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ICSS
I N T E R N AT I O N A L C E N T R E
FOR SPORT SECURIT Y
Vol 1 | No 4
Stadium technology
– from access-control innovations
to futuristic viewing experiences
Securing sport
Contents
Get the latest edition of ICSS Journal on your iPad and online,
fusing perceptive and timely insights with sport-security issues that
are affecting the sporting generations of today, and of the future
Mohammed Hanzab
ICSS
FOR SPORT SECURIT Y
President, ICSS
Vol 1 | No 4
Dear Reader,
icss-journal.newsdeskmedia.com
I
n my experience, most people have an overwhelmingly positive perception
of sport, in its broadest sense. From playing football in the park, to winning
a gymnastics gold medal, the
skill,
effort, discipline and determination
Editor
Chris
Aaron
involved are seen as good
values;
and the athletes that dedicate their lives
Consulting editor
Simon
Michell
to achieving their best are rightly
viewed
as role models in society, setting
Assistant editor, safety
Marion
Flaig
examples for others, particularly younger people, to follow.
Yet in the United Dr
Kingdom,
31McCarthy
per cent of boys and 29 per cent of girls
ICSS editorial director
Shaun P
are now
by the country’s
health service to be obese. The London
ICSSconsidered
Director Research
& Development
2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, specifically aimed to increase sporting
participation among the BritishBarry
population,
Editor-in-chief
Davies yet, during 2012-13, participation
rates actually dropped. Sport Jane
is commonly
Managing editor
Douglasheld to embody values of fair play
and honest competition, but Emily
new reports
of doping and match-fixing seem
Assistant editor
Eastman
to surface every week.
Most worryingly,Jean-Philippe
while it is vitally
important to encourage children’s
Art director
Stanway
involvement
in sport,
the Coalition
forWhite
Safeguarding Children in Sport, along
Art editors
Herita
MacDonald,
James
with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), reports that 75 per cent of
sport haveHeuchan
experienced emotional harm, while three
Production and distribution managerchildren participating in Elizabeth
per cent have been abused sexually.
What should we do when
faced Howard
by these troubling contradictions?
Managing director
Andrew
At the ICSS, we believe that
we have
to keep shining a light on the darker
Chief operating officer
Caroline
Minshell
side
of
sport,
revealing
more
about
what
is happening, even if some of it
Chief executive
Alan Spence
is
unpalatable.
The
recent
conference
on
Child Protection in Sport that we
Chairman
Lord David Evans
organised with others in GenevaPaul
is a Duffen
case in point. Nobody likes the idea
President
that sport and major sporting events could actually bring harm to young
people,
but if research
Cover images: Peepo/Getty Images, Michael
Blann/Getty
Images, suggests this, we must investigate and suggest
measures to stop it. Likewise, though less urgently, if the 2012 Olympics
Tongro Image Stock/Alamy
has not increased the take-up of sport in its host country, we should try
to find out why, and try to build improvements into the next Olympics.
ISBN: 978-1-906940-86-7
OnTU
5 December,
the ICSS participated with UNESCO Member States
Printed by Cambrian Printers, managed by
ink
Published on behalf of
and other key stakeholders, such as the IOC and Nike, in a sports advocacy
initiative under MINEPS V. The meeting addressed the challenges associated
Published by
with encouraging public investment in sport and physical activity and socioeconomic benefits. The ICSS looks forward to being an active participant
in such efforts, and to playing an active role in developing key principles
and performance indicators for encouraging increased physical activity
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among Member States.
Exposing the problem side of sports is not always
130 City Road, London EC1V 2NW, UK
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in
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years.
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F O R S P O R T S E C U RAt
I T Ytimes,
it can also seem to make a situation worse, at least in the short term. As
International Centre for Sport Security,
more
attention
Newsdesk Media publishes a wide range of
business
and is paid to a problem, more is revealed; this is good in itself,
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but can
lead
to overreaction and a loss of confidence
the overwhelmingly
customer publications. For further information
please
contact
positive
benefits of sport.
www.theicss.org
Alan Spence, chief executive, or Paul Duffen,
president
The ICSS will keep the light, and the pressure, on – whether in the fields of
match-fixing, doping, corruption or human rights in sport – as it is our belief that,
together, we can build laws and policies that will improve the game for everyone.
ICSS
ICSS
FOR SPORT SECURIT Y
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authors and contributors in this publication are provided in the writers’ personal capacities
sincerely,
and are their sole responsibility. Their publication does not imply that they represent the views or opinions of Newsdesk Media or the International Centre for
Mohammed
Hanzab
Sport Security (ICSS) and must neither be regarded as constituting advice on any matter whatsoever, nor be interpreted as such.
ICSS Journal – Vol 1 | No 4
3
Contents
Ross Kinnaird/PA Images
Tribute
In 1995, victorious South Africa captain Francois Pienaar received the
Rugby World Cup from Nelson Mandela, who wore the Springboks’
jersey in support of the national team, formerly a symbol of white rule
A tribute to Nelson Mandela
T
he world lost a true leader with the death of Nelson Mandela in
December. Mandela had this to say about sport and how it plays a
unique role in peace and reconciliation: “Sport has the power to unite
people in a way that little else can. It can create hope where once
there was only despair. It breaks down racial barriers. It laughs in the face of
discrimination. Sport speaks to people in a language they can understand.”
