Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
Transcrição
Stalemate Meets Structural Reform!
WISSENSCHAFT & SICHERHEIT WiSi-Papers Texte des Bundesverbandes für Sicherheitspolitik an Hochschulen Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty von Karsten Pötschke Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 05. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty development to resolve tensions between the organizations.4 A. Introduction After1 the Cold War the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) shaped Europe‟s strategic landscape. During the last 20 years both organizations have changed their character tremendously. Having lost its main raison d´être since the Soviet threat had vanished, NATO is still in the process of defining its new mission. Besides maintaining collective defense as its core function, it is trying to find new uses for its capabilities. Simultaneously, the European Communities (EC) have been transformed with the Treaty of Maastricht (1992) into the European Union. In order to promote political integration the EU is successively equipped with powers and instruments to deal with foreign policy matters. As part of its Common Foreign and Security Policy The objective of the paper is twofold. It strives to analyze the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership. Therefore, it will need to review the current state of the partnership beforehand to identify existing deficits of and risks to (CFSP) the European Union has only recently begun starting with the EU Summit of Cologne B. NATO – EU Strategic Partnership before Lisbon (1999) to develop an European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as integral part.2 The European Union strives for the capability to conduct a broad range of military and civilian operations. Unfortunately, the parallel development of NATO and EU has created some friction since responsibility is not clearly divided among the organizations.3 In response the EU and NATO announced a formal “Strategic Partnership” in 2002 almost 10 years after the start of the parallel the relationship. By focusing afterwards on selected revised European Union treaty provisions, the article will be able to analyze whether existing problems are mended, ignored, or aggravated. Thereafter, it will briefly discuss the possible impact of the development trend of the EU-NATO partnership on international law. The final conclusion will contain an outlook of the future development of NATO-EU relations and, building upon prior findings, some policy advice. The following chapter will focus on the description of the strategic partnership between EU and NATO before the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty. Before looking at the links which have been established between the organizations and how these organizations cooperated in the field, the chapter will first briefly address the question why NATO and EU are doomed to cooperate. Finally, the persistent problems in the relationship between NATO and EU will be reviewed. 1. Reasons for a Strategic Partnership 1 The author holds a bachelor degree in International Relations from Dresden University of Technology. He is currently a LLM (Adv.) candidate in Public International Law at Leiden University. The author wishes to thank Professor Frans A.M. Alting von Geusau and Nicholas Procopenko for their encouragement and perceptive comments. All errors are the author’s own. 2 For a good overview of the development of ESDP see Keukeleire, From Taboo to Spearhead 3 Twenty-one countries belong to NATO and the EU. The six non-NATO members of the European Union are Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Ireland, Malta, and Sweden; the seven non-EU members of NATO are Albania, Canada, Croatia, Iceland, Norway, Turkey and the USA. There are several reasons why NATO and EU need to cooperate thoroughly. The most important ones are: First, as can be seen comparing the current NATO strategy as 5 Washington Summit developed at the 1999 and the EU strategy with 6 respect to CFSP and ESDP , it is apparent that both 4 EU-NATO, EU-NATO declaration on ESDP NATO, Washington Strategic Concept 1999 6 EU, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 1-9 5 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty organizations have partially overlapping missions crises call for a comprehensive approach combining and geographical foci. Both organizations aim to military and civilian efforts.9 Undoubtedly, the EU is bolster European defense and crisis management more proficient than NATO in topics like civilian capacities. In addition, besides having a clear focus reconstruction or the promotion of the rule of law, on Europe, both organizations conduct crisis but it is still lacking necessary assets to conduct management operations worldwide. It is important high intensity combat operation. to note that the EU as an actor who is perceived as “EU capabilities have become the necessary more independent than NATO can be active in complement to NATO‟s military forces in nearly all of regions where NATO engagement is politically the Alliance‟s current operations.” 10 The reality is that 11 impossible. The EU missions to Georgia after the Russian-Georgian war in August 2008, in the Middle East and in the Ukraine can stand as an example. Hence, one organization can stabilize regions which Fourth, both organizations suffer from similar capacity shortfalls. Joint capacity building is likely to benefit both organizations and moderate costs for the member states. The importance of cooperation are also of strategic interest to the other.7 to address joint capability shortfalls is highlighted by Second, the organizations need to coordinate since the fact that the 2009 EU Report on ESDP they partially build upon the same resource pool. As dedicates one third of its section on NATO-EU some countries‟ militaries have to fulfill roles within relations to the work of the joint EU-NATO NATO and the ESDP, they have earmarked their Capability Group.12 resources for use within both frameworks. Hence, two problems arise: Availability and interoperability. Availability is not only an issue when resources are double hatted and are already used within an EU or NATO operation yet are needed by the other organization for its own mission, but also when they are single hatted since then the other organization has no access to these resources at all. Interoperability is important to ensure that national resources can be used in both NATO and EU roles and that resources of countries, not being a joint Fifth, the number of operations where NATO and EU Assets are deployed jointly is rising; recent examples are Afghanistan and the fight against piracy (Operation Ocean Shield (NATO) and Atalanta (EU)).13 Sixth, as Shea points out, in an ever more multipolar world, where power shifts towards Asia, the pressure of North America and Europe increases since both have a common value base resulting in 14 similar policies. member of NATO and EU, can be applied effectively in operations where NATO and EU are jointly engaged.8 9 Third, both organizations lack certain capacities that the other organization can offer. Many of today‟s 7 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 (highlighting added) 8 Here different training standards and equipment have proved to be a problem, since NATO rules of engagement differ from EU rules. See CRS, NATO and EU, 7 and 20 The Counter Insurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan is a perfect example of this complex interplay. See PA Consulting Group, Dynamic Planning for COIN in Afghanistan; NATO, Afghanistan Report 2009; and US Army, COIN Field Manual 10 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 99; Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 32 11 Shea quote a high ranking NATO official, see Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 12 EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34; EU, Development of