris», «animus
socii»(3)). Today, legal scholars try to identify more objective criteria such
as the significance of the contribution and the individual position of the
contributor. In German doctrine, the figure of «Tatherrschaft» (dominion
of the act) has been developed by my famous Munich colleague Claus
Roxin and has been, to some extent, accepted by German jurisprudence.
Anyway, it is clear that the liability of mere accomplices, instigators, aiders
and abettors is derived from the liability of the main perpetrator which is
called in German «Akzessorietät», in French «emprunt de la criminalité»,
in English «derivative responsibility».
Although the traditional analysis is well established, I feel that it is
quite insufficient. It focuses on active and voluntary participation in the
offence. But participation by omission – breach of a duty to act(4) – is not
covered; neither are negligent offences(5) and offences which can only be
committed by qualified persons ( 6) (what is called in German doctrine
«Sonderdelikte »). The analysis gives rise to pointless questions such as the
Austrian discussion on whether Austrian criminal law really belongs to the
monistic model or to a functionally dualistic model( 7). It does not integrate
many new forms of individual responsibility and participation we find in
comparative criminal law, for instance vicarious liability, responsabilité
pour fait d’autrui ou de chef d’entreprise, conspiracy, complicity after fact
and responsibility of legal persons. But above all, the traditional analysis is
based on a very limited, very technical concept of participation in the
offence: the situation that an individual participates in a well-defined,
consummated or at least attempted offence committed by another
individual. In social life, we often encounter very different situations: more
(2)
PAUL, Der Strafverteidiger (1998), p. 623 (624); LANGER, Das
Sonderverbrechen, pp. 375-376.
(3)
RGSt 74, 84
(4)
Handling these cases is discussed in JAKOBS , (note 1) 29/101 et seq.; ROXIN,
Täterschaft und Tatherrschaft, 7. Aufl., (2000), pp. 458 et seq., pp. 702 et seq.
(5)
Handling these cases is discussed in RENZIKOWSKI, (note1), passim.
(6)
Handling these cases is discussed in JAKOBS (note 1), 21/2, margin Nos. 115
et seq.; ROXIN (note 4), pp. 352 et seq., pp. 695 et seq.
(7)
Disussed by BURGSTALLER in ESER/HUBER/CORNILS (eds.) (1998),
Einzelverantwortung und Mitverantwortung im Strafrecht, p. 13 (pp. 25 et seq.).
154
or less structured organisations, even loose networks, which are fully or
partly or only exceptionally involved in criminal activities, and individuals
which contribute to these activities in various forms – actively or passively
– and on various levels. That is what I mean by «systemic contexts». So I
feel that the base of an adequate theory of participation in the offence in
systemic contexts must be a non-technical, functional understanding of
participation as any contribution to criminal activities. Such a
comprehensive understanding enables us, for instance, to realize that
various new offences such as membership in a criminal organisation,
money laundering, financing of terrorism or incitement to genocide are – of
course – forms of participation. And it is not surprising that we find a lot
more models of legal rules on participation than the «monistic» and
«dualistic/pluralistic» model.
III. A new analysis: «naturalistic» vs. «normative» model; «individual» vs.
«systemic» model; «sentencing orientated» vs. «responsibility orie ntated»
model; «special part» vs. «general part» model; «imputation» model;
«supervision» model; «conspiracy» model; «collective responsibility»
model
Indeed, we can identify not less than twelve possible models (which
do not exclude each other but can be found, in positive criminal law, in
various combinations). Although I am not quite sure whether the English
terminology is convincing, I would like to call them: «naturalistic» vs.
«normative» model; «individual» vs. «systemic» model; «sentencing
orientated» vs. «responsibility orientated» model; «special part» vs.
«general part» model; «imputation» model; «supervision» model;
«conspiracy» model; «collective responsibility» model. Let us have a look
at what is behind these terms:
1. and 2. «Naturalistic» vs. «normative» model
Traditionally, participation is a naturalistic concept and means
«causal contribution to the offence» or «an act which results in an offence
being committed». The causal chain is essential, but also (setting mens rea
aside) sufficient. If you apply such a naturalistic concept to complex
systemic structures, for instance a company or an army, you will end up at
what has been called in German legal discussion «bottom up approach»:
You will start with the immediate actors, e.g. workers assembling a
dangerous machine or soldiers shooting civilians; proceed to the middle
155
level, e.g. construction managers or field officers; and finally reach the top
level, e.g. the board of directors or the general staff. The longer the causal
chain, the more difficult it is to establish individual responsibility, for
instance by proving a command chain (a problem very clearly to be seen in
The Hague at the moment). On the other hand, the immediate actors often
simply do not know enough to be guilty of an offence, or they can plead
necessity, order, mistake of law etc.
These problems can be overcome if the naturalistic model is replaced
by a normative model. In a normative model, the leading concept is neither
«participation» nor «causality» but «responsibility». Responsibility does
not necessarily require positive and full causality( 8). A co-perpetrator or
accomplice is responsible even if he had not had any decisive influence on
the offence being committed or not. A person with supervisory authority
and duty is responsible if he could have influenced the offence. There are
inchoate offences – e.g. incitement to commit genocide – where criminal
responsibility exists even if the main offence has not (yet) been committed.
If you apply a normative model in a systemic environment, you will end up
at what has been called in German legal discussion as «top-downapproach»: You will start with those who have the «main responsibility»,
e.g. directors, generals, political leaders, and work your way down the
ranks until you finish with the «small fish»( 9). You will argue that, if the
«small fish» is responsible as perpetrator, the «big fish» must be
responsible as perpetrator, as well. In effect, nearly all will be treated as
perpetrators (so that a normative model leads to some kind of monistic
model in the sense explained before(10)).
The present tendency is clearly in favour of the normative model. It
lies at the very heart of international criminal law and can be studied in the
jurisprudence of the I.C.T.Y. and I.C.T.R. and also in the Rome Statute of
the I.C.C. But also national legislations and natio nal courts prefer
normative approaches. For instance, the German Federal Supreme Court
has developed a doctrine of «Organisationsherrschaft» (dominion of an
organisation) to hold leaders of an organisation – a state, a company, a
criminal organisation – liable as main perpetrators even if they neither
(8)
German law: RGSt 58, 113 (114); BGHSt 37, 106 (129); contrary to this
LACKNER/KÜHL, StGB, 24. Aufl., (2001), § 25 margin No. 11 (Mittäterschaft), § 27
margin No. 2 (Beihilfe) [including further references].
(9)
The terms go back to SCHMIDT -SALZER (1992), Betriebs-Berater, p. 1866 (p.
1869).
(10)
BGHSt 40, p. 218 (p. 237).
156
planned nor explicitly ordered the offence. (11) In Japanese criminal law, we
find special forms of co-perpetration which are tailored to mafia bosses
(«Komplott-Mittäterschaft»(12)). In English and American law, we find even
a strict or vicarious liability of directors of companies for offences
committed by subordinates. «Respondeat superior» is an ancient principle
of military criminal law; it has now developed into the well-known
command responsibility of international criminal law ( 13) .
However, a normative model has problems of its own. The term
«responsibility» is quite vague, and the term «normative» implies that there
are norms or standards or principles which can serve as guidelines to
measure responsibility. Such a principle is the principle of personal fault or
culpability. Mens rea, knowledge and intention, are still key factors of
responsibility. ( 14) However, knowledge and intention are not sufficient to
make a person individually responsible, and the Latin saying «cogitationis
nemo poena patitur» is still valid (and still a limit to conspiracy
responsibilities). You also need some contribution in form of an act or an
omission in breach of a legal duty. Therefore, another key factor of
responsibility is the power to act in an organisation or to control it ( 15).
Furthermore, the principle of proportionality limits responsibility. In
particular, problems of proportionality arise in case adequate behaviour is
labelled as criminal behaviour ( 16) – e.g. financial services which may
constitute money laundering, financing of terrorism etc. – and if behaviour
in the very pre- and post-zone of the offence is criminalized( 17) – e.g.
conspiracy or complicity after fact.
(11)
BGHSt 40, 218; ROXIN (note 4), pp. 677 et seq. [including further
references].
(12)
YAMANAKA in ESER (1991), A LBIN/YAMANAKA , KEEICHI, Einflüsse
deutschen Strafrechts auf Polen und Japan, p. 127 (pp. 130 et seq.).
(13)
TRIFFTERER in LÜDERSSEN-FS (2002), p. 437 (pp. 438 et seq.).
(14)
JUNG in ESER/HUBER/CORNILS (note 7), p. 175 (p. 196).
(15)
VOGEL (1998), Goltdammer’s Archiv für Strafrecht, p. 127 (p. 132).
(16)
German law: BGH Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (NStZ), (2000), p. 34;
BGH NStZ-Rechtsprechungs-Report 1999, p. 184 (p. 186); A MELUNG in GRÜNWALDFS, (1999), pp. 9 et seq.; HASSEMER, Wistra (1995), p. 41 et seq.; OTTO in LENCKNERFS, (1993), pp. 193 et seq.; ROXIN in Leipziger Kommentar StGB, 11th edition as of
05/1992, § 27 margin Nos. 16 et seq.
(17)
This has been little discussed yet but is nonetheless urgent, for example
cases of financing acts of terrorism before they are committed, or laundering money
after a crime is committed. In German penology the participation in the forefront of
offences is limited by a demand for a specific and concret offence (LACKNER/KÜHL
StGB Kommentar, § 26 margin No. 5 and § 27 margin No. 7 offers only a broad
157
Of course, these are vague principles. However, I do doubt whether
we will be able to develop clearer, more distinct principles. For example,
the German legal discussion has identified quite a lot of quite diverse
principles: «Tatherrschaft» (dominion of the act); «Sonderpflichtigkeit»
(special duty) ( 18); «Risikoerhöhung» (creating or increasing the risk that an
offence will be committed) ( 19); «Solidarität» (solidarity with crime)(20);
«Normerschütterung» (destabilization of norms) ( 21); «Autonomie» (autonomy)( 22); «Regressverbot» (rupture of imputation). It is unclear how these
principles relate to each other, and also whether they are internationally
applicable or restricted to German law. A possible general theory might be
the so-called «Lehre von der objektiven Zurechnung» (theory of objective
imputation) where risk-creation and risk-realization are central concepts
which might be very useful for a normative model of participation( 23).
3. and 4. «Individual» vs. «systemic» model
Traditional criminal law focuses on the individual, not on society or
systems. The responsibility of society as a whole (or of parts of society) is
not – or only exceptionally – taken into consideration in a criminal process.
In this sense, traditional criminal law is based on an «individual» model.
But such a model is certainly inadequate if we look at criminal
structures and institutions and at offences committed in an organised and
structured manner(24), for example organised crime in economy, public
administration or politics and the so-called «Makrokriminalität» (macro
crime) such as genocide and other crimes against humanity or war crimes.
The German criminal law scholar Klaus Marxen(25) has shown that we need
a new and «systemic» model to cope with the problems of individual
overview). In German law participation far beyond the offence is only accused in
special cases as « Anschlussdelikt».
(18)
See note 6.
(19)
RENZIKOWSKI (note 1), pp. 127 et seq. (Participation as endangerment).
(20)
SCHUMANN (1986), Strafrechtliches Handlungsunrecht und das Prinzip der
Selbstverantwortung der Anderen, pp. 50-51; contrary to this Renzikowski (note 1), pp.
46-47. [including further references]
(21)
LESCH (1992), Das Problem der sukzessiven Beihilfe, pp. 239 et seq.
(22)
RENZIKOWSKI (note 1), pp. 72 et seq.
(23)
Again RENZIKOWSKI, (note 1), pp. 72 et seq.; furthermore LESCH (1993),
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Strafrechtswissenschaft, 105, p. 271 (p. 281).
(24)
M ARXEN in LÜDERSSEN (ed.) (1998), Aufgeklärte Kriminalpolitik oder
Kampf gegen das Böse?, vol. III, p. 220 (pp. 234-235.).
(25)
In LÜDERSSEN (note 24), p. 200 (pp. 231-232).
158
responsibility for offences committed a structured and organised
environment and manner. Here, individual responsibility is generated by
three elements: The first element is a specific behaviour of a person within
the system, an act or an omission in breach of a duty to act. The second
element is the system itself, the criminal organisation and criminal
structure, the criminal group and/or the criminal program. And the third
element is an offence committed somewhere in the system. The second
element – the systemic context – «links» the first element, the act or
omission, to the third element, the offence, regardless whether the act or
omission was the proximate cause of the offence. That means: a person
who knowingly and willingly contributes to the functioning of the system
will be responsible for the offence even if he or she does not immediately
participate in the commission of the offence, if the offence can be foreseen
in the framework of the system. For example, a person who organizes
concentration camps where a genocide is being committed will be
individually responsible for each single killing even if he or she does not
have specific knowledge about place, time and manner of specific killings.
In present criminal law, we find such a reasoning in the framework
of the conspiracy responsibility: a person who engages in a criminal
conspiracy will individually be made responsible for offences being
committed subsequently, at least if these offences could have been
reasonably foreseen. Extensive forms of co-perpetration in systemic
patterns are also recognized in international criminal law, e.g. in the wellknown Tadic decision of the I.C.T.Y, and in Japanese criminal law
(«Komplott-Mittäterschaft»)(26).
Another important feature of the systemic model is the irrelevance of
alternative causalities(27). In particular, it is no defence that the offence
would have been committed anyway and that the perpetrator would have be
probably or even certainly replaced by another person who was willing and
capable to commit the offence. Even if such a reasoning is hardly
compatible with the causality concept of «condicio sine qua non»( 28), it
reflects a fundamental ethical principle: He who runs with the pack is
responsible for what the pack will do.
(26)
See note 12.
BGHSt 2, p. 20 (pp. 24-25).
(28)
PUPPE in Nomos Kommentar StGB, 5. Erg.Lief. 31.10.1998, vor § 13 margin
Nos. 90 et seq.
(27)
159
5. and 6. «Sentencing orientated» vs. «responsibility orientated»
model
In the first Tadic decision, the prosecution at the I.C.T.Y. cites «the
modern trend to move away from very technical definitions about the
degree of responsibility, and instead move us to focus on whether the action
in any way incurred criminal liability … The relative degree of
responsibility is a matter for sentencing»( 29). Indeed, it is the very idea of
«monistic»
models
(in
German
legal
terminology:
(30)
«Einheitstätersysteme» ) that we should not ask whether a person is liable
as main perpetrator (author, pr imary party) or accomplice (instigator, aider
and abettor, secondary party) but weigh the degree of participation in the
sentencing process. Therefore, «monistic» models may also be called
«sentencing orientated».
In contrast, it is still the majority of the criminal law systems in the
world which make a legal distinction between primary and secondary
liability – which may be called a «responsibility orientated» model.
However, a closer look reveals that these systems are indeed moving
towards a «sentencing orientated» model( 31). In many legal systems, there is
no difference between the penalties provided for main perpetrators on the
one hand and secondary parties on the other hand. At best, legal systems
provide for (mandatory or facultative) mitigation of penalties for
accomplices (aiders and abettors)(32). An organizer who is technically only
inciter or instigator will often be punished more severely than the persons
who actually commit the offence and is technically main perpetrator.
Indeed, the practical value of the distinction between primary and
secondary parties may well be doubted. Often – and setting symbolic
reasons aside – nothing will depend on whether the accused is instigator or
accomplice by encouraging. On the other hand, a complex system of
degrees of responsibility will lock up precious legal resources. In Germany,
books and articles have been written about whether heads of organisations
responsible for offences are «indirect» perpetrators under Art. 25 par. 1
German Criminal Code, co-perpetrators under Art. 25 par. 2 or instigators
(29)
ITCY Trial Chamber 1, Prosecuter v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgement
of 7 May 1997 (also found in KLIP /SLUITER (ed.) (1998), Annotated Leading Cases of
International Criminal Tribunals, vol. I, p. 287).
(30)
KIENAPFEL (1972), Der Einheitstäter im Strafrecht, p. 29, p. 32.
(31)
BLOY(1985), Die Beteiligungsform als Zurechnungstypus im Strafrecht, pp.
291-292; Lesch, (note 21), p. 199; contrary to this Renzikowski (note 1), pp. 35 et seq.
(32)
The compulsive mitigation of punishment in § 27 par. 2 sentence 2 StGB of
the aide is an exception in international comparison. e.g. Art. 121-6 Code pénal.
160
under Art. 26 – a question of hardly any practical importance because the
same penalties apply. ( 33) There is a clear and present danger that real and
really important questions are neglected. For instance, a real problem is to
define the «minimum threshold» of participation and responsibility, in
particular in systemic contexts. Is a person who simply passes on an order
to commit an offence responsible and participant? What about a person
who is engaged in per se legitimate, usual business which, as a matter of
fact, furthers criminality, e.g. sells certain chemical substances to a
potential terrorist organisation? And which degree of authority is necessary
to trigger liability in systemic contexts – is the truck driver who knowingly
brings innocent victims to a concentration camp (co-) responsible for the
atrocities committed there?
7. and 8. «Special part» vs. «general part» model
The principle of legality («nullum crimen sine lege») requires
continental criminal law systems to lay down the rules on responsibility
and participation by written law. The very minimum is to declare that any
participant is liable (see Art. 110 Italian Criminal Code). Due to the «lex
certa »-principle, clear and restrictive definitions of the possible forms of
participation are preferable. In modern criminal codes, they are laid down
in the general part, they apply – in principle – to any specific offence and
are spelt out in an abstract, general and not casuistic way which may be
called the «general part» model. In contrast, a «special part» model
provides for specific participation rules in specific offences. Historically
speaking, the law on participation in the offence started from specific and
casuistic rules in the special part – e.g. as annex to the murder prohibition
in ancient criminal law – and developed into the abstract, general rules in
the general part which are now the international standard.
However, we can identify counter movements. Many «new» offences
such as money-laundering, financing of terrorism, membership in a
criminal organisation etc. are, as a matter of fact, nothing else than special
forms of participation, in the case of money-laundering complicity after
fact. (34) Recently, criminal legislators tend to mention certain forms of
(33)
BAUMANN/W EBER/M ITSCH (Note 1), § 28 margin No. 11.
Implemented now as well in common law: HUBER in ESER/HUBER/CORNILS
(note 7), p. 79 (p. 89) for the United Kingdom; N. SCHMID, Strafverfahren und
Strafrecht in den Vereinigten Staaten, 2. Aufl., (1993), pp. 211-212 for the United
States.
(34)
161
participation explicitly in the text of the specific offence(35), e.g. in the field
of drug trafficking offences where certain forms of aiding and abetting are
explicitly mentioned so that – technically speaking – a mere aider and
abettor will be perpetrator of the offence.
The recent trend gives rise to interesting legal questions which are
not sufficiently discussed. For instance, the problem arises whether specific
rules on participation in a specific offence exclude the application of
general rules of participation( 36). An example drawn from German law
where it is a separate criminal offence to «aid» a receiver of stolen goods:
Is it also a criminal offence to aid an aider of a receiver of stolen goods
under the general rule on aiding or abetting( 37)? Another question is whether
specific rules on participation in specific offences should be interpreted in
accordance with the interpretation of the respective general rules.
9. «Imputation» model
If each participant realizes the offence him- or herself – e.g. if a
group of soldiers loots a house and each soldier steals valuable objects –,
legal problems of participation and responsibility do not arise( 38). It is only
when a participant does not realize all the constituent elements of the
offence in person that it becomes necessary to impute to him another
person’s act. Holding an officer who orders a civilian to be shot by a
subordinate liable for murder, we impute the subordinate’s act to the
officer. Therefore, we can say that an «imputation» model lies at the heart
of any law of participation in the offence. Depending on the participants’
(35)
The term «to deal» in narcotic criminal law includes inciting and aiding per
se; on this problem NESTLER in KREUZER (ed.), (1998), Handbuch des
Betäubungsmittelstrafrechts, § 11 margin Nos. 360 et seq.; ROXIN (note 4), pp. 618 et
seq.; for polish criminal law: PLYWACZEWSKI in ESER/YAMANAKA (note 12), p. 109
(pp. 121 et seq.).
(36)
There are two possible antithetic answers: antecedence of the special part as
lex specialis or antecedence of the general part because of their general prevalence.
(37)
These questions are worked on selectively: e.g. § 129 StGB, the abetting of a
criminal organisation is punished autonomously; VON BUBNOFF in Leipziger
Kommentar StGB, 11th edition as of 08/1995, § 129 margin Nos. 73 et seq. [including
further references]
(38)
As an example for a normative point of view: BGHSt 18, p. 87 (p. 89) in the
famous «Staschynskij-Urteil»; also BGHSt 8, p. 397 and BGH Neue Juristische
Wochenschrift (1951), p. 323). discussing the importance of normative tendencies for
system «Systemkriminalität» ROGALL in 50 Jahre Bundesgerichtshof, Fes tgabe aus der
Wissenschaft, vol. IV (2000), p. 383 (pp. 396 et. seq.); discussing the possibility of
normative interpretation: Roxin (note 1). p. 177 (pp. 188 et seq.).
162
position we may distinguish between «horizontal» imputation among peers
and «vertical» imputation in hierarchies. (39) Paradigm of a «horizontal»
imputation is co-perpetration or complicity, paradigm of a «vertical»
imputation indirect or mediate perpetration by means of an innocent agent.
As a rule, imputation requires fault (intention, mens rea, at least
negligence) although there are exceptions, in particular in systemic contexts
where a «strict» or «vicarious» liability of superiors, a «responsabilité pour
fait d’autrui» is well known in various criminal law systems. However,
fault is only the basis and not the object of imputation. What is imputed are
acts – either acts as such or illegal or punishable acts. An imputation which
starts from a illegal or punishable act done by another person results in a
«derivative responsibility», in French «emprunt de criminalité », in German
«Akzessorietät». It is, as a rule, the basis of secondary forms of
participation such as counselling or procuring, encouraging, provocation,
instruction, instigation, aiding or abetting. However, we can see in many
legal systems that the principle of derivative responsibility, emprunt de
criminalité or Akzessorietät is increasingly undermined(40). In theory, a
derivative responsibility cannot exist if the main offender is not or only
partly responsible, e.g. a child, a mentally ill person or a person acting in
good faith. But exactly these situations are classical examples of «indirect»
or «mediate» perpetration by means of an innocent agent. Once again, we
notice that the traditional «dualistic» model moves towards a «monistic»
model.
10. «Supervision» model
Imputation of another person’s illegal, and criminal, behaviour can
be based on activity, for instance on instigating, aiding or abetting the other
person. However, many criminal law systems acknowledge an imputation
based on passivity, on the failure to prevent and control offences committed
by subordinates – which may be called the «supervision» model of
participation. It is one of the most important instruments to determine
individual responsibility in systemic contexts.
In international criminal law, the «supervision» model is the basis of
the so-called «command» or «superior responsibility». In many national
(39)
JUNG in ESER/HUBER/CORNILS (note 7), p. 175 (pp. 180 et seq.); HEINE in
ESER/YAMANAKA (note 12), pp. 101 et seq.
(40)
Comparing tendencies in french complicité: HÜNERFELD in
ESER/HUBER/CORNILS (note 7), p. 43 (pp. 47 et seq.); in english complicity: HUBER in
ESER/HUBER/CORNILS (note 7), p. 79 (pp. 86 et seq.).
163
criminal law systems, we find comparable rules in the national military or
administrative law, but increasingly also in economic criminal law where
directors and managers are bound to prevent offences commited by their
subordinates and otherwise are criminally or at least administratively liable
if a subordinate commits an offence that would not have been committed if
the superior had exercised due care – which is, under German law, an
administrative offence of «Aufsichtspflichtverletzung».
In a more general perspective, the «supervision» model belongs to
the difficult area of participation by omission. It is an accepted principle of
criminal law that omissions can be punished if there was a duty to act. So,
the key question of the «supervision» model is therefore to establish a duty
to prevent subordinates from committing offences and to control them.
German legal doctrine has developed a quite unique theory according to
which legal duties are derived from factual or social positions, the so-called
«Garantenpositionen»(41), and it is highly debated whether superiors are in
a position which requires them to prevent and control crime committed by
subordinates. However, it is clearly impossible to derive norms from facts.
Therefore, we must turn to positive law – military, administrative,
economic law – in order to identify obligations to prevent and control
crime. As mentioned before, these obligation do indeed exist, also with
regard to subordinates who are fully responsible.
The practical problems of a superior responsibility are twofold: On
the one hand, prosecution must establish that the superior was in effect in
power and could have prevented the offence from being committed. In
order to ease the burden of proof, many legislations – among them
Germany – require not more than the proof that it would have been more
difficult for the subordinate to commit the offence if the superior would
have exercised due care. (42) In international criminal law, it is even
sufficient that the superior did not prosecute the subordinate after the
offence had been committed. Here, we see again that modern criminal law
replaces causal by statistical or risk relations. On the other hand, the
superior’s mens rea must be proven. However, mens rea does not
necessarily mean knowledge or intention. Under many national legislations,
negligence may be sufficient, and there are even forms of «strict» or
«vicarious» liability where not even negligence is required(43).
(41)
KÜHL, (note 1) § 18 margin Nos. 41 et seq.
SCHÜNEMANN, wistra (1982), p. 41 (p. 45) idem Unternehmenskriminalität,
pp. 206 et seq. and pp. 266 - 267.
(43)
JUNG in ESER/HUBER/CORNILS (note 7), p. 175 (pp. 182-183); HEINE in
ESER/YAMANAKA (note 12), p. 101 (pp. 104-105).
(42)
164
11. «Conspiracy» model
The responsibility under the «imputation» or «supervision» model
implies that an offence has really been committed or at least attempted.
However, many criminal law systems recognize a criminal liability for
conspiring to commit an offence even before (and regardless of) the
commission of the offence – which can be called «conspiracy» model. It is
a traditional model of criminal liability in common law countries but is also
advancing in continental countries where risk management has become an
idée directrice of modern societies. The traditional criminal law approach –
to intervene only after an offence has been committed and after harm has
been done – becomes less and less acceptable, also with a view to the
extent and the quality of the harm which criminals can cause in a modern
technical society.
In detail, we can identify four legal techniques based on a
«conspiracy» model: firstly, many legislations incriminate the conspiracy
itself, i.e. the planning or plotting of an offence by at least two persons (44).
Secondly, there are what has been called by German doctrine «climate
offences» (Klimadelikte ), i.e. inchoate offences like attempted instigation,
private oder public incitement( 45), certain forms of hate crime etc. Thirdly,
many legislations make it a separate criminal offence to be member of a
criminal or terrorist organisation or to support or aid a criminal or terrorist
organisation. The European Union even has made such an criminal offence
obligatory for the Member States(46). And fourthly, collective violent action
may be punished as such regardless of results, e.g rioting in football
stadiums or civil disorder ( 47).
Of course, such incriminations are far-reaching. In the German
discussion, several voices – many of them belonging to the so-called
«Frankfurt school» around the German legal scholars Winfried Hassemer,
Klaus Lüderssen and Wolfgang Naucke – have called for a «core» or
«classical criminal law» which does without such incriminations of mere
(44)
HUBER in ESER/HUBER/CORNILS (note 7), p. 79 (p. 89) for the United
Kingdom; N. SCHMID (note 34), pp. 206 et seq. for the United States.
(45)
HUBER in ESER/HUBER/CORNILS (note 7), p. 79 (p. 90) for the United
Kingdom; N. SCHMID (note 34), pp. 205-206 for the United States.
(46)
Joint action of 21 December 1998 adopted by the Council on the basis of
Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on making it a criminal offence to
participate in a criminal organisation in the Member States of the European Union –
«Official Journal», L 351, 29/12/1998, pp. 1-3.
(47)
JUNG in ESER/HUBER/CORNILS (note 7), p. 175 (p. 185).
165
«risks» before actual harm has been done. But which are the alternatives? It
seems clear to me that a State has the right, and also the obligation, to
intervene if a terrorist organisation plans a terrorist attack. Certainly, it is
possible to call such an intervention a «police» or «r isk prevention act».
But such a juggling with words is not really convincing and even dangerous
because the legal consequence would be that essential judicial guarantees –
e.g. the right to be silent – would not apply. So I hold that the «conspiracy»
model is a possible model of criminal law intervention – provided that
fundamental rights and guarantees are respected.
12. «Collective responsibility» model
A last attempt to cope with responsibility in complex system contexts
is to make the system itself, the collective entity, the organisation
responsible – which may be called «collective responsibility» model.
However, collective responsibility is not an alternative to individual
responsibility but an addition: There is not a single legal system known to
me where punishing an individual is excluded if the collective entity is
punishable or after the collective entity has been punished. Indeed, «dual»
responsibility is the rule – also because most legal systems require an
offence committed by an individual member of the collective entity which
is imputed to the entity as such. In legal doctrine, it has often been said that
collective criminal responsibility serves as substitute where individual
criminal responsibility cannot be proven. At least the German experiences
do not support such a suspicion.
It is well known that the criminal responsibility of organisations,
companies, legal persons or other collective entities is not generally
accepted although more and more legislations have introduced or are
introducing such a responsibility. On the other hand, practically all legal
systems do intervene if members of a collective entity commit offences on
its behalf or in its favour and make use of administrative measures,
administrative sanctions (in particular fines like the German «Geldbuße»)
or civil liability for harm resulting from the offence(48).
The doctrinal debate started from the fundamentalist argument that
«societas non delinquere potest» because a collective responsibility would
run against the very idea of criminal law, punishment and culpability.
Meanwhile, it is well established that collective criminal responsibility is
(48)
Comparing different law systems:
La criminalisation du comportement collectif.
DE
DOELDER/TIEDEMANN (eds.) (1996),
166
possible although its structures differ from the structures of individual
criminal responsibility. Important concepts are: derivative or vicarious lia bility; alter-ego-model; aggregation theory; doctrine of self-identity;
corporate attitude / climate. Therefore, the discussion turns to real
questions: Which is the «trigger mechanism» for collective responsibility
(ratione materiae, ratione personae)? Which are the sanctions, and which
the criteria for sanctioning? Which is the standard of proof? Which
procedural rules apply? And how do you enforce sanctions against
collective entities which may change their legal status, may be bought by
another entities and even dissolve themselves any time? A rich reservoir of
answers can be found in the E.C. law: Collective responsibility is triggered
rationae materiae by acting on behalf or in favour of the collective entity,
ratione personae by persons with power to represent or to decide or to
control. Sanctions are fines, but also exclusion from public subsidies or
contracts, judicial supervision, dissolution. Criteria for sanctioning are
gravity of the offence, proceeds from the offence, annual turnover. The
requirements of responsibility must be proven beyond reasonable doubt;
however, it must not be proven which person exactly committed the
offence, and negligence may be proven by comparing the company with a
careful company. Certain procedural guarantees tailored to natural persons
– e.g. the right to be silent – do not or only partly apply to legal persons.
Changes in the legal status as such do not matter.
III. Final Remarks
Simone Rozes and Edmondo Bruti-Liberati point out a «dilution, or
broadening of the scope of classic criminal liability (…) in response to the
phenomenon, often described by modern sociology, of the collectivisation
of social life today».
Basically, I do agree: There is indeed a change in the «classic» law of
individual responsibility, of participation in the offence: «Modern»
participation law is based on a «normative» rather than a «naturalistic»
model, has certain «systemic» features, makes use of the «supervision» and
«conspiracy» model and recognizes a collective criminal responsibility.
