Tópicos em Contratos - Escola de Economia de São Paulo

Tópicos em Contratos - Escola de Economia de São Paulo

Programa de Mestrado e Doutorado
em Economia
[email protected]
Bolton, P.; Dewatripont, M. Contract Theory. Cambridge:
MIT Press, 2005.
Gallini, N. T. & N.A. Lutz (1992). “Dual distribution and
royalty fees in franchising”. Journal of Law, Economics,
& Organization, 8: 471-501.
Grossman, G.; Katz, M. (1983) Plea Bargaining and
Social Welfare. The American Economic Review, Vol. 73,
No. 4. (Sep., 1983), pp. 749-757.
Jensen, M.C. & Murphy, K.J. (1990). “Performance Pay
and Top-Management Incentives”. Journal of Political
Economy, v. 98, n. 2, pp. 225-264.
Laffont, J.J.; Martimort, D. The Theory of Incentives: The
Principal-Agent Model. Princeton; Princeton University
Press, 2001.
Lafontaine, F. (1992). “Agency theory and franchising:
some empirical results”. Rand Journal of Economics, v.
23, n. 2, summer.
Lafontaine & Raynauld (2002). “The Role of Residual
Claims and Self-Enforcement in Franchise Contracting”.
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper
8868(http://www.nber.org/papers/w8868
Menard, C. (2002). The Economics of Hybrid
Organizations. 6th Conference of the International Society
for New Institutional Economics, MIT-Cambridge-MA,
2002.
Scott, R.; Stuntz, W. (1992). Plea Bargaining as Contract.
The Yale Law Journal, Vol. 101, No. 8, Symposium:
Punishment. (Jun., 1992), pp. 1909-1968
Williamson, Oliver (1996). The Mechanisms of
Governance. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wills, W.P.J. (2007). Lenience in Antitrust Enforcement:
Theory and Practice. World Competition 30(1), 25-64.
Rey, P. e J. Tirole, 2006, Primer on Foreclosure,
Handbook of Industrial Organization, vol. 3, ed. by M.
Armstrong e R.H. Porter, North Holland .
Bernheim, B. e M. Whinston, 1998, Exclusive Dealing,
Journal of Political Economy, 106, 64-103.
Carlton, D. e M. Waldman, 2002, The Strategic Use of
Trying to Preserve and Create Market Power in Evolving
Industries, Rand Journal of Economics, 33(2), 194-220.
Choi, J. P. e C. Stefanadis, 2001, Tying, Investment, and
the Dynamic Leverage Theory, Rand Journal of
Economics, 32(1), 52-71.
Farrell, J. e M. Katz, 2000, Innovation, Rent Extraction,
and Integration in Systems Markets, Journal of Industrial
Economics, 48, 413-432.
Martimort, D., 1996, Exclusive Dealing, Common
Agency and Multiprincipal Incentive Theory, Rand
Journal of Economics, 27(1), 1-31.
Disciplina: Tópicos em Contratos
Professores: Braz Camargo, Klenio Barbosa, Paulo
Furquim de Azevedo
1° Semestre de 2011
EMENTA
Essa disciplina tem como objetivo apresentar assuntos de
fronteira na área de Teoria de Contratos, em suas mais
variadas aplicações, tais como incentivos em organizações,
regulação, concorrência, finanças e governança corporativa,
entre outros. Por seu propósito, a ementa é revista a cada
edição da disciplina, com o intuito de preservar sua
característica de preservar a abordagem de fronteira em
Teoria de Contratos, em suas dimensões teórica e empírica.
METODOLOGI A E PEDAGOGI A
Seminários e discussões de texto.
PROGRAMA
Tópicos em Contratação com risco moral
Sharecropping e Incentivos para executivos
Múltiplos agentes e múltiplas tarefas
Múltiplos principais: Governança corporativa
Tópicos em Seleção Adversa e Screening
Tópicos em Sinalização
Contratos incompletos e Fronteiras da Firma
Tópicos avançados
BIBLIOGRAFI A
Barzel, Y. Mearurement Cost and the Organization of
Markets. Journal of Law and Economics, n. 25, April, 1982.
pp. 27-48.
Becht, M.; Bolton, P. and Röell,A. (2002). Corporate
Governance and Control. NBER Working Paper Series:
9371, Dec 2002
Blair, R.D.; Lafontaine, F. (2005). The Economics of
Franchising. Cambridge Univ Press.