European Military Capabilities, 6 13 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 14 Ibid., 45 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty To sum up, NATO and the ESDP of the European development commenced with informal “breakfast Union are realities which cannot be denied by the meetings”19 between the NATO Secretary-General other organization. For practical reasons they are de Hoop Scheffer and the High Representative for required to cooperate as long as both of them exist. CFSP Solana, a former NATO Secretary-General The next part will explain how the organizations himself. As the ESDP developed more permanent have structured their cooperation. structures in 2001, expanded institutionalized cooperation became viable. Currently, meetings 2. Conceptual and Institutional Links between the Foreign Ministers of NATO and EU or various the EU‟s Political and Security Committee (PSC) instruments and forums with NATO. The foundation and NATO‟s North Atlantic Council are common for formal cooperation was created with the practice20. Furthermore, EU and NATO have announcement of a “Strategic Partnership” in 2002 established ad hoc working groups addressing The European Union is linked via 15 in the joint “EU-NATO Declaration on ESDP” . The issues such as managing capability goals, the cornerstone of this partnership is the Berlin Plus implementation of the Berlin Plus Agreement, the Agreement of 2003 which gives the European Union exchange of classified information, or the facilitation “assured access” to NATO planning abilities and of “presumed access” 16 to NATO operational capabilities for EU-led missions. Furthermore, both organization confirmed and have constantly geographical dialog.21 In addition, mission working groups have been established to coordinate efforts where NATO personnel alongside EU personnel. 22 are deployed Moreover, the EU has reassured each other that their relationship ought to established a small planning cell at the Supreme be mutually reinforcing and that they respect their Headquarter Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) in decision making autonomy. Additionally, it was 2006 which is reciprocal to the NATO permanent underlined that the development of ESDP takes liaison team to EU Military Staff (EUMS) (since place within the framework of NATO and that NATO 2005).23 However, it appears that the informal staff should remain the main organization for the to staff contacts are most important to smooth the Before day to day cooperation.24 Moreover, the simple fact NATO that the majority of member states belongs to both distinguished itself from the EU via its mandate of organizations or is associated at least via programs collective self defense which contrasts the EU‟s like the NATO‟s Partnership for Peace (PfP) provision of collective security in Europe. the Lisbon Treaty, it seemed more general humanitarian tasks. 17 that 18 guarantees an exchange of information.25 NATO and the EU slowly established institutional Looking at the development of the institutionalized links parallel to the conceptual links. The formal cooperation between the NATO and EU, one is 15 19 16 20 EU-NATO, Declaration on ESDP The agreement reads that NATO will with “strong likelihood” decide that some listed assets and capabilities will be made available to the EU. See EUNATO, Berlin Plus Agreement; see also CRS, FAQ EU, 6; CRS, NATO and EU, 16 17 See for example EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34 and NATO, Straßbourg/Kehl; Duke, Future of EUNATO Relations, 28 18 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 30 Ibid., 33 See NATO, List of Ministerial Dinners. 21 See for example Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96 for the cooperation for the Berlin Plus mission Althea to Bosnia-Herzegovina 22 CRS, NATO and EU, 16 23 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 33 24 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 25 See EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34-35 for current cooperation Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty likely to conclude that a healthy relationship military activities in Afghanistan even within the between both of them exists. However, as will be framework of NATO‟s Provision Reconstruction shown below, this perception is misguiding. Teams (PRT). Shea, the Director of Policy at NATO, concludes that “it is difficult to envisage a major 3. Relationship of Field Operations NATO operation these days in which the EU would NATO and EU have conducted a broad range of not also be present in a significant complementary missions after the end of the Cold War. The role.”29 However, it seems that some operations are relationship pattern between them is and ever was rather competitive than complementary, which is diverse. Both organizations conducted missions especially problematic if shared resources are used. which were totally independent from the other For instance, NATO and EU were competing to organization.26 Many of the EU‟s independent provide air lift capacities for the African Union‟s missions, however, made use of the Berlin Plus mission in Darfur.30 Also, at the Horn of Africa the Agreement since critical assets such as air transport EU mission ATALANTA operates parallel to the capacity were and are missing in the Union‟s NATO‟s Ocean shield with essentially the same arsenal. The first such independent mission was mandate – prevent piracy. CONCORDIA in Macedonia. It seems that the Berlin Plus Agreement is working quite effectively when 4. Deficits and Risks applied.27 The European Union‟s first autonomous Whereas part 1 identified the opportunities created military mission outside the Berlin Plus agreement by cooperation, this part turns to the other side of was ARTEMIS to the DRC contributing to the the coin looking at the deficits of and the risks for stabilization of the security conditions and the the strategic partnership. improvement of the humanitarian situation in Bunia in 2003.28 Some of the independent missions conducted by the EU have in fact been taken over from NATO; an example is the EU mission (EUFOR) Althea which replaced NATO‟s in Bosnia- The relationship between NATO and EU might look healthy, but it is in fact crippled for various reasons. At core of the “stalemate”31 is the fluidity in which both organizations operate and their overlapping membership. On the one hand, fluidity refers to the Herzegovina. ever changing operating environment of ESDP and In some instances EU and NATO missions run NATO. They need to deal with issues ranging from parallel. Ideally they are complementary like in classical Afghanistan. the humanitarian aid and out of area crisis management development of the Afghan National Army, EUPOL to “new” threats like terrorism and organized crime. provides assistance to the Afghan National Police. On Furthermore, provides organizations themselves. NATO and the EU are significant funding, personal and material for non- involved in a transformation process developing While the ISAF European focuses Union on their the national other structures defense, hand, and over fluidity strategies. delivery refers to Having of the three 26 For NATO see Frantzen, NATO and peace support operations 1991-1999 27 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44; EU, ESDP Report 2009, 34 28 EU, Council Decision 2003/432/CFSP; for NATO missions see: NATO, NATO operations and missions 29 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 CRS, NATO and EU, 20; Duke, Future of EUNATO Relations, 32 31 This is the term used by former NATO Secretary-General Japp de Hoop Scheffer, see de Hoop Scheffer, Transatlantic Leadership for a New Era 30 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty variables (environment, NATO, ESDP), which are institutions.”33 Furthermore, the absence of highly volatile and whose future value is hard to common strategy and henceforth priority setting predict, it seems to be almost impossible to