Therefore, the scope of criminal liability is indeed «broadened». But I
would not say that criminal responsibility is «diluted». Rather, it is focused
in a normative – non-naturalistic – perspective on persons with power to
represent, to decide and to control. I fear that those who favour a «classic»
and naturalistic criminal law intend, or at least accept, that persons with
power to represent, to decide and to control enjoy impunity because they –
167
as Simone Rozès and Edmondo Bruti-Liberati – note «are
not
the
material authors of the facts contested in law» in a naturalistic sense. But in
a normative sense, those who decide and control are material authors and
should be made responsible.
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A CARTA DOS DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS DA UNIÃO EUROPEIA
E A PROTECÇÃO DOS DIREITOS FUNDAMENTAIS
RUI MANUEL MOURA RAMOS
Professor da Faculdade de Direito da Universidade de Coimbra, Portugal
Membro do Istituto de Direito Internacional
Juiz o Tribunal de Primiera Instância das Comunidades Europeais
1. A recente proclamação, pelo Parlamento Europeu, o Conselho da
União Europeia e a Comissão Europeia, por ocasião do Conselho Europeu
de Nice(1), de uma Carta dos Direitos Fundamentais da União Europeia (2), à
qual foi por enquanto negada a inserção na lei fundamental da Comunidade
e da União(3), oferece naturalmente o ensejo de repensar a problemática da
protecção dos direitos fundamentais no interior do sistema jurídico criado
por estas organizações.
Procuraremos, no presente estudo, de forma necessariamente
sumária, abordar alguns dos aspectos que esta questão suscita. Para tanto, e
após recordar brevemente as razões que, no plano interno como no
internacional, impuseram que a este tema fosse reconhecido, na segunda
metade do último século, direitos de cidade, referiremos a evolução que a
problemática em apreço sofreu no sistema comunitário e a especificidade
de que ela se reveste no seu seio, para concluir com uma breve avaliação da
Carta e do lugar por ela ocupado no aprofundamento do ordenamento em
que se passa a inserir.
2. Constitui praticamente um truísmo recordar que a consciência da
necessidade de inventariar os direitos humanos fundamentais e para eles
instituir mecanismos de protecção se afirma sobretudo após o final do
segundo conflito mundial que marcou o século que há pouco finda. A
circunstância de durante e após o termo das hostilidades se ter tornado claro
(1)
(2)
A 7 de Dezembro de 2000.
Para o respectivo texto, cfr. o “Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias”,
C, 364, de 18 de Dezembro de 2000, pp. 1-22.
(3)
A revisão destes textos a que procede o Tratado de Nice não afecta, na
verdade, as disposições que se referem à protecção dos direitos fundamentais,
designadamente o actual artigo 6.E do Tratado da União Europeia. Apenas se
modificam os termos pelos quais o Conselho pode agir nos casos de risco claro de
violação grave destes direitos por um Estado-Membro.
Veja-se, a este propósito, o novo texto do artigo 7.E deste Tratado.
A carta dos direitos fundamentais da União Europeia
172
o grau de violação desses direitos em alguns dos países beligerantes viria
assim a estar na origem do desenvolvimento que os textos constitucionais
do pós-guerra europeu, maxime em Itália e na Alemanha, deram a esta
questão, que atingiria um nível até então desconhecido e que se não pode
dissociar da experiência acabada de viver.
Mas a história do direito constitucional comparado revela -nos
também que se não tratou de uma moda ou de algo de passageiro, podendo
ao contrário dizer-se que esta tendência para a consagração da protecção
constitucional dos direitos humanos se afirmou como um dado estrutural da
evolução jurídica recente. Tenha-se presente, a este propósito, o que se
passou com os textos constitucionais que, no dobrar do terceiro quartel do
último século, marcariam a transição dos países ibéricos para sistemas de
democracia representativa e pluralista ( 4), assim como a de vários Estados
latino-americanos (5), na década seguinte, e, um pouco mais tarde, a da
generalidade dos Estados leste-europeus.
Antecedendo este desenvolvimento, contudo, ou contemporâneo
dele, um outro se faria no entanto sentir, buscando fundar na ordem
internacional a protecção dos direitos humanos. Trata-se de um mecanismo
complementar do anterior que, começando por partir da possível
insuficiência deste, uma vez que a protecção que ele garante ficaria sempre
dependente da consagração constitucional que aqueles direitos poderiam
lograr em cada ordem jurídica estadual, sublinha em particular o
universalismo que caracteriza esta problemática(6). Na verdade, é a
(4)
No que respeita a Portugal, e com referência à Constituição de 1976, vejam-se
sobretudo, Vieira de Andrade (1983), Os direitos fundamentais na Constituição
Portuguesa de 1976, Coimbra, Livraria Almedina; Gomes Canotilho (1999), Direito
Constitucional e Teoria da Constituição, 3.a edição, Coimbra, Livraria Almedina, pp.
349-496, e Jorge Miranda, (1998), Manual de Direito Constitucional, t. IV Direitos
Fundamentais, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora.
(5)
Em particular sobre a experiência brasileira, vide PIOVESAN FLAVIA, (2000),
Direitos Humanos e o Direito Constitucional Internacional, 4.a edição, São Paulo, Max
Limonad, pp. 47-63.
(6)
Para uma ilustração desta asserção, cfr. o conjunto de estudos inseridos em
Les dimensions universelles des droits de l'homme (sob a direcção de A. Lepeyre, F. De
Tinguy e K. Vasak), v. I, Bruxelas, (1990), Bruylant.
Sublinhando igualmente que os direitos do homem se não confundem com as garantias
constitucionais ou com os direitos da cidadania democrática e que constituem uma
classe particular de direitos cuja aplicação é universal e cuja generalidade é
incontroversa, cfr. ainda John Rawls (Le droit des gens, Paris, Editions Esprit, 1998, p.
93) que precisa que eles fazem parte de um direito razoável dos povos e especificam os
limites que vinculam as instituições internas e que se impõem a todas as comunidades
173
circunstância de o fundamento dessa protecção radicar afinal em valores
que se têm por universais e perenes, essenciais à convivência humana e
social( 7), que justifica que a ordem internacional por ela se venha
igualmente a responsabilizar e que os Estados que incorram na sua violação
possam ser alvo da condenação de instâncias internacionais.
Dando corpo a esta ideia, a Convenção Europeia para a Protecção
dos Direitos do Homem e das Liberdades Fundamentais ( 8), concluída em 4
humanas, especificando «o limite exterior do direito interno das sociedades admissível
para os membros respeitáveis de uma justa sociedade dos povos».
(7)
Sobre este fundamento, cfr. Celso Lafer, (1988), A Reconstrução dos Direitos
Humanos. Um diálogo com o Pensamento de Hannah Arendt, São Paulo, Companhia
das Letras, os trabalhos reunidos em Los fundamentos filosoficos de los derechos
humanos, Paris, (1985); Unesco-Serbal e em, (1994), Diritti Umani, Oxford Amnesty
Lectures (edited by Stephen Shute and Susan Hurley), Garzanti; e José Manuel Pureza,
(1989), «Os direitos do homem na comunidade planetária: auto-referência ou harmonia
espacial?» in Estado e Direito, No. E 4, pp. 17-31. E para as suas raízes, cfr. os textos
coligidos emDroits de l'homme et philosophie. Une anthologie (1789-1914), Paris,
Presses Pocket (1993).
(8)
Cfr. para uma análise deste texto, dos protocolos adicionais que o
modificariam e desenvolveriam, assim como da jurisprudência do Tribunal, Convention
européenne des droits de l'homme, Recueil de textes, Strasbourg, (1994), Les éditions
du Conseil de l'Europe; Les droits de l'homme à l'aube du XXIe siècle, (1993),
Strasbourg, Les éditions du Conseil de l'Europe; Francis G. Jacobs, (1975), The
European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford, Clarendon Press; Gérard CohenJonathan, (1989), La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, Paris, Economica;
Jacques Velu, Rusen Ergec, (1990), La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme,
Bruxelles, Bruylant; Fausto de Quadros, «La Convention européenne des droits de
l'homme: un cas de ius cogens régional», in Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung,
Festschrift für Rudolf Bernhardt, (1995), Berlin, Springer Verlag, pp. 555-562; Frederic
Sudre, (1990), La Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France; Dimitrios Evrigenis, (1978), «Le rôle de la Convention
européenne des droits de l'homme», in New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe
(sous la direction de Marco Cappelletti), Bruxelas, Bruylant, pp. 341-357, e Donna
Gomien, Vademecum de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme, Strasbourg,
(1991), Les éditions du Conseil de l'Europe, e, em língua portuguesa, Maria Luísa
Duarte, (1989), «O Conselho da Europa e a protecção dos direitos do homem», in
Documentação e Direito Comparado, n.E 39/40, pp. 191-242; Pinheiro Farinha,
(1980), Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem. Anotada, Lisboa; José Alfredo
de Oliveira Baracho, (1998), «A prática jurídica no domínio da protecção internacional
dos direitos do homem (a Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem)», in Liber
Amicorum Hector Fix-Zamudio, São José, Costa Rica, Secretaria de la Corte
Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, pp. 375-413, e Ireneu Cabral Barreto, (1999), A
Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem. Anotada, 2.a edição, Coimbra, Coimbra
Editora. Para a posição deste instrumento nas ordens jurídicas nacionais, vide Dimitrios
174
de Novembro de 1950, em Roma, no seio do Conselho da Europa, viria a
estabelecer um conjunto de direitos que os Estados que a ela se
vinculassem deveriam reconhecer a todas as pessoas dependentes da sua
jurisdição (artigos 2.E a 18.E), prevendo igualmente a criação de um
tribunal permanente (o Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos do Homem) que
asseguraria o respeito, por parte daqueles, dos compromissos assim
assumidos (artigos 19.E a 51.E). E o mesmo caminho seria posteriormente
seguido no âmbito do universo jurídico latino-americano pela Convenção
Americana sobre Direitos Humanos assinada em 22 de Novembro de 1969
em São José da Costa Rica(9). De modo não inteiramente idêntico, as
Nações Unidas dariam também corpo a um outro sistema de protecção
internacional de direitos humanos que, assentando igualmente num
catálogo de direitos cujo reconhecimento é imposto aos Estados partes nos
instrumentos internacionais que o integram( 10), vê o controlo da respectiva
Evrigenis, «L'interaction entre la dimension internationale et la dimension nationale de
la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme: notions autonomes et effet direct», in
Volkerrecht als Rechtsordnung. Internationale Gerichtsbarkeit. Menschenrechte.
Festschrift für Hermann Mosler, Berlin, Springer Verlag, (1983), pp. 193-202 e, entre
nós, Moura Ramos, (1996), «A Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do homem. Sua
posição face ao ordenamento jurídico português», in Da Comunidade Internacional e
do seu Direito. Estudos de Direito Internacional Público e de Relações Internacionais,
Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, pp. 5-108, .
E para a caracterização do sistema por ele instituído vide, por último, Richard S. Kay,
(2000), «The European Human Rights System as a System of Law», 6 The Columbia
Journal of European Law, pp. 55-71.
(9)
E no do africano, ainda que com características diferentes, com a Carta
Africana dos Direitos do Homem e dos Povos, adoptada em Junho de 1981 em Nairobi,
pela Conferência de chefes de Estado e de Governo da Organização da Unidade
Africana. Sob este sistema, em particular, cfr. Philip Kunig, Wolfgang Benedek, Costa
R. Mahalu, (1985), Regional Protection of Human Rights by International Law: The
Emerging African System, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft e Maria José
Morais Pires, (1999), «Carta Africana dos Direitos Humanos e dos Povos», in
Documentação e Direito Comparado, v. 79/80, pp. 333-350.
(10)
Constituído pelo Pacto Internacional relativo aos direitos económicos, sociais
e culturais e pelo Pacto Internacional relativo aos direitos civis e políticos, adoptados
pela Assembleia Geral das Nações Unidas a 16 de Dezembro de 1966 e que
desenvolvem, dotando-os de uma garantia jurídica, os direitos que a Declaração
Universal dos Direitos do Homem, proclamada a 10 de Dezembro de 1948, consagrava
como simples directiva moral. Sobre este sistema, cfr. The United Nations and Human
Rights, New York, (1984), United Nations; Jaime Oraá, Felipe Gomez Isa, (1997), La
Declaracíon Universal de los Derechos Humanos. Un breve comentario en su 50
Aniversario, Bilbao, Universidad de Deusto, e Alberto de Amaral Junior e Claudia
175
observância por estes últimos assentar na discussão e análise, pelo Comité
de Direitos Humanos ( 11 , de relatórios estaduais descrevendo as medidas
adoptadas no plano nacional para a efectivação daqueles direitos ( 12).
3. A constituição de entidades fruto do desenvolvimento do
fenómeno de integração regional introduziria no entanto algumas novidades
ao funcionamento do sistema acabado de evocar. Na verdade, como
sucedeu com a instituição das Comunidades Europeias, os EstadosMembros aceitaram a limitação de alguns dos seus poderes, passando as
respectivas competências a ser exercidas pelos órgãos das novas
instituições por eles criadas. Nessas circunstâncias, a admitir-se que estas
estariam livres da vinculação aos mecanismos de protecção internacional
que os Estados haviam constituído, a sua criação envolveria um retrocesso,
Perrone-Moises (orgs.), (1999), O Cinquentenário da Declaração Universal dos
Direitos do Homem, São Paulo, Editora da Universidade de São Paulo.
(11)
Instituído pelo Pacto Internacional dos Direitos Civis e Políticos, referido na
nota anterior.
(12)
Para uma recolha de textos de direito internacional sobre direitos do homem,
cfr. Droits de l'homme en droit international, Strasbourg, 1992, Les éditions du Conseil
de l'Europe, Droits de l'homme. Recueil de documents internationaux et nationaux,
Bruxelles, Bruylant, (1989); e, em língua portuguesa, Jorge Campinos, (1984), Direito
Internacional dos Direitos do Homem. Textos Básicos, Coimbra, Coimbra Editora. E
para um comentário à sua origem e desenvolvimento, Karel Vasak, (1983), As
dimensões internacionais dos direitos humanos, Lisboa, Unesco, Manuais
LTC;Thomas Buergenthal, (1988), International Human Rights in a Nutshell, St. Paul,
Minn., West Publishing Co; Frédéric Sudre, (1995), Droit international et européen des
droits de l'homme, 2.a edição, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France; AAVV, (1998),
La protection des droits de l'homme et l'évolution du droit international, Paris, Editions
A. Pedone, AAVV, (1999), Los derechos humanos en un mundo dividido, Bilbao,
Universidad de Deusto; AAVV, (1999), Os direitos humanos e o direito internacional
(org. Carlos Eduardo de Abreu Boucault e Nadia de Araújo), São Paulo, Renovar; Rui
Machete, (1978), Os Direitos do Homem no Mundo, Lisboa, Fundação Social
Democrata Oliveira Martins; e Juan Antonio Carrillo Salcedo, (1995), Soberania de los
Estados e Derechos Humanos en Derecho Internacional Contemporaneo, Madrid,
Tecnos.
Em especial sobre os direitos culturais, cfr. AAVV, (1970), Os direitos culturais como
direitos do homem, Unesco, Porto, 1973, Livraria Telos Editora.
E sobre os meios da sua efectivação, cfr. a resolução do Institut de droit international,
na sua Sessão de Santiago de Compostela de 1989 e o comentário de Christian
Dominicé, «La contrainte entre Etats à l'appui des droits de l'homme», in Hacia un
nuevo orden internacional y europeo. Estudios en homenaje al Profesor Don Manuel
Diez de Velasco, Madrid, Editorial Tecnos, (1993), pp. 261-272.
Colocando a tónica nas instituições internacionais de protecção dos direitos do homem
veja-se o panorama apresentado em The Reform of International Institutions for the
Protection of Human Rights, Bruxelles, Bruylant(1993).
176
no que à tutela dos direitos humanos diz respeito. A menos que se
entendesse que elas sucederiam aos Estados-Membros partes nos
instrumentos que haviam presidido à sua criação quando exercessem as
competências de cujo exercício os Estados haviam sido privados e que, a
sê-lo por estes, estariam na origem do funcionamento do referido
mecanismo de protecção.
Acresce que o risco que se acaba de relevar era de algum modo
reforçado pela circunstância de os tratados institutivos, num silêncio que se
prolongaria durante bastante tempo, não fazerem qualquer referência à
problemática da protecção dos direitos humanos ) e isto apesar de às
instituições por eles criadas terem sido devolvidos poderes cujo exercício
poderia sem sombra de dúvidas desencadear a respectiva violação(13). E não
se esqueça que, num período inicial, o Tribunal de Justiça, quando
chamado a pronunciar-se sobre a compatibilidade de disposições
comunitárias com as normas constitucionais dos Estados-Membros
relativas à protecção dos direitos fundamentais, se limitava a afirmar só ter
«que garantir o respeito do Tratado e dos regulamentos de execução, não
devendo regra geral pronunciar-se sobre as normas de direito interno», e
não podendo, em consequência «examinar o argumento segundo o qual, ao
adoptar a sua decisão, a Alta Autoridade violou princípios do direito
constitucional alemão»( 14). A instância jurisdicional comunitária
negligenciava assim, de alguma forma, a questão da protecção dos direitos
fundamentais, ao não indagar se os direitos fundamentais invocados pelo
requerente não deveriam ser considerados como existentes na própria
ordem jurídica comunitária, por a respectiva consagração resultar afinal de
princípios constitucionais comuns aos Estados-Membros (15).
(13)
Estamos a pensar em disposições que se refiram à questão em geral, não
querendo com isto esquecer que divers as regras específicas se inspiraram nos valores
que tinham estado na base da consagração dos sistemas de protecção dos direitos
humanos. Assim, o artigo 7.E e as demais cláusulas de não discriminação entre os
nacionais dos Estados-Membros (artigos 40.E, 48.E, 52.E e 60.E) e o artigo 119.E, que
se referia à igualdade entre homens e mulheres, em matéria de remuneração (referimo nos à numeração inicial destes artigos).
(14)
Acórdão de 4 de Fevereiro de 1959, Storck/Alta Autoridade, processo 1/58,
Colectânea da Jurisprudência do Tribunal, 1954-1961, pp. 293-306, ponto 4, alínea a).
(15)
Recorde-se que o Tribunal havia já considerado que os princípios de direito
comuns aos Estados-Membros constituíam uma fonte complementar de direito
comunitário, ao afirmar que, na inexistência de disposições do Tratado sobre
determinada questão, o Tribunal, «para evitar uma denegação de justiça, se encontrava
obrigado a decidir inspirando-se das regras reconhecidas pelas legislações, a doutrina e
a jurisprudência dos Estados-Membros (acórdão de 12 de Julho de 1957, Dineke Algera
177
Posteriormente a esta tomada de posição, o défice de protecção
comunitária dos direitos fundamentais seria sublinhado, no plano nacional,
pelo acórdão do Bundesverfassungsgericht de 29 de Maio de 1974( 16) que
sublinharia que esta instância não podia deixar de controlar a
compatibilidade do direito comunitário derivado com os direitos
fundamentais enquanto não existisse, por falta de um catálogo de direitos
fundamentais no sistema comunitário, uma garantia suficiente quanto à
protecção de tais direitos nesta ordem jurídica.
Face à necessidade de evitar as consequências que tomadas de
posição como esta poderiam vir a ter sobre o acatamento dos princípios da
aplicabilidade directa e do primado do direito comunitário, por si entretanto
formulados ( 17), o Tribunal de Justiça chamaria a si, com o acórdão
Stauder(18), o papel de garante dos direitos fundamentais. Nesta de cisão, e
ao apreciar uma disposição cuja conformidade com os princípios gerais do
direito comunitário constituía o objecto da questão prejudicial formulada
pelo juiz nacional, o Tribunal acrescentaria num obiter dictum que a
interpretação que para ela preconizava não revelava «qualquer elemento
susceptível de colocar em causa os direitos fundamentais individuais
compreendidos nos princípios gerais do direito comunitário, cuja
observância é assegurada pelo Tribunal»(19).
A inserção da garantia da protecção dos direitos fundamentais nos
poderes de cognição da jurisdição comunitária seria pouco depois precisada
e o./ Assembleia Comum da CECA, processos apensos n.Es 7-56 e 3-57 a 7-57,
Colectânea, cit., 1954-1961, p. 158, e, para a publicação integral do acórdão, Recueil
de jurisprudence de la Cour, v. III (1957), pp. 81-178 (114-115).
Maria Luísa Duarte, (2000), A União Europeia e os Direitos Fundamentais, Métodos
de Protecção, in Estudos de Direito da União e das Comunidades Europeias,
Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, pp. 11-35; qualifica de agnosticismo valorativo a postura
do Tribunal referida em texto.
(16)
Veja-se o v. 37 da Colectânea das decisões do Bundesverfassungsgericht, p.
271-291. Este acórdão fora precedido de outros da mesma instância jurisdicional alemã,
na sequência de uma primeira decisão no mesmo sentido de 18 de Outubro de 1967;
cfr. a mesma Colectânea, no v. 22, pp. 293-299.
(17)
Cfr., respectivamente, os acórdãos de 5 de Fevereiro de 1963, Gend &
Loos/Administração Fiscal, processo 26/62, Colectânea, 1962-1964, pp. 205-232, e de
15 de Julho de 1964, Flaminio Costa/ENEL, processo 6/64, Colectânea, 1962-1964, pp.
549-577.
(18)
Acórdão de 12 de Novembro de 1969, processo 29/69, Colectânea, 19691970, pp. 157-166. Esta decisão inaugura aquela a que Maria Luísa Duarte (op. cit.
supra, nota 15) chama de fase de reconhecimento activo dos direitos fundamentais (p.
20).
(19)
Sublinhado nosso. Cfr. o ponto 7 da decisão citada na nota anterior, a p. 160.
178
com particular destaque no acórdão Internationale Handelsgesellschaft(20),
onde o Tribunal procederia à compatibilização das suas afirmações
anteriores desenvolvendo ademais o papel reconhecido aos direitos
fundamentais
no
ordenamento
comunitário».
Pronunciando-se
expressamente sobre a protecção dos direitos fundamentais nesta ordem
jurídica(21), começaria por recordar a jurisprudência mais antiga nos termos
da qual «o recurso às regras ou noções jurídicas do direito nacional, para a
apreciação dos actos adoptados pelas instituições da comunidade, teria por
efeito pôr em causa a unidade e a eficácia do direito comunitário». E
sublinharia que «ao direito emergente do Tratado, emanado de uma fonte
autónoma, não podem, em virtude da sua natureza, ser opostas em juízo
regras de direito nacional, quaisquer que sejam, sob pena de perder o seu
carácter comunitário e de ser posta em causa a base jurídica da própria
Comunidade; portanto, a invocação de violações, quer aos direitos
fundamentais, tais como estes são enunciados na Constituição de um
Estado-Membro, quer aos princípios da estrutura constitucional nacional,
não pode afectar a validade de um acto da Comunidade ou o seu efeito no
território desse Estado». Para acrescentar em seguida, aprofundando as
considerações já afloradas no acórdão Stauder: «Convém, no entanto,
analisar se não terá sido violada qualquer garantia análoga, inerente ao
direito comunitário. Com efeito, o respeito dos direitos fundamentais faz
parte integrante dos princípios gerais de direito cuja observância é
assegurada pelo Tribunal de Justiça. A salvaguarda desses direitos, ainda
que inspirada nas tradições constitucionais comuns aos Estados-Membros,
deve ser assegurada no âmbito da estrutura e dos objectivos da
Comunidade».
Ficava assim assente a competência jurisdicional para a protecção
dos direitos fundamentais, mediante a inserção destes nos princípios gerais
de direito cuja observância o Tribunal deve garantir. E estes princípios
viam a sua formulação decorrer da utilização do método comparativo, que
sublinhava o recurso à tradição constitucional dos Estados-Membros, em
lugar da abstracta referência do acórdão Stauder aos princípios gerais de
direito comunitário ( 22).
(20)
Acórdão de 17 de Dezembro de 1970, no processo 11/70, Colectânea, 19691970, pp. 625-657.
(21)
Pontos 3 e 4 da decisão citada na nota anterior, a p. 628-629.
(22)
Acentuando esta precisão, cfr. Antonio Saggio, (1993), «A protecção dos
direitos fundamentais na ordem jurídica comunitária», in O Sistema Jurisdicional
Comunitário e a sua contribuição para a integração europeia, Lisboa, pp. 69-97, p. 74.
179
Posteriormente, no acórdão Nold/Comissão(23), ao ser confrontado
com a alegação de que certas disposições comunitárias, além de
contrariarem disposições constitucionais alemãs, violavam ainda «diversos
instrumentos internacionais, nomeadamente a Convenção Europeia dos
Direitos do Homem», o Tribunal alargaria o quadro de parâmetros de
identificação dos direitos fundamentais, ao acrescentar à ideia de que se
deveria inspirar, ao garantir a protecção dos direitos fundamentais, nas
tradições constitucionais dos Estados-Membros ( 24), o reconhecimento de
que «os instrumentos internacionais relativos à protecção dos direitos do
homem, em que os Estados-Membros colaboraram ou a que aderiram,
podem igualmente dar indicações que é conveniente tomar em consideração
no âmbito do direito comunitário».
Esta linha de rumo viria a ser concretizada em seguida no acórdão
Rutili/Ministro do Interior (25)em que o Tribunal, instado a esclarecer
quando é que as limitações ao direito de livre circulação e permanência dos
cidadãos de outros Estados-Membros se poderiam considerar justificadas,
para os efeitos do artigo 48.E, n.E 3 (hoje artigo 39.E, n.E 3), invocaria
determinadas normas da Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem( 26)
para acentuar que as limitações introduzidas aos poderes dos EstadosMembros em matéria de polícia dos estrangeiros (27) seriam expressão de um
princípio mais geral consagrado naquelas disposições que igualmente
dispõem que as ofensas aos direitos por elas garantidos, «em virtude das
necessidades de ordem e segurança públicas, não poderão ultrapassar o
âmbito do que é necessário para protecção daquelas necessidades ‘numa
sociedade democrática’»(28).
4. Assumindo este desenvolvimento jurisdicional, as instituições
comunitárias em breve confirmariam no plano político o caminho assim
trilhado. Na verdade, por uma Declaração Comum de 5 de Abril de
(23)
Acórdão de 14 de Maio de 1974, no processo 4/73, Colectânea, 1974, pp.
283-300, especialmente ponto 13.
(24)
O que teria a consequência de que não poderia «admitir medidas
incompatíveis com os direitos fundamentais reconhecidos e garantidos pelas
constituições destes Estados».
(25)
De 28 de Novembro de 1975, no processo 36/75, Colectânea, 1975, pp. 415436.
(26)
Os artigos 8.E, 9.E, 10.E e 11.E, assim como o artigo 2.E do Protocolo n.E 4,
de 16 de Setembro de 1963.
(27)
Pelo artigo 3.E da Directiva 64/221 e o artigo 8.E do Regulamento n.E
1612/68.
(28)
Ponto 32 do acórdão citado supra , na nota 25.
180
1977( 29), o Parlamento europeu, o Conselho e a Comissão vieram sublinhar
«a importância fundamental que reconhecem aos direitos fundamentais tais
como resultam nomeadamente das Constituições dos Estados-Membros
bem como da Convenção Europeia de Salvaguarda dos Direitos do Homem
e das Liberdades Fundamentais», acrescentando que «no exercício da sua
missão e no prosseguimento dos objectivos das Comunidades Europeias,
respeitam e continuarão a respeitar esses direitos».
Após as instituições seriam os chefes de governo dos EstadosMembros a reafirmar a mesma linha, ao subscreverem, a 7 e 8 de Abril de
1978, a Declaração sobre a Democracia, onde, para além de se afirmar «que
a aplicação dos princípios da democracia representativa, do primado da lei,
da justiça social e do respeito pelos direitos do homem implicava um
regime político que garantisse as modalidades processuais necessárias ao
respeito dos direitos do homem», se acrescentava que «a manutenção da
democracia e a defesa dos direitos do homem constituíam elementos
consubstanciais da Comunidade Europeia».
Estas tomadas de posição só poderiam reforçar a corrente
jurisprudencial acima referida, que passaria a fundar a referência à
protecção dos direitos fundamentais, de forma sistemática, nas tradições
constitucionais nacionais e nos instrumentos de direito internacional
pactício, com particular referência à Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do
Homem. Exemplo do que afirmamos é o acórdão Lisalotte Hauer/Land
Rheinland Pfalz(30) onde, referindo-se ao acórdão Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft, o Tribunal sublinharia que «a questão de uma
violação eventual dos direitos fundamentais por um acto institucional das
Comunidades apenas pode ser apreciada no quadro do próprio direito
comunitário» (ponto 14). Para continuar, na esteira do acórdão Nold,
referindo que «os direitos fundamentais fazem parte integrante dos
princípios gerais de direito cujo respeito lhe cabe assegurar», e que, ao
fazê-lo, «está obrigado a inspirar-se nas tradições constitucionais comuns
aos Estados-Membros, de tal modo que se não poderiam admitir na
Comunidade medidas incompatíveis com os direitos fundamentais
reconhecidos pelas Constituições destes Estados; e que os instrumentos
internacionais relativos à protecção dos direitos do homem, nos quais os
Estados-Membros cooperaram ou a que aderiram, podem igualmente
(29)
Vide Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias, 1997, C, 103, p. 1.
Acórdão de 13 de Dezembro de 1979, no processo 44/79, Recueil, 1979, v.
III, pp. 3727-3765. Sobre esta decisão, cfr. Simona Bellini, (1981), «La tutela dei diritti
fondamentali nell'ordinamento comunitario secondo la sentenza Hauer», Rivista di
Diritto Internazionale, 64, pp. 318-327.
(30)
181
fornecer indicações que há que ter em conta no quadro do direito
comunitário». Para concluir recordando que esta concepção havia sido
igualmente reconhecida pela citada Declaração comum das instituições, de
5 de Abril de 1977, que, «após ter recordado a jurisprudência do Tribunal,
se referia, por um lado, aos direitos garantidos pelas Constituições dos
Estados-Membros e, por outro, à Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do
Homem» (ponto 15).
5. Pode dizer-se que a partir desta altura a vinculação das
Comunidades à garantia dos direitos fundamentais não deixaria de ser uma
constante da jurisprudência do Tribunal de Justiça. Simplesmente, na
ausência de textos claros no direito primário que consagrassem com
carácter geral esta obrigação, ela apresentava -se assim como uma corrente
de natureza pretoriana, que procurava suprir a falta de um catálogo preciso
de direitos fundamentais recorrendo às tradições constitucionais nacionais
e, de forma crescente, à Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem. A
importância deste texto como parâmetro da interpretação do sistema de
direitos fundamentais reconhecidos no sistema comunitário seria
evidenciada pela jurisprudência posterior ( 31) e levaria inclusivamente a
(31)
Para mais extensas indicações neste sentido, cfr. Manfred Dauses, (1990),
«La protection des droits fondamentaux dans l'ordre juridique des Communautés
Européennes. Position du problème, état actuel et tendances», in Documentação e
Direito Comparado, 41-42 pp. 9-35; Antonio Saggio, «O sistema jurisdicional
comunitário e a sua contribuição para a integração europeia», cit. supra , nota 22,
Angel Chueca Sancho, (1989), Los derechos fundamentales en la Comunidad
Europea, Barcelona, Bosch, pp. 147-321; Andrew Clapham, (1991), Human Rights
and the European Community: A Critical Overview, Baden-Baden, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, especialmente pp. 29-89; F. G. Jacobs, 1992, «The protection of
human rights in the member States of the European Community. The impact of the
case-law of the Court of Justice», in Human Rights and Constitutional Law. Essays
in honour of Brian Walsh (edited by James O'Reilly), Dublin, The round hall press,
pp. 243-250; Konstantinos Kakouris, «La jurisprudence de la Cour de justice des
Communautées européennes relative aux droits de l'homme. Aperçu général», in
Julia Iliopoulos, Strangas (hrsg.), (1993), La protection des droits de l'homme dans le
cadre européen. L'adhésion des Communautés Européennes à la Convention
européenne des droits de l'homme , Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp.