1
Nalebuff, B., 2004, Bundling as an Entry Barrier,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 119, 159-187.
Segal, I., 1999, Contracting with Externalities, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 114, 337-388.
Whinston, M., 2006, Exclusionary Vertical Contracts,
Capítulo 4, Lectures in Antitrust Economics, MIT Press.
Rochet, J.C. e J. Tirole, 2005, Two-Sided Markets: A
Progress Report, Rand Journal of Economics.
Armstrong, M., 2005, Competition in Two-Sided Markets,
Rand Journal of Economics.
Caillaud, B. e B. Jullien, 2003, Chicken & Egg: Competition
among Intermediation Service Providers, Rand Journal of
Economics, 34, 309-328.
Gomes, Renato, 2010, Mechanism Design in Two-Sided
Markets: Auctioning Users, World Congress Econometric
Society, Shanghai, China
Levin, Jonathan, 2010, The Economics of Internet Markets,
World
Congress
Econometric
Society,
Shanghai, China
Weyl, Glen, 2010, A Price Theory of Multi-Sided Platforms,
The American Economic Review, 100(4)
White, Alexander, 2009, Search Engines: Left Side Quality
versus Right Side Profit, Working Paper, Toulouse, France
Bajari, P e S. Tadelis, 2001, Incentives versus Transaction
Costs: a Theory of Procurement Contracts, Rand Journal of
Economics.
Banerjee, Abhijit e Esther Duflo, 2000, Reputation Effects
and the Limits of Contracting: A Study of the Indian
Software Industry, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115,
989-1018.
Gagnepain, Philippe e Marc Ivaldi, 2002, Incentive
regulatory policies: the case of public transit systems in
France, The RAND Journal of Economics, 33 (4), 605-629
Hart, Oliver, Andrei Shleifer, Robert W. Vishny, The Proper
Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to
Prisons, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112( 4), 11271161
McAfee, R. Preston e John McMillan, 1986, Bidding for
Contracts, a Principal-Agent Analysis, The Rand Journal of
Economics, 17(5), 326-338.
Bajari, Patrick, Robert McMillan e Steven Tadelis, 2009,
Incentives and Award Procedures: Competitive Tendering
vs. Negotiations in Procurement, Journal of Law,
Economics, and Organization, 25(2), 372-399
Barbosa, Klenio, 2010, Free-Riding in Procurement Design,
TSE Working paper.
Gagnepain, Philippe e Marc Ivaldi, 2008, Contract choice,
incentives, and political capture in public transit, Working
paper, Toulouse School of Economics
Holmstrom, Bengt e Paul Milgrom, 1987, Aggregation
and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives,
Econometrica, 55 (2), 303-28
Holmstrom, Bengt e Paul Milgrom, 1991, Multitask
Principal-Agent Analysis: Incentive Contracts, Asset
Ownership, and Job, Journal of Law, Economics, and
Organization, 7 (Special Issue), 24-52 3
Rogerson, William P., 1992, Overhead Allocation and
Incentives for Cost Minimization in Defense
Procurement, The Accounting Review, 67 (4), 671-690
Rogerson, William P., 1994, Economic Incentives and the
Defense Procurement Process, The Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 8 (4), 65-90
Rogerson, William P., 2003, Simple Menus of Contracts
in Cost-Based Procurement and Regulation, The
American Economic Review, 93 (3), 919-926
Hart, O., 2003, Incomplete contracts and public
ownership: remarks and an application to public-private
partnerships, Economic Journal
Iossa, Elisabetta e David Martimort, 2008, The Simple
Micro-Economics of Public-Private Partnership, mimeo.
Bennett, J. e Elisabetta Iossa, 2006, Building e managing
facilities for public services, Journal. Publics Economics,
90.
Iossa, Elisabetta e Patrick Legros, 2004, Auditing and
property rights, RAND Journal of Economics, 35 (2).
2004, pp. 356–372
Martimort, D. e Pouyet J., 2005, Build it not: normative
and positive theories of public-private partnerships, WP,
IDEI.
AVALI AÇÃO
Seminários 1: .......................................................... 40%
Seminários 2 ............................................................ 40%
Participação nas leituras: ........................................ 20%
PROFESSOR - CONTATO
Braz Camargo
[email protected]
Klenio Barbosa
[email protected]
Paulo Furquim de Azevedo
[email protected]
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