define a hampers the effective development of capabilities stable and efficient relationship among the EU and and creates the controversy about deployment of NATO. commonly used resources. On a less abstract level the threats facing the Thirdly, there is a constant fear of competition for relationship are: Firstly, the purpose and mission of especially more mobile, high readiness resources NATO are not clearly defined. The strategic and the fear of independent, uncoordinated action concepts of Rome (1991) and Washington (1999) by one organization. are merely interim measures. Since the end of the unfounded. The examples of the USA‟s coalition of Cold War, which rendered collective security less the willing or the competition in support of the AU‟s important, it is constantly looking for a new raison Darfur mission are telling. Another stunning example d´être. While it is looking for a purpose, NATO does of lacking coordination is the fight against piracy. At not want the EU to occupy any possible roles it the Horn of Africa are currently ships from multiple might want to fulfill itself. This leads to rivalry. The NATO/EU countries deployed in various missions. internal deadlock about strategic future, due to These ships are active under national command, as deadlocked negotiations between the USA and part of the NATO Operation Ocean Shield, the EU Europe as well as the Europeans response to fulfill Operation ATALANTA, or the US led CTF 151.35 34 a This fear is not quite their vision via ESDP, hinders effective cooperation Fourthly, one major reason for the deadlock of EU- between NATO and EU. NATO cooperation relates to Turkey. Not only has Secondly, impacted by either the lack of their own the Turkish blockade “reduced to a farce the regular strategic concepts or their ambiguity, NATO and EU official meetings between the PSC and the NAC[,]” have not gone past their mutual recognition as which makes strategic cooperation impossible, but strategic actors in the European security structure. also everyday cooperation between established a liaison cells is hampered.37 To justify this blockade, common comprehensive strategy is missing. Thus, Turkey claims that it cannot pass NATO intelligence no clear cut burden sharing exists (e.g. NATO to EU, since non-PfP countries Malta and Cyprus focuses on collective security and robust peace could benefit. enforcement, while the EU focuses on policing and Turkeys obstruction of coordination of EU-NATO peace keeping and building). The manner in which relations, it needs to be pointed out that Turkey NATO and EU cooperate led some to conclude that exerts quite some influence over NATO and EU. the “strategic benefits to Europe‟s security have Besides the fact that Turkey can effectively veto any Despite the limited substantial cooperation 32 36 38 Before looking into the reasons for resulted more from a happy convergence of the independent actions of both NATO and the EU than from a deliberately coordinated policy of these two 32 On issues like: defense policy, crisis management, capability building for expeditionary missions, stabilization and reconstruction operations and security sector reform. 33 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 44 CRS, NATO and EU, 7; McNamara, CFSP threatens transatlantic security, 2 35 Wiegold, Wie ernüchternd ist die Piratenbilianz & Order of Battle (Revised) 36 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96 37 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 34 38 Ibid., 29; Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96-97 34 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty NATO decision due to the consensus requirement39, not a viable alternative to formal debates and Turkey‟s geographic location as bridge between decisions. Moreover, Turkey also weakened the EU Europe, the Middle East and Asia is of strategic Battlegroup concept by withdrawing its promised importance. Furthermore, it contribution. Furthermore, the future application of 40 the Berlin Plus Agreement is also unclear due to hence it has a great potential to support peace possible Turkish delays. ALTHEA might be its last keeping operations. Turkey has already done so in mission.44 excluding Russia, commands by far the biggest European military, support of several ESDP mission. 41 Fifthly, the current institutional links are weak and Turkey‟s behavior derives from various reasons. deficient, especially for cooperation on strategic Turkey is not interested in seeing a separate matters. The Berlin Plus Agreement might have European Security Identity evolve at the decline of worked well in the two instances where it was NATO. Additionally, it has virtually no weight in applied; however, it is too cumbersome and ESDP as compared to its active role in the Western politically complex to be suitable for some of the European Union before. Ankara is also upset with EU‟s envisioned fast crisis response scenarios. the EU because of the slow progress in its Additionally, it does not explicitly allow strategic accession negotiations. Furthermore, the historical debate. Furthermore, it forces the EU to adapt to conflict between Greece, Cyprus and Turkey over NATO structures.45 Therefore, some like Howorth Northern Cyprus has recently reached new heights. conclude that “an entirely new set of arrangements Additionally, Cyprus is reciprocally blocking Turkish therefore needs negotiating.” participation in EU security activities like the EDA. It that this is going to happen any time soon especially is mainly the political disagreement between Turkey because of the Turkish blockade.47 Moreover, and Cyprus that has “essentially held the entire outside Berlin Plus, the capacity to conclude ESDP-NATO relationship hostage for years.” 42 46 It is highly unlikely agreements quickly between NATO and EU to arrange for joint deployment was hampered48 by the The deadlock is hampering everything from strategic debate, over every day exchange of lack of international European Union. legal personality of the 49 sensitive information up to the set up of new missions or the management of existing missions. Sixthly, recently the base for the development ESDP For instance, Turkey‟s refusal to let Cyprus within the framework of NATO known as the three participate in a police training mission in Southern Ds Kosovo complicates this mission. 43 (no decoupling, no discrimination, no Strategic duplication), a term coined by Madeleine Albright in cooperation on questions like Afghanistan or Darfur 1998, is being questioned.50 ESDP challenges all is impossible. The existing informal channels are 44 39 NATO, Consensus-Decision Making In fact, it has with 514.000 troops twice as much as Germany (215.000). Russia excluded. For military comparison see Globalfirepower, Turkey Military Strength and Globalfirepower, Germany Military Strength 41 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 98 42 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96-97 43 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 39 40 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 97; see also Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 33; CRS, FAQ EU, 6; CRS, NATO and EU, 17 45 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 34 46 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 97 47 In fact, Ankara already delayed the conclusion of the Berlin Plus Agreement by two years, see Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 97 48 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 45 49 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 30 50 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 100 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty three D‟s by its very design. Duplication is dictates is the terms of the development of ESDP inevitable. and the strategic partnership, is under siege.54 For example, after in 2002 the compromise to add a small operational planning cell to EUMS could prevent the establishment of a 51 