183-207; Federico Mancini, Vittorio di Bucci, «Die Entwicklung der Grundrechte als
Teil des Gemeinschaftsrechts», ibidem, pp. 208-230; Cástor M. Diaz Barrado, (1995),
«Reconocimiento y protección de los derechos fondamentales en la Union Europea»,
in Derecho de extranjeria, Asilo y Refugio, Madrid, Instituto Nacional de Servicios
Sociales, pp. 127-153; Gil Carlos Rodríguez Iglesias, (1998), «La proteccíon de los
derechos fundamentales en la Union Europea», in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe
Federico Mancini, v. II-Diritto dell'Unione Europea, Milano, Giuffrè, pp. 831-845;
Montserrat Pi Llorens, (1999), Los derechos fondamentales en lo ordenamiento
182
Comissão a apresentar em 4 de Abril de 1979( 32) um Memorandum sobre a
adesão das Comunidades à Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem.
Se as diferentes dificuldades postas por uma tal démarche (e que seriam, de
resto, elencadas neste documento) (33) estariam necessariamente na origem
de um arrastar da reflexão sobre o tema, o certo é que a ideia de dotar a
Comunidade de um catálogo de direitos fundamenta is não seria
abandonada.
É assim que o Projecto de Tratado da União Europeia, aprovado pelo
Parlamento Europeu em 14 de Fevereiro de 1984, conteria um artigo 4.E
que retomava o compromisso das Comunidades com a protecção dos
direitos fundamentais, nos termos da jurisprudência já referida, nela
incluindo também os direitos económicos, sociais e culturais ( 34), previa a
possibilidade de sanções aos Estados que séria e persistentemente os
violassem e anunciava, num prazo de cinco anos, uma decisão sobre a
adesão à Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem e à Carta Social
Europeia assim como a adopção de uma declaração comunitária sobre os
direitos fundamentais ( 35). E se os Estados não viriam a adoptar esta via
(nem a dar seguimento ao projecto de Tratado), o certo é que não deixariam
de reafirmar, no preâmbulo do Acto Único Europeu assinado em 17 de
Fevereiro de 1986, a sua decisão de promover conjuntamente a democracia
«com base nos direitos fundamentais reconhecidos nas Constituições e
legislações dos Estados-Membros, na Convenção da Protecção dos Direitos
comunitario, Barcelona; Ariel e Koen Lenaerts, (2000), «Fundamental rights in the
European Union», 25 European Law Review pp. 575-600 (577-585).
(32)
Na esteira de uma posição anterior do Parlamento Europeu que em 10 de
Julho de 1975 aprovaria uma Resolução sobre a União Europeia em que reclamava a
elaboração de uma carta dos direitos dos cidadãos da Comunidade com o objectivo de
dar aos cidadãos da Comunidade o sentimento da sua comunidade de destino.
(33)
Para a sua análise, cfr., entre outros, Angel Chueca Sancho, Los derechos
fundamentales en la Comunidad Europea, cit. supra, nota 31, pp. 327-353, e Rudolf
Bernhardt, (1996), «Probleme eines Beitritts der Europaischen Gemeinschaft zur
Europaischen Menschenrechts Konvention, in Festschrift für Ulrich Everling (Ole
Due, Marcus Lutter, Jurgen Schwarze, hrsg), v. I, Baden-Baden, Nomos
Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 103-111.
(34)
Referindo-se a este propósito também à Carta Social Europeia. Cfr., a
propósito deste texto, La Charte sociale européenne. Origines, fonctionnement et
résultats, (1991), Strasbourg, Les éditions du Conseil de l'Europe.
(35)
Veja-se o comentário a esta disposição em The European Union TreatyCommentary on the draft adopted by the European Parliament on 14 February 1984
(por Francesco Capotorti, Meinhard Hilf, Francis G. Jacobs e Jean-Paul Jacqué),
Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, pp. 39-44.
183
do Homem e das Liberdades Fundamentais e na Carta Social Europeia,
nomeadamente a liberdade, a igualdade e a justiça social».
Claramente afirmado no preâmbulo dos Tratados, o compromisso da
Comunidade com a protecção dos direitos fundamentais seria ainda
retomado pelo Parlamento Europeu, através da adopção, em 12 de Abril de
1989, de uma Declaração dos Direitos e Liberdades Fundamentais ( 36) e
seria expressamente realçado pelo Tribunal Constitucional alemão que, por
sentença de 22 de Outubro de 1986 ( 37), reconheceria que o Tribunal de
Justiça tinha passado a assegurar, pelo desenvolvimento da sua
jurisprudência, uma protecção dos direitos fundamentais que no essencial
era equivalente à exigida pela lei fundamental alemã ( 38).
Se tal compromisso parecia indiscutível, continuava porém a notar-se
alguma incerteza sobre as melhores vias para a sua concretização. Assim,
(36)
Para o respectivo texto, cfr. o Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias, C,
120, de 16 de Maio de 1989, pp. 51-57. Note-se que o Conselho Europeu adoptaria
também, a 8 e 9 de Dezembro de 1989, em Estrasburgo, uma Carta Comunitária dos
Direitos Fundamentais dos Trabalhadores.
(37)
Cfr. o respectivo texto na Colectânea das decisões do
Bundesverfassungsgericht, v. 73, pp. 339-388.
(38)
Com o que aquela instância declarava que não exerceria o controlo
normativo das disposições de direito comunitário que serviam de base aos actos da
administração ou das jurisdições alemãs enquanto o Tribunal de Justiça garantisse uma
protecção eficaz dos direitos fundamentais face ao poder da Comunidade.
Mas atente-se em que, numa ulterior decisão de 12 de Maio de 1989, o
Bundesfassungsgericht voltaria a decidir que se o Tribunal de Justiça continuasse a não
garantir os princípios jurídicos sobre os quais se fundamenta a parte da lei fundamental
relativa aos direitos fundamentais consideraria admissíveis os recursos que viessem a
ser interpostos pelos particulares.
É na linha destas preocupações que há que entender a tomada de posição expressa no
novo texto do artigo 21 da Grundgesetz (introduzido por ocasião da ratificação alemã
do Tratado de Maastricht) e onde se escreve que a República Federal da Alemanha
contribui para o desenvolvimento da União Europeia na medida em que esta está
vinculada aos princípios federativos, sociais, do Estado de Direito e da democracia e
que «garante uma protecção dos direitos fundamentais substancialmente comparável à
da presente lei fundamental» (sobre a interpretação deste preceito vide, por último, Uwe
Kischel, (2000), «Der unabdingbare grundrechtliche Mindeststandard in der
Europäischen Union. Zur Auslegung des Art. 23 Abs. 1 Satz 1 GG», Der Staat, v. 39
pp. 523-545. E sobre os mais recentes desenvolvimentos jurisprudenciais do Tribunal
de Karlsruhe a este propósito (falamos do acórdão de 7 de Junho de 2000 proferido a
propósito do contencioso das bananas), cfr., numa perspectiva evolutiva, Willy
Zimmer, «De nouvelles bases pour la coopération entre la Cour Constitutionnelle
Fédérale et la Cour de Justice de Luxembourg? (A propos de BVerfGE, 7 juin 2000,
Solange III)», in Europe, Ano 11, n.E 3, de 3 de Março de 2001, pp. 3-6.
184
enquanto a via pretoriana ensaiada pelo Tribunal de Justiça na sua
jurisprudência se mantinha e desenvolvia, e as tentativas de estabelecer um
catálogo próprio de direitos fundamentais cujo respeito deveria ser
assegurado no sistema comunitário continuavam a não ser coroadas de
sucesso(39), a Comissão retomaria a via de um controlo externo do respeito
dos direitos fundamentais na Comunidade, ao aprovar, na sequência do já
referido Memorando de 4 de Abril de 1979, uma comunicação, a 19 de
Novembro de 1990, em que propunha ao Conselho a adesão das
Comunidades à Convenção Europeia dos Direitos do Homem( 40).
Ainda que apoiada pelo Parlamento, que na sua resolução de 9 de
Julho de 1991( 41) sobre os direitos do homem convidaria a Comunidade a
aderir à Convenção a fim de melhor garantir o respeito destes direitos, a
proposta não colheria a aceitação dos Estados entretanto reunidos em
conferência intergovernamental para a revisão dos Tratados, que se
limitariam a consagrar expressamente a via pretoriana no direito
comunitário primário ao inserirem no Tratado da União Europeia, aprovado
em Maastricht em 7 de Fevereiro de 1992, um artigo F, n.E 2, segundo o
qual «a União respeitará os direitos fundamentais tal como os garante a
Convenção Europeia de Salvaguarda dos Direitos do Homem e das
Liberdades Fundamentais, assinada em Roma em 4 de Novembro de 1950,
(39)
No sentido de que não lograra ainda a aprovação de um documento com
carácter vinculativo com este objecto.
(40)
Sobre o ponto cfr., além dos trabalhos citados supra, na nota 33, G. CohenJonathan, (1984), «La problématique de l'adhésion de la Communauté Européenne à la
Convention européenne des droits de l'homme», in Mélanges Henri Teitgen, Paris,
Pedone, pp. 81-108; Jean-Paul Jacqué, «L'adhésion de la Communauté Européenne à la
Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Aspects juridiques et techniques», in
La protection des droits de l'homme dans le cadre européen (cit. supra, nota 31), pp.
302-319, e «Communauté Européenne et Convention européenne des droits de
l'homme», (1992), in L'Europe et le droit. Mélanges en hommage à Jean Boulouis,
Paris, Dalloz, pp. 325-340; Moura Ramos, (1990 a 1993), «L'adhésion des
Communautés à la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. Rapport national du
Portugal», 16 a 19 Revista de Direito e Economia pp. 753-766; e F.G. Jacobs, (1994),
«European Community Law and the European Convention on Human Rights», in
Institutional Dynamics of European Integration. Essays in honour of Henry G.
Schermers (edited by Deirdre Curtin and Tom Heukels), Dordrecht, Nijhoff, pp. 561571.
Identificando também as três possibilidades que citamos em texto, cfr., por exemplo,
Jean Vergès, «Droits fondamentaux de la personne et principes généraux du droit
communautaire», in L'Europe et le Droit. Mélanges en hommage à Jean Boulouis, cit,
pp. 513-531, a p. 515.
(41)
Cfr. o Jornal Oficial das Comunidades Europeias, C, 240, p. 45.
185
e tal como resultam das tradições constitucionais comuns aos EstadosMembros, enquanto princípios gerais de direito comunitário».
Se os Tratados passavam assim a reconhecer expressamente, no seu
texto, a vinculação das Comunidades à protecção dos direitos do homem, a
ideia de as submeter a um controlo externo conheceria novo
desenvolvimento com a iniciativa do Conselho de, após novo
pronunciamento do Parlamento a favor da adesão à Convenção Europeia (42),
submeter ao Tribunal de Justiça, em 26 de Abril de 1994, um pedido de
parecer sobre a compatibilidade de tal adesão com o Tratado que instituiu a
Comunidade Europeia.
No parecer que proferiria cerca de dois anos depois ( 43), o Tribunal de
Justiça viria a pronunciar-se no sentido de que, «no estado actual do direito
comunitário, a Comunidade não tem competências para aderir à Convenção
para a Protecção dos Direitos do Homem e das Liberdades Fundamentais».
Partindo da constatação (ponto 27) de que «nenhuma disposição do Tratado
confere às instituições comunitárias, de modo geral, o poder de adoptar
regras em matéria de direitos do homem ou de celebrar convenções neste
domínio», o Tribunal analisaria depois a questão de saber se a adesão da
Comunidade se pode basear no artigo 235.E (ponto 31). Realçando a
importância dos direitos fundamentais e retomando a sua jurisprudência a
este propósito (ponto 33), o Tribunal chegaria contudo a uma conclusão
negativa quanto ao problema que lhe era submetido considerando que «a
adesão à Convenção implicava uma alteração substancial do regime
comunitário actual de protecção dos direitos do homem, na medida em que
teria como resultado a inserção da Comunidade num sistema institucional
internacional distinto, bem como a integração do conjunto de disposições
da Convenção na ordem jurídica comunitária» (ponto 35); acrescentando
que «tal alteração do regime de protecção dos direitos do homem na
Comunidade, cujas implicações institucionais seriam igualmente
fundamentais tanto para a Comunidade como para os Estados-Membros,
teria relevância constitucional e ultrapassaria, pois, pela sua natureza, os
(42)
Ver a Resolução de 18 de Janeiro de 1994 in Jornal Oficial das
Comunidades Europeias, C, 44, p. 32.
Para uma análise da posição do Parlamento na questão que os ocupa, cfr. Jean-Pierre
Cot, (2000), «Le Parlement européen et la protection des droits fondamentaux dans le
cadre de l'Convention européenne», in Les droits de l'homme au seuil du troisième
millénaire. Mélanges en hommage à Pierre Lambert, Bruxelles, Bruylant, pp. 155-170.
(43)
Parecer 2/94, de 28 de Março de 1996 (in Colectânea, 1996, pp. 1763-1790).
186
limites do artigo 235.E», só podendo ser realizada pela via de uma
modificação do Tratado (ponto 35) ( 44).
Face a esta tomada de posição, a Conferência intergovernamental,
que se iniciaria em Turim no dia seguinte à prolação do parecer do
Tribunal, optaria por, deixando de lado outras propostas(45), reforçar a
referência ao princípio do respeito dos direitos do homem e das liberdades
fundamentais, que passa a ser considerado, conjuntamente com os
princípios da liberdade, da democracia e do Estado de direito, um princípio
comum aos Estados-Membros e que constitui um dos fundamentos da
União( 46). Mas não tomaria qualquer iniciativa tendente a elaborar um
(44)
Para a crítica da solução adoptada e o inventário das diferentes possibilidades
que subsistem de melhor assegurar a protecção dos direitos fundamentais na ordem
jurídica comunitária, cfr., respectivamente, Michel Waelbroeck, (1996), «La Cour de
justice et la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme», Cahiers de droit européen,
37 pp. 549-553; Olivier de Schutter, Yves Lejeune, «L'adhésion de la Communauté à la
Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. À propos de l'avis 2/94 de la Cour de
justice des Communautés», ibidem, pp. 555-606, e Claudio Zanghi, «Un’altra critica al
parere 2/94 della Corte sull' adesione della Comunità alla convenzione europea dei
diritti dell'uomo», in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Federico Mancini (cit. supra, nota
31), pp. 1101-1120.
(45)
Cfr., sobre as propostas de um «comité de sábios» designado pela Comissão
em Outubro de 1995 com o objectivo de reflectir e formular propostas concretas sobre a
reforma dos direitos civis e sociais à atenção da conferência intergovernamental, o
juízo crítico de Eduardo Garcia de Enteria, (1996), em «Les droits fondamentaux et la
révision du traité sur la Convention européenne», Cahiers de droit européen, 37, pp.
607-612.
(46)
Veja-se o artigo 6.E (antigo artigo F), n.E 1, do Tratado da União Europeia,
tal como este preceito ficou depois do Tratado de Amsterdão de 2 de Outubro de 1997.
Saliente-se que, de acordo com a nova redação do artigo 49.E (antigo artigo O), n.E 1,
daquele Tratado, o acatamento do princípio do respeito dos direitos do homem e das
liberdades fundamentais (como dos demais princípios mencionados no artigo 6.E)
passa a constituir uma condição de adesão dos outros Estados europeus à União
Europeia. E que, pelo seu artigo 46.E (antigo artigo L), alínea d), o Tribunal de Justiça
passa a exercer o seu controlo também ao artigo 6.E, n.E 2, no que respeita à acção das
instituições na medida em que ele seja competente nos termos dos tratados que
instituem as Comunidades Europeias e nos termos do tratado da União.
Sobre o alcance destas alterações, cfr. Bruno Nascimbene, «Tutela dei diritti
fondamentali e competenza della Corte di Giustiza nel Trattato di Amsterdam», in
Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Federico Mancini (cit. supra, nota 31), pp. 683-694; Koen
Lenaerts, (2000), «Respect for fundamental rights as a constitutional principle of the
European Union», 6 The Columbia Journal of European Law, pp. 1-25 e Peter Oliver,
(2000), «Fundamental rights in European Union law after the Treaty of Amsterdam», in
Judicial Review in European Union Law. Liber amicorum in honour of Lord Slynn of
Hadley, The Hague, Kluwer Law International, pp. 319-342.
187
catálogo de direitos fundamentos que vinculasse a União ou a
Comunidade(47) e conservaria o antigo artigo F (actualmente artigo 6.E),
n.E 2 do Tratado da União, que condensava a base jurídica que permitira o
desenvolvimento da concepção pretoriana de defesa dos direitos
fundamentais no quadro comunitário ( 48).
6. Se as negocia ções que conduziram à adopção do Tratado de
Amsterdão se limitaram, no que diz respeito à protecção dos direitos
fundamentais na União Europeia, ao ponto que acabamos de mencionar, a
situação evoluiria no entanto muito rapidamente mal havia decorrido um
mês após a entrada em vigor deste Tratado(49). É assim que, ao mesmo
tempo que, no Conselho Europeu de Colónia de 3 e 4 de Junho de 1999,
anunciavam a convocação de uma nova conferência intergovernamental
para concluir as questões que em Amsterdão tinham ficado por resolver e
para as quais urgia encontrar uma solução(50), nomeadamente na perspectiva
do alargamento em curso da União(51), os chefes de Estado e de governo
decidiam, face ao estado de desenvolvimento desta, «estabelecer uma carta
de direitos fundamentais a fim de sublinhar, de maneira visível para os
cidadãos da União, a sua importância excepcional e o seu alcance».
(47)
Como o fizera o comité referido supra , na nota 45. Para uma análise do
elenco de direitos a considerar neste âmbito, vejam-se também os trabalhos recolhidos
na obra organizada por Antonio Cassese, Andrew Clapham, Joseph Weiler (eds.),
(1991), Human Rights and the European Community: The Substantive Law, BadenBaden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.
(48)
No sentido de que a protecção dos direitos fundamentais no sistema
comunitário parece desde o princípio hesitar entre esta concepção, o estabelecimento de
um controlo externo e a instituição de um catálogo de direitos fundamentais próprio ao
sistema comunitário, cfr., entre outros, Gregorio Robles Morchon, (1988), Los
derechos fundamentales en la Comunidad Europea, Madrid, Editorial Ceura, pp. 153159, e Andrew Claphan, Human Rights and the European Community: A Critical
Overview (cit. supra, nota 31), pp. 90-99.
(49)
O Tratado de Amsterdão, assinado a 2 de Outubro de 1997, viria a entrar em
vigor a 1 de Maio de 1999.
(50)
Tratava-se, fundamentalmente, de um acordo quanto à reponderação das
vozes dos Estados no seio do Conselho, ao elenco de matérias quanto às quais uma
decisão por maioria qualificada (e não já por unanimidade) seria possível, e à
composição numérica da Comissão.
(51)
Recorde-se que para além da Estónia, da Hungria, da Polónia, da República
Checa, da Eslováquia e da Eslovénia, cuja adesão se admite possa ter lugar a partir de
2004, a União Europeia negoceia ainda com a Bulgária, Chipre, a Letónia, a Lituânia,
Malta e a Roménia, para além de ter igualmente pendente o pedido de adesão da
Turquia cuja consideração continua algo suspensa da situação deste último país em
matéria de respeito dos direitos humanos.
188
Os termos da decisão sublinham de modo claro que se procurou
sobretudo dar maior visibilidade e transparência ao sistema de protecção
dos direitos fundamentais já existente na União, tornando mais explícitos
os parâmetros em que até ao presente se tem baseado a jurisprudência do
Tribunal de Justiça. O que pareceria justificar-se à luz do reforço das
competências da União em áreas onde a questão da protecção dos direitos
fundamentais se coloca em termos particularmente sensíveis, do anunciado
alargamento a países até há pouco governados por regimes não
democráticos e à necessária concordância com o lugar que a problemática
da protecção dos direitos humanos tem ocupado na política externa da
União. Procurando, com a elaboração da Carta, dar uma contribuição à
identidade da Europa e aumentar o sentimento de pertença dos cidadãos
europeus a esta entidade, o Conselho Europeu tinha em mente a elaboração
de um documento que pudesse ser redigido e apresentado antes da sua
reunião prevista para Nice em Dezembro de 2000, de modo a que nela ele
pudesse propor ao Parlamento e à Comissão a sua proclamação conjunta,
ficando a sua eventual inserção nos tratados para ser examinada
subsequentemente.
Mais tarde, na sua reunião de Tampere, em 15 e 16 de Outubro de
1999, o Conselho Europeu, aprovaria a composição do órgão( 52),
posteriormente denominado «Convenção», que elaboraria o projecto de
Carta. A discussão respectiva iniciar-se-ia em 13 de Janeiro de 2000,
estando um primeiro projecto concluído a 28 de Julho e um segundo a 14
de Setembro e obtendo-se a 26 do mesmo mês um consenso sobre um texto
que seria formalmente adoptado a 2 de Outubro de 2000( 53). Reunido em
(52)
A Convenção compreendia, como membros de pleno direito, 15
representantes dos chefes de Estado e de Governo dos Estados-Membros, um
representante do presidente da Comissão, 15 membros do Parlamento Europeu
designados por este e 30 membros dos parlamentos nacionais (dois por cada EstadoMembro) por eles designados. Como observadores previu-se a participação de dois
representantes do Tribunal de Justiça e dois do Conselho da Europa, um dos quais
representando o Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos do Homem. Para além disso, diversas
instâncias comunitárias (designadamente o Comité Económico e Social, o Comité das
Regiões e o Mediador) seriam convidadas a pronunciar-se na fase de elaboração do
documento.
(53)
Sobre o método de trabalho da Convenção e os seus resultados, cfr. em
particular, as actas das journées d'études sobre La Charte des droits fondamentaux de la
Convention européenne que tiveram lugar a 16 e 17 de Junho de 2000 em Estrasburgo
[in Revue universelle des droits de l'homme, v. 12 (2000), pp. 1-83]; Laura Carrasco
Macia, «Le projet de Charte des droits fondamentaux de l'Union Européenne»,
EIPASCOPE, n.E 2000/3, pp. 19-27; António Vitorino, «La Charte des droits
189
Biarritz a 13 e 14 de Outubro, o Conselho Europeu aprovaria o texto por
unanimidade, abrindo assim a via para a sua proclamação solene em Nice,
nos termos referidos.
Após um preâmbulo em que se recordam, por um lado, os
fundamentos e objectivos da União e a importância da protecção dos
direitos fundamentais no desenvolvimento das suas missões, e, por outro
lado, as fontes( 54) dos direitos que a União reconhece pela presente Carta,
estes aparecem-nos enunciados em 50 artigos, divididos em seis
capítulos ( 55), que são completados por um último, contendo quatro
disposições de carácter mais geral.
Estando fora dos objectivos do presente trabalho a análise cuidada da
condensação a que se chegou neste bill of rights, não deixaremos no
entanto de fazer uma breve referência ao seu conteúdo.
Assim, no Capítulo I enumeraram-se os direitos que decorrem
imediatamente da inviolabilidade da dignidade do ser humano (proclamada
no artigo 1.E): o direito à vida (com expressa proibição da pena capital)
(artigo 2.E), o direito à integridade (com a particularização, no domínio da
medicina e da biologia, do necessário respeito do consentimento livre e
esclarecido da pessoa, da proibição das práticas eugénicas, da
fondamentaux de la Convention européenne», Revue du droit de la Convention
européenne, n.E 3/2000, pp. 499-508; Melchior Wathelet, «La Charte des droits
fondamentaux: un bon pas dans une course qui reste longue», Cahiers de Droit
européen, v. 36 (2000), pp. 585-593; Gráinne de Búrca, (2001), «The drafting of the
European Union Charter of Fundamental Rights», 26 European Law Review, pp. 126138; o editorial comment («The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights still under
discussion») do n.E 1 do v. 38 (2001) da Common Market Law Review (pp. 1-6) e
Giorgio Sacerdoti, (2002), «The European Charter of Fundamental Rights: From a
Nation-State Europe to a Citizen's Europe», 8 Columbia Journal of European Law pp.
37-52.
(54)
A Carta refere-se, a este propósito, aos direitos que decorrem «das tradições
constitucionais e das obrigações internacionais comuns aos Estados-Membros, do
Tratado da União Europeia e dos Tratados comunitários, da Convenção Europeia para a
Protecção dos Direitos do Homem e das Liberdades Fundamentais, das Cartas sociais
aprovadas pela Comunidade e pelo Conselho da Europa, bem como da jurisprudência
do Tribunal de Justiça das Comunidades Europeias e do Tribunal Europeu dos Direitos
do Homem».
Sobre a extensão progressiva das fontes dos direitos fundamentais no sistema de direito
da União Europeia e para um ensaio da sua sistematização, cfr. Fabrice Picod,
(2000),«Les sources», in Réalité et perspectives du droit communautaire des droits
fondamentaux, Bruxelles, Bruylant, pp. 125-185.
(55)
Intitulados,
respectivamente,
Dignidade,
Liberdades,
Igualdade,
Solidariedade, Cidadania e Justiça.
190
transformação total ou parcial do corpo humano em fonte de lucro e da
clonagem reprodutiva dos seres humanos) (artigo 3.E), a proibição da
tortura e dos tratos ou penas desumanas e degradantes (artigo 4.E) e a
proibição da escravidão e do trabalho forçado (com especial referência à
proibição do tráfico de seres humanos) (artigo 5.E).
Sob a epígrafe Liberdades, o Capítulo II consagra em seguida vários
dos direitos reconhecidos já pela Convenção Europeia, como o direito à
liberdade e à segurança (artigo 6.E), o direito ao respeito pela vida privada
e familiar (artigo 7.E), o direito de contrair casamento e de constituir
família (com remissão, quanto ao respectivo exercício, para as legislações
nacionais respectivas) (artigo 9.E), a liberdade de pensamento, consciência
e religião (com o reconhecimento do direito à objecção de consciência)
(artigo 10.E), a liberdade de expressão e de informação, que inclui o
respeito da liberdade e do pluralismo dos meios de comunicação social
(artigo 11.E), a liberdade de reunião e de associação, com específica
referência ao domínio político e o reconhecimento de que os partidos
políticos ao nível da União contribuem para a expressão da vontade política
dos cidadãos da União (artigo 12.E) ( 56v , pelos respectivos Protocolos
Adicionais, como o direito de propriedade, com referência expressa à
protecção da propriedade intelectual (artigo 17.E), o direito à educação
(artigo 14.E) (57), e a protecção em caso de afastamento, expulsão ou
extradição (artigo 19.E) (58), pela Carta Social Europeia, como o direito ao
trabalho (artigo 15.E) (59) ou por outros documentos internacionais ( 60), como
o direito de asilo (artigo 18.E). Mas reconhecem-se igualmente outros
direitos, que entretanto obtiveram eco nos ordenamentos constitucionais
(56)
Cfr., no mesmo sentido, o actual artigo 191.E do Tratado da Comunidade
Europeia (antigo artigo 138.E-A), tal como foi introduzido neste instrumento
convencional em 1992, pelo Tratado da União Europeia.
(57)
O artigo 2.E do Protocolo n.E 1 falava, com um alcance aparentemente mais
restrito, do direito à instrução. Mas assinale-se que o direito à formação profissional era
já reconhecido pela Carta Social Europeia (artigo 10.E). Sublinhe-se porém que o texto
a que nos reportamos consagra expressamente «o respeito (...) da liberdade de criação
de estabelecimentos de ensino, no respeito pelos princípios democráticos e o direito dos
pais de assegurarem a educação e o ensino dos filhos de acordo com as suas convicções
religiosas, filosóficas e pedagógicas».
(58)
Ainda que em termos mais alargados do que acontecia nas disposições dos
Protocolos n.os 4 e 7.
(59)
Que surge enunciado em termos mais latos como liberdade profissional e
direito de trabalhar.
(60)
Trata-se, no caso, da Convenção de Genebra, de 28 de Julho de 1951 e do
Protocolo de 31 de Janeiro de 1967, relativos ao estatuto dos refugiados.
191
nacionais e no próprio sistema comunitário, como a protecção de dados
pessoais (artigo 8.E) ( 61v e a liberdade da empresa (artigo 16.E), ou que em
geral não são objecto de um reconhecimento específico, como a liberdade
das artes e das ciências (artigo 13.E).
O Capítulo III, a propósito da igualdade, consagra especialmente a
igualdade perante a lei (artigo 20.E) e a proibição da discriminação (artigo
21.E) (62), para afirmar depois o compromisso da União com o respeito da
diversidade cultural, religiosa e linguística (artigo 22.E), a igualdade entre
homens e mulheres em todos os domínios, incluindo emprego, trabalho e
remuneração, com explícita previsão da possibilidade de medidas positivas
a favor do sexo sub-representado (artigo 23.E), os direitos das crianças
(artigo 24.E) (63), e das pessoas idosas (artigo 25.E) e a integração das
pessoas com deficiência (artigo 26.E).
No Capítulo IV, e sob a epígrafe Solidariedade, reúne-se um
conjunto de direitos de natureza social que na maior parte dos casos já se
encontram consagradas quer na ordem jurídica comunitária (ou nos
Tratados ou no direito derivado) quer nas ordens jurídicas dos EstadosMembros (64). É o que se passa com as disposições relativas à protecção da
(61)
Cfr., no que toca a Portugal, o artigo 35.E da Constituição da República. No
sistema comunitário, saliente-se que por força de um novo artigo 213.E-B, introduzido
no Tratado da Comunidade Europeia pelo Tratado de Amsterdão (hoje artigo 286.E) os
actos comunitários relativos à protecção das pessoas singulares em matéria de
tratamento de dados de carácter pessoal e de livre circulação desses dados (trata-se das
Directivas 95/46/CE e 97/66/CE, ambas do Parlamento e do Conselho, respectivamente
de 24 de Outubro de 1995 e de 15 de Dezembro de 1997) serão aplicáveis, a partir de 1
de Janeiro de 1999, às Instituições e órgãos instituídos pelo presente Tratado, ou com
base nele (n.E 1) e que, antes dessa data, o Conselho, através do processo da codecisão, deveria criar um órgão independente de supervisão, incumbido de fiscalizar a
sua aplicação, e tomar as demais disposições que se revelem adequadas (n.E 2) ) para o
efeito, veja-se o Regulamento n.E 45/2001 (in Jornal Oficial, L, 8, p. 1).
(62)
Que, para além de recordar a proibição da discriminação com base na
nacionalidade, no âmbito de aplicação dos Tratados da Comunidade Europeia e da
União Europeia, alarga a outros fundamentos, como as características genéticas, a
deficiência ou a orientação sexual, a expressa proibição da discriminação.
(63)
Onde, para além da referência ao interesse superior da criança, na linha da
Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre os direitos da criança, de 20 de Novembro de
1989, se consagra o direito à livre expressão da opinião desta, que deverá ser tomada
em consideração nos assuntos que lhe digam respeito em função da sua idade e
maturidade.
(64)
Para uma análise recente, numa perspectiva comparatística, da situação dos
direitos sociais nos sistemas jurídicos dos Estados-Membros da União, cfr. Julia
Iliopoulos-Strangas (ed.), (2000), La protection des droits sociaux fondamentaux dans
192
saúde (artigo 35.E), ao acesso a serviços de interesse económico geral
(artigo 36.E) (65), à protecção do ambiente (artigo 37.E) e à defesa dos
consumidores (artigo 38.E) que consagram um dispositivo que se não
afasta particularmente do que encontrávamos já, respectivamente, nos
artigos 152.E, 86.E, 174.E e 153.E do Tratado da Comunidade Europeia.
Ou com os direitos à informação e à consulta dos trabalhadores na empresa
(artigo 27.E), de negociação e acção colectiva (artigo 28.E), e de acesso aos
serviços de emprego (artigo 29.E), reconhecidos já nos artigos 17.E, 11 e 6.
E do Título I da Carta Comunitária dos Direitos Sociais Fundamentais dos
Trabalhadores. Da mesma forma que o disposto a propósito das condições
de trabalho justas e equitativas (artigo 31.E), da proibição do trabalho
infantil e protecção dos jovens no trabalho (artigo 32.E), da vida familiar e
profissional (artigo 33.E) e da segurança social e da assistência social
(artigo 34.E) se situa na linha do prescrito, respectivamente nos artigos 2.E,
7.E, 16.E e 12.E e 13.E da Carta Social Europeia, ainda que as novas regras
reflictam compreensivelmente os desenvolvimentos entretanto operados
nas concepções e práticas existentes. Mas salientam-se de igual modo
alguns rasgos inovadores neste plano, como a afirmação da protecção em
les Etats membres de la Convention européenne. Etude de droit comparé, Bruxelles,
Bruylant.
(65)
A problemática dos serviços de interesse económico geral ganharia especial
actualidade a partir do Tratado de Amsterdão que introduziria no Tratado da
Comunidade Europeia um novo artigo 7.E-D (hoje artigo 16.E) que, atendendo à
posição que estes serviços ocupam no conjunto dos valores da União e ao papel que
desempenham na promoção da coesão social e territorial, dispõe que, sem prejuízo dos
artigos 77.E, 90.E e 92.E (hoje artigos 73.E, 86.E e 88.E), a Comunidade e os seus
Estados-Membros, dentro dos limites das respectivas competências e dentro do âmbito
de aplicação do presente Tratado, zelarão por que esses serviços funcionem com base
em princípios e em condições que lhes permitam cumprir as suas missões. A
Conferência Intergovernamental aprovaria ainda uma Declaração a este artigo
(Declaração n.E 13) que sublinharia que as suas disposições relativas aos serviços
públicos seriam aplicadas no pleno respeito pela jurisprudência do Tribunal de Justiça,
nomeadamente no que se refere aos princípios da igualdade de tratamento, da qualidade
e da continuidade desses serviços (sobre o ponto, cfr. C.F. Molina del Pozo, (1999),
«Los servicios de interés general en el derecho comunitario: especial referencia a su
regulacíon en el Tratado de Amsterdam», in Cuadernos Europeos de Deusto, v. 21 pp.
125-160).
Mais recentemente o Conselho Europeu de Nice tomaria nota da comunicação da
Comissão sobre os serviços de interesse geral (in JOCE, C, 17, pp. 4-23) e aprovaria a
declaração adoptada pelo Conselho a este respeito, que reconhece o papel daqueles
serviços para assegurar a coesão económica e social na União Europeia no seio dos
valores comuns que fundam o modelo social europeu (sem prejuízo dos referidos
artigos 73.E, 86.E e 87.E).
193
caso de despedimento sem justa causa (artigo 30.E), ainda que o seu
conteúdo concreto seja obtido por remissão para o direito comunitário e as
legislações e práticas nacionais.
Em matéria de cidadania, o Capítulo V da Carta segue de perto a
actual parte II do Tratado da Comunidade Europeia, ao consagrar o direito
de eleger e de ser eleito nas eleições para o Parlamento Europeu (artigo
39.E), de eleger e de ser eleito nas eleições municipais (artigo 40.E), de se
dirigir ao Provedor de Justiça (artigo 43.E), de circular e permanecer
livremente no território dos Estados-Membros (artigo 45.E) e de beneficiar
de protecção diplomática e consular (artigo 46.E) ( 66). E inclui também o
(66)
Cfr., respectivamente, os artigos 19.E, n.E 2, 19.E, n.E 1, 21.E, parágrafo 2,
21.E, parágrafo 1, 18.E e 20.E do Tratado da Comunidade Europeia. E sobre a origem,
desenvolvimento e sentido da cidadania da União, instituída pelo Tratado de
Maastricht, cfr. Moura Ramos, (1999), «Maastricht e os direitos do cidadão europeu»,
in Das Comunidades à União Europeia. Estudos de Direito Comunitário, 2.a edição,
Coimbra, Coimbra Editora, pp. 323-358; Carlos Closa, (1992), «The concept of
citizenship in the Treaty of European Union», Common Market Law Review, 29 pp.
1137-1169; Robert Kovar, Denys Simon, (1993), «La citoyenneté européenne»,
Cahiers de Droit Européen, 29 pp. 285-315; Stephen Hall, (1995), Nationality,
Migration Rights and citizenship of the Union, Dordrecht, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers;
Maria Elizabete Gomes Ramos, «Breves notas sobre a cidadania da União Europeia»,
Temas de Integração, v. I (1.E semestre de 1996), pp. 63-112; Elisa Perez Vera, (1996),
«Citoyenneté de la Convention européenne: Nationalité et Condition des Étrangers»,
Recueil des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International de la Haye, t. 261, pp. 245425; Jo Shaw, (1997), «The Many Pasts and Futures of Citizenship in the European
Union», European Law Review, 22, pp. 554-572; Joseph H.H. Weiler, (1998), «To be
an European Citizen», in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Federico Mancini, v. II-Diritto
dell'Unione Europea, Milano, Giuffrè, pp. 1067-1099; Patrick Dollat, (1998), Libre
circulation des personnes et citoyenneté: enjeux et perspectives, Bruxelles, Bruylant;
Maria Dolores Blázquez Peinado, (1998), La ciudadania de la Union (Los derechos
reconocidos en los articulos 8.A a 8.D del T.C.E.) , Valencia, Tirant lo blanch; Pilar
Juarez Perez, (1998), Nacionalidad estatal y ciudadania europea, Madrid; Marcel
Pons, Marie José Garot, (1999), La Citoyenneté de la Convention européenne, Paris,
L'Harmattan; Miguel Gorjão Henriques, «Cidadania e Integração», ibidem, v. IV (2.E
semestre de 1999), pp. 65-91, (2000), La Citoyenneté européenne (sob a direcção de
Christian Philip e Panayotis Soldatos), Montreal, Chaire Jean Monnet, Université de
Montréal; e a série de estudos recolhidos na colectânea organizada por Massimo Le
Torre intitulada European Citizenship. An Institutional Challenge e citada supra, na
nota 7.
Para uma análise do desenvolvimento jurisprudencial dos preceitos que a consagram,
cfr. Helen Toner, (2000), «Judicial Interpretation of European Union Citizenship.
Transformation or Consolidation?», Maastricht Journal of Comparative Law, 2, pp.
158-182.
194
direito de acesso aos documentos (artigo 42.E) (67) que o Tratado de
Amsterdão inserira naquele mesmo Tratado, passando a contribuir o seu
artigo 255.E. Além sido, o artigo 41.E da Carta consagra o direito de todas
as pessoas a uma boa administração que, para além de abranger dois
direitos até agora já expressamente reconhecidos no Tratado da
Comunidade Europeia ( 68), se desdobra igualmente no direito de todas as
pessoas a que os seus assuntos sejam tratados pelas instituições e órgãos da
União de forma imparcial, equitativa e num prazo razoável, direito cujos
corolários haviam sido já igualmente recebidos nos próprios Tratados, no
direito derivado ou na jurisprudência dos tribunais comunitários ( 69).
O catálogo dos direitos fundamentais reconhecidos pela Carta
concluiu-se com o capítulo dedicado à Justiça onde se consagram o direito
(67)
Situando este direito num contexto mais geral, no plano da ordem jurídica
comunitária, cfr. Hans Ragnemalm, «Démocratie et transparence. Sur le droit général
d'accès des citoyens de la Convention européenne aux documents detenus par les
institutions euro péennes», in Scritti in onore di Giuseppe Federico Mancini, v. IIDirittto dell'Unione Europea, Milano, Giuffrè, (1998), pp. 809-830; Roberto Viciano
Pastor, «Publicité et accès aux documents officiels dans les institutions de la
Convention européenne avant et après le Traité d'Amsterdam», in Mélanges en
hommage à Michel Waelbroeck, v. I, Bruxelles, Bruylant, (1999), pp. 649-681; Bo
Vesterdorf, (1999), «Transparency. Not just a vague word», in 22 Fordham
International Law Journal pp. 902-929, maxime 913-924 e D.M. Curtin, (2000),
«Citizens fundamental right of acess to EU information: An evolving digital
passepartout?», 37 Common Market Law Review, pp. 7-41.
(68)
O direito à reparação, por parte da Comunidade, dos danos causados pelas
suas instituições ou pelos agentes no exercício das respectivas funções, de acordo com
os princípios gerais comuns às legislações dos Estados-Membros e o direito de se
dirigir às instituições da União numa das línguas oficiais dos Tratados, devendo obter
uma resposta na mesma língua, consagrados, respectivamente, nos actuais artigos
288.E, parágrafo 2, e 21.E, parágrafo 3, do Tratado da Comunidade Europeia.
(69)
A Carta refere expressamente, a este propósito, o direito de qualquer pessoa
ser ouvida antes de a seu respeito ser tomada qualquer medida que a afecte
desfavoravelmente (cfr., por exemplo, em matéria de concorrência, o artigo 19.E, n.E 1,
do Regulamento n.E 17/62, do Conselho, de 6 de Fevereiro de 1962, e os artigos 2 a 9
do Regulamento n.E 99/63/CEE, da Comissão, de 25 de Julho de 1963), o direito a ter
acesso aos processos que se lhe refiram, no respeito dos legítimos interesses da
confidencialidade e do segredo profissional e comercial (cfr. o artigo 287.E do Tratado
da Comunidade Europeia) e a obrigação, por parte da administração, de fundamentar as
suas decisões (cfr. o actual artigo 253.E do Tratado da Comunidade Europeia).
Em particular quanto ao direito a obter uma decisão da administração num prazo
razoável, cfr. o acórdão do Tribunal de Primeira Instância de 22 de Outubro de 1997,
SCK e FNK/Comissão, T-213/95 e T-18/96, Colectânea, p. II-1731, que o qualifica
como princípio geral de direito comunitário (ponto 56).
195
à acção e a um tribunal imparcial (artigo 47.E), a presunção de inocência e
os direitos da defesa (artigo 48.E), os princípios da legalidade e da
proporcionalidade dos delitos e das penas (artigo 49.E) e o direito a não ser
julgado ou punido penalmente mais do que uma vez pelo mesmo delito no
interior da União (artigo 50.E), em termos que, salvo quanto ao último( 70),
reproduzem praticamente o disposto nos artigo 6.E e 7.E da Convenção
Europeia.
Finalmente, a Carta inclui ainda num último capítulo (o VII) um
conjunto de disposições gerais que visam o alcance e os efeitos dos
preceitos anteriores. Assim, na primeira (artigo 51.E), e a propósito dos
destinatários das regras da Carta, sublinha-se que estes são constituídos
pelas instituições e órgãos da União, na observância do princípio da
subsidariedade, e pelos Estados-Membros, apenas quando aplicam o direito
da União( 71). A ambas estas entidades cabe assim respeitar os direitos,
observar os princípios e promover a sua aplicação, de acordo com as
respectivas competências. Fiel ao objectivo de se limitar a garantir a
transparência do sistema, o número 2 deste artigo sublinha ainda que a
Carta não cria quaisquer novas atribuições ou competências para a
(70)
O acolhimento, nos termos em que é feito, do princípio do ne bis in idem
configura no entanto uma concepção algo limitativa deste princípio uma vez que apenas
dá relevo para o efeito a um anterior julgamento no território da União. No sistema
jurídico português, por exemplo, o princípio tem um alcance mais lato, obtendo
inclusivamente consagração constitucional no artigo 29.E, n.E 5 da lei fundamental.
Cfr., já no domínio do Código Penal de 1886, Eduardo Correia (com a colaboração de
Figueiredo Dias), 1968, Direito Criminal, v. I, Coimbra, Livraria Almedina, p. 175, e,
hoje, o artigo 6.E, n.E 1 do Código Penal de 1982.
(71)
Para uma análise dos primeiros arestos jurisprudenciais neste sentido, cfr.
Joseph H. H. Weiler, (1991), «The European Court at a crossroads: Community human
rights and member State action», in Du droit international au droit de l'intégration.
Liber amicorum Pierre Pescatore, Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, pp. 821842.
Sublinhando as limitações da fórmula utilizada, em contraposição com a (mais ampla)
expressão utilizada pela jurisprudência comunitária que precisa que as exigências dos
direitos fundamentais devem ser respeitadas também quando se trate de uma
regulamentação nacional que «entre no campo de aplicação do direito comunitário»,
cfr. Sophia Koukoulis -Spiliotopoulos, «De Biarritz à Nice: le projet de Charte des
droits fondamentaux est-il bien articulé avec le droit de l'Union?», in Gazette
Européenne, n.E 25 (dimanche 29 au mardi 31 octobre 2000), pp. 18-23. E sobre o
alcance desta última fórmula, cfr. Florence Zampini, (1999), «La Cour de justice des
Communautés Européennes gardienne des droits fondamentaux ‘dans le cadre du droit
communautaire’», Revue trimestrelle de droit européen, pp. 659-707.
196
Comunidade ou para a União, não modificando também as atribuições e
competências definidas nos Tratados.
Em sede de âmbito dos direitos garantidos, o artigo 52.E dispõe
sobre a sua restrição e o seu conteúdo. Quanto ao primeiro aspecto,
prescreve o n.E 1 que ela deve ser prevista por lei e respeitar o conteúdo
essencial desses direitos e liberdades(72). Mais particularmente, precisa-se
que, na observância do princípio da proporciona lidade, essas restrições só
podem ser introduzidas se forem necessárias e corresponderem
efectivamente a objectivos de interesse geral reconhecidos pela União. ou à
necessidade de protecção dos direitos e liberdades de terceiros. Quanto ao
alcance dos direitos reconhecidos, o n.E 2 sublinha que, quando eles se
baseiam nos Tratados comunitários ou no Tratado da União Europeia, são
exercidos de acordo com as condições e limites por estes definidos ( 73),
acrescentando o n.E 3 que igual regra vale quanto aos direitos
correspondentes aos direitos garantidos pela Convenção Europeia, a não ser
que a Carta lhes confira uma protecção mais extensa ou mais ampla (74).
A propósito do nível de protecção conferido, o artigo 53.E clarifica
ainda que as disposições da Carta não podem ser interpretadas no sentido
de restringir ou lesar os direitos do Homem e as liberdades fundamentais
reconhecidos, nos respectivos âmbitos de aplicação, pelo direito da União,
o direito internacional e as convenções internacionais em que são partes a
União, a Comunidade ou todos os Estados-Membros, nomeadamente a
Convenção Europeia, bem como pelas Constituições dos EstadosMembros.
Enfim, numa disposição final (artigo 54.E) proíbe-se o abuso do
direito, esclarecendo-se que as normas da Carta não devem ser
interpretadas no sentido de exercer actividades ou praticar actos que visem
a destruição dos direitos ou liberdades por elas reconhecidos, ou restrições
maiores desses direitos e liberdades que as previstas na Carta (75).
7. Das considerações que precedem parece emergir a conclusão(76) de
que o sistema de protecção dos direitos fundamentais proclamados com a
Carta se não concebe em termos de instrumento de uma alteração
substancial da situação a este respeito vivida no seio da União. Bem pelo
contrário, e muito mais modestamente, para além de não lhe ser atribuída
(72)
Cfr., em idêntico sentido, o artigo 18.E da Constituição Portuguesa.
De algum modo se confirmando assim a natureza não inovatória da Carta,
quanto ao conteúdo do sistema de protecção dos direitos fundamentais nela contido.
(74)
Possibilidade esta que o preceito em análise expressamente reafirma.
(75)
Em idêntico sentido, cfr. o artigo 17.E da Convenção Europeia.
(76)
Sublinhada em particular nas Disposições Gerais.
(73)
197
especial força jurídica vinculante, a Carta aparenta não visar alterar de
modo algum o equilíbrio existente entre a Comunidade e a União, por um
lado, e os seus Estados-Membros (77), por outro, resultado que aliás deveria
ser atingido por alteração dos Tratados. Daí que se insista em que os
destinatários dos seus comandos são as instituições e órgãos da União, na
observância do princípio da subsidariedade (78), bem como os EstadosMembros apenas quando apliquem o direito da União( 79).
Mas se a Carta não pretende trazer nada de novo no domínio das
relações entre a Comunidade e a União e os seus Estados-Membros, ela
também não parece inovar demasiado, em sede de conteúdo dos direitos
garantidos, quando precisa, no artigo 52.E, n.E 2, que os direitos nela
reconhecidos que se baseiam nos Tratados comunitários ou no Tratado da
União são exercidos de acordo com as condições e limites por estes
definidos ( 80), e que as suas disposições não podem ser interpretadas no
sentido e restringir ou lesar o nível de protecção dos direitos fundamentais
já atingido no sistema comunitário ( 81).
(77)
Expressamente neste sentido o artigo 51.E, n.E 2, sublinha que a Carta «não
cria quaisquer novas atribuições ou competências para a Comunidade ou para a União,
nem modifica as atribuições e competências definidas nos tratados».
(78)
Sublinhado nosso.
(79)
Cfr. o que dizemos supra, na nota 71. A fórmula parece querer sublinhar que
a aprovação da Carta não envolve qualquer novo compromisso ou limitação da
competência estadual.
(80)
Uma disposição paralela acrescenta que na medida que os direitos
reconhecidos na Carta sejam correspondentes aos garantidos na Convenção Europeia o
seu sentido e âmbito são iguais aos conferidos por esta Convenção, a não ser que a
Carta garanta, o que sempre será possível, uma protecção mais extensa ou mais ampla.
A recondução do conteúdo dos direitos fundamentais que a União deve garantir ao
alcance que estes obtiveram na jurisprudência do Tribunal dos Direitos do Homem é
um dado adquirido pela jurisprudência comunitária ) cfr. por exemplo o acórdão de 28
de Março de 2000, Krombach, C-7/98 (ainda não publicado) e Moura Ramos, (2000),
«Public policy in the framework of the Brussels Convention. Remarks on two recent
decisions by the European Court of Justice», 2 Yearbook of Private International Law,
pp. 25-39 (33-39).
Atente-se porém em que o relacionamento entre a jurisprudência de Estrasburgo e a do
Luxemburgo não se faz apenas neste sentido, podendo igualmente detectar-se uma
influência da existência do direito comunitário sobre a interpretação da Convenção
Europeia. Neste sentido, cfr. já Maurice Mendelson, (1984), L'incidence du droit
communautaire sur la mise en oeuvre de la Convention européenne des droits de
l'homme, Strasbourg, Conselho da Europa, especialmente pp. 28-31.
(81)
Cfr. o artigo 53.E.
198
Confirma-se assim que a Carta corresponde ao objectivo querido
pelo Conselho Europeu de dar visibilidade ao sistema comunitário de
protecção dos direitos fundamentais, sem prejudicar o destino de questões
que até agora se encontravam em debate, como a adesão da Comunidade ou
da União à Convenção Europeia, nem dar passos significativos na senda da
definição quer de um sistema de protecção de direitos humanos a que seja
reconhecida centralidade na construção do ordenamento comunitário ( 82),
quer do conteúdo específico que àqueles direitos deva caber, tendo em
conta as suas exigências, neste sistema jurídico( 83).
Mas esta modéstia não exclui que, sem pretender embora constituir
mais do que o fruto da codificação e do desenvolvimento progressivo do
sistema preexistente, a Carta não deixe de vir a inspirar, independentemente
do seu valor jurídico, o quadro de valorações da jurisdição comunitária ( 84),
e não venha a ter igualmente um efeito de irradiação sobre os demais
mecanismos (nacionais e internacionais) de protecção dos direitos
fundamentais.
(82)
Para uma análise orientada neste sentido, cfr., por último, as contribuições
recolhidas na obra editada por Philip Alston (com Mara Bustelo e James Heenan),
(1999), The EU and Human Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press. Mas
demonstrando algum cepticismo quanto à possibilidade de transformar a problemática
dos direitos humanos na razão de ser da União, veja-se Armin von Bogdandy, (2000),
«The European Union as a Human Rights Organization? Human Rights at the core of
the European Union», Common Market Law Review, v. 37 pp. 1307-1338 e Deirdre
Curtin, «The ‘EU Human Rights Charter’ and the Union Legal Order: The ‘Banns’
before the marriage?», in Judicial Review in European Human Law (cit. supra, nota
46), pp. 303-318.
(83)
Veja-se a propósito, J.H.H. Weiler, (1999), «Fundamental rights and
fundamental boundaries: on the conflict of standards and values in the protection of
human rights in the european legal space», in The Constitution of Europe, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, pp. 102-129.
(84)
Ve ja-se neste sentido a recente invocação que dela faz o Advogado-Geral
Tizzano nas suas conclusões (de 8 de Fevereiro de 2001) (ainda não publicadas) sobre o
processo prejudicial C-173/99 [Broadcasting, Entertainment, Cinematographic and
Theatre Union (BECTU) contra Secretary of State for Trade and Industry].
A propósito do carácter fundamental do direito a férias pagas (reconhecido no
artigo 31.E, 2 da Carta) o Advogado-Geral escreve que embora desprovida, do ponto de
vista formal, de valor obrigatório autónomo, não é possível, num litígio que se refira à
natureza e ao alcance de um direito fundamental, ignorar os enunciados pertinentes da
Carta nem sobretudo a sua vocação evidente para servir, quando as suas disposições o
permitam, de parâmetro de referência substancial para todos os autores ) EstadosMembros, instituições, pessoas físicas e morais ) da cena comunitária (ponto 28)
(sublinhado nosso).
THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS :
A JUSTICE LOOKING ALSO TO FUTURE GENERATIONS
ADOLFO CERETTI
Associate Professor of Criminology, Faculty of Law, Milano-Bicocca
University, Italy; ISSD Assistant-Secretary-General
ALBERTO NOSENZO
Judge, Milan Court, Italy
«the truth must dazzle gradually ... or all the world would be blind»
Emily Dickinson
1.
The Rights of Future Generations
This work of ours sets out to make a contribution – within the sphere
of the topic chosen for this Convention, the «Rights of Future Generations»
– to the debate on International Criminal Tribunals and Truth and
Reconciliation Commissions, which are by many now singled out as being
meaningful and effective tools for the management of the periods of
transition from an author itarian regime to democratic rule a number of
countries go through ( 1).
In confronting such a sensitive issue, fraught with social, juridical
and philosophical implications, we have decided to privilege the analysis of
some theoretical traits typical of the Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions, devoting specific attention to the model of justice the
Commissions draw inspiration from, that is Restorative Justice.
In order to proceed in such a direction it proved first of all necessary
to identify the theoretical framework within which any analysis of the
Commissions must necessarily be viewed, whilst not losing sight of more
general themes such as the meaning and role of historical «truth», the
themes of forgiveness and oblivion related to the issue of amnesty, the
significance and import of the narrative structure of a collective experience.
Such theoretical considerations stem out of the specific experience of
a country, South Africa, which opted for reconciliation but a few years ago,
(1)
The debate has raged, for instance, in Argentina, Cambodia, Chad, Chile, El
Salvador, Ethiopia, in Greece after the rule of the Colonels, in Uruguay, in post-Franco
Spain, in all Eastern European countries following the fall of the communist regimes.
See: Gentili, Lollini, 2000.
202
The Truth and Reconciliation Commissions
specifically through the setting up of a Truth and Reconciliation
Commission (henceforth referred to as «TRC»).
In our opinion, the issue of «future generations» is inseparable from
that of the Commissions as such.
Of course, the work of Commissions is entirely focused on the
investigation of the past, on unveiling any violation of human rights and
any abuse perpetrated, and does not have the present as its direct object.
This undoubtedly stems from the attention – the legitimate attention – paid
to the victims of such violations. Yet this is far from being the only goal
pursued by a Commission: its attention is also addressed to the future, to
the generations following the one that has had to live through a period –
long or short that it may be – of violations and abuses.
As we will see further on, re-activating the past or memory is a task
that is directly related to the issue of the peaceful coexistence of future
generations and cannot be based on oblivion of what has been. As the
Commission's President Tutu (Tutu, 2000) has repeatedly stated, the Final
Report on the TRC's work will take its place in the historical context of
which «future generations» will try to make sense.
The questions which pose themselves forcibly and spontaneously are
the following ones: «Do future generations have any rights?». And: «What
is the social milieu in which such rights are to be respected?» These are not
merely philosophical speculations, but issues definitely bound to affect
decisions in present action.
In political philosophy said questions have found answers in the
recent debate highlighting a paradoxical difference in opinion between
those who believe rights are to be viewed within the context of a
community and that only within a community can they be guaranteed
(Communitarians), and those, the Liberals, who instead believe that, if the
issue is broached seriously, individuals' rights should be made to prevail
over the rights of the community.
In a period in which welfare had not yet shown its limitations, it was
Rawls (Rawls, 1972) among the Liberals, who insisted that it is of the
utmost importance to observe how generations are placed in time, and who
drew attention to the fact that any actual exchange between generations can
take place only in one direction: while we are in a position to do something
for the generations to come, they cannot do anything for us. That is, actual
exchanges between generations do exist, but they are virtual and always
mediated by a present which engages in self-study and self-adjusts in a
possibly binding relationship with the future. Generations, their virtual
relations and their interplay are nothing more than the world of symbols
society consists of.
203
Resta instead (Resta, 1997) calls attention to the fact that the term
generations is complex, paradoxical, inasmuch as generations cannot exist
as identitites if not in relation to a difference (other generations). Yet it was
once again Rawls, this time in his more recent Political Liberalism (Rawls,
1994), who described society as a system of cooperation (the term to be
interpreted – as we have just said – as a stable though virtual link,
functional to a common task) over time, from one generation to the next.
For the American philosopher, contractarian public ethics are to be set
against the notion of society based on the endless interplay of generations,
and he goes so far as to state that it is the way of thinking of and viewing
society that is opening up.
What is changing is the very grammar of viewing.
Without espousing Rawls' theories, Resta remarks that nowadays the
problems raised by ethics inform us about the limits of the present thus
interrupting the soliloquizing temporal dimension of techne, which may be
summarised in the expression: «we can do all we can do». This temporal
dimension is interrupted when another language – that of ethics, as already
said – transforms this soliloquy showing us that the space and time in
which our lives unfold are neither unique nor absolute and that the idea of
our fellow-beings deserves more attention. Yet, while enabling us to extend
our vision to the future, such an approach ambiguously reminds us that the
only life we can live is in the present. «As modernity draws to its end, –
Resta points out – a subtle fear impels us to adjust our view of society so as
to place indiv iduals in relation to a spatially and temporally wider notion
of our fellow-beings. The responsibilities are our own but it is future
generations we are acountable to; there being no sovereign third-party to
enjoin responsibility, responsibility mirrors itelf nakedly in the present, the
contemporary» (Resta, 1997, p. 28).
As we know, the emergence of such ideas echoes the heuristics of
fear, an issue which Jonas has brilliantly dealt with (Jonas, 1984).
He warns us that it is the anxiety created by the uncontrollable pace
of technological time that creates the need to stop and think. As already
stated, it is ethics that interrupts the soliloquy of technology and poses
questions on the «imperative of responsibility» which also invests the
social system, raising the issue of how another time, that of future
generations, relates to the present temporal horizon.
But how can one «identify» the rights of future generations?
It should be made clear from the very outset that Jonas does not base
his «imperative of responsibility» on the traditional idea of rights and
duties, the idea grounded upon reciprocity, according to which my duty is
the counterpart of another's right, which in turn is seen as the like of my
204
own right; so that once certain rights of another are established, then my
corresponding duty to respect such rights is established.
For Jonas the traditional idea of rights and duties is unsatisfactory.
Only what makes claims can have claims – what exists. Every form of life
makes a claim to life, but the nonexistent makes no claims and can
therefore suffer no violation of its rights: «The claim to existence begins
only with existence». Yet Jonas's ethic is concerned precisely with this
«not-yet-existent»: his «imperative of responsibility» is, as a matter of fact,
independent of any idea of a right and a reciprocity.
A right of the unborn to being born (of the ungenerated to
generation) is simply not arguable. We are therefore confronted with a duty
that is not the counterpart of another's right.
Jonas therefore introduces the notion of the duty toward the existence
of future mankind and the condition of future progeny, even if no
descendants of ours are among them.
The duty to care for one's children can be grounded on the factual
responsibility of having originated their existence and then, in
consequence, upon the right that pertains to these children insofar as
existing, the duty toward the existence of future mankind does not call for
the thorny task of grounding, since we need not fear the procreative drive
may come to an end. More dangers seem to threaten the future condition of
mankind. According to Jonas, the problem can be viewed in the following
terms: «since there will in any case be later men, who had no say in their
coming to exist, they will in their time have the right to accuse us who came
before them of being the originators of their misfortune – if we have spoiled
for them the world or the human constitution through careless and
avoidable deeds. Whereas for their existence they can hold responsible
only their immediate begetters (and even there have a right to complain
only if the parents’ right to progeny can be questioned on specific
grounds), for the conditions of their existence they can hold distant
ancestors or, more generally, the originators of these conditions
responsible. Thus, from the right of the anticipated being of later subjects
there issues for us today, as the causative agents, an answering duty, which
makes us responsible to them with those of our deeds whose effective range
extends into such dimensions of time, space, and depth» (Jonas, 1984, p.
41) ( 2).
(2)
All this is not sufficient in the light of Jonas's ethics. His line of reasoning
becomes, if anything, even more articulate and sounder, when he points out that
ultimately we cannot consult – foreseeing them – our successors' wishes (which can be
of our making). What we consult is what they ought to be which is not of our making
2.
205
The Phase of Transition and the Role of Truth
In the second half of the Twentieth Century, the history of a number
of countries was characterised by transition toward democracy after
decades of authoritarian, dictatorial and military rule: in Europe, after the
end of World War II and the fall of Nazism; still in Europe, but more
recently, following the collapse of the Soviet Union; in South America,
with opposition to the authoritarian regimes born of the military coups; and
finally, in South Africa, following the end of the regime of apartheid
(Goldstone, 1996, p. 485; Flores, 1999, p. 7).
The path taken by those countries that proved to be capable of
managing said transition in a peaceful way is undoubtedly a novelty and a
trait peculiar to contemporary history. Where instead the passage, the
transition of peoples has resulted in war as in former Yugoslavia or in a
number of ex-Soviet Union Republics, this was due to complex causes,
mirroring above all the controversial issues of national vindication and
ethnical identity.
The peaceful transitions, or negotiated revolutions, we have
witnessed – the South African one being extremely significant as the
country was on the brink of civil war – were as a matter of fact
characterised by their non-violent nature, by the insistence on trying to
come to a more or less official compromise between the authorities of old
times and the movements embodying the new issues.