separate EU Military Headquarter, 5. Interim Conclusion the 2008 EU As has been shown, it is in the interest of North strategic review based on operational experience America and Europe that the EU and NATO concluded that the EU still needed its own military cooperate thoroughly and avoid competition and 52 planning capacity. The fear of decoupling is rivalry. Crises like in Somalia or Afghanistan call for 55 evident, considering the negative reactions of some long term engagement of NATO and EU. NATO countries because the EU did not consult potential for synergies and greater coherence NATO before starting its latest autonomous mission exists.56 Yet, the formal relationship between them to Congo, even though EU did not request the use is still unsatisfactory or even dysfunctional. Their 53 of NATO. Yet, on the other hand not only the The relationship is dominated by “political and functional 57 Europeans are striving for more independence confusion.” Lately, it seems that “neither entity is through ESDP, but also the USA has recently at all interested in a formal division of labour.”58 detached itself from the NATO framework when it Cooperation under the Berlin Plus Agreement, engaged in “coalitions of the willing”. The reason for except for existing missions, is steadily declining.59 the decoupling process is the growing division This is even more surprising as the agreement between European and Americans about the offers a partial raison d’être for NATO after the Cold strategic security interest of each region. This War, which, henceforth, should be interested in its transatlantic divide is best seen in the struggle to implementation. The various deficits identified are find a new security strategy for NATO. the cause and catalyst for the diminishing scope of cooperation between NATO and the EU. The Lisbon In conclusion, the problems the NATO-EU Treaty impacts on both will be discussed next. partnership is facing are intrinsically linked to the problems NATO and the EU face by themselves: The divide between the their member states about the proposed role for the organization in the future, the fear of each organization and member states to C. Possible Impact of the Lisbon Treaty on the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership Subsequently, selected provisions of the Treaty on be sidelined in important decisions as well as very the European Union (TEU) and of the Treaty on the tight military budgets and limited military capabilities Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) as threaten security cooperation among the two organizations. Furthermore, the assumption that NATO is the senior partner in the relationship, who revised by the Lisbon Treaty, which are relevant for the NATO-EU Strategic Partnership, will be examined. The focus will be on those prominent provisions which either differ from the Nice Treaty or 54 51 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 33-34; CRS, NATO and EU, 16 52 EU, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 9 53 CRS, NATO and EU, 20 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 98; CRS, NATO and EU, 23 55 Shea, Ten Years of ESDP, 45 56 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 96 57 Ibid., 96 58 Ibid., 99 59 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 29 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty will likely have an impact on the Strategic however, keeping that the organic development of Partnership. ESDP occurred mainly outside the treaty structure, the Lisbon Treaty merely “brings the ESDP and all 1. General its development since the Cologne European 65 Prior to any in depth analysis of the Lisbon Treaty, it Council in 1999 within the Treaty framework.” is important to note that the Lisbon Treaty Secondly, despite the formal abolition of the EU‟s resembles most of the provisions which already pillar structure, it seems to continue to exist at least were contained in the European Constitution; in implicitly. For instance, all major substantial 66 total over 90 percent of the structure of the decisions require unanimity , only implementation constitutional treaty have been preserved, and even decisions in non CFSP matters are subject to more in case of CFSP.60 However, despite that the qualified majority voting. Yet, in case of vital interest provisions on CFSP and ESDP proved to be the even implementation decisions can be referred to “most uncontroversial” in the negotiation and the European Council for a decision by unanimity.67 62 academic debate 61 significant Additionally, Article 31 TEU prohibits any kind of about their quality and the legislative act. Moreover, Article 24 TEU stresses ratification process of the treaty, For that the procedures of CFSP must be strictly instance, Sally McNamara perceives the Lisbon observed, and Article 352 TFEU underlines the Treaty as the “most significant boost to date” of prohibition of the use of implied powers. Therefore, CSFP that effectively “remov[es] foreign policy form it can be concluded CFSP and CSDP essentially the intergovernmental sphere and mak[es] it a remain an intergovernmental matter.68 If it however supranational EU competence” and that “the Lisbon represents a threat to NATO and the partnership is treaty represents a major threat to the NATO a different matter, which will be discussed below. impact on 63 alliance. transatlantic Contrary, relations exists: the International Security Information Service concludes that many provisions of the treaty “do not challenge the essential intergovernmental nature of foreign and security policy decision making.”64 Undoubtedly, this second interpretation appears after all more convincing. First, it might be true that in direct comparison with the Nice Treaty, the Lisbon Treaty represents a significant restructuring of CFSP and ESDP; 60 With respect to CFSP only three relevant changes occurred: First, the ECJs jurisdiction is more limited with respect to CFSP (Art. 24 TEU); a separate data protection clause has been introduced, and the principle of implied powers does explicitly not apply to CFSP (Art. 352 TFEU); Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 2-5; CRS, FAQ EU, 3 61 Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 104 62 A very good summary can be found at Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 3-5 63 McNamara, CFSP threatens transatlantic security, 1, 10 64 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 1 65 DGExPo, Lisbon and its implications for CFSP, 3 66 Constructive abstention is allowed (Art. 31 (1) 3rd sentence TEU); see also Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 23 67 Art. 31 TEU in the Nice Treaty the threshold for referral was lower: Only “important” interests must have been in stake for a referral. See also Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 24-25 68 So concludes also Wessels/ Bopp, Intuitional Architecture after Lisbon, 10-11 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty Furthermore, it is remarkable that new list contains 2. EU Objectives and Missions a) Objective of CFSP and Extended Petersberg explicitly the task of conflict prevention and postconflict stabilization, besides the old tasks of peacekeeping and peace-making, but also the task Tasks of combating terrorism. In addition, Article 42 As ESDP, now formally CSDP, is an “integral part” 69 of the Unions CFSP, it ought to contribute to the stresses the coherent civilian-military approach of ESD. Union objectives as set out in the Preamble, Article In conclusion, the new aims and objective provisions 3 (5) and Article 21 TEU. reflect the EU‟s desire to become a global actor and In comparison to Nice several differences can be crisis manager. On the one hand, the extension of identified in the Union‟s objectives which can have the Petersberg Tasks can lead to increased an impact on the conceptual relationship between tensions and pressure to coordinate with NATO as it NATO and EU. Article 3 contains an expanded list