In South Africa, in particular, the choice of a negotiated settlement
was favoured by yet another consideration: even if it had resulted in
improved living conditions for the black population, a violent clash would
have inevitably resulted in an exodus of the whites from the country. And
since it is the whites who controlled and control most economic activities, a
further consequence would have been an economic crisis it would have
taken the country decades to overcome. All this means, therefore, that
among the considerations that led to privilege a compromise, there was the
convenience of both sides.
This approach has led on a number of occasions to an overlapping of
the economic and political interests and the values and the socio-cultural
and stands above both of us. To make it impossible for our successors to be what they
ought to be is the true crime, behind which all frustration of their desires, culpable as it
may be, takes second place. This means that it is not so much over the right to
happiness of future men we must watch, but over their duty to be truly human, that is
over their capacity for this duty, a capacity which we could possibly rob them of with
the alchemy of our utopian technology. (Jonas, 1984, p. 42).
206
needs of the defeated ruling class with those of the élites representing the
new needs, but above all has entailed seeking a solution which would make
such co-existence, such overlapping possible. The political sphere was
undoubtedly the sphere in which such overlapping was less evident,
following the more or less widespread turnover in the ruling class, while
said overlapping was more marked in the economic sphere and within those
institutions (the army, the magistracy, the higher echelons of the Civil
Service) engaged in the research for a compromise and at times playing the
role of guarantors of the agreements reached (Flores, 1999).
Following a period of conflict, abuse and violation of human rights
and leading to the restoration of democracy and the turnover of the
politicians in office, negotiated revolution is a very delicate phase which
entails a period of reconstruction. The strategic and political role of this
phase (and above all of the procedures and the modes chosen to tackle the
problem) is indeed that of reconstructing, creating a new understanding of
the previous political regime in order both to legitimize the new political
system and to delegitimize the old one and its ideology, drawing a lasting
picture of past events(3) (Teitel, 2000) (Gentili, Lollini, 2000).
If on the one hand all this makes it possible to avoid further armed
conflict and the unflagging resistance to change by the old ruling class, on
the other hand it must not entail that the price to be paid for a peaceful
transition is oblivion of the past. Negotiated revolution does not imply
silence on the crimes committed (Flores, 1999).
Peaceful transitions, as a matter of fact, imply the need to rediscover
the history of the country and the irruption of individual and collective
memory in the public debate, that is the need to find out what was so long
hidden. In this process of rediscovery, a crucial role is played by the
construction of a divided or shared historical identity within the single
national realities, the single communities. Of course, the importance of the
memory of a recent past cannot be identical in countries which have
experienced violations and abuses of human rights often very different the
one from the other( 4). That is why, in pursuing this recovery of memory, in
(3)
«…by creating a realistic perspective of past human rights abuses individual
and collective cognitive recovery could be aided by allowing survivors to accept what
happened to them and deal with their resultant emotional responses. Importantly, it
could also absolve the feelings of guilt and personal causal responsibility that
survivors often experience after traumatic events» (Hamber ,1995, p. 2).
(4)
«New Democracies in Transition. Countries in transition share a number of
similarities which include: 1) a shift from totalitarianism to a form of democracy; 2) a
legacy of oppression and serious violations of human rights; 3) a fragile government
and a precarious unity; 4) a commitment to the attainment of a culture with human
207
pursuing its own «historical truth», every country embarks on a course of
its own, by means of:
a) the passing of political and moral judgements on the key
representatives of the past regime;
b) the debate on political responsibilities and on the causes of those
events which, more than others, have imprinted themselves on
collective memory;
c) indictment of those responsible for the violations;
d) the rediscovery of traditions banned under the authoritarian regime.
2.1.
Individual and Collective Truth
Mention of memory brings us back to the main central issues of
defining «historical truth», in the meaning it is invested with by the
experience of the Commissions ( 5).
When a country where a Commission has been set up sets out to
investigate its history, a dual dimension of truth emerges:
- an individual dimension, related to the experience of the individual,
which is highly «subjective» and coincides with memory,
characterised by the presence of feelings and sensitivity. In this
respect, «historical truth» is identified with the subjective perception
of facts and events by the individual victim or persecutor;
- a collective dimension, this too related to the experience of
individuals but seen within the framework of community experience,
resulting from the evidence gathered and any investigation carried
out in order to reconstruct the historical picture of the violations
committed by the past regime (Teitel, 2000; Villa -Vicencio, 2000). It
is a truth resulting from a narration involving all the community to
rights and a respect for the rule of law; 5) a determination to make it impossible for the
past violations to be repeated. Questions confronting these newly emerging
democracies include the following: 1) how do emerging democracies deal with past
violations of human rights? What measures are desirable and possible for each
country’s transition? 2) how do new democracies deal with leaders and other
individuals responsible for disappearances, death squads, psychological and physical
torture? Where should the line be drawn between those who gave the orders, and those
who carried them out? 3) how do new democracies deal with perpetrators who remain
part of the public sector, within the new government, security force or as influential
public personas? Do they pose a risk to the new democracy? Different countries make
different choices in dealing with past violations» (Boraine, 1994, p. 2).
(5)
Such considerations will prove to be particularly useful when we take a closer
look at the setting in which the work done by the TRC is carried out.
208
which the narrator belongs, so that the narrator reconstructs his/her
truth for the community listening to him/her.
But why is collective truth perceived as being so essential for the
survivors of a regime?
To begin with, because it is attributed a value per se.
After generations of denial and lies, a burning, almost obsessional
desire arises to know exactly what happened.
Victims of torture are often more insistent in asking for the truth than
in asking for justice. People who have been tortured do not necessarily and
automatically wish their past tormentors to be sentenced and imprisoned.
First and foremost they want the truth to be known (Cohen, 2001). This
mental mechanism, writes Weschler (quoted in Cohen), is a mysterious,
quasi magical mechanism, because often everybody already knows the
truth, everybody knows who the torturers were and what they did; the
torturers themselves know everybody knows and everybody knows they
know.
Why, then, this need to make such knowledge explicit?
Nagel claims that the answer is to be found in the difference between
the notion of knowledge and that of acknowledgement. One has
acknowledgement when at last knowledge is officially sanctioned and, in
the form of discourse, enters the public sphere (Nagel, 1989).
Another question is related to the sensitivity of the victims , above all
to the sensitivity of those whose family members and friends have gone
missing. Although they might have lost all hope of ever finding their loved
ones alive, there is a desperate need to know what has happened to them.
The unidentified bodies in common graves require some form of symbolic
burial. In one of his speeches, Tutu said: «I recall so vividly how at one of
our hearings a mother cried out plaintively, 'Please can't you bring back
even just a bone of my child so that I can bury him?».
Finally, in order to understand the reasons impelling this quest for
the truth, it might be very helpful to bear in mind that the TRC’s Final
Report is replete with metaphors relating to the wounds, the indelible scars
left by the past in the collective conscience. These scars often hide «still
bleeding wounds» which must be reopened to be cleansed and treated. The
collective dimension of truth contributes to the success of said operation.
2.2.
Reactivating the Past
Both individual truth and collective truth are of the utmost
importance in the experience of Commissions and testify to the twofold
goal they set themselves: on the one hand, individual truth makes it
209
possible to focus one's attention on the suffering of the victims, who are
given an opportunity to recount their experiences; on the other, collective
truth provides us with an overall picture of the violations, a description
consisting of a number of individual stories told publicly, thanks to which it
proves easier to distance onself, once the attempt to unveil «historical
truth», albeit through such an unusual procedure, has been made.
What makes the phase of transition so tricky is the fact that one
mediates between individual and collective history, between individual and
collective responsibilit y, between individual and collective truth.
The different levels of truth have different roles and functions, yet
they are all equally necessary: if historical and «judicial» investigation aim
at a reconstruction and an understanding as «objective» as possible of the
causes and consequences of and the responsibilities for the violations
committed, personal truth, heard through the accounts of the victims and
the perpetrators of the violations, apart from providing individual
acknowledgement, leads perpetrators, victims and the communities to
which they belong to take part in the shaping of a common memory and
identity, by sharing and collating individual experiences.
In such a perspective, the reactivation of a memory of a shared past
helps take the first steps towards the recognition and acceptance of the
others and respect for them (Toscano, 2000, p. 44), above all if such a
process is invested with the political purpose of highlighting and helping
identify the ties and bonds the two sides have, rather than the reasons for
division and juxtaposition.
The meaning attributed to the symbolic lieux of this reconstruction of
individual and collective truth is that of creating a moment of transition
from looking back to looking forward: «the revealed truth brings on the
switch from the tragic past to the promise of a hopeful future» (Teitel,
2000); reactivating the past means – in this perspective – also indicating the
possibility for political and social change:
a) by helping to attribute individual responsibilities, thus avoiding the
imposition of collective responsibilities on groups of an ethnic or
religious or other nature. This way, on the one hand one limits the
risk that hatred and lust for revenge might have repercussions on a
group as a whole, on the other one seeks to ascertain individual
responsibilities. This, of course, does not mean playing down any
collective or institutional political and historical responsibilities nor
does it mean the acceptance of «exemplary» trials against
individuals. Indeed, reconstructing the nature and extent of the
crimes makes it possible to unveil systematic and institutional
patterns of gross violation of human rights or the involvement or
210
acquiescence of large social, political or cultural groups; this kind of
truth-seeking can help identify and demolish the mechanisms, the
patterns of behaviour and the institutions responsible for the
prolonging of the violations (Goldstone, 1996, p. 488; Calzini,
2000);
b) by reconstructing and revealing what happened. This comes to
constitute a form of official and public recognition for the victims,
which certainly represents a first step towards reparation and
reconciliation;
c) finally, by offering an opening to the issue of forgiveness – an issue
which we will discuss further on, but which it is necessary to
examine when having to decide if it is best to reactivate memory or
allow oblivion to prevail. In reality, the two paths, memory and
oblivion of «historical truth», are not necessarily antithetical; the
issue can instead be dealt with differently by considering, side by
side with «historical truth», the possible effects of the revelation and
transmission of a «narrative» truth, which has a lot to do with storytelling. On examining the issue from this point of view, Bettini
(Bettini, 2000) considers the two alternatives of oblivion of the past
and recollection as both essential for the shaping of a memory, which
is also a «unifying» collective identity. In such a perspective,
memory privileges the transmission of «what unites» and decides to
set aside «what has divided»; a choice, this, which favours a
collective identity based on recognition of the fact that all the parties
involved have a common history. It has been said by many, and first
and foremost by the TRC promoters, that what is at stake here is the
production of a new collective identity, through the reconstruction of
a common memory and a shared vision of the past. Though not
wishing to deal with the complex issue of identity( 6), we believe that
(6)
As for the complex and controversial issue of a collective group identity, we
shall here provide but a brief outline of the theoretical and philosophical framework
within which the Commissions are to be viewed. We shall therefore simply report a few
interesting remarks: «Psychology, sociology and history agree in defining identity as an
inalienable requirement not only for individual psychological well-being, but for social
cohesion and joint action. Yet, in the course of the last decade of the twentieth-century,
we witnessed hideous atrocities perpetrated and justified on the grounds of an
unconditional and violent affirmation of a group identity: from genocide in Rwanda to
ethnic cleansing in former Yugoslavia. But what should we then make – both from the
political and the ethical point of view – of the issue of identity? the «nationalists» have
recourse to the semantical trick of distinguishing between «patriotism» (their own) and
«nationalism» (that of the others). Just as schematic is the reply of the
211
the interweaving of narratives and hearings, of explicit recollections
and oblivion, rather than the birth of a collective identity constitutes
– though less ambitiously – an opportunity for the healing of the
statement-givers, making it possible to add details to the truth to be
shared and to start building pathways to mutual recognition and
reconciliation, by attaching importance to individual experiences (7).
3.
Judicial Truth and Historical Truth
Emphasizing the individual and collective dimension of truth
cannot excuse us from analysing, albeit briefly, also other notions of
truth, undoubtedly more deeply rooted in our heritage and which we have
recently mentioned: judicial truth and historical truth.
When analysing the latter concepts – as we will clearly see further
on – we are far removed from the notions of truth (individual-narrative,
collective-social and restorative) elaborated by the Commissions (8).
Nevertheless, we must briefly examine them if we are:
a) to reason on the choices made by the other model, that of «victors'
justice» which we will deal with, though not at length; ( 9)
b) to understand, through juxtaposition, the deeper meaning of the
work carried out by the Commissions.
3.1.
Historical Truth
That history, law and trials are strictly interrelated is a known fact.
In such a context the notion of «historical truth» takes on a
meaning – let us reaffirm it clearly, though we run the risk of seeming to
«cosmopolitans», of those who hold that belonging to a common mankind allows for no
distinctions or specific identities, which are viewed as being both artificial and
conflictual… Let us therefore start by saying that at the root of any group identity there
is a cultural artefact, an intellectual construction elaborated by élites defined as
«professional producers of subjective visions of the social world»… Failing all
objective and verifiable support to the definition of group identities, one has recourse
to what has been called «the invention of tradition», to the creation of «imaginary
communities», to the elaboration of a «founding myth». Thus we go from speculations
about the hypothetical nature of group identity to actual political construction»,
Toscano (2000), pp. 22-24.
(7)
See infra § 5.2.
(8)
See infra § 5.2.
(9)
See infra § 4.1.
212
be pedantic – altogether different from that attributed to it by the
experience of the Commissions (10).
As Ricoeur points out (Ricoeur, 2000), the specific roles of the
historian and of the judge impose on both the need to confront themselves
with the issues of truth and justice, with regard to which they undertake,
as it were, to be impartial, given the role of «third party» taken on (and
attributed to them) in the social consortium ( 11).
It is Ginzburg, in an epoch-making essay, Il giudice e lo storico
(The judge and the historian, Ginzburg, 1991), who reminds us that after a
series of changes late Nineteenth-Century political historiograhy took on
– or, rather, claimed it was taking on – a judiciary physiognomy.
Carefully assessing evidence, witnesses' accounts and documents meant
(10)
See supra § 2.1 and infra § 5.2.
It is understood that such third-partiness is not "absolute", but is constantly
redefined within the mobile confines traced from the outside by the level of critical
attention devoted by a given social system to the themes of truth and justice .
Ricoeur (Ricoeur, 2000) reminds us that an important consideration on
impartiality as a moral intellectual virtue common to anyone aspiring to the function
of "third party" has been offered by Nagel, (Nagel, Italian translation, 1993, p. 23)
where he affirms that the most conspicuous part of our experience of the world and of
our wishes belongs to our individual points of view: it is from such individual points
of view, as it were, that we see things. Nonetheless we are capable of thinking of the
world also detaching ourselves from the specific position we occupy in it and even
from the kind of people we are. It is also possible to detach onself from the
contingences of the self in a far more radical manner (...). Each of us embarks on
reflection starting from a complex of worries, wishes and interests and each of us is
capable of recognising what is also true for the others. We can therefore detach
ourselves from the thought of the specific position we occupy in the world and think
simply about all those people, without distinguishing as self what we happen to be.
Like Nagel and Ricoeur we define as impersonal this point of view, which is a
sort of non-point of view. It is both epistemological and moral and could be defined
in this respect as an «intellectual virtue». The epistemological aspect is related to the
split within the point of view, while the moral one concerns the implicit affirmation
of the equal value and dignity of points of view. As Nagel says, at first the basic
intuition emerging from the impersonal point of view is that everybody's life is
important and that nobody is more important than the others. He also claims that we
should live as if we were actually guided by a kind-hearted impartial onlooker from a
world in which we are nothing more than an individual among billions of other
individuals. (Nagel, Italian translation, 1993, p. 25).
The question spontaneously arising and which – of course – we leave open also
after the pages that follow is: "To what extent do the historian and the judge meet this
need for impartiality inscribed in their professional codes of conduct and what role do
social and political forces play in such a context?".
(11)
213
for the historian of that day and age (12) focussing on the events (be they
political, military, etc.) which could be taken to result from the actions of
one or more individuals; in doing so, the historian stood above disputes,
not viewing as relevant all those phenomena that did not call for
explanation (for example the history of social groups, of outlook, etc.).
In the following years, the massive cultural impact on experts in the
field exerted by the review Annales d’histoire économique et sociale,
founded in 1929 by Bloch and Febvre, and the ensuing loss of interest in
the histoire événementielle, led those who were confronted with the
dilemma if the historian was to judge or understand, to opt for the second
alternative, thus renouncing any attempt to interpret the State's superior
reasons.
Nowadays, according to Ginzburg, further enriching the range of
existing explanations, there is a growing intolerance by historians towards
the notion of «evidence», a term which – instead – used to justify the
analogy between the work of the historian and that of the judge. For many
a historian such a notion is outmoded (like that of truth), while far more
credit is given, also overseas, to the notion of representation( 13).
But doesn't setting aside the notions of truth and evidence
eventually produce a sad brand of skepticism? Ginzburg's opinion is in
this respect categorical: the notions of truth and evidence are essential
elements of the historian's trade, as also evinced from the fact that the
historian is entitled to raise doubts also where a judge would enter a
nonsuit. Paradoxically, it is this difference that brings out the element
common to the trades of judge and historian: the use of evidence, that is.
In any case, if it not possible here to deal with the issue, if not
through a few occasional cultural references, likewise we can do nothing
more when turning our attention to another highly controversial issue:
that of judicial truth.
(12)
Ginzburg quotes as ad hoc example the address given by Lord Acton in 1895
on the occasion of his appointment as Regius Professor of Modern History at
Cambridge University.
(13)
When one speaks of representations the sources (be they in writing or
figurative) – as Ginzburg explains – are analysed inasmuch as sources relating to
themselves (how they were constructed), inasmuch as evidence of social
representations and not as sources for what they discuss (Ginzburg, 1991, p. 12).
214
3.2.
Judicial truth
On the theme of judicial truth, Ferrajoli (Ferrajoli, 1989) ( 14) has
written pages we cannot overlook.
What a criminal judge ascertains and declares to be «true» – unlike
the truth ascertained and declared by the Commissions – is related to the
analysis of the meaning of the predicate «true» associated with the
propositions motivating a judicial ruling. «If on a theoretical level one may
admit that ‘truth is in the facts’ – writes Ubertis, one of the most important
Italian experts on these matters – in trials, where truth -seeking is
irrenounceable (…), one cannot do anything more than ascertain ‘the truth
of a proposition’: what has to be verified, therefore, is not a ‘fact’ but a
‘statement’» (Ubertis, 1993, p. 58) ( 15).
Let us take as a starting point a proposition such as: «So-and-so has
(or has not) committed the fact denoted by law as an offence»; Ferrajoli
specifies that such a proposition can itself be broken down into two
propositions: one factual or de facto (the truth of which can be ascertained
by proving the fact took place), the other judicial or legal (the truth of
which is judicial, in as much as it can be ascertained by means of the
interpretation of the meaning of the legal provisions classifying the event
as an offence) (Ferrajoli, 1989, p. 21).
Such interpretation:
a) offers the advantage of partially re-defining the intuitive notion of
truth as «correspondence» (that is, the notion enclosed in the
Enlightment ideal viewing jurisdiction as mere «verification of the
event» and «mouthpiece of the law»), establishing that the term
«true» can be employed without any metaphysical implications;
asserts that the term «true» designates here only conformity or
difformity from jurisdictional propositions ( 16);
b) defines judicial truth not as «absolute», «objective» but «relative»,
«approximate» in relation to the principle of «perfect
(14)
See above all the chapter titled Cognitivismo o decisionismo (Cognitivism or
Decision-making), pp. 5-45.
(15)
UBERTIS instead quotes FRANCESCO CARRARA, Programma del corso di
diritto criminale (Syllabus of the criminal law course). Parte generale , III, Prato,
1886, § 900, p. 201.
(16)
«Both the conditions for the use of the term ‘true’ and the conditions
required to assert that a judicial hypothesis is true are not independent of the way in
which the legal system with reference to which judicial truth can be proclaimed is
formed» (FERRAJOLI, 1989, p. 24).
215
correspondence», which becomes a «regulatory principle» or an
«extreme model» in jurisdiction.
It is in this interplay of reasons, that makes of judicial truth an
«approximate» truth that we can trace, in Ferrajoli's ideas, some
interesting analogies and differences between the work of the judge and
that of the historian, above all because judicial truth cannot be affirmed,
like historical truth, on the grounds of direct observation. As a matter of
fact:
a) «Factual judicial truth is a peculiar form of «historical truth»,
related to propositions relating to past events, and as such not
directly accessible to experience…» (Ferrajoli, 1989, p. 24);
b) juridical judicial truth is instead a truth we might term classifying,
inasmuch as it qualifies accepted historical facts on the grounds of
the categories supplied by legal jargon and processed through the
interpretation of legal language.
Given these premises, if we confront the stritctly interrelated issues
of verifications and verificability of the judicial propositions drawn up by
the judge, we will notice they are strictly related to the issues the historian
must deal with:
a) the truth of factual verifications can be enounced only on the
grounds of the «effects» produced, that is on the «signs of
pastness» traced in the present in relation to past events. Like the
historian, then, the judge cannot examine the fact, which eludes the
direct observation of the one as of the other, but only evidence of
the fact, which with Ubertis we define as «that mechanism, that
complex of elements and activities having the function of
consenting the ascertainment of the truthfulness or untruthfulness
of one of the factual enunciations integrating the thema
probandum» (Ubertis, 1979, pp. 89-90). It follows that both
«factual judicial truth» and «historical truth» «result from an
inference of the proven facts of the past from the probatory facts of
the present … the premise including a description of the event to be
explained and of the evidence provided and… in its conclusion the
enunciation of the event which ones assumes has been proved by
the premises and which equates to a possible explanation of said
events» (Ferrajoli, 1989, p. 26) ( 17);
(17)
«The task of judicial enquiry is to eliminate dilemma in favour of the
simpler hypothesis, the one endowed with more explicatory powers and, above all,
compatible with most of the evidence and knowledge previously acquired.» (Ferrajoli,
1989, p. 24).
216
b) judicial verification is also the result of an inference: here too there
is no direct observation of the events but a reasoning – termed
«subsumption» – consisting in a classifying procedure based on
deduction( 18).
Moreover, just as the historian is necessarily selective in his
construction, inevitably swayed by historiographical interests, points of
view and interpretative hypotheses, the subjectivity of the judge also
massively impacts on the judicial enquiry( 19), which is all the more serious
because while historiography is capable of self-correction, for the judge a
judicial mistake is never fecund.
In some respects, therefore, there seems to be an overlapping of the
figures of the judge and of the historian. It should be added, however –
and Ferrajoli would certainly agree with us – that such overlapping is to
be viewed with mistrust and perplexity: as a matter of fact, it is already on
the «… level of the language that the historian must be careful not to
reduce himself to the kind of language a judge uses, nor must he use the
same concepts, methods or, even worse, set himself the same goals»
(Flores, 2000).
Let us consider by way of example that, following Pinochet's return
to Chile, Antonio Cassese, formerly Chairman of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Jugoslavia, recommended that, so that
the past should not be forgotten, a criminal trial be started, in the course
of which historical facts could be gathered and viewed through rigorous
examination and evaluation procedures. This is, as a matter of fact, a
statement which might be derived from the delusion of establishing
together both «judicial truth» and «historical truth», or of the fallacy that
the two truths may be exchangeable. Instead, unlike justice, history
cannot boast any «official vestals» capable of coming up with a fitting
close (judicial truth) to the events under examination; history is
necessarily the subject of verification and revision, and its canons are
more ambiguous than those of criminal justice (Flores, 2000).
Such ideas have been successfully dealt with by Ricoeur (Ricoeur,
2000), who calls attention to the fact that what creates a marked
difference between the judicial approach and the historiographical one –
especially when it is the same facts that are being «judged» – is above all
(18)
It must, however, be clarified that subsumption is only distinguished from
the ascertainment of fact from a logical and practical point of view, while the rule of
the law transcendentally influences the judges' operational language and also his
approach to the facts to be judged.
(19)
See retro § 3.1, and footnote No. 11.
217
the ruling , inasmuch as the event upon which judgement has been passed
with an irrevocable ruling can only be challenged by public opinion, but
cannot become the subject of a new impugnation, save for review, which
Garapon, however, rightly termed «a single -shot weapon». That is: non
bis in idem.
In other words, the judge must reach a conclusion, he cannot deny
justice: he «must» decide in order to avoid that others should decide, by
having recourse to other codes. The law states that his decisions «have to
be», and once the communication network has been activated – for the
most diverse reasons – in its communicative mechanism, the same law
states which la nguages shall be relevant. It is Resta who reminds us:
(Resta, 1996, p. 301): «One cannot decide by having recourse to other
codes because the law explicitly lays it down that one cannot decide by
having recourse to other codes: say the ethical or economic code... which
does not mean that all these codes are not relevant, indeed they always
are, but only under the conditions to which the law recognizes
relevance».
The judge, therefore, must conclude, he/she must re-establish a
correct distance between the defendant and the victim, by relying on a
basically binary logic: the defendant is either guilty or is not guilty.
The historian cannot carry out such functions nor does he wish to
do so. If he falls prey to the temptation to take on the role of «historical
judge» – Ricoeur points out (Ricoeur, 2000) – the price he will have to
pay will be that of acknowledging he has expressed a partial, militant
view. But apart from this specific instance, it is the opening itself to the
possibility of revisitation by the scientific community of historians that
marks the difference between historical evaluation – as such always
temporary – and a final judicial sentence.
A further specific difference between historical and judicial enquiry
is that the latter extends to include new sources of evidence
(interrogations, witness accounts, confrontation, experts' opinions). As
Ferrajoli bluntly puts it: «A trial is, as it were, the only instance of
‘historiographical experimentation’: in a trial sources are made to
intervene de vivo, not only because they are acquired directly, but also
because they are confronted the one with the other, undergo crossexamination and are made to reproduce, as in psychodrama, the events
being judged» (Ferrajoli, 1989, p. 32).
All this goes to prove that in trials – unlike what happens in
historical investigation – the final decision derives from the active
working of the dialectics engaged in by the parties, and not only from the
acknowledgement of external reality. The fairness of the sentence stems
218
above all from the work done to reach such a decision, so much so that
any elements gathered violating the rules disciplining cross-examination
cannot contribute to the shaping of the judge's ruling, consisting as they
do of limitations of the right to defend oneself and ways of eluding rules
meant to protect defendants' rights (Ubertis, 1993). Any evidence
gathered violating said principles cannot be used.
Such limitations do not bother the historian.
4.
The International Experience of Countries in Transition
The above considerations on subjective-individual-narrative «truth»
and on collective-social-community «truth» represent the theoretical
premises to understand the reasons for that kind of agreement we have
already designated with the term negotiated revolution, a mechanism
privileging different objectives from the classical one of the punishment
of the perpetrators («victors' justice» ( 20)) as it privileges the search for
«judicial truth.»
Anyway, the problem common to all the countries engaged in the
transition towards democracy following a period of repression and human
rights violations is that of deciding how to deal with their past and by
which institutional means (Garrett, 2000): one the one hand, the problem
is that of how to relate to the old ruling class responsible for terrible
abuses; on the other, the perplexities concern the victims of said
violations.
At present, the possible tools to which one may have recourse in
order to reconstruct truth (both collective and individual) and promote the
re-activation of memory are therefore multifold, just like those one may
have recourse to when assigning responsibility. From the politicaldiplomatic point of view one uses the symbolic term of post-conflict
peace building to refer to all the tools aimed at the reconstruction of a
social fabric making for mutual understanding and for co-existence after
periods of strife and violence (Toscano, 2000, p. 43).
Juxtaposed to the model created in Latin America after the end of
the military dictatorships and in South Africa (Truth Commissions; see
Schey, 1997, p. 332) there is the Nuremberg model (Taylor, Italian
(20)
«Victors' justice», which we will deal with more at length in § 4.1, can coexist with «negotiated revolution», provided application of said mechanism alongside
the judicial is foreseen. Let us take, by way of an example, the South African
experience.
219
translation, 1993) – historically older and defined as «victors' justice»;
there is also that opted for by Central and Eastern Europe following the
fall of communist regimes (Lustration Mechanism( 21)), and a further
model was chosen to deal with the crimes committed during the conflict
in former Yugoslavia (International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia).
Given the variety of possible options, the path taken by the Truth
and Reconciliation Commissions differs from that taken by the Criminal
National and International Tribunals.
It must be added that, apart from the historical and political reasons
for the negotiations conducted in the single countries and apart from the
objections and perplexities a solution of compromise can often arouse, (22)
by now it is being insistently asked that international codifications should
foresee, in the perspective of Restorative Justice, mechanisms other than
international criminal trials. More specifically, it is being asked that
enquiry Commissions, both national and non-national, be set up, that the
perpetrators be removed from office, that the victims receive reparation and
that counselling be provided for them (Bassiouni, 2000).
But before discussing these new experiences more at length, we wish
to recall, even if not in detail, the principles on which «victors' justice» is
based, which basically calls for judicial truth-seeking.
(21)
See infra § 4.2.
On the other hand, a critical reading has been given for the viable models in
periods of transition (Commissions and International Criminal Tribunals) setting
against the incredibly high number of victims caused by conflicts of a non-international
nature (internal conflicts and dictatorial regimes provoked in the past century 170
million victims – 86 million of which after World War II –, while over the same period
the number of victims of armed conflict between nations was of thirty-three million;
see the research figures reported in Bassiouni, 2000, p. 17) the number of
acknowledgements of responsibility, which is too low even to be termed symbolic. But
then: «the question arises as to why there have been so few instances of prosecution
and other accountability mechanisms» (Bassiouni, 2000, 18; Bassiouni, 1996). The
reason for this is to be found in the research for compromise typical of negotiated
revolutions: «The answer is that justice is all too frequently bartered away for political
settlements. Whether in international, non-international or purely internal conflicts, the
practice of impunity has become the political price paid to secure an end to the
violence of ongoing conflicts, or as a means to ensure tyrannical regime changes. In
these bartered settlements, the victims’ rights become the objects of political trade-off,
and justice becomes the victim of Realpolitik… in order to obtain peace, negotiations
must be held with the very leaders who frequently are the ones who committed,
ordered, or allowed atrocious crimes to be committed. Thus, the choice presented to
negotiators is whether to have peace or justice» (Bassiouni, 2000, p. 18).
(22)
220
4.1.
The Judicial Path: Criminal National and International
Tribunals
The model of the Criminal National and International Tribunals has
its historical and cultural roots in the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, which in
turn look back to the trials celebrated after World War I.
In the Nuremberg trial, the punishment of Nazi criminals was made
possible thanks to the application of «victors' justice», a formula used to
refer to the most critical aspect of this model, that is to the fact that the
Military International Tribunals judged exclusively the crimes and the
violations committed by the higher echelons of the Nazi hierarchy, and not,
instead, the crimes committed by the allies. Suffice it here to recall but an
example: at Nuremberg, the act of indictment did not contemplate the
German bombings with the V1s and the V2s simply because in 1942 the
allies themselves had decided to raze to the ground the German towns,
regardless of their strategic importance in the military field (see AlfredMaurice de Zayas, Italian translation, 1996, p. 112). Although the Court
(whose Statutes, enclosed to the London agreement, contained the most
important legal provisions) was set up as an International Court, as a matter
of fact it might be better defined as an Inter-allies Occupation Tribunal, as
Germany had not accepted the creation of a supranational body. The
Tribunal was an institution based on an agreement against a third party.
And as a matter of fact, the Nazi defence-lawyers raised as a first objection,
then overruled by the Court, that of its incompetence through lack of
jurisdiction (Alfred-Maurice de Zayas, Italian translation, 1996).
All this reminds us of what is now happening before the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, where, upon the opening of
the trial for genocide and human rights violation against Slobodan
Milosevic, former President of the Yugoslav Republic, Milosevic
challenged the legitimacy of the institution of an ad hoc Tribunal with
arguments partially re-echoing those used in Nuremberg, which goes to
prove that to this day a number of knots remain to be untied – though the
issue was partially dealt with in Rome in 1998, with the approval of the
Statutes of the International Criminal Court (Balboni, 2000).
It is also true, however, that the Nuremberg model, whilst
embodying «victors' justice», also helped provide a definition of the
category of international crimes. If we have now created an International
Criminal Court (although ratification of the agreements is likely to take
quite long), it is because an international consensus has been reached as to
what is meant by international crime and people at large have been
221
sensitized to the problem (Calzini, 2000), which is a long-term effect of
Nuremberg.
In other words, what was then held to be extraordinary is now
viewed as «normal» (Teitel, 2000).
Also the positive experiences of the ad hoc International Criminal
Courts partially find their origins in the paradigm of «victors' justice».
Apart from the above-mentioned institutional subjects, who have to a
greater or lesser extent been legitimated by that experience, also the legal
classification of crimes adopted in Nuremberg – crimes against peace, war
crimes and crimes against humanity( 23) (see Alfred-Maurice de Zayas,
Italian translation, 1996) – helped international lawyers start to think about
and work on the issue, thus leading to the approval of a number of UN
conventions.
If the Nuremberg experience proved to be decisive in developing
modern sensitivity to the issue of international criminal responsibility, it is
also true that «victors' justice», fifty years after its most complete historical
manifestation has – inevitably – come in for a lot of criticism.
If one temporarily overlooks their symbolic significance and their
capacity to embody a desire for punishment or retaliation, the choice of a
judicial trial, the desire to seek a judicial truth( 24), – the application of the
principle of «victor's justice» –, have left a number of unresolved issues. As
a matter of fact,:
- the number of perpetrators found guilty has been so low as to prove
meaningless in spite of the legal provisions and political intentions
which often had as their avowed aim that of bringing to justice large
groups of people; ( 25)
(23)
Crimes against peace: the planning, preparation, waging of a war of
aggression or of a war declared in violation of international agreements, treaties or
warranties, or participation in a joint project or plot with a view to carrying out any of
the above listed acts. Crimes against war: violation of war laws or customs. Crimes
against humanity: murder, extermination, subjection, deportation or other inhuman
acts, committed against civilians before or during a war, persecution on political, racial
or religious grounds indulged in while committing one of the offences or in relation to
one of the offences over which the Court has jurisdiction.
(24)
See retro § 3.2
(25)
On the other hand, « it would be naive to expect proceedings instituted by the
winners to be characterised by some form of legal fundamentalism, of extreme
widespread coherence in prosecuting all the people against whom large amounts of
evidence have been amassed. Even the staunchest supporters of drastic purges and non
ordinary judicial proceedings engaged in with the utmost efficacy could not eacape the
political imperative to establish limits to prevent the legal proceedings becoming
counterproductive and dangerous for the stability of the new democratic institutions...
222
- the victims have received no recognition and, indeed, have publicly
declared they felt excluded from the procedures of reconstruction
following the violations suffered;
- the persecutors, instead, have often felt unjustly indicted for facts
they had often committed in complicity with large segments of the
communities they belonged to;
- the community has been apparently pacified but a number of
divisions and misunderstandings deriving from the absence of a
process of reconstruction and the shaping of a common identity
through the seeking of a shared «historical truth» persist – divisions
which have periodically surfaced as resentment and lust for revenge
(Llewellyn-Howse, 1999, p. 358; Flores, 1999).
Anyway, everytime the judicial approach and «victors' justice» are
taken to be viable solutions, they will inevitably place at the very heart of
the public debate the persecutors and their judges (Joinet, 1997), whilst at
the same time denying room for the victims' deeper needs, such as the right
to actively contribute to the reconstruction of the historical-collective
dimension of truth, the right to reparation.
The considerations made for the International Criminal Courts also
apply to the choice of opting for the judicial approach with the celebration
of domestic criminal trials; indeed, in such an instance, the doubts as to the
advisability for countries in transition to embark on such a path are even
greater.
Apart from the unsettled issues listed above, the fact that the task of
restoring justice is delegated in such cases to that same magistracy who
administred justice in the years of the dictatorship is a factor which –
coupled with the lengthy proceedings and the difficulty of dealing with the
high number of complaints filed – contributes greatly to frustrating and
dashing the high hopes set on «victor’s'' justice».
Such perplexity, after fifty years, is still felt in Italy when one
considers the period immediately following the end of World War II,
characterized by the institution of an incredibly high number of judicial
proceedings against Fascist regime representatives. Historical records prove
that, following the impressive number of complaints filed as soon as the
According to the law, the number of potential culprits has always been far larger than
the number of defendants actually standing for trial. Whether this was due to inability
in conducting inestigations, an arbitrary or a political choice is, all things considered,
of little relevance and everywhere victims have protested against the impossibility to
prosecute the culprits ... while the persecutors have declared themselves to be they too
victims of excessive and prolonged persecution» (Flores, 1999, p. 23).
223
hostilities came to an end, the early proceedings embarked upon led to very
severe sentences, but that sentences grew milder and milder, eventually
leading to a deluge of acquittals and anulments following the June 1946
amnesty – the result, from the judicial point of view, of the tendency to
acquit inaugurated by the Court of Cassation ( 26).
Given the nature of our work, we are not in a position to discuss
Italian history following the fall of Fascism in detail; what can be said is
that the harsh criticism levelled already at the time at the judicial approach
which was adopted in the transitional phase still holds true (Crainz, 2000).
Failure to reactivate memory at that given time in history mirrors itself in a
debate still raging in which the failure to understand a number of episodes
of violence of the day is still sadly felt ( 27).
4.2.
National Lustration Mechanisms and Civil Remedies
Before going on to discuss the Commission model, we would like to
briefly consider two other tools: the Lustration Mechanisms and Civil
Remedies.
Lustration Mechanisms are part of a purging process, adopted above
all in the former communist countries, whereby individuals who supported
or participated in violations committed by a prior regime may be removed
from the position still occupied and barred from positions of authority or
elective positions. These are political sanctions of which it has been said
they risk affecting whole classes or groups of people without accounting
for individual responsibilities (Ellis, 1996; Bassiouni, 2000; Boraine,
1994). Such measures were not taken into account in the TRC experience.
(26)
Of the hundreds of death sentences meted out about ninety were carried out,
while about 770 were carried out in France over the same period (Crainz, 2000).
(27)
An interesting reconstruction of the different phases of this debate identifies
three particularly interesting moments: «a) The first critical su mming-up belongs to the
immediate post-war period and came even before the formal conclusion of the legal
proceedings (…) b) The second moment of interest coincided with the thirtieth
anniversary of the liberation (…) c) Finally a third wave of interest was recorded in
the nineties (…) in a perspective which we might term «global», including, that is, both
the actions directly ascribable to the parties involved and those decided on the grounds
of contradictory laws and therefore born of the workings both of administrative purges
and criminal justice(…) Looking back on those years, one now tends to privilege the
single episode, the event, and around it to elaborate an account centering on the
human beings involved and on the uncertain watershed the memory is always
confronted with on the occasion of an act of violence between truth and justice, guilt
and innocence, the accuser and the accused, lust for revenge and legal codes» (Salvati,
2001, pp. 141-142).
224
The option of civil suits includes, instead, the right of victims and of
their heirs to start a lawsuit to obtain protection, including economic
damages, as the result of an individual or group claim.
4.3.
The paradigm inspiring traditional criminal proceedings stands in
juxtaposition to that of the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, ( 28)
viewed not necessarily as an alternative to, but possibly as a way of
integrating the former.
To begin with, Commissions may occasionally not be aimed at the
twofold purpose of Truth and Reconciliation; at times indeed they are only
Truth Commissions, when they resemble more closely traditional enquiry
commissions than the kind of commission we are about to discuss, that is
Commissions also foreseeing reconciliation among their goals. Such a goal
obviously impacts on the activity of the Commission, starting from the
planning of the work to be done to the way victim hearings are conducted,
from the response to persecutors to the drawing up of a final report.
As a rule, Commissions symbolically represent «bridges» between
the past and the future and are perceived by the collectivity at large as tools
capable of helping us interpret the changes taking place and of representing
a turning-point and a fresh start as compared to the previous power
structure (Goldstone, 1996, p. 493). As regards the way of interpreting the
transitional phase, it is still necessary to remember that, even if the hope
expressed when a Commission is set up is that it may reduce the likelihood
of such atrocities and abuses being repeated, the Commission's work will
impact only indirectly on future political choices, investigation centering
instead on past violations. Yet a new political line-up may view the work
done as a meaningful and, in a certain sense, community-shared startingpoint to promote policies more attentive to and more respectful of human
rights (Hainer, 1994, p.608; Hamber, 1995).
The work of a Commission can, however, even more directly
contribute to reducing the risk of new abuses if among the tasks it is
attributed there is also that of submitting recommendations and proposals
for reform to the new institutions, or of identifying support measures for
the victims who have testified (Hayner, 1994, p. 609). The final reports of
some Commissions, for example, (and among them the TRC's Final
Report) included recommendations of this kind and raised issues such as:
- the consolidation of new democratic institutions;
(28)
See list of Truth Commissions sub Schedule 1.
225
- the reform of military apparatuses;
- the reform of police apparatuses and of the legal system;
- the introduction of measures for the promotion of national
reconciliation; the introduction of reparation measures for the victims
of violations and abuses.
It is however true that often such recommendations are not foreseen
as binding for the new institutions.
The Truth and Reconciliation Commissions are, therefore,
technically speaking, institutions created to investigate a past of human
rights violations at the international, national or regional level.
Although each Commission presents peculiar traits, all of them are
born from the dynamics of transition here above described and generally
set themselves similar objectives:
- reparation for the victims;
- the reconstruction of the historical-collective dimension of the
violations;
- community involvement in a reconciliation project;
- the involvement of the authors of the violations in a project of
disclosure and awareness of their individual responsibilities (Allen,
1999, p. 315).
As affirmed by Archbishop Desmond Tutu when speaking of the
TRC, the issue of restoration takes on a central function in the experience
of the Commissions which is inspired to Restorative Justice in relation to
which the interests and needs both of the perpetrators and the victims
become the central and main consideration (Gentili, Lollini, 2000). Unlike
«victors' justice», Restorative Justice promotes reintegration into society of
the perpetrators, posing this requirement on the same level of importance as
the healing of victims through recognition of their suffering.
It is not possible here to examine at length the issues co-occuring in
Restorative Justice (Ceretti, Mannozzi, 2000), a term employed to describe
a phenomenon which is very wide in scope and with a content which is
multidirectional. Zher, in fact, defines Restorative Justice as a model of
justice which «involves the victim, the offender and the community in a
search for solutions which promote repair, reconciliation and reassurance»
(Zehr, 1990, p. 181). Similarly, Wright sees it as avoiding that one ill be
added to another (suffering the imposition of the punishment added to the
suffering caused by the offence), in order to devote every possible effort to
the real protection of the victims through a process of reparation (Wright,
1991, p. 112). The most commonly accepted definition of Restorative
Justice is the one proposed by Marshall: «Restorative Justice is a process
whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offence come together
226
to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offence and its
implications for the future» (Marshall, 1999, p. 7).
4.3.1.
The Commission's constituting elements
In spite of the wide range of possible options – after all they are
institutions influenced both by the historical and political climate in which
they are set up and by the groups which in the transition phase manage to
exercise a greater decision-making power – the Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions refer to a model including the following characteristics:
- the activity of the Commission focuses on the past, while it does not
investigate the respect of human rights in the period in which it is set
up;
- the attention of the Commission is not addressed to a specific event,
but to the reconstruction of an overall picture of the abuses and
violations of human rights recorded in a given period of time defined
when the Commission is set up;
- the Commission, which is given a temporarily predefined mandate,
ceases to exist when a final report containing the outcome of the
investigation and any recommendations is submitted;
- the Commission must have the necessary autonomy to access
essential information and to carry out the investigations needed for
the historical reconstruction of events; said autonomy can vary
significantly;
- uncertain is the aspect referring to the extent of the Commission's
mandate. As a rule, there seems to be agreement that the terms of the
mandate should be sufficiently ample and flexible, so as to make it
possible to investigate all forms of abuse, allowing for a certain
degree of autonomy which will enable it to identify the most
significant cases or appropriate procedures (Hainer, 1996, p. 179).
Many Commissions have operated within a very rigid and limited
mandate; (29)
(29)
A problem that has arisen as to the extent of a Commission's mandate is
whether the final report should include an analysis of the role of the international actors
involved in the internal conflict. At almost all times, as a matter of fact, in the course of
an internal conflict, there are relevant pressures and intrusion by foreign governments.
The role of such «indirect actors», should be acknowledged and investigated, especially
when there have been violations of human rights and such external interference has
contributed to prolonging the conflict. But most Commissions have not investigated the
international context nor have they reported any investigations of this kind in their final
reports. (Hainer, 1996).
227
- there is widespread and heated debate about the advisability for a
Commission to disclose the names of those responsible for gross
violations of human rights (Gentili, Lollini, 2000). The choice of the
one or the other option has to take into account two opposing
principles: on the one hand the due process principle, which
establishes, among other things, that everybody is entitled to defend
himself/herself in the course of a trial before being declared to have
been responsible for the violations – a principle which would be
violated if the Commission's report were to disclose the names of the
persecutors without giving them a chance to defend themselves; on
the other hand the truth principle, according to which making the
whole truth known implies disclosing the names of the people
responsible for the violations, once their guilt has been proved
beyond all reasonable doubt( 30).
Above all, the description of the main features of the Commissions
makes it possible to highlight an onthological difference between this
paradigm and the judicial one.
Trials before the Criminal National and International Tribunals can
no doubt contribute to demonstrate the extent and the seriousness of the
violations and the abuses committed. The fact remains that judicial enquiry
focuses on the specific actions of single individuals, without setting itself
the goal – in our opinion irrenounceable – of investigating and bringing to
public attention the whole picture of the violations. Indeed, to think, as a
matter of fact, that a trial can address this need means deluding oneself – as
already hinted when speaking of Pinochet's Chile – that one can reach both
judicial and historical truth.
Given these premises, the reconstruction of the past could be left
exclusively to the Commissions, thus avoiding the risk that the Tribunals
might – even if indirectly – be attributed a function alien to their
competences and which may be potentially dangerous given their essential
duty to guarantee the impartiality, objectivity and non exemplary nature of
the trial.
In reality, one cannot rule out that, as in South Africa, it may be
possible at the same time both to set up a Commission and to institute legal
proceedings against individuals responsible for crimes (Bassiouni, 2000),
(30)
Up to 1992, no Truth Commission had disclosed the names of persecutors.
228
even if, historically speaking, there have been very few proceedings
instituted after the submission of a Commission's final report ( 31).
Taking into account the traits peculiar to Commissions, with a view
to attempting to avoid their being unduly influenced by the circumstances
and any display of clout, and to avoid, therefore, that their flexibility might
prove to be a weakness, in 1996 the United Nations came up with a first
detailed list of recommendations for the criteria to be adopted in setting
them up (United Nations, 1996). This is a carefully detailed document
constituting an important contribution towards the definition of an as yet
unsettled issue (Hainer, 1996).
From all the points made, next to the general recommendation in
favour of the creation of Commissions for the historical reconstruction of
violations, there emerges the need to promote practices aiming at
recognizing a «right to truth».
In particular, it is foreseen that:
- the components of the Commission be unmovable;
- the evidence emerging from the investigations be safeguarded for a
possible use in successive trials before criminal courts;
- the names of those responsible be disclosed;
- the final report be published and divulged;
- that measures be taken for the preservation of files and to avoid the
destruction of documents.
The Commissions can be set up or supported: at a national level by
the government or Parliament; at the international level by the United
Nations or by NGOs.
Working under the auspices of the United Nations may involve some
positive ( 32) practical aspects but also some drawbacks (33), which may make
(31)
As a matter of fact, let us here hint at the fact that the coordination of a
Commission's work with the activity of the ordinary legal system is a delicate and
complex issue, which is generally taken into account when a Commission is set up.
(32)
Among the possible advantages let us mention the most significant: a) the
neutrality of the body set up by the international community; b) the authoritativeness
deriving from international legitimation and the ensuing pressure exerted on the parties
involved to make them collaborate with the Commission; c) the possibility of strong
economic support, an element which might prove to be decisive to complete the work
of the Commission.
In Chad, in Uganda and in the Philippines, for examp le, the different
Commissions have been adversely affected by economic problems, while in El
Salvador international sponsorship has resulted in United Nations funding (Hainer,
1994).
(33)
A number of arguments against the advisability of international sponsorship
have been identified. To begin with, if all the members of the Commission are
229
it preferable to set up a Commission completely internal to the country
involved (Hainer, 1994, p. 642).
4.3.2.
Critical Aspects: an Outline
Besides allowing for a first theoretical reconstruction of their
principles and guidelines, the experience of the Commissions, set up in
recent decades, has also highlighted a number of critical issues on which
the debate is still open.
These are, in short:
- the choice itself of considering the search for and diffusion of
«historical truth» (in its widest acception) as a principle of justice
necessary to reconciliation and peace-building – let us remember
here the considerations on the positive role which we believe the
reconstruction of individual and collective truth and the reactivation
of memory have – is not accepted unconditionally. In particular,
some have also challenged the advisability of circulating a final
report in a moment of transition characterized by criticality and
institutional fragility (Woods, 1998, p. 83; Hayner, 1996, p. 176). As
a matter of fact, this is not an altogether theoretical issue, as there are
countries which, in spite of having just been through a period of civil
war or of terrible violations, have shown no interest in investigating
the most recent events (in Mozambique and in Angola the opposing
parties have refused the proposal of some human right organizations
to set up a Truth Commission);
- a relevant limit is also represented by the fact that, as a rule, the
Commissions are not empowered to carry out investigations (they are
not entitled, for example, to summon witnesses). The TRC
constituted an important exception in this respect because it was
endowed with ample powers of investigation and could link up in
some cases with the judicial authorities and the police;
foreigners this might result in an impaired understanding of certain events, due to a lack
of first-hand knowledge of the events themselves. Moreover, an International
Commission, as a rule, leaves the country once the investigation is over, which means it
cannot apply any pressure within the country for the adoption of the measures and the
recommendations set out in the final report. Finally, some countries have refused the
setting up of an International Commission in the name of a rigid interpretation of the
principle of national sovereignty on internal affairs (Hainer, 1994).
230
- it is also necessary to consider a further possible limitation to the
reconstruction of the picture of the violations ( 34): the difficulty or,
sometimes, the impossibility to investigate individual cases when
one is in the presence of an elevated number of abuses and
widespread violations. A country, above all when going through a
delicate phase of transition, rarely has the resources or knowledge
needed to investigate all instances of individual violations, also if the
evidence is easily accessible, managing only to outline a general
truth, according to some «models» of repeated violation. Such an
outcome may well engender – as in the case of «victors' justice»,
though to a lesser extent – feelings of frustration among the victims,
who often give evidence hoping that their personal cases may be
thoroughly investigated;
- with the exception of the TRC, (35) the Commissions set up so far
have not been legitimized through democratic means. In periods of
transition, as a matter of fact, one is unlikely to have conditions
conducive to a public, political or social debate or to a referendum
aimed at making the people choose. Often, the facilities needed for
elections do not as yet exist, which would instead be of the utmost
importance, since the objective is that of setting out on a common
(34)
«…all Truth Commissions have their limitations. In the words of Michael
Ignatieff: ‘All that a Truth Commission can achieve is to reduce the number of lies
that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse. In Argentina, its work has
made it impossible to claim, for example, that the military did not throw half-dead
victims in the sea from helicopters. In Chile, it is no longer permissible to assert in
public that the Pinochet regime did not dispatch thousands of entirely innocent
people...’. Applying Ignatieff’s notion of reducing the number of lies, one can say that
the information in the hands of the Commission made it impossible to claim, for
example, that: the practice of torture by state security forces was not systematic and
widespread; that only a few ‘rotten eggs’ or ‘bad apples’ committed gross violations
of human rights; that the state was not directly and indirectly involved in ‘black -onblack violence’; that the chemical and biological warfare programme was only of a
defensive nature; that slogans by sections of the liberation movement did not
contribute to killings of ‘settlers’ or farmers; and that the accounts of gross human
rights violations in the African National Congress (ANC) camps were the
consequence of state disinformation. Thus, disinformation about the past that had
been accepted as truth by some members of society lost much of its credibility». See:
TRC- Final Rreport, vol. 1, chap. 5, pp. 33-34.
(35)
The TRC is the first instance of the creation of a Commission preceded by a
procedure explicitly aiming at encouraging the participation of the community in its
setting up.
231
path, based on the analysis of past events and the idea of turning over
a new leaf.
In conclusion, the theoretical picture is still quite complex: the
decision to set up a Commission, as a matter of fact, entails not only the
evaluation of the social, political and economic circumstances making it
advisable, but also makes it imperative to solve in one direction or the other
the endless issues concerning its actual setting up( 36).
5.
The TRC
5.1.
The Setting up of a TRC
The choice of setting up a TRC, aimed at the recognition of the
violations and the abuses committed during apartheid and at the attribution
of the historical and judicial responsibility for said violations and abuse to
perpetrators from all walks of life without necessarily seeking their
punishment is undoubtedly to be viewed as an option grounded on the
advanced principles of Restorative Justice (Tutu, 2000; Pitch, 2001, p.
336).
In order to understand the work done by the TRC, it is first of all
necessary to understand how the TRC was born (Gentili, Lollini, 2000).
It was the result of a peaceful transition from the segregationist
apartheid regime to democratic rule, which interested all South-African
peoples (Villa -Vicencio, 2000; Hamber, 1998). Together the political
parties involved (the ANC, the National Party and Inkata) negotiated a
transfer of powers, which were embodied in the approval of the 1993
provisional Constitution, containing among other things a number of
indications on the setting up of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
The option to be chosen, whether a Commission or a Criminal
National and International Tribunal, was therefore openly debated and there
was a clear-cut refusal of the idea of opting for «victors' justice». Some
important political figures in the different line-ups, especially some ANC
members, were of the opinion that the alleged perpetrators of gross human
rights violations should be prosecuted, the way the allied forces opted for
prosecution in Nuremberg. A number of arguments, besides the basic one
(36)
The choice of setting up a Commission was defined as «open» (Llewellyn,
Howse 1999, p. 375), as opposed to the judicial model, because its structure and
activities can be adapted to the specific situation, encouraging from the very beginning
a careful analysis of existing circumstances.
232
that sets reparation and reconciliation – not punishment – as essential goals,
were decisive in leading to the setting up of a Commission: «In South
Africa, where we had a military stalemate, that (the Nuremberg option) was
clearly an impossible option. Neither side in the struggle (the state nor the
liberation movements) had defeated the other and hence nobody was in a
position to enforce so-called victor’s justice. However, there were even
more compelling reasons for avoiding the Nuremberg option. There is no
doubt that members of the security establishment would have scuppered the
negotiated settlement had they thought they were going to run the gauntlet
of trials for their involvement in past violations. (...) Another reason why
Nuremberg was not a viable option was because our country simply could
not afford the resources in time, money and personnel that we would have
had to invest in such an operation. (...) the route of trials would have
stretched an already hard-pressed judicial system beyond reasonable
limits. It would also have been counterproductive to devote years to
hearing about events that, by their nature, arouse very strong feelings. It
would have rocked the boat massively and for too long. The Malan trials
and the Goniwe inquest have also shown us that, because such legal
proceedings rely on proof beyond reasonable doubt, the criminal justice
system is not the best way to arrive at the truth. There is no incentive for
perpetrators to tell the truth and often the court must decide between the
word of one victim against the evidence of many perpetrators. Such legal
proceedings are also harrowing experiences for victims, who are
invariably put through extensive cross-examination (...) We have been
concerned, too, that many consider only one aspect of justice. Certainly,
amnesty cannot be viewed as justice if we think of justice only as retributive
and punitive in nature. We believe, however, that there is another kind of
justice - a Restorative Justice which is concerned not so much with
punishment as with correcting imbalances, restoring broken relationships –
with healing, harmony and reconciliation. Such justice focuses on the
experience of victims; hence the importance of reparation.» (Tutu, 2001;
see also anche Caron, 1999).
Hamber, possibly resorting to words which are less poignant from
the emotional point of view but just as effective in summarizing the reasons
why South Africa opted for a Commission, states that «A Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is to be established in South Africa with
the express purpose of facilitating a truth recovery process aimed at
reconciling with the past. According to the objectives of the latest draft of
the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Bill this process of
reconciliation is to occur through the establishing of as complete a picture
as possible of the causes, nature and extent of past abuses. The so-called
233
«victims» of these abuses will be located and allowed to relate their stories
so as to restore human and civil dignity. Thereafter, the TRC aims to make
amends to these individuals through the granting of reparations and
rehabilitative measures. Furthermore, the TRC intends to enhance
reconciliation by granting amnesty to perpetrators of human rights abuses
and by compiling a comprehensive report of past abuses. The Report will
make recommendations on how such events can be prevented from
occurring again » (Hamber ,1995, p. 1).
5.2.
TRC Activity
(1) As we have repeatedly pointed out at the very heart of the TRC's
work (as of the work done by the Commissions set up in other countries) is
the new and unprecedented way of dealing with the link between truth and
justice, in the specific instance consisting in the creation of three different
levels of intervention:
a) the Commission was vested simply with the authority to seek the
truth, a circumscribed activity having no direct link with the power to
prosecute and mete out punishment;
b) the determination of truth is directly related to accountability –
through the identification of alleged perpetrators or explicitly
referring prosecution to another agency (37);
c) the Commission was authorized to implement reconciliation and
amnesty policies, for those who made «full disclosure», provided
that their crime was politically motivated and showed remorse.
(2) The work of the TRC was huge and complex and unfolded
through the activities of three Committees:
a) the Human Rights Violation Committee which took victims'
statements;
b) the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee, whose task it was to
gather information and evidence on the identity of the victims and
(37)
The problem of the coordination between the TRC's work and the criminal
judicial system is extremely complex, so much so that specific mechanisms of
coordination have been foreseen. The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation
Act, 1995 laid down, as a matter of fact, that the TRC could subpoena witnesses,
having previously informed of its intention to do so the General Prosecutor and
explained why the need existed, even if the answers given or evidence sought could
lead to the indictment of the witnesses. However, it also explicitly prohibited the use of
any declaration or information or incriminating evidence obtained during the
Commission's hearings in legal proceedings (Woods, 1998).
234
their families, on the nature and the extent of their suffering, and to
make recommendations to the government as to the measures needed
to ensure reparation and rehabilitation for the victims themselves
(Lansing, King, 1998, p. 765);
c) and the Amnesty Committee, which assessed the possibility of
granting amnesty to individual perpetrators, in return for full
disclosure of the abuses committed.
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
(3) The main modes through which information was collected were:
the hearings (of the victims; related to specific events; related to
specific groups – women, youth and children, the military; the
institutions; political parties);
the investigations, to corroborate the statements, check them and
integrate them with additional information;
research work, through the setting up of a true and proper specific
department to assist in the analysis and contextualization of the huge
amount of data, evidence and information received;
22,500 victims came before the local chapters of the Human Rigths
Violation Committee to tell their stories;
«all those who have suffered physical or mental injury, emotional
suffering or a substantial impairment of human rights due to gross
violation of human rights associated with the political conflicts of the
past» were recognizeded to be victims (Hamber, 1995, p. 2);
7,100 requests for amnesty were submitted to the Amnesty
Committee(38).
The Commission, as we have already repeatedly said, was aware of
the fact that it had to come up with a version of the past capable of bringing
about common consensus. «We believe we have provided enough of the
truth about our past for threre to be a consensus about it» ( 39).
But which truth is meant here? The Final Report mentions a truth
altogether different from judicial truth( 40), yet far more complex than that
which is normally termed consensual truth (Cohen, 2001). As a matter of
fact, it identified four different kinds of truth ( 41):
(38)
See infra Schedule 2.
Tutu D., Chairperson’s Foreword, 18, quoted by Cohen, 2001.
(40)
See retro § 3.3.
(41)
«Given the magnitude of this exercise, the Commission’s quest for truth
should be viewed as a contribution to a much longer-term goal and vision. Its purpose
in attempting to uncover the past had nothing to do with vendetta; it had to do, rather,
with helping victims to become more visible and more valuable citizens through the
(39)
235
a) factual truth: this is defined as legal or scientific information which
is factual, accurate and objective, obtained through impartial
procedures. On an individual level this means information on
particular incidents and people: what exactly happened to whom,
when, how and where. On a social level this means recording the
context, the causes and the patterns of violation: an interpretation of
the facts that should, that is, do away with any tendency to deny the
past. But the Commission was not a Tribunal, and, rightly so, did not
subject the victims' statements to cross-examination. It anyway
assessed, through confirmation, said statement on the grounds of
likelihood. As Simpson holds, «it is fascinating to note that most of
the legal and jurisprudential dilemmas presented by the TRC process
are actually rooted in its own almost bipolar roles as both a ‘factfinding’ and quasi-judicial enterprise on one hand, and as a
psychologically sensitive mechanism for story telling and healing on
the other» (Simpson, 1999, p. 15);
b) personal and narrative truth: these are the stories told by the
perpetrators and, more exhaustively, those told by the victims. This
experience constitutes an opportunity for the healing of the
statement-givers, making it possible to add details to collective truth
and to pave the way for reconciliation attaching value to the
individual experience of people who had previously been silenced;
c) social truth: this is born of interaction, discussion and debate. Public
hearings foster transparency and encourage participation. Highly
conflicting points of view on the past can be taken into account and
compared. What it highlights is the confrontation, the process rather
than the final result;
d) restorative and healing truth: these are the kinds of narrative dealing
with the past in an attempt to come to terms with it. It is based on the
assumption that truth, inasmuch as evidence based on facts, is not
sufficient: the interpretation must have self-healing, reconciliatory
and restorative aims. This requires the acknowledgement that
everyone’s suffering was real and worthy of attention (Cohen, 2001).
Truth, however, is but the first of the TRC's objectives.
Just as important is reconciliation. If the two are not taken together,
the latter is but a mere statement of principle.
The philosophy informing such an interpretation is that which
enabled the South African people to deal with the conflicts of the past in
public recognition and official acknowledgement of their experiences». See: TRCFinal Report, vol. 1, chap. 5, 27.
236
the name of a new social contract, which is the pursuit of truth with no
hankering for vengeance.
Far removed from a predominantly religious approach, reconciliation
is based on the acknowledgement of past history and on the censure of the
evil done, whichever party was the wrong-doer.»The trouble is that there
are erroneus notions of what reconciliation is all about. Reconciliation is
not about being cosy; it is not about pretending that things were other than
they were. Reconciliation based on falsehood or not facing up to reality, is
not true reconciliation and will not last» (Final Report, 1998).
5.3. Public Hearings: Story-Telling and Narration
It would be very interesting to have time to go into the procedures
and the praxis of the TRC (to analyze in detail its functions, powers,
composition, structure, procedures, the results obtained).
Unfortunately it is not possible to do so here.
We shall therefore be content with examining an aspect we are
particularly interested in and which came to be the main activity of the
TRC: that of both victims' and perpetrators' narratives and story-telling
within the context of public hearings with community participation.