aims to be active in the same area (e.g. terrorism). of common values which characterize the EU On the other hand provides the EU‟s explicit focus internally and that it seeks to promote externally. It on prevention and post-conflict stabilization and is important to note that the EU has added the civilian-military cooperation potential for a burden “protection of its citizens” as a new aim. Article 3 sharing.76 The preamble and Article 3, in particular, and 21, which combines several Nice Treaty contribute to widening the transatlantic conceptual articles, underlines the Union‟s character as a divide as they reaffirm the European position on “civilian power”70 willing to export its values and issues like the respect for the United Nations system promote worldwide development.71 and the preferred mode of conflict resolution. The Lisbon Treaty also updates the ESDP mission b) Towards a Truly Common Defense Policy task list.72 Compared to the old TEU this Petersberg The Lisbon Treaty maintains the goal of a common Task73 list seems quite extensive.74 However, if defense policy. However, the language in some compared to the latest mission list as set out in the parts of new Treaty is more compelling than in Head Line Goal 2010 (2004) the task extension previous treaties. For instance, the ESDP was seems less dramatic.75 Yet, it can be seen as renamed to CSDP. Article 42 (2) TEU now states reaffirming of the EU‟s strategic development. that CSDP “shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy” and “this will lead 69 Art. 42 (1) TEU Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 7-8 71 Articles 11(1), 131, 177, 181a TEU (Nice version) 72 Article 43 TEU 73 The mission list was only included with the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997 to the EU. Originally it was a task list compiled by the Western European Union in 1992. See WEU, Petersberg Declaration 74 Article 17 TEU (Nice version) only included humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping and tasks of combat forces crisis management. 75 DGExPo, Lisbon and implications for CFSP, 56 70 to a common defense”. The provisions promote the doubling of capacities and open the opportunity for decoupling from NATO strategy. The changed provisions can especially harm the partnership if read in conjunction with the new aim of “citizen protection” as they encroach on NATO‟s core function. 76 The Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean is one example, which could lead to coordination difficulties. Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty c) Formal Relationship to NATO Furthermore, besides leading the Foreign Affairs Like previous treaties the revised TEU stresses in Article 42 (2), directly after it confirmed the perspective of the developing a truly common defense policy, that the Union shall respect the obligations of member states under the North Atlantic Treaty and that CSDP shall be compatible with NATO defense policy. Yet, paragraph 2 does not state that CSDP will be developed within the NATO policy framework. However, the newly established provision on mutual assistance 77 Council he or she will be the Vice President of the Commission. The tasks of the HR, inter alia, are to representing the Union‟s position in International Organization, to harmonize Member States views and to preside over the CFSP bodies. The wish to create greater policy coherence through new institutional structures is supplemented by expanding the obligation of member states to confirm with Union policy. Article 24 (3) TEU adds to the existing commitment to refrain from any action reaffirms that NATO will “remain[] the foundation of […] collective defence and the forum for its implementation [for NATO members].” The future which is contrary to the interest of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness the obligation to “comply with the Union‟s action in [CFSP]”. Hence, the will show how much these provisions are a mere lip member states‟ obligation to coordinate themselves service to calm some NATO member states and is enhanced. 82 The impact on the behavioral pattern improve the relations to NATO. However, the of member states remains to be seen.83 absence of such provisions would have been certainly destructive for NATO-EU relations. The major changes in institutional architecture certainly do have an impact on NATO-EU relations. 3. Institutions and Procedure First, they are likely to create greater policy a) Longer Presidency, High Representative and coherence among the European states, which eventually will tilt the balance of power in NATO and European External Action Service in the strategic partnership towards Europe as the The Lisbon Treaty aims to provide greater visibility, USA will have more difficulties countering pre- stability and coherence in the Union‟s CFSP by negotiated European consensus. Secondly, as the prolonging the presidency of the European Council HR will make a difference in framing EU policy to two and a half years78 and the creation of the towards NATO, its election mechanisms require “High Representative of the Union for Foreign some attention. The required qualified majority could is either be achieved through a “pro integration” or “pro supported by the newly created European External NATO” coalition or from 2017 onward by all 23 Affairs and Security Policy” 79 (HR), who The HR will wield smaller member states plus two big states.84 Lastly, substantial power as he will link the Council to the the new architecture has the potential to address the 80 Action Service (EEAS). Commission by combining the roles of the former High Representative for CFSP in the Council and the 77 78 79 80 81 Commissioner for External Art. 42 (7) TEU Article 15 (5) TEU Article 18 TEU Art. 27 (3) TEU ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 2 Relations. 81 82 For a detailed description of member states obligations see Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 12 83 For a detailed explanation of institutional changes see Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 14-23 especially 16 84 „Big states“ are Germany, France, United Kingdom and Italy. Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 20 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty Turkey-problem as it allows member states to adopt more decoupling and duplication. In order to benefit decisions with qualified majority if they act upon a the partnership the USA and Europe will have to 85 proposal from the HR. Hence, the Union could agree on common priorities and threats that need to approve actions that improve the relationship with be countered. Such agreement will depend on the Turkey even against the opposition of Cyprus. outcome of NATO‟s strategic debate. Furthermore, However, due to the provisions limitation in case of NATO‟s capabilities development mechanism and “vital interests” and the exclusion of matters with EDA need to establish a formal relationship, which security and defense implications, it remains to be is also less likely today. seen to what extend the provisions can be applied. 4. Other Instruments b) EDA a) Mutual Assistance and Mutual Solidarity The European Defense Agency (EDA) is not an Clause invention of Lisbon. It was established by the Council of Ministers in 2004 “to improve the EU‟s defense capabilities.” 