It is the victims, as a matter of fact, who are at the very heart of the
attempt to come to terms with the past; it is the victims who are the
protagonists of the Commission's research and investigation, and because
of this they are sought, approached and listened to with the utmost attention
(Flores, 1999, p. 24).
In such a context, the Human Rights Violation Committee, presided
over by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, was entrusted within the scope of the
TRC mandate, to take the statements of the victims ( 42) in public hearings
held throughout the country.
To begin with, the people were informed by the Committee
members, who went to the towns and villages in the different regions to
explain the aims of the TRC and the way it would work; then, anybody
who had been the victim of abuse or violence was invited to make a
statement in his/her language and to provide any evidence he/she might
have. The statements were made in front of statement-takers belonging to
non-governmental organisations, faith organisations and civic bodies who
spoke the country's main languages.
(42)
For an accurate definition of the term 'victim', see the Promotion of National
Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34, 1995, chapter 1, par. 1, which basically coincides
with the definition given by Hamber. See retro § 5.2.
237
The taking down of the stories told in public had a twofold function:
on the one hand, it meant the stories of human rights violations were
collected by the parties directly interested in doing so, thus helping form a
picture of the abuses perpetrated; on the other, it offered the victims an
opportunity to relate their suffering to people who listened to them
sympathetically and recognized their pain (Final Report, 1998). For many
people, the public hearing was the first place in which they felt free to
recount the experience lived under apartheid, to give vent to the
impressions gathered and to put forward their requests and expectations;
besides the fact of being listened to could be considered as a first form of
restoration.
It has, as a matter of fact, been said that story-telling, the oral
handing down of individual memory has an important catartic and symbolic
function and constitutes an opportunity to learn about the victims' most
urgent needs (Teitel, 2000). Which is why, «By holding public hearings or
granting private interviews, the Commission attempted to diminish the
legal, andat times adverserial, nature of its work and to focus on the
restorative and therapeutic dimensions of its mandate» (Final Report,
1998).
The evidence, the truth revealed must be listened to for what it is: a
cry from the heart, a suffering which is close to that expressed by the
characters in Greek tragedy and which must therefore also be listened to in
its silences. The Commission therefore worked to transform what seemed a
pre-ordained destiny into a chance of a possible future.
However, it must be borne in mind that «despite the potential for the
TRC to operate as a psychologically healing mechanism it is not a
sufficient process in itself to promote psychological rehabilitation. It is
argued that a range of psychological structures and strategies will be
needed to run parallel to the TRC» (Hamber, 1995, 1) ( 43).
(43)
About the nature of trauma: «The people who suffered most from traumatic
episodes fell into five categories: the victim, the perpetrator, their families and
dependants, the community and, in a different way, Commission personnel.
Commission personnel and so me dependants and family members formed a distinct
group in that their traumatic experience was often of a vicarious nature. However, all
groups vicariously or directly shared classic symptoms of post-traumatic stress
syndrome. Symptoms included lowered self-esteem, depression, emotional blunting,
avoidance behaviour, impulsiveness, uncontrollable anger, substance abuse, paranoia,
relationship difficulties (social and interpersonal), complicated bereavement and sleep
disturbance. Often such symptoms had become a part of life for the sufferer and were
so deeply entrenched in the individual that they had to be viewed as part of that person
and not merely a passing crisis.
238
Already when the TRC was set up, as a matter of fact, doubts were
expressed as to the enormous difficulties which the impact of the victims'
story-telling would have, also from a psychological point of view, and it
was held they should be provided with support services.
In this respect, it might be useful to remember some of the major
challenges and problems the TRC had to contend with at the time of its
creation (Hamber, 1995, 4):
a) South Africa was a country with limited resources, and mental health
care services are particularly «under-resourced»;
b) the conflicts of the past were not easily viewed as a unitary complex.
The roots and context of conflicts are still complex and in specific
areas are still continuing. Often, the clear division between political
and criminal violence and the delineation between perpetrators and
victims have been obscured for a long time. Further, the re-telling of
stories, irrespective of enormous psychological backup, cannot
substitute for addressing the causes and nature of the violence and
the development of mechanisms for preventing its re-occurrence;
c) it has been underlined that a continued focus on the psychological
needs of the victims and on the TRC activity has the risk to overmedicalise a social phenomenon. The social process of reconciliation
is not about diagnosing and treating pathology. These views can
prompt mental health-care workers to want to «repair» individuals
rather than becoming part of the process of reconciliation or healing;
d) finally, from a more political angle, psychologists need to be aware
that often political processes run counter to psychological processes.
The process of not remembering and re-visiting the past becomes
difficult to be substained for a political rationality that often demands
forgetting and the need for political consensus. It has been
underlined that this condition required that mental health care
workers develop an active stance and engage in the political debates.
It was important not to generalise or simplify diagnosis or, indeed,
understanding of treatment. Often the trauma that individuals presented had been
complicated by a range of socio-economic and medical problems and was also affected
by the time that had elapsed since the traumatic event. Often living conditions caused a
new range of emotional difficulties that conflated with previous ones, resulting in a
complicated traumatic cocktail that demanded more then a mere therapeutic or healing
intervention. The mental health of a person could not be seen or understood in isolation
from socio-economic realities». See: TRC- Final Report, vol. 1, chap. 11, pp. 4-5.
5.4.
239
The other models of public hearing
The activity of the Committee was carried out not only through
public hearings devoted to the listening of individual stories and
experiences but also through other kinds of hearing:
- those focusing on specific events (gross widespread human rights
violations) ( 44);
- special ones, in which one tried to focus the attention on victims
belonging to particularly «vulnerable» social groups (children,
women, etc.);
- those focusing on the institutions and the different social contexts
(the world of business and work( 45), the health sectors, the legal
system, the media, the economic set-up, the prison system and the
faith community) in order to reconstruct the role played by the
different professional or institutional sectors and by the different
organisations within the system created by apartheid, so as to
understand the antecedents, the circumstances, the factors and the
context of violations;
- those devoted to the legal community: the emergency legislation was
surely one of the main tools of the regime. Especially when the state
of emergency was proclaimed for the second time in the eighties, the
police and the defence forces were practically given a «licence to
kill», and the hearings carried out to investigate such events made it
possible to uncover the existence of true and proper «death squads»,
whose task it was to kill the opposers and spread violence and terror
throughout the country (Boraine, 2000). The hearings about the legal
system made it clear that the courts and the legal system in general
connived in the legislative and executive pursuit of injustice; (46)
(44)
Some of the specific events investigated are events whose echo spread
beyond the South African pale and drew the attention of the world at large. We might
take as an example the uprising of the Soweto students in 1976; the killing, in 1986, of
the «Guguletu seven» following police infiltration into the ANC; the seven-day war
between the ANC and IFP (Inkatha freedom party) in 1990.
(45)
Two dominant points of view emerged from these hearings and from the
ensuing public debates: on the one hand there were those who viewed apartheid as part
of a system of «racial-capitalism» and held it was beneficial for white business because
it was an integral part of a system based on the exploitation of black workers; on the
other hand, there were those who held, instead, that apartheid raised the costs of doing
business, severely eroded South-Africans' skill base and technical competitiveness and,
as a reult, undermined long-term productivity and economic growth.
(46)
In October 1997 the TRC and the population at large, also those most inured
to public lies, were surprised at the repeated denial of responsibility by the notorious
240
6.
The Issue of Amnesty
At this point we should deal with a second issue which is just as
complex and of paramount importance: the possibility to foresee the
granting of an amnesty.
Regardless of the paradigm to which one has recourse to come to
terms with the past, one of the most widely debated issues in the phase of
transition and of change from a past of violations and abuses is the granting
or not of amnesty to those responsible for the violations being investigated
(Quaritsch, Italian translation, 1995) ( 47).
Minister of the Police, Adrian Vlok. There was no doubt that Vlok had been a member
of the State Security Council, and he had been undeniably responsible for police
behaviour, as he had had specific powers to manage and control the "death squads"
organised within the police forces.
He entrenched himself behind two techniques of denial.
The first was denial of responsibility: Vlok held that not only could he not be
charged with the violation of any human rights, but also that, as a Minister, he had done
all he could to sensitise the police and get them to treat blacks and whites the same
way. Any form of abuse that had taken place had never, anyway, been explicitly
commissioned.
The neutralisation to which Vlok and like-minded people had recourse to by
way of justification sounded more or less like this: "We at the top took certain
decisions and used certain terminology without thinking about it. It worked its way to
the ground, where people misrepresented it" (quoted in Cohen, 2001, p. 127). Some
witnesses therefore justified themselves saying that their intentions had been
misinterpreted: the orders imparted to "get rid" of an ANC activist, for example, meant
to them an invitation to get them to move out of a given area, not to kill them.
The second artifice advocated by Vlok was based on the denial of knowledge.
Vlok declared he had been kept in the dark by the lies of his police-colleagues.
He had never known about the torture and the death squads. Here his words take on an
unprecedented concreteness and become ludicrously literal:"There was never any
report on my desk saying 'we tortured someone or we killed someone and buried his
body'. I never approved it, it was never brought to my attention"(quoted in Cohen,
2001, p. 128).
Leon Wessel, former Deputy Minister for Law and Order, has supplied a refined
analysis for this kind of denial: "I do not believe the political defence of 'I did not know'
is available to me, because in many respects I believe I did not want to know... In my
own way, I had suspicions of things that had caused discomfort in official circles, but
because I did not have the facts to substantiate my suspicions, or I lacked the courage
to shout from the rooftops, I have to confess that I only whispered in the corridors... It
may be blunt, but I have to say it... the Nationalist Party did not have an inquiring mind
about these matters"(quoted in Cohen, 2001, p. 128).
(47)
As Quaritsch points out, when an illegitimate political regime falls, the
question inevitably ariseas as how to deal with those who held offices in the old
241
The problems of punishment and reconciliation, of revenge or
forgiveness, of memory or oblivion converge, as a matter of fact, in
amnesty.
The word amnesty derives from the Greek amnestia, which means
forgetting, oblivion or remission. In the meaning we are here concerned
with, the term refers to an act by a sovereign power aimed at exempting
those it concerns from criminal prosecution for past offences. It is a
measure of a predominantly political nature and as such answers above all
needs of advisability and expediency.
Given that this is the meaning of the term, there is a first
consideration to be made: in a country in transition from a past of
violations and widespread injustice to democratic rule, any request,
especially if made by the victims, to «learn the truth» on the one hand and
to «obtain justice» on the other (Ratner, 1999, p. 732) becomes an
imperative – while oblivion and forgiveness pose themselves as possible
further and extremely complex phases. And it is here that an approach
privileging the punishment of the culprits clashes with an approach that
considers it advisable in some situations to grant amnesty to those
responsible for the abuses. In the most convincing of reconstructions, the
second position comes to hypothesise a possible incompatibility between
peace (the primary object of the reconciliation process) and justice
(interpreted as punishment of the culprits).
When discussing the negotiated revolution, some point out that the
20th century was characterised by a huge number of conflicts and violations
of human rights, which was followed by an altogether inadequate response
in terms of punishment of the culprits (Bassiouni, 2000).
It is clear that oblivion and forgetting, not preceded by the
experience of forgiveness, have covered most of these violations and
extended to most of the victims. All this happened in a number of
countries, without even needing a law in this sense. Elsewhere, instead,
after the fall of a repressive regime or after the end of a conflict, the most
regime, those who carried out orders and their followers. In our century too different
peoples have come up with very different answers. Five different methods can be
chosen either separately or at the same time or the one after the other: the deeds
performed under the old regime and now legally censored are (1) ignored or (2)
immediately amnestied by law; (3) for weeks if not for months one indulges in
retaliation without having any recourse to legal proceedings; (4) the crimes of the old
regime are judged by special tribunals or by ordinary magistrates; (5) the old regime's
supporters are dispossessed of their property and offices, interned and killed (in
totalitarian regimes) for supporting the old regime, or subjected to economic sanctions
or penalised on the professional level. (Quaritsch, Italian translation, 1995, p. 139).
242
serious violations of human rights have been covered up by blanket
amnesties(48). For these reasons, amnesty for crimes against humanity or
human rights has always been looked upon with suspicion (Flores, 1999, p.
29).
The problem arising is therefore twofold: on the one hand it is above
all necessary to decide whether amnesty is a viable option, without
however renouncing to affirm principles of justice(49); on the other it is just
as indispensable to question whether the conditions required to grant such a
measure exist (bearing in mind that blanket amnesties are, as a rule, viewed
as denials of justice).
An amnesty is therefore an act of a predominantly political nature, of
«political justice», which historically has been resorted to also when one
has opted for prosecution to deal with the past; also «victors' justice» has
found a collocation for such measures (Flores, 1999; Crainz, 2000) ( 50). In
such instances, amnesty consists in a display of will-power by the
«winners», made all the more justifiable, from a political point of view, by
the passing of time (and by the scanty effectiveness of criminal
proceedings).
In the course of the eighties and the nineties, instead, amnesty was
often an integral part of the agreements and compromises negotiated to
reach a peaceful solution in countries in transition (Scharf, 1996, p. 1) ( 51). In
(48)
As happened, for example, in Brazil: «…the atrocities committed by the
Brazilian government have received little attention since the passing of a general
amnesty in 1979. The amnesty-granting process in Brazil is a detailed and complex
one, but the key point for this discussion is that the amnesty passed was, in the words of
President Geisel, «ample, general and unrestrictive». In effect, it was a «Blanket
Amnesty» without full disclosure or compensation for victims. This Blanket Amnesty,
coupled with no investigation into the past by the old or new governments, has meant
that an official truth was never uncovered in Brazil. As a result, the families of victims
continue to seek the truth and draw attention to the numerous atro cities perpetrated by
the past government despite the fact that a civilian government was instated in 1985»
(Hamber,1997).
(49)
In the course of the preparatory conference for the setting up of the
International Criminal Court, it had been suggested that the Court may consider the
granting of an amnesty so as to foster international peace and national reconciliation,
when having to decide whether to exert its jurisdiction in a given context or to
prosecute a given individual. The final text of the Rome Statute contains some points
which might be interpreted in the light of said suggestion (Scharf 1999, p. 139).
(50)
Suffice it to think of the many amnesties which brought to a close the denazification or de- fascistization processes after World War II.
(51)
In such cases (Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Uruguay,
South Africa), amnesty resulted from the negotiated revolution which characterised the
peace agreements reached.
243
such processes, the groups in a position of power are animated by the desire
to avoid a head-on collision with the emerging élites and by the need to
play an active role in the confrontation with their successors in order to
survive, in political, economic, and judicial terms in the society to come.
Opposition movements, on the other hand, have sought a negotiated
solution to avoid clashing from the social and military point of view against
an enemy who is still too strong. In such a situation, insisting on criminal
proceedings at all costs entailed the risk of prolonging the conflict, while
the granting of an amnesty became the tool to put an end to the raging
conflict. ( 52)
6.1.
Amnesty and the TRC
In order to exemplify what we have said so far, reference shall be
made once more to the TRC(53), whose choice to foresee the possibility of
the amnesty was part of a negotiated compromise at the end of the
apartheid regime (Hamber 1995), without which it would have been
difficult to reach a somewhat peaceful transition( 54).
(52)
More specifically: a) those who hold that an amnesty could prove to be a
necessary tool for bargaining do not view the granting of an amnesty as being
equivalent to impunity, because they couple such an option with the idea of effective
and more specific mechanisms for the ascertaining of responsibilities: it is to be
noticed, therefore, that whenever an amnesty was granted so as to bring about peace,
damages were always awarded to the victims and their families, Truth Commissions
were set up to document the abuses, disqualification from public offices was always
foreseen. Even those who conceive of amnesty in such terms believe, however, that an
amnesty should be granted only in exceptional cases (Scharf, 1999, p. 512); b) those
who instead view the punishment of culprits as an essential and irrenounceable part of
justice view amnesties as standing in absolute juxtaposition to the peace-building
process.
Many have asked that at least as far as the three main classes of international
crimes are concerned (that is, genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes) the
option of granting amnesties to perpetrators be ruled out both at a national and
international level (Bassiouni, 1999). While it is, as a matter of fact, quite easy to
accept the ideal that a State may pardon the crimes it has suffered directly, gross
violations of human rights are considered to be first and foremost crimes against
people; this makes it extremely difficult to establish to what extent it may be legitimate
for the State to stand in for the individual in granting «forgiveness».
(53)
For quantitative data on the work of the subcommission that has seen to the
granting of amnesties – the Amnesty Committee – see infra Schedule No. 2.
(54)
«The amnesty provisions in the TRC's charter represented essentially a
compromise between the demands of the old regime for a Blanket Amnesty for all those
charged with human rights abuses and the equally strong insistence of many in the
244
The Amnesty Committee examined the granting of amnesty for
single deeds, in return for full disclosure of all the relevant facts related to
that same act, which «were advised, planned, directed, commanded,
ordered or committed within or outside The Republic…» between 1960 and
1994 (Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34, 1995,
chapter 4, par. 20 (2)), and which were connected with a political objective.
The constitutive act (Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act, No. 34, 1995) defined as an act with a political
obiective any action constituting an offence related to a political end or
which was committed to fight or resist the political struggle under
apartheid ( 55) without distinguishing between perpetrators or material
executors or instigators of the violations being examined.
The constitutive act also foresaw, fully in line with the TRC's general
scope to obtain as full as possible a picture of the violations committed, as
a pre-requisite for the granting of amnesty, the «full disclosure of all
relevant facts», and this also if such disclosure were to prove selfincriminating for the petitioner.
Such a pre-requisite however was never clearly laid down and the
task of assessing the exhaustiveness of the disclosures was entrusted to the
Committee.
The meaning attributed to amnesty, in the approach adopted by the
TRC, was therefore twofold:
- to help ascertain the truth;
- to foster the reconciliation process.
anti-apartheid movement that just punishment had to be meted out to the miscreants.
The decision to proceed on a course that represented a middle ground between
"Nuremberg and amnesia" was dictated by the fact that the transition to the new South
Africa was the result of a negotiated settlement between the old regime and the
liberation forces. Absent the possibility of at least selected amnesties for past crimes, it
is virtually certain that the government of President F.W. de Klerk would simply have
refused to proceed with the dismantling of apartheid and to allow the African National
Congress to come into power» (Garrett, 2000, p. 4).
(55)
More precisely, the acts in question must have been commited during
«political uprising, disturbance, protest, strike». The act has a political objective if «the
conduct was primarily directed at a political opponents or State property or personnel
or against private property or individuals» (Promotion of National Unity and
Reconciliation Act, No. 34, 1995, chapter 4, par. 20 (3) (b) (d)), and if the conduct was
«the result of the deliberate planning on the part of the State (or former State) or any of
its organs, or the part of any political organisation, liberation movement or other
group or individuals» (Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, No. 34,
1995, chapter 2, par. 4 (a) (IV)).
245
On the one hand, as a matter of fact, the purpose was to obtain the
statements of the perpetrators of the violations so as to reconstruct the truth
on the past (Lansing, King 1998, p. 770), that is to ascertain who was to
blame for the violations, what drove them to be so and behave so and what
influenced their behaviour (Final Report, 1998). In other words, the
procedure leading to the granting of amnesties obliged the apartheid regime
to own up to their abuses, making it inevitable for the white population to
acknowledge the systematic violence perpetrated and the horrors
committed during the period. (56) On the other hand, the amnesty procedure
has made it possible for the perpetrators of violations, invited to publicly
disclose the crimes they committed, to participate in and contribute to the
construction of a segment of the reconciliation process. The Commission,
which had not been given the mandate to directly bring about reconciliation
between single victims and perpetrators(57), was however allowed to express
in its Final Report its recommendations that strategies should be adopted to
favour the peaceful co-existence of those who had acknowledged their
responsibilities, thus obtaining amnesty.
Once again the experience of the TRC goes to prove that opting for
amnesty is undoubtedly one of the most difficult and critical choices to be
made (Markel, 1999, p. 390), when a country has to decide which tools to
use to deal with its past. As a matter of fact, the usefulness of amnesties in
the truth-reconstruction process has long been debated. (58) Not everybody
(56)
In reconstructing persecutors' truth, the TRC was confronted with the issue
of the relationship existing between individual responsibility and collective
responsibility. The crimes for which it was possible to apply for amnesty, as a matter of
fact, were those committed on political grounds, that is those motivated by ideology, by
political beliefs or the crimes committed within a criminal system as such. In order to
understand the underlying dynamics, it was necessary to contextualise the investigated
crimes, considering them the result of an individual action but not only (Llewellin,
Howse, 1999). In the Final Report it is specified that those responsible for violations
may be viewed as people who carried out orders, as people indoctrinated, threatened, or
influenced by their education.
(57)
«The contribution of the Commission to reconciliation between specific
victims and perpetrators was necessarily limited (by its time frame, mandate and
resources). In some cases, however, the Commission assisted in laying the foundation
for reconciliation. Although truth does not necessarily lead to healing, it is often a first
step towards reconciliation. Father Michael Lapsley, who lost both arms and an eye in a
near fatal security police parcel bomb attack in Harare in 1990, told the Commission: ‘I
need to know whom to forgive in order to endeavour to do so’ ». See: TRC- Final
Report, vol. 1, chap. 5, p. 16.
(58)
«The argument was that, despite the noble motivations for national
reconciliation, any amnesty arrangement without a parallel obligation to disclose the
246
has accepted that a truth declared but not followed by an acknowledgement
of responsibility could be viewed as a form of justice, and some indeed
have declared that it is unlikely that the identification of the perpetrators, if
unaccompanied by some form of judicial hearing and accompanied instead
by the granting of an amnesty, may in some way help reconciliation with
one's past (59) (Lansing, King, 1998; Woods, 1998).
systemic nature of the crimes perpetrated, in fact has potentially grave implications for
the long-term prospects sustainable democracy. In particular, for the victims of these
abuses of power the implication would be that they would never have access to the
information essential to their rehabilitation, let alone any prospect of redress at civil or
criminal law. One possible consequence of this is that, in the absence of any public
acknowledgment, coupled to the impossibility of restitution through the courts,
widespread resentment could well manifest itself in informal retribution at both an
individual and a collective level, resulting in escalating rather than de-escalating
violence under the new democratic dispensation. The TRC represents a creative
response to this very concern. It was therefore decided to combine the process of
granting amnesty to perpetrators, with the processes of officially establishing the
truth about past human rights abuse, providing victims with some form of reparation
and making recommendations to the President as to measures the government should
take to prevent any future recurrence of systematic violations of human rights. By
attempting to foreground the needs and interests of victims, the TRC can be viewed as
an attempt to restore the moral balance to an amnesty agreement, borne of negotiated
political compromise, and which would otherwise engender a reconciliation-building
enterprise in South Africa which exclusively ministered to the needs of
former perpetrators. This fusion of an amnesty process with a truth recovery and
reparative process is without precedent among similar initiatives internationally. It
also demands that any evaluation of the TRC must be undertaken in its own terms, that
is as a process designed to prioritize the needs and interests of victims of past
gross human rights abuses» (Simpson, 1998, p. 2).
(59)
« Those who have cared about the future of our country have been worried
that the amnesty provision might, amongst other things, encourage impunity because it
seemed to sacrifice justice. We believe this view to be incorrect. The amnesty applicant
has to admit responsibility for the act for which amnesty is being sought, thus dealing
with the matter of impunity. Furthermore, apart from the most exceptional
circumstances, the application is dealt with in a public hearing. The applicant must
therefore make his admissions in the full glare of publicity. Let us imagine what this
means. Often this is the first time that an applicant’s family and community learn that
an apparently decent man was, for instance, a callous torturer or a member of a
ruthless death squad that assassinated many opponents of the previous regime. There
is, therefore, a price to be paid. Public disclosure results in public shaming, and
sometimes a marriage may be a sad casualty as well». See: TRC- Final Report, vol. 5,
chap. 9, p. 35.
7.
247
Conclusions: which For-giveness can be given?
To sum up. Much, possibly too much has been said.
Yet, as we take leave, there emerges – forecefully – a last issue
which cannot be overlooked: that of forgiveness.
From what has been already been said, it is clear that the issues of
amnesty and forgiveness are closely linked. Yet, while amnesty is an act of
«politic al justice» granted through a law, which also foresees the modes
whereby such amnesty should be granted( 60), forgiveness is an individual
and collective virtue which cannot be imposed by law. «Justice and
forgiveness are different measures with which to process time and involve
altogether different decisions which must be kept separate », writes Resta
(Resta, 1998, p. 83).
From an anthropological point of view, forgiveness is part of the
circuit of giving: those who forgive present themselves as people who,
freely and without any obligation, give something to somebody else. What
matters is that forgiveness meant as a gift, that is an act implying some
form of return, can turn the original hostility into a relationship based on
exchange and reciprocity, precisely because a gift has been implanted on
the hostility originally characterising the relationship between the two
opposing parties. «Morals and politics can only wait for it (forgiveness) to
come about … It remains an individual virtue that cannot be delegated to
law: the law cannot afford this particular supplement of feeling» (Resta,
1998, p. 87). In these terms, forgiveness is to be viewed as an ajuridical act,
whose essential, basic, distinguishing trait is, first and foremost that of its
being «free», that is, the fact that it cannot be subjected to conditions ( 61)
(Jankélévitch, ital. transl. 1968) ( 62).
(60)
As to whether amnesty, inasmuch as a juridical act, may be classed or not as
a «form of forgiveness» see infra footnote No. 62.
(61)
For the conditions enouncing it and the rules generally accompanying the
use or the modes of expression of «moral forgiveness» see infra footnote No. 65.
(62)
The theory of the ajuridical nature of forgiveness, held by Rousset (1987)
and adopted by Silvi (2001, p. 219), apparently lies in the very fact that an «act of
forgiveness, to be such, cannot be performed by carrying out a duty or satisfying the
conditions of lawfulness and/or validity any legal system lays down to regulate the
sphere of application of any juridical act». It follows that, in the light of such a theory,
forgiveness cannot be classed as a juridical act.
Instead, according to Silvi, a theory in favour of the juridical nature of
forgiveness may be constructed not on the grounds of rational truth, but on the grounds
of factual truth: that is by verifying whether there are – within any legal system – any
acts that, regardless of their nomina iuris, are characterised by a prescriptive structure
mirroring the essential elements of the conceptual structure of forgiveness (that is:
248
This being so, which forgiveness can individuals and the collectivity
actually grant? ( 63).
When discussing forgiveness(64) it is necessary to distinguish
between «moral forgiveness» (forgiveness to those who have
acknowledged their guilt) from other forms of forgiveness, which, as we
will see, are far more interesting and topical in the economy of our
discourse.
There is, however, a form of forgiveness bound to cover a universal
moral function, which is to re-estabilish reciprocity, interrupting the moral
circuit of evil. It is a form of basic forgiveness which reinforces the
principle of retribution and which states that only what can be punished can
be forgiven. It is a forgiveness that entails the promise the wrong-doing
will never «occur again», which entails reparation and is based on the
assumption of a temporal and spatial dimension within which good and evil
are causes always ascribable within the structure of exchange.
The point is such forgiveness applies only where the validity of
obligations foreseeing commensurate exchanges is sanctioned and where
the validity of a legitimately detained power is not challenged( 65). These are
gratuitousness). For instance, being an «act of leniency», an amnesty may, in this
respect, be viewed as a «form of forgiveness».
(63)
Let us here set aside – no matter how relevant in other discourse contexts –
the difference between the notion of forgiveness as a speech act (an utterance such as:
«I forgive you») and as a psychological event (taking place in the person who forgives
and not requiring any form of utterance to be carried out (Silvi, 2001, p. 223). Our line
of reasoning, as it were, places itself prior to such a distinction.
(64)
The following paragraph was written drawing inspiration from the following
texts, which we are quoting here and which we will refrain from quoting further on, for
brevity's sake: Abel, 1993; Abel, 2000; Lyotard, Italian translation, 1985; Ricoeur,
Italian translation, 1989; Silvi, 2001.
(65)
But let us broach analytically the modes of enunciation and the rules which,
according to Abel, generally accompany recourse to or the granting of «moral
forgiveness». The main points are: a) forgiveness is not a magic word but a breaking of
silence, a releasing of memory, which makes it possible to remember a past up to that
very moment too painful to be put into words; b) only he/she/they who have
acknowledged their wrong-doing can be forgiven. Nobody can repent on their behalf
(that is, this happens but occasionally, for example when "representatives" of religious
or political communities publicly repent for deeds they did not commit personally); c)
the fact that he/she/they who forgive must be the he/she/they who suffered the wrongdoing. Nobody is to usurp their place; d) the fact that there can be no forgiveness until
every possible attempt has been made to redress the wrong done. One can always find
new forms of reparation and engaging in doing so, if coupled with an awareness of the
irreparable, teaches not to make the same mistakes again; e) the fact that no forgiveness
can be granted where no punishment can be meted out.
249
situations in which it is possible to identify a victim and a culprit and in
which, as Resta and Ceretti write (Resta, 1996, p. 333; Ceretti, 2000), any
kind of difference will always be subjected – or can be subjected – to the
unifying power of law, which comes to represent «the lowest common
multiple», a shared language capable of translating and interpreting the
dialects of the opposing parties. Here the culprit can be found guilty and
acknowledge guilt and beg forgiveness, the victim grant it. In relation to
them the third party (that is the judge) is always a third party because he
obeys the law which creates a sense of belonging to the community that has
created such a law.
The problem, though, lies in the fact that most real-life historical
events have to do with conflicts of a very different nature. They are
conflicts in which the contending parties do not speak two different dialects
of a same language, but two different languages, because there is no
consensus on the wrong-doing and one is confronted with irreparable and
ancient facts, where there are victims from past generations and the wrongdoing is too strictly intertwined with other instances of wrong-doing, so
that it becomes impossible to appeal to a linear cause-effect relationship to
identify the guilty parties. We are confronted with specular forms of
behaviour which have degenerated; we are bordering on folly. In such
situations, where the participants' dialects are incommensurable, where no
hermeneutics and no reparation and reconciliation through the words of a
third impartial party are possible, where the collective identities of peoples
or of segments of a population are at stake, moral forgiveness can have no
mandate.
In the circumstances we are referring to – and we are of the opinion
that the circumstances the TRC was confronted with before it was set up
prove to be very relevant to what we are saying – the protagonists are
unable/incapable to (ex)change their points of view. Not only, it is through
the assumption of its «own» restricted viewpoint that each party self
legitimates itself indefinitely, by submitting an endless list of rights. The
coherence of each party appeals therefore to an exterior infinite principle.
There is not, among the parties, a common time-frame, because there are no
issues/themes shared or to be shared: what is missing, indeed, is the
Silvi (Silvi, 2001, pp. 227-228), an analytical philosopher, discusses instead the
assumptions of forgiveness. He identifies three kinds of assumption: a) a factive
assumption (by forgiving one assumes the topicality of the fact for which forgiveness is
granted; b) a negative assumption (by forgiving one assumes that the fact for which
forgiveness is granted is a fact that is viewed as being negative); c) an assumption of
validity (by forgiving one assumes that he/she who is granted forgiveness is responsible
for the deed for which forgiveness is granted).
250
opportunity for an exchange based on a common principle. In other words,
the resolution of a conflict, the remittance of a debt, the exchange of
memories is impossible because the historical identity of each of the
opposing parties is inscribed in an immemorable time which cannot be
remembered and revived in the present. Everybody speaks a language of
their own, narrates their own stories, etc.