86 It came into being despite The mutual assistance clause 93 clause 92 and the solidarity are important innovations. The solidarity the failed ratification of the Constitutional treaty. It is clause will not directly impact the NATO-EU the perfect example that “institutional changes relationship as its application is limited to terrorist within the CFSP are also pursued without the official attacks and man-made or natural disasters. It has, 87 however, the potential to supplement NATO efforts However, the Lisbon Treaty did not only bring EDA in preventing and reacting towards terrorist attacks within the treaty structure, but also highlighted since it includes also non-military actions. procedure of treaty revisions and ratification”. EDA‟s importance of the improvement of European military capacities by the frequency and compelling The mutual assistance/defense clause can however manner it referred to EDA.88 It underlines the wish be perceived as a threat to NATO. The including of European states to make the EU also a military saving clause, which prohibits the treaty from actor on the international scene.89 prejudging NATO‟s collective defense system, is merely cosmetic. If the mutual assistance/defense The EDA is critical in the attempt to encourage clause is seen in conjunction with the provisions on more amongst establishing a common defense policy and the goal European allies. Indisputably, the choices EDA will of protection of European citizen, it is apparent that make are going to be important for NATO-EU the clause encroaches on NATO‟s core function – joint relations. 90 R&D and procurement The European capability building can collective self-defense. However, Duke concludes have “beneficial effects on allied contributions to that despite the provision the EU will not assume a 91 NATO,” as Duke predicts, but it could also lead to classical collective defense function.94 Currently, the EU lacks the military capacity to displace NATO as 85 Art. 31 (2) TEU EU, Joint Action, 2004/551/CFSP 87 Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 28 88 Mainly Art. 42 (3) and 45 TEU, see also Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 32 89 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 4 90 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 38 91 Ibid., 28 86 92 Article 42 (7) TEU; detailed analysis of the article can be found at DGExPo, Lisbon and its implications on CFSP, 8 93 Art. 222 TFEU 94 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 31; also Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 11 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty foundation for Europe‟s defense. Yet, the pure member existence of the clause will put strain on the NATO- intergovernmental cooperation.100 states to create more than EU relations. The introduction of these mechanisms allows for a Europe of two speeds; A hard core101 of particular capable states could now go ahead with further b) Permanent Structured and Enhanced Cooperation Procedure Strategic Partnership is ambiguous. PSCo is likely In reaction to the existing ESDP rhetoric-resource gap95 and the Union‟s desire to handle the extended Petersberg Tasks, the Lisbon Treaty expands the 96 existing mechanism “Enhanced Cooperation” to ESDP and introduces the new mechanism of 97 “Permanent Structured Cooperation” (PSCo). The later is especially interesting for the EU-NATO relationship. Member States “whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitment to one another […] with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structure cooperation”. The PSCo is established by QMV in the Council after consultation with the HR. The details of PSCo are laid out in detail in a specific protocol. It defines the “higher criteria” threshold and calls upon the participants “to take concrete measures to enhance the availability, defense integration. The impact on NATO and the interoperability, flexibility and deployability of their forces.”98 They shall cooperate to strengthen European military capacities through encouraged improved joint procurement interoperability. projects Furthermore, and PSCo provides a strong incentive for non participants to improve their own military capacities in order to join the PSCo. On the other hand, the risk exist that a small group of EU nations pool their military resources “to form an army of 60.000 to undertake EU missions.” McNamara concludes that since no additional troops would be enlisted, “either [forces] who are already committed to NATO [would] be counted twice, or, in the worst case scenario, troops [would] be withdrawn from existing NATO Missions.”102 Additionally, better coordinated and capable Europeans could also aggravate the deadlock within NATO and the NATO-EU relationship since they are more likely to challenge the USA‟s and NATO‟s leadership. c) International Legal Personality in joint procurement and development programs and regularly review their commitments with respect The explicit recognition of to the changing security environment and the EU‟s personality is likely to strengthen the Union‟s missions. Furthermore, they are called upon to perception as a global actor. develop their defense capacities in multinational facilitate and accelerate the formal conclusion of 99 the Union‟s legal 103 Additionally, it will forces . In fact, PSCo is one of the few CFSP agreements with other international actors, including provisions that clearly show the motivation of NATO, improving the 100 95 96 97 98 Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 32 Art. 326-334 TFEU Art. 42 (6) icw 46 TEU DGExPo, Lisbon and its implications for CFSP, 7 99 Protocol. The Battelgroup concept is also included in the Union‟s reaction time. ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 4 At the beginning these are most likely the Defense G6: Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, Spain and Poland. 102 McNamara, CFSP threatens transatlantic security, 11 103 Art. 37 TEU icw Art. 47 TEU; Wessels/ Bopp, Institutional Architecture after Lisbon, 3 101 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty However, it is unlikely to resolve the political an attempt to dismantle the pillars”108 and that “the deadlock preventing the conclusion of any kind of treaty underscores the EU‟s long held ambition to agreements between NATO and EU. become a global power.109 d) Other Keeping in mind the deficits and risks identified in Two other innovations need mentioning. First, Article 41 (3) provides a procedure “guaranteeing rapid access to the Unions budget for urgent financing of initiatives in the framework of” CFSP. This includes the set up of a rapid start-up fund to finance ESDP mission.104 Such a measure is likely to increase the Unions crisis reaction time. However, it might harm the NATO-EU relations, as it strengthens the EU‟s crisis first responder capacities, which impacts the debate on appropriate chapter B, the question whether the Lisbon Treaty harms or helps NATO and the Strategic Partnership cannot be answered easily. On the one hand, for example, the recognition of NATO as prime collective defense mechanism is positive. On the other hand, the affirmation of the creation of a common defense policy combined with the introduction of a mutual assistance clause are very likely to harm the relationship as they fuel the traditional 3-D fears.110 The impact of other provisions like the ones aiming at joint defense roles of NATO and EU. procurement needs to be assessed in the light of Second, the Lisbon treaty also institutionalizes the 105 future events. Currently, it is not possible to to “entrust the implementation of an EU conclude whether they will help the Alliance, i.e. by mission” to a group of member states who are creating a bigger and better resource pool available practice 106 “willing and have the necessary capacities.” This to the Alliance, or harm it, i.e. by substituting procedure is similar to the delegation of UN mission armament cooperation in NATO for EU cooperation or even NATO non-Article 5 missions to certain and withdrawing resources from the Alliance. member effective Additionally, the new Treaty stresses the European implementation of ESDP.107 This provision could perception on foreign and security policy, which is benefit NATO because it encourages capacity likely to reinforce the transatlantic divide. The further development to fulfill delegated tasks. However, it development could also limit the availability of high quality capacities will also impact the debate on the division resources for NATO, as they may be already used of labor between NATO and the EU. More in EU missions. importantly, some core problems of the NATO-EU states. It allows the of European crisis management relationship, like the Cyprus-Turkey deadlock, are 5. Interim Conclusion not or only insufficiently addressed. The Lisbon Treaty is not a revolutionary jump in the Therefore, de Hoop Scheffers conclusion that development of ESDP, but it cements its progress Lisbon will not unlock the institutional stalemate in and hints the direction of its further development. the EU Relationship is probably correct. 111 The One can agree with the conclusions that “it is clearly 104 The provision emulates the current informal funding practice for missions like Athena. DGExPo, Lisbon and its implications, 3 105 E.g. Artemis 2003 with France as lead-nation. 106 Art. 44 TEU 107 ISIS, Impact of Lisbon, 4-5 108 Ibid., 6 McNamara, CFSP threatens transatlantic security, 9 110 Ibid., 10 111 de Hoop Scheffer, Transatlantic Leadership For A New Era 109 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty treaty, by setting a clear course towards integration, help to develop legal rules and regulation governing is more likely to aggravate the existing deadlock in a more supranational cooperation. Furthermore, as NATO and the Strategic Partnership. Following the EU member states limit their sovereignty by ratchet integration model the treaty will put more participating in the ESDP, it seems possible that the pressure on the USA and NATO to adapt to Europe legal concept of sovereignty is impacted, for as Europe‟s position is becoming more rigid. example, further limiting the scope of the domain reserve. D. Impact on the Development of International Law The current development of the EU-NATO Relationship, impacted by the Lisbon Treaty, could have in the long run a profound impact on the development of international law. Three distinct E. Conclusion and Advice Unfortunately it is true that “despite overlapping membership and interests, NATO and the European Union have struggled to establish a cooperative and modes can be identified. complementary relationship.”112 The main problems The first mode is the impact via the “European bothering approach to security”. Firstly, by acting coherently conceptual transatlantic divide, which hampers the (e.g. actions, declarations, voting behavior in UN ongoing transformation process of NATO as well as General Assembly) the European states could Turkey‟s blockade of NATO-EU cooperation. The contribute to the formation of soft law or even deadlock in NATO‟s new strategy development and custom. The further development can impact the the hampered EU-NATO strategic partnership are in legal concept of security (human security, link harsh contrast to the progressive development of between security and development), the concept of the ESDP, which can partially be understood as a humanitarian intervention and the use of force. The reflex to the standstill in NATO and the partnership. strict adherence to UN rules is likely to strengthen Whereas the EU seems to have found its future role the UN system. Secondly, a proactive EU could in nation building and crisis management and is promote European values like the rule of law as well rapidly developing structures and instruments to as human rights worldwide. match its vision, NATO is still puzzling where it NATO-EU relation stem from the belongs to the 21st century. The second mode results from the cooperation between NATO and EU. The cooperation could The Lisbon Treaty, even though not revolutionary, further develop the law of cooperation among underlines the EU‟s drive for more independence international organizations, by helping to resolve and points towards the creation of an “ever closer such questions as whether an organization can be union” also in security and defense issues. It is held legally responsible for the acts of another when unlikely to solve the existing deadlocks, but is more it shared its assets (logistics, intelligence). likely to contribute to the transatlantic strategic divide. The final mode results from further EU integration. Because the Union is striving towards future integration in areas previously reserved for international-governmental cooperation, it could 112 CRS, FAQ EU, 6 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty The more the pattern of EU progressive‟s Keeping the history of European integration development and its establishment as a global crisis in mind, NATO, but in particular the USA, manager with a comprehensive civilian-military should accept that CSDP will boost the strategy in contrast to the deadlock in NATO EU’s civilian and military capacities to transformation and EU-NATO relations persists, the operate independently from NATO. NATO more pressure will come upon NATO to define its should not perceive this as threat to its strategy in response to the EU‟s concept. 113 It existence, but rather accept it as reality and seems we are at a turning point of the relations seize the opportunity to build its new between NATO and ESDP. Until recently, NATO strategic concept in response to the path limited the scope in which ESDP could develop; chosen henceforth, it might be the ESDP defining what Remembering its origins and capacities NATO‟s role in the world should be. NATO should retain its character as a by the European Union. military and (collective self-) defense However, this is far from concluding that NATO will organization disappear. In the foreseeable future NATO will and be a forum of transatlantic exchange. remain an important organization114 for the following reasons: First, NATO‟s, but especially the USA‟s The EU has proven itself as a valuable and Canada‟s military capacities and knowledge is crisis manager. It should continue to boost still indispensable for the EU and the UN to resolve its own civilian and military capacities to high intensity conflicts. Furthermore, although the match its ambitious vision. To preserve the transatlantic the transatlantic relationship it should refrain relationship between North America and Europe is from becoming the second collective self- and will remain special. The European continent is defense organization on the continent. link has lost importance, well aware that several conflicts (e.g. Palestine, Iran) can only be solved with the help of the United Since both organizations are still evolving, States.115 The complete decoupling of Europe of NATO and the EU should abandon their North America is therefore very unlikely. With this attempts to define a common strategic perspective NATO will remain the forum for relationship.116 Rather they should in the transatlantic security and defense cooperation. short and medium term improve their adhoc Based on the analysis of the relationship of EU and coordination and consultation mechanism. NATO and the trend shown by the Lisbon Treaty the following advice may be derived: The transatlantic divide needs to be addressed urgently. It can only be closed by balancing the leadership ambitions of the EU and the US and mutual understanding of each other‟s world perception. Bilateral 113 So concludes also Duke, Future of EU-NATO Relations, 30 114 Howorth explicitly concludes that NATO will stay the “primary body for coordinating military, security and defense policy among its 28 member states.” Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 105 115 EU, Report on the Implementation of the European Security Strategy, 11 dialogue between the US and European 116 So concludes also Howorth, NATO and ESDP, 106 Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty states as well as between the USA and the European Union should be improved. The Lisbon Treaty could not remove the Turkish blockade of the Strategic Partnership. It can only be solved if USTurkish and EU-Turkish relations are improved in a comprehensive manner also 117 outside defense the security realm. F. Bibliography 1. 