Must one therefore accept the idea that in situations of irreconcilable
disagreement (différend, in French, dissidio in Italian) – what Abel terms
the tragic aspect of conflict – one should renounce the possibility of having
recourse to forgiveness? Far from it. Abel indeed claims that on this level it
proves to be one of the most important forms of what Ricoeur terms
«practical wisdom». By reading Hegel not as the philosopher of synthesis
but as the philosopher who has most fully explored the notion of «pratical
wisdom», Ricoeur reminds us that Hegelian forgiveness rests on the very
renounciation by everybody of their partiality, on the acceptance of the idea
by each individual that he/she is to abandon what is identical to
himself/herself, on the consensus both of he who forgives and he who is
forgiven to become other than themselves.
«Practical wisdom», claim Ricoeur and Abel, does not consist in
abandoning the tragic, but in abandoning onself to the tragic, that is to a
wisdom capable of dealing with the destructive effects of disagreement and
of enabling the main actors to assume they themselves disagree on what
divides them. It is against this wall that «moral forgiveness» crashes and in
relation to this wall that it is difficult to place onseself: the parties would
rather go on killing one another – an act which paradoxically deludes them
they are still communicating – rather than surrender to the idea that they
disagree.
How can one therefore overcome this heterogeneity of languages, of
values, of incommensurable memories?
The path recommened by Abel – which we believe can be taken – is
to undertake to conceive of forgiveness as the virtue of compromise, a
«compromise» which obviously he doesn't see as the mere juxtaposition of
two points of view. The disagreement (différend), anyway, as Lyotard
teaches, is never reduced. But how can one forgive when confronted with
the irreducible?
If one attempts to reply, the line of reasoning becomes, if anything,
even more complex.
Forgiveness here is the the virtue of compromise in the sense that it
does not claim, like «moral forgiveness», to re-establish reciprocity, it does
not claim to be the starting point of the mutual recognition of the opposing
parties. As the terms of the disagreement are incommensurable they are
251
neither symmetrical nor asymmetrical. Between them there is no
contradiction, there is neither a main nor a secondary aspect, there is
neither new nor old. Above all there is neither a winner nor a loser. In other
words: what is incommensurable one moment cannot stop being so the next
moment, that is the moment the other party in the disagreement is
recognised (for example inasmuch as «minority») and historicised.
Forgiveness, where there is disagreement, cannot but intervene a
latere of the antagonists. Everybody remains inscribed in his or her past
(immemorable for the other party), in his or her language, in his or her
history. One accepts to forgive knowing that such irriducibility will never
cease. The virtue of compromise therefore consists in managing to abandon
the constant return of the two separate versions through the exercise of a
pratical wisdom which confers awareness to the antagonists:
a) that the disagreement cannot be absorbed and one can only find an
agreement which accounts for the disagreement;
b) that no final word or shared language can be found in which to
formulate the wrong done or suffered;
c) that the attempt to create a tale, a narrative sufficiently ample and
polycentric to contain the plurality of memories and lead them to a
point where they can be reconciled in a virtuous compromise, is
plausible;
d) that the overlapping of different universes is guaranteed by frail
words, which combine heterogeneous modes of discourse;
e) that it is impossible to try to know a priori which role each party will
fill on the scene: after all, we are confronted with neither a forgiving
party nor a forgiven one.
It follows:
a) that forgiveness is what animates a sort of practical imagination,
once accepted there is forever the impossibility of formulating a final
judgement capable of saying «at the same time» what is universally
right for everybody, and what is right for every single individual;
b) that by dilating everybody's language to open a space for
cohabitation and for co-presence, foregiveness does not eliminate the
past but obliges the parties to defuse individual congealed memories
and to start a multi-voice narration through which «I» accept that,
like me, the others might say «I»;
c) that forgiveness obliges each of us to move, to find a new place in
the web of history.
Could these be the frail premises for a peace possible even for future
generations?
252
Schedule 1: Truth Commissions
Country
Uganda
Name of Commission
Report title and date of Institution
publication
Commission of Inquiry Report of the
Presidential
into the Disappearances Commission of Inquiry
of People
into the Disappearances
of People in Uganda
since 25 January 1971,
1975
Period
investigated
1971- 1974
Bolivia
National Commission of No final report
Inquiry into
Disappearances
Presidential
1967 - 1982
Argentina
National Commission on Nunca Mas (Never
the Disappeared
again), 1985
Presidential
1976 - 1983
Uruguay
Commission for the
Investigation of the
Situation of the
Disappeared and Related
Events
Final report of the
Parliamentary
Commission for the
Investigation of the
Situation of the
Disappeared and Related
Events
Zimbawe
Commission of Inquiry
Final report not
published
Uganda
1973 - 1982
Presidential
1983
Commission of Inquiry Did not finish its work
into Violations of Human
Rights
Presidential
1962 - 1986
Philippines
Commission on Human
Rights
Presidential
1972 - 1986
Chile
National Commission for Report of the National Presidential
Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Truth
and Reconciliation, 1991
1973 - 1990
Did not finish its work
Report title and date of
publication
Commission's report,
1992
253
Country
Name of Commission
Institution
Chad
Commission of Inquiry
into the Crimes and
Misappropriations
Committed by ExPresident Habre, His
Accomplices and/or
Accessories
Sudafrica
Commission of Enquiry
into Certain Allegations
made by ex- ANC
prisoners, 1992
Germania
German Parliament's
Final Report, 1999
Study Commission for
the Assessment of
History and
Consequences of the SED
Dictatorship in Germany
El Salvador
Commission on the Truth From Madness to Hope, United Nations 1980 - 1991
for El Salvador
1993
Rwanda
International Commission
Report of the
Nonof Investigation on
International
governmental
Human Rights Violations Commission of
international
in Rwanda since October Investigation on Human organizations
1, 1990
Rights Violations in
Rwanda since October 1,
1990, 1993
Presidential
Report of the
ANC
Commission of Enquiry
into Certain Allegations
made by ex- ANC
prisoners, 1992
Parliamentary
South-Africa Commission of Enquiry Report of the
ANC
into Certain Allegations Commission of Enquiry,
of Cruelty and Human
1993
Rights Abuses against
ANC Prisoners
Period
investigated
1982 - 1990
1979 - 1991
1949 - 1989
1990 - 1993
1979 - 1991
254
Schedule 2: Summary on Amnesty Decisions - Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, 1.11.2000
STATUS
Granted/refused
No status
1.11.2000
54
24 (1.7.2000)
Duplication
37
Scheduled
88
Withdrawn
248
Decision o/s
302
Chamber
142
Hearable
94 (1.7.2000)
Granted
849
Refused
5392
Grand Total
7112
255
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REMARKS ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURTS AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSIONS
FAUSTO POCAR
Professor of International Law,
University of Milan, Italy
Judge, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
During the last decades a growing number of emerging democracies
have faced the problem of promoting and restoring a climate of
reconciliation in the country that might overcome past divisions and
conflicts that had characterised the country’s preceding history. Such
conflicts and divisions had frequently been marked by serious and
widespread violations of fundamental human rights or humanitarian law,
depending on whether the violations were attributable to authoritarian
governments in peacetime or to governmental agents and individuals in the
course of internal armed conflicts.
Recent history shows quite a variety of situations of this kind in most
regions of the world although it is not the purpose of this paper to analyse
them in detail. It has been frequently pointed out that a satisfactory degree
of confidence is required for strengthening the new democratic institutions.
Such confidence could not effectively be achieved, in such situations,
without establishing one credible and definitive truth about the magnitude
of the atrocities and abuses committed during the authoritarian rule or in
the course of an internal conflict. Different measures may be adopted in this
context. Several States – individually but more frequently on the initiative
of and in co-operation with international organisations – have established
special bodies and entrusted them with the investigation of the violations
that occurred over a specific period of time and of the reasons thereof, the
identification of the perpetrators, as well as the determination of the relief
to be given to victims. In light of their mandate, such bodies have been
referred to as Truth Commissions (e.g. in Argentina, Chile, El Salvador,
Haiti, Uganda and Chad), Truth and Reconciliation Commissions (e.g. in
South Africa and in the draft law of Bosnia and Herzegovina), or another
equivalent denomination (like the Commission for Historical Clarification
in Guatemala)( 1).
See HAINER, (1994), «Fifteen Truth Commissions − 1974 to 1994: A
Comparative Study», 16, Human Rights Quarterly, pp.597 ff.
(1)
262
International Criminal Courts and Reconciliation Commissions
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have been regarded as
appropriate tools in light of the fact that criminal prosecutions of
individuals responsible for having committed violations of fundamental
human rights are frequently difficult in the political situation of States
coming out of internal conflicts or a dictatorial government. A Truth
Commission, especia lly if accompanied by amnesty laws, may more easily
prompt the perpetrators to confess their guilt. More significantly, Truth
Commissions have been sometimes regarded as more appropriate for
allowing an overall consideration of the violations that occurred. Such a
consideration, being officially sanctioned, may also serve the purpose of
preserving the memory of past events and of recognising the sufferings of
the victims, thus contributing to answer the demands for justice by the
people.
However, it has also been pointed out that Truth and Reconciliation
Commissions may not fully serve their purposes if they are not followed by
criminal judicial proceedings, at least as far as the perpetration of major
violations of human rights is concerned. A climate of confidence between
the people may be difficult to establish if violators of fundamental human
rights are not brought to justice. Furthermore, it has also been considered
that the conscience of the entire international community would be
offended, should crimes of such gravity remain without a trial and the
persons responsible for them continue to enjoy impunity.
The desirability of prosecuting violators for the crimes committed as
a follow up of the activities of these commissions has been, and continues
to be, at the centre of legal and political discussions within the countries in
which they have been established. But it has to be noted that in recent times
the option of criminal prosecution has been followed, both as an alternative
to the establishment of a Truth Commission and in conjunction therewith.
On the initiative of international organisations, in particular the
United Nations, a growing number of criminal tribunals have been set up or
envisaged during the last decade, and entrusted with the prosecution of
persons responsible for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian
law. It is interesting to note that such a course of action has been followed
both at the international and at the national level. Besides the International
Criminal Trib unal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda, national ad hoc tribunals have been or are being set
up for Sierra Leone, Cambodia, Kosovo and possibly East Timor, with the
understanding that an international participatio n would contribute to their
composition and management. While some of these tribunals were
designed to be the only option to re-establish a climate of confidence in the
population of the country concerned, others are intended to co-exist with
263
Truth and Reconciliation Commissions. The former is in particular the case
for the international tribunals set up so far, although the establishment of a
Truth and Reconciliation Commission is under consideration in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the latter is the case for the national tribunals concerning the
four countries mentioned above (2).
The trend towards a coexistence of Truth Commissions and judicial
criminal bodies (whether international or national with international
participation) may or may not appear predominant. But it has to be stressed,
in any event, that the option which consists in establishing a Truth
Commission that will not be accompanied by the possibility of prosecuting
major crimes before judicial bodies will become the more and more
difficult, not to say impossible, in the next future. The recent entry into
force of the statute of the International Criminal Court on the 1st July 2002
included the pledge, at least for State parties, to prosecute and try persons
responsible for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, even
when the latter are committed in peacetime. In the absence of the
availability of prosecution at the domestic level, the exercise of criminal
jurisdiction over such crimes may be taken up by the ICC. The latter’s
jurisdiction will therefore concur with actions that may be taken by Truth
Commissions established in the State concerned.
The choice made by the international community to ensure the
prosecution and punishment of persons responsible for major violations of
human rights and humanitarian law, whether at the domestic or
international level, raises a number of issues so far as the practice of
establishing Truth and Reconciliation Commissions is concerned. How far
is the coexistence between such commissions and judicial bodies justified?
And how can their role and functions be reconciled and harmonised?
A positive answer to these questions will require that their respective
goals and competence are correctly and clearly defined. In the absence of
such a definition, not only may their activities overlap to some extent; they
may even represent an obstacle for a full and effective exercise of their
competence.
As to the goals, the exercise of criminal jurisdiction by international
(or quasi-international) tribunals is obviously intended to establish the truth
about events that occurred during a civil or ethnic conflict or an
authoritarian rule. The establishment of the truth in concrete cases is
obviously preliminary to any conviction. In this regard, the functions of an
(2)
See in particular, with regard to the special court set up in Sierra Leone,
Frulli, (2000), «The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Some Preliminary Comments», 11,
European Journal of International Law, pp. 857 ff.
264
international tribunal overlap with those of a Truth Commission. However,
the legal instruments establishing such tribunals – be they resolutions of the
United Nations or the treaty on the Statute of the International Criminal
Court − also mention that the crimes falling within their competence have
to be regarded as a threat to international peace and security. Therefore,
measures adopted to bring to justice persons who are responsible for such
crimes are also seen as a contribution to the restoration and maintenance of
peace. It is undeniable that such an aim may also be present in the
establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. However, the
latter’s contribution to peace and wellbeing of a country or a region may
be, and has sometimes been, based on the opposite view, that persons
responsible for serious crimes should not necessarily be brought to justice.
Just to make an example, a decision to grant amnesty to perpetrators with a
view to favouring national reconciliation would certainly claim to
contribute to peace. But the same would also clearly obstruct an
international tribunal in achieving its goal, which is to contribute to peace
by means of submitting those perpetrators to justice. How should the
balance be set? Should one of the two bodies take priority over the other?
And if so which one? Or should the respective areas of competence be coordinated in a different way?
As a first step, it is submitted that areas should be identified, which
would be clearly specific to the functions that can better be performed by
each body. There are activities that an international criminal tribunal or
court (or even a domestic court) would no be able to carry out in its
capacity as a judicial body. Other activities, in turn, would not be
performed properly by a Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and would
have to be handed over to judicial institutions in any event. Such a
preliminary identification of areas specific to each institution would clarify
their fundamental respective functions and form the basis for a co-ordinated
approach (3).
One first area in which an international tribunal would appear to
have a limited role to play concerns an analysis of all the causes of the
conflict or of the authoritarian rule during which the criminal violations
occurred. There is no doubt that the judicial activity of an international
court may occasionally apply a consideration of relevant aspects related to
the origins of the environment, which may have led to the commission of
(3)
In a recent speech, delivered on 12 May 2001 at a conference in Sarajevo, the
President of the ICTY identified some limitations on the activity of the International
Tribunal, and suggested that certain activities could be carried out by a Truth and
Reconciliation Commission. Some of these limitations are considered hereafter.
265
the crimes submitted to it for trial. However, it is not for a judicial body to
analyse all the historical, economic and social causes having determined the
existence of such an environment. On one hand, a tribunal has the duty to
review the events only from the specific angle of the criminal responsibility
of the perpetrators. On the other hand, it is self-evident that a court cannot
undertake a systematic review of all events, but is bound to limit its
consideration to events that are brought to its attention in the indictments. A
systematic review will nonetheless be essential for the purposes of an
effective and long-standing reconciliation between the people in the region
concerned. Only in the light of such a review, accompanied by a wide and
efficient programme of information, will current and future generations
avoid falling into confrontations of a similar nature as those that already
occurred. A review of this kind can be effectively performed by a truth
commission and would justify by itself its establishment.
A second area of specific competence of a truth commission, related
to the one just mentioned, is to build up a collective memory of the events,
based upon a discussion open to all, so that it may be shared by all
individuals in the region concerned. The exercise of criminal jurisdiction by
a court will certainly play a role also in this respect, but, due to the nature
of the procedural requirements for performing a judicial activity, it cannot
be the appropriate forum for an open discussion about the past. Its
contribution will always be incomplete and limited to the perspective of a
consideration of the events that resulted in major violations of fundamental
human rights or humanitarian law. There is no doubt that a Truth
Commission will provide a more general forum to this effect. In this
context, the role to provide a forum for dialogue is stressed by the statutes
of the Truth Commissions established so far. Thus, the statute of the Truth
and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone declares that the
Commission is intended to provide a forum for both victims and
perpetrators to tell their stories and facilitate genuine healing and
reconciliation. Similarly, the draft law of Bosnia and Herzegovina on the
same subject indicates the objective of providing a forum where victims
and persons with information about massive human rights violations in the
past war can be heard.
A third area in which a Truth and Reconciliation Commission may
act more efficiently than a tribunal in situations of massive violations of
human rights may be in providing reparation for the victims. Actually,
providing reparation to victims of crime falls in general terms within the
judicial function of a court and is frequently done by national courts in
accordance with the provisions of their respective criminal procedural laws.
However, while a court may provide reparation to identified victims of a
266
specific crime, it is hardly possible for a court to achieve the same result
when massive violations are at issue. This is especially the case with
victims of armed conflicts or of activities of paramilitary groups, where a
nexus between identified victims and criminal acts cannot be established.
The difficulty of finding a solution to the problem of providing reparation
to victims of widespread crime has been underlined on several occasions,
and it is not necessary to go back here to the resolutions adopted by
international organisations, including the United Nations, on this matter. It
is sufficient to appreciate that a satisfactory solution cannot easily be found
merely by relying on the judicial function and improving its efficiency.
It is not surprising therefore that the question of reparation to victims
has not been dealt with in the statutes of the existing International
Tribunals, even if it has been later discussed both within the tribunals
themselves and within the political bodies that established them. While the
reasons for starting a debate on this issue may also go beyond the general
issue of providing reparation to victims, the outcome of such a debate is far
from being predictable. In any event, it is unlikely that it may lead to
increasing the functions of the International Tribunals with a view to
including therein the provision of reparation to victims other than the moral
reparation resulting from the conviction and sentence of the persons
responsible for the crimes. A Truth Commission – on the basis of an
assessment of the magnitude of the violations suffered by the people
affected by the events – would be in a better position to propose appropriate
reparations that could be given by the authorities. Besides forms of
symbolic or moral reparation designed to take into account the collective
nature of the harm suffered by victims, they may include other measures for
the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations, as is envisaged by
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone. For example,
compensation to be provided to victims from a fund available to the
commission, whose decisions would not necessarily require the
identification of a specific perpetrator. It has to be pointed out, in this
connection, that the statute of the International Criminal Court envisages
that a trust fund be established for the benefit of victims of crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court, and the families of such victims. However,
although the statute gives the Court a role in providing the fund by ordering
that money and other property collected through fines or forfeiture is
transferred to it, the management of and the distribution from the fund will
depend on criteria to be determined by the Assembly of States parties. And
it is likely that the trust fund will not managed by the Court in the
framework of its judicial functions.
267
The above mentioned issues may easily permit to identify
appropr iate criteria for a distribution of competence between international
tribunals and Reconciliation Commissions, and to co-ordinate their
respective functions and activities. The critical question in this context is
whether the persons responsible for offences, which amount to crimes
under international law should be prosecuted. In this area the approaches of
the two institutions may clearly differ and make it difficult to determine
how their role should be co-ordinated.
It should be noted, at the outset, that an issue of this nature could
arise only as far as a crime will fall within the competence of an
international tribunal. The same would apply with respect to a national
tribunal with international participation, or also a domestic tribunal to
which the prosecution of a crime may have been delegated by an
international trib unal. Absent such a situation, the way in which a
Reconciliation Commission may deal with crimes committed during a
conflict or an authoritarian rule will not interfere with an international
tribunal’s activity. The problem would in such a case consist of choosing
between the attribution of competence to truth commissions to deal with
crimes, and the exercise of criminal jurisdiction through ordinary domestic
courts.
When a crime falls within the jurisdiction of an international
tribunal, it would appear obvious that the concurrent competence of a truth
commission to deal with the same crime requires a co-ordination in order to
avoid conflicts. A clear rule establishing whose competence takes priority
would certainly be welcome in such a situation. Any unclear approach
would create misunderstandings and possibly lead to contradictory
decisions that may affect the credibility of both institutions. In light of the
consideration that both of them pursue the goal of establishing peace and
reconciliation through means of action that largely differ, the credibility of
both should be preserved, by permitting both of them to perform effectively
their basic functions. It has to be noted, however, that the choice of
establishing an international criminal tribunal for the prosecution of persons
responsible for the violation of serious violations of human rights law as
well as of humanitarian law has already been made by the international
community. Thus, the only reasonable conclusion appears to be that
international tribunals should enjoy priority over truth commissions.
The issue may however be raised, and has indeed been raised,
whether a co-ordination between the activity of an international tribunal or
court and that of a truth commission should be made in light of the gravity
of the crimes falling within the competence of the tribunal. In particular, it
is suggested that the position of the perpetrator should be taken into
268
account, with a view to submitting to the jurisdiction of an international
tribunal only high ranking persons and leaders. Truth commissions’
competence will consequently be limited to dealing with crimes committed
by low ranking executioners. Such an approach may be valuable, provided
that clear
criteria are applied in order to decide which body will be
competent in a concrete case. A borderline between high and low ranking
perpetrators may indeed not be always easy to determine in a given
situation and may have to take into account individual qualifications and
factual circumstances. Should such a solution be adopted, it would
probably be convenient to leave to the international tribunal to decide
whether to exercise uj risdiction on the basis of an assessment of the
concrete situation and its implications. It cannot be ignored, however, that
other factors should be taken into account in the co-ordination between
truth commissions and international tribunals as regards the prosecution of
perpetrators. National jurisdiction will necessarily play a significant role in
this matter. It is submitted that a correct co-ordination can not be merely
between international tribunals and Truth Commissions but should include
the attribution of cases to domestic courts. There will certainly be cases
that, although their submission to an international tribunal may be regarded
as not justified, will still require to be tried by a court of law rather than
considered by a Truth Commission.
Whatever approach is followed and whatever co-ordination is put in
place, it cannot be denied that Truth Commissions should not be excluded
altogether from dealing with situations revealing the commission of serious
crimes against humanity or war crimes. Confessions of perpetrators before
a Truth Commission may be extremely valuable in order to promote
national reconciliation. It has been stressed that they constitute recognition
not only of the commission of mass crimes but also of the suffering
inflicted on the victims. It must be pointed out however that perpetrators
would be encouraged to admit their crimes before a commission only if
they may derive some benefit from doing so. The problem is therefore to
identify what kind of benefit may be made available to them and which
body should make it available.
At the national level the problem has sometimes been approached by
granting amnesties to perpetrators who voluntarily participate in the work
of a truth and reconciliation commission. That has been the case, for
example, of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for South
Africa(4).However, as has already been mentioned, such an approach would
(4)
See DUGARD, (1988), «Reconciliation and Justice: The South African
Experience», 8, Transnational Law and Contemporary Problems, p. 277.
269
clearly constitute an intrusion in the work of an international tribunal and
obstruct the performance of its functions. It would risk nullifying its
activity and the reasons for its existence. Moreover, since an amnesty
would result in the recognition of the impunity of the perpetrator, it is
doubtful whether and how far it would really contribute to the foundation
of a solid democracy based on national reconciliation, in partic ular when
crimes against humanity and war crimes are at issue. International bodies,
such as the Human Rights Committee under the International Covenant on
Civil and political Rights, have always regarded amnesty laws with great
suspicion ( 5), though especially outside the context of a truth and
reconciliation commission. They have pointed out that amnesty laws may
sanction the spreading of a climate of impunity that would favour further
violations of human rights. On the other hand, it has to be noted that not all
perpetrators may be brought to justice and that certain benefits may also be
given to perpetrators before international or national courts, when they cooperate with the establishment of the truth.
A suggested solution of this dilemma would consist in excluding the
possibility for truth commissions to grant amnesties, but allowing or even
encouraging them to make their assessment of the behaviour of the
perpetrators known to the prosecutors of international tribunals. Their
recommendation would allow the voluntary participation in the
reconciliation process carried out by the commission to be taken into
account as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing, provided that a
perpetrator confirms his co-operative attitude before an international
tribunal by pleading guilty. Whether such an approach would be sufficient
to encourage perpetrators to appear before a Truth Commission to admit
their crimes is questionable. But the shortcomings inherent in allowing a
Truth Commission to grant amnesty are admittedly greater, unless the
granting of amnesty is followed on by measures of publicity such as to be
equivalent to a criminal sanction in the eyes of the civil society. It is clear,
however, that a satisfactory solution has not been found so far in
international and national practice.
In conclusion, although different forms of co-operation between truth
and reconciliation commissions and international tribunals may be
envisaged, they should be compatible with a framework that would ensure
the priority of the activity of the international tribunals when serious
(5)
See POCAR , (1998), La impunidad frente al Comité de derechos humanos de
la ONU, "Contra la impunidad. Simposio contra la impunidad y en defensa de los
derechos humanos" (Plataforma Argentina contra la Impunidad ed.), Barcelona, at 159
ff.
270
violation of human rights and humanitarian law are at issue. Thus, only
when an international tribunal would decide not to prosecute a crime, either
directly or through domestic criminal courts, could a truth commission be
entrusted with the competence to deal with it and to set aside, as the case
may be, criminal prosecution. It must be stressed, however, that the role
that the la tter can perform cannot be underestimated in the delicate area of
bringing about a reconciliation process within the context of emerging
democracies.
JOÃO TIAGO SILVEIRA
Director do Gabinete de Política Legislativa e
Madame Simone Rozès, Presidente da Sociedade Internacional de Defesa
Social para uma Política Criminal Humanista (SIDS),
Senhor Professor De Figueiredo Dias, Vice-Presidente da SIDS,
Senhor Edouardo Vetere, Director do Centro para a Prevenção do Crime
Internacional das Nações Unidas,
Senhor Bruti Liberati, Secretário-Geral da SIDS,
Gostaria, muito rapidamente, de felicitar a SIDS pela organização
deste XIV Congresso de Defesa Social, no qual se discutiram temas
relevantíssimos quanto ao papel do Direito Penal nas sociedades. Questões
como quais os diferentes níveis de responsabilidade em função dos sujeitos
em causa, qual a melhor forma de aferir e avaliar a efectividade das
soluções, qual a função dos Direitos do Homem e o seu papel
simultaneamente legitimador e limitador do papel do Direito Penal ou
questões como qual o critério a utilizar para determinar a necessidade de
uma resposta penal e alternativas a essa resposta são, sem dúvida, questões
da ordem do dia.
É por essa razão que gostaria de felicitar a SIDS, na pessoa da sua
Presidente, pela organização deste Congresso e, particularmente, pela sua
organização em Portugal.
É com muito gosto que vos acolhemos e são sempre, naturalmente,
bem vindos no nosso País.
Uma última palavra, finalmente, para agradecer o trabalho do
secretariado da SIDS e do Dr. Miguel Romão, consultor do Gabinete de
Política Legislativa e Planeamento do Ministério da Justiça, incansáveis na
organização deste Congresso.
SIMONE ROZES
président de la SIDS
Monsieur le Directeur,
vous venez de nous remercier, ce qui est très aimable car c'est à nous
de vous adresser de très profonds remerciements pour tout ce que vous avez
fait pour nous! Nous ne l'oublions pas et nous savons que, si nous avons pu
tenir notre quatorzième Congrès, c'est bien grâce à vous, aux efforts du Ministère de la Justice qui ont été constants, grâce aussi à Monsieur le Professeur Jorge de Figueiredo Dias. Nous avons pu bénéficier de facilités remarquables. Croyez bien que ce fut un plaisir de travailler dans des conditions
aussi exceptionnelles. Le Centre culturel de Belém est magnifique et nous
avons apprécié de pouvoir disposer de ces locaux superbes et modernes
face au merveilleux ensemble du Monastère de Jeronimos et de l'une des
plus belles villes du Monde. Nous vous en sommes reconnaissants. Nous
avons eu aussi beaucoup de plaisir à nous retrouver dans un cadre moins
solennel mais très pittoresque, au bord du Tage, pour le dîner que le Ministère de la Justice nous a offert si généreusement. Il est donc bien évident
que les remerciements les plus chaleureux ne peuvent s'exprimer que de ce
côté-ci!
Je veux aussi remercier tous les participants, nos amis, ici présents.
Moins nombreux que d'habitude en raison des circonstances vous avez tous
tenus à nous apporter votre contribution et je tiens à souligner la qualité des
rapports présentés et des échanges intervenus. Comme vous le signaliez il y
a un instant, Monsieur le Directeur, nous allons partir, les uns et les autres,
avec diverses pistes de réflexion sur les problèmes qui se posent désormais
à nous et qui sont si différents de ceux qui nous occupent habituellement
tant par leur contenu que par l'approche qui doit être la nôtre dans un
contexte qui connaît d'aussi profondes mutations. Notre dernière séance
vient encore de confirmer la nécessité d'un approfondissement des questions posées. Nous devons les aborder sous l'angle particulier du Mouvement de défense sociale. La recherche d'une politique criminelle capable de
permettre à toute société de vivre paisiblement est certes notre objectif,
mais nous savons en même temps que «tous les moyens ne sont pas bons»
et qu'il faut beaucoup de vigilance pour que les impératifs de sécurité indispensables ne remettent pas en cause le respect des garanties qui s'attachent
aux droits de l'homme. Trouver un juste équilibre est bien notre ambition et
je suis heureuse de constater que ce souci est aussi partagé par les plus je u-
276
Séance de clôture/ Closing Session
nes d'entre nous qui s'impliquent avec force dans ces travaux. Je les en remercie. Ils appartiennent à cette génération montante dont nous nous préoccupons, car il est dans notre rôle d'être habité par l'inquiétude sur la qualité
de l'héritage que nous leur transmettons! Mais j'emporte de cette réunion,
de leur contribution, la réconfortante certitude de leur détermination et de
leur engagement dans notre Mouvement.
Avant de nous séparer je voudrais vous demander, Monsieur le Directeur, d'assurer Madame le Ministre de la Justice de notre très réelle gratitude ainsi que tous ceux qui ont travaillé auprès d'elle à la réussite de ce
Congrès.
Je me tourne enfin, «but not least», vers les interprètes sans le squels
nos débats et travaux seraient vains. Merci, infiniment.
LES CONGRES INTERNATIONAUX DE LA SIDS
ISSD INTERNATIONAL CONGRESSES
Ier Congrès
San Remo, 1947
Pour la transformation des actuels systèmes pénaux et pénitentiaires en
systèmes d’éducation et de traitement en rapport avec la personnalité
individuelle des délinquants.
IIe Congrès
Liège, 1949
La personnalité humaine du point de vue des droits de la société dans ses
rapports avec les droits de l’homme.
IIIe Congrès
Anvers, 1954
L’individualisation de la sentence et de l’exécution (observation et
resocialisation).
IVe Congrès
Milan, 1956
La prévention des infractions contre la vie humaine et l’intégrité de la personne
humaine.
Ve Congrès
Stockholm, 1958
L’intervention administrative ou judiciaire
d’adolescence socialement inadaptées.
en
matière
d’enfance
et
VIe Congrès
Belgrade, 1961
Dans quelle mesure se justifient des différences dans le statut légal et le
traitement des mineurs, des jeunes adultes et des délinquants?.
VIIe Congrès
Lecce, 1966
Les interdictions professionnelles.
VIIIe Congrès
Paris 1971
Les techniques de l’individualisation judiciaire.
278
Les Congrés internationaux de la SIDS
IXe Congrès
Caracas, 1976
Marginalité sociale et justice.
Xe Congrès
Thessalonique, 1981
La ville et la criminalité.
XIe Congrès
Buenos Aires, 1986
L’internationalisation des sociétés contemporaines dans le domaine de la
criminalité et les réponses du mouvement de défense sociale.
XIIe Congrès
Paris, 1991
Défense sociale, protection de l'environnement et droits fondamentaux.
XIIIe Congrès
Lecce, 1996
Défense sociale, corruption, protection de l’administration publique et
indépendance de la Justice.
XIVe Congrès
Lisbonne, 2002
Défense sociale et droit pénal pour la protection des générations futures, en
présence des risques nouveaux.

2002 - Societe Internationale de Defense Sociale

Transcrição

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