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The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty Wiegold, Thomas (2009): Wie ernüchternd ist die Piratenbilianz & Order of Battle (Revised), blog entry of 28.12.2009; available at: http://wiegold.focus.de/augen_geradeaus/2 009/12/wie-ern%C3%BCchtern-ist-diepiratenbilanz-order-of-battle-revised.html (11.02.2010) Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty G. Appendix Extracts from the revised Treaty on European Union118 Article 3 (5) TEU In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter. (e) encourage the integration of all countries into the world economy, including through the progressive abolition of restrictions on international trade; (f) help develop international measures to preserve and improve the quality of the environment and the sustainable management of global natural resources, in order to ensure sustainable development; (g) assist populations, countries and regions confronting natural or man-made disasters; and (h) promote an international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good global governance. Article 21 TEU 1. The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law. The Union shall seek to develop relations and build partnerships with third countries, and international, regional or global organisations which share the principles referred to in the first subparagraph. It shall promote multilateral solutions to common problems, in particular in the framework of the United Nations. 2. The Union shall define and pursue common policies and actions, and shall work for a high degree of cooperation in all fields of international relations, in order to: (a) safeguard its values, fundamental interests, security, independence and integrity; (b) consolidate and support democracy, the rule of law, human rights and the principles of international law; (c) preserve peace, prevent conflicts and strengthen international security, in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, with the principles of the Helsinki Final Act and with the aims of the Charter of Paris, including those relating to external borders; 118 (d) foster the sustainable economic, social and environmental development of developing countries, with the primary aim of eradicating poverty; 3. The Union shall respect the principles and pursue the objectives set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 in the development and implementation of the different areas of the Union's external action […]. Article 24 1. The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence. The common foreign and security policy is subject to specific rules and procedures. It shall be defined and implemented by the European Council and the Council acting unanimously, except where the Treaties provide otherwise. The adoption of legislative acts shall be excluded. The common foreign and security policy shall be put into effect by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and by Member States, in accordance with the Treaties. The specific role of the European Parliament and of the Commission in this area is defined by the Treaties. The Court of Justice of the European Union shall not have jurisdiction with respect to these provisions, with the exception […]. 2. […], the Union shall conduct, define and implement a common foreign and security policy, based on the development […] the achievement of an ever-increasing degree of convergence of Member States' actions. Emphasis added. Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty 3. The Member States shall support the Union's external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area. The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations. The Council and the High Representative shall ensure compliance with these principles. Article 37 The Union may conclude agreements with one or more States or international organisations in areas covered by this Chapter. Article 42 TEU 1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States. 2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. 3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States which together establish multinational forces may also make them available to the common security and defence policy. Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as „the European Defence Agency’) shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities. 4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate. 5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article 44. 6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfill higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43. 7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty Article 43 (1) TEU The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories. (e) contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector […]. Article 46 (1) TEU 1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation […], which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative […]. Article 44 (1) TEU Article 47 TEU Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. […] Article 45 (1) TEU 1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council, shall have as its task to: (a) contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments […]; (b) promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods; (c) propose multilateral projects […], ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes; (d) support defence technology research, […]; The Union shall have legal personality. Article 222 (1) TEFU 1. The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilise all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to: (a) - prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; - protect democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; - assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack; (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster. Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010 Stalemate Meets Structural Reform! The Current State of the NATO – EU Strategic Partnership and the Impact of the Lisbon Treaty Der Bundesverband Sicherheitspolitik an Hochschulen (BSH) ist der Dachverband sicherheitspolitischer Hochschulgruppen an deutschen Universitäten. Der BSH setzt sich aus sicherheitspolitisch interessierten Studierenden, Doktoranden und Lehrkräften aller Fachrichtungen zusammen. Die Mitgliedschaft im BSH steht allen sicherheitspolitisch interessierten Personen mit akademischem oder praktischem Hintergrund offen, welche die Grundsätze und Ziele des BSR teilen. Grundsätze des BSH Der BSH steht ein für die Verteidigung der Werteordnung des Grundgesetzes. In unserer sicherheitspolitischen Arbeit bildet die Auseinandersetzung mit Bedrohungen dieser Werteordnung einen Schwerpunkt. Zudem ist uns die Aufrechterhaltung der akademischen Freiheit ein besonderes Anliegen. Die Schaffung von Erkenntnis im Wettbewerb der Ideen setzt voraus, daß alle Stimmen gehört werden. Die Arbeit des BSH Die Arbeit des BSH richtet sich an alle Studierenden und erfolgt überparteilich und überkonfessionell. Die Aktivitäten des BSH umfassen: Sicherheitspolitische Bildungsarbeit an Hochschulen Akademische Nachwuchsförderung im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich Wissenschaftliche Auseinandersetzung mit sicherheitspolitischen Fragestellungen Weiterbildung- und Qualifikation der Mitglieder im Bereich politische Bildung und Sicherheitspolitik Impressum Wissenschaft & Sicherheit wird herausgegeben durch die AG Wissenschaft & Sicherheit des BSH und erscheint in unregelmäßigen Abständen. Kontakt und kostenloses elektronisches Abonnement unter [email protected] sowie [email protected] Kontakt: Verband der Reservisten der Deutschen Bundeswehr e.V. - Geschäftsstelle Zeppelinstraße 7A 53177 Bonn Tel.: 0228/2590 914 Fax: 0228/2590 919 Im Internet www.sicherheitspolitik.de ISSN: 1869-5256 (elektronische Ausgabe „WiSi Papers“) Verantwortlich für diese Ausgabe: Karsten Pötschke Redaktion: Stella Adorf, Johanna Lange, Steve Schlegel Wissenschaft & Sicherheit „WiSi Papers“ Nr. 2/2010 – 25. 03. 2010