Not only has one nation, South Africa, lost an inspirational leader, but so
has the world. Nelson Mandela showed us how to use sport to promote peace,
forge reconciliation, and to enable a nation to put aside its differences and
to focus on excelling on the playing field. Sports men and women around the
world owe it to Nelson Mandela to continue to pay tribute to his example, his
courage, his passion for brinkmanship and his enthusiasm for sport.
Mr Mandela, the world of sport salutes you, Hamba Kahle!
4
Contents
Vol 1 | No 4
December 2013
Bongarts/Getty Images
News and comment
8
A review of events and developments
Looking at sports integrity and children's rights, the atmosphere among fans in
football stadia, a new WADA code and the economic impact of the America's Cup
12
The evolution of sport and stadia in a hyper-interactive world
Technological advances are having a significant impact on security and crowd surveillance. Dr Shaun McCarthy reveals how new technologies may change the design of future stadia, along with people's viewing habits
Technology
18
If the face fits: business and safety
benefits of stadia access-control systems
Tracey Caldwell studies the latest access-control systems for sports stadia and finds that, while they are beneficial, implementation is not always easy
24
A typology of cyber threats
Chris Aaron considers who would want to carry out cyberattacks against major sporting events and the potential impact of such action
5
Contents
Contents
ICSS Sport Integrity Model ICSS
TM
Security and safety
28
FOR SPORT SECURIT Y
Advancing the integrity of sport to safeguard the future
Spanish football clubs aim for ultra security
Javier Santos Núñez looks at the evolution of security operations within
Spanish football and how clubs are getting tough with ultra groups
34
Threats, designs and predicting the future
In the conclusion of his two-part article, Roger Cumming considers the
challenges that are faced during the construction and operation of a venue
42
Sochi: potential threats and security preparations
PROTECT
Nathan Barrick reviews security preparations for the Winter Olympics,
along with the possible threats and impact of any disruption to the Games
50
Pitching in: fans struggle for control of public space
James Dorsey examines ultras' involvement in recent protests in Egypt and
Turkey, and militant fans' attempts to distinguish their different identities
58
Security and the commercialisation of ‘fan fests’
PREVENT
Simone Eisenhauer takes an overview of the FIFA Fan Fest in Cape Town and
examines the security and rights-protection arrangements that surrounded it
Richard Giulianotti and Peter Millward examine alternative strategies to
combating violence at sporting events and the attempts to get fans on side
Integrity
72
Commercial implications of corruption in sport
Samantha Gorse finds that, while corruption in the sporting sector is highly
criticised, not enough thought is given to its impact on stakeholders
78
How major sporting events can mitigate risks of child exploitation
Professor Celia Brackenridge and Dr Daniel Rhind look at child exploitation
and abuse associated with major sporting events and call for action to be taken
84
Monitoring betting at Olympic events: lessons from London 2012
Kevin Carpenter examines a UK Gambling Commission report that provides
a thorough and frank insight into the Joint Assessment Unit's operations
90
Looking for betting fraud
David McCarthy reports on how sports-betting monitoring systems have
developed rapidly over the past 10 years and reviews their progress
94
Michael Regan/Getty Images
The role of fan projects in avoiding conflict at football matches
Photo: Kolvenbach/Alamy
66
• Strong statutes operating
in all sport bodies
• Transparent integrity and
due-diligence for all sport bodies
• Independent anonymous
reporting mechanisms
• Global integrity information
sharing across sports
• Harmonised government
legislation and sport statutes
• Integrated police and
sport investigations
• Independent and
integrity-driven referees
• Protect sport’s image as a model
for the best in human behaviour
ICSS
Sport
Integrity
Model
TM
DELIVER
CONSEQUENCES
• Harmonised disciplinary and
integrity systems across all sports
• Internationally standardised
consequence delivery to corrupted
persons in sport
• International database of persons
complicit in sport corruption
Match-fixing cases underline need for new laws
INVESTIGATE
• Preventative investigation
resources for sport bodies
• An independent global
intelligence collection and
sharing body for sport bodies
and police
• The support of government
regulators and the betting industry
to provide investigative indicators
and administrative evidence
MONITOR
• Promote for a single agency monitoring
international gambling to detect betting
fraud for all sports
• Sport specialists monitoring play to identity
suspicious matches
• A procedure to advise and guiding sport
bodies on global corruption threat
• In-play corruption-prevention
procedures for urgent
match-corruption alerts
Chris Aaron examines cases of match-fixing across Europe, how players
and officials are lured into corruption and what is being done to prevent it
Legacy
98
Tackling the dangers of inactivity through sport
Iain Lindsay runs through the wide-ranging physical and financial costs of
a lack of exercise, and assesses the effectiveness of policies and initiatives
designed to address the problems
Last word
102
The future of sport
Governing bodies wait with bated breath to see how the forthcoming major
sporting events in Sochi and Brazil will be received, writes Simon Chadwick
6
For further information about our Sport Integrity Services,
contact us at [email protected]
www.theicss.org
7
News digest
News digest
Fan apathy is criticised by football managers
Sport integrity: a right for youth
Panel members observed that
while some countries may have
robust protection policies, many
others can be found to be severely
lacking. It was stressed that even
within developed nations, child
protection remains a fundamental
concern. This was highlighted by the
Coalition for Safeguarding Children
in Sport which, in conjunction with
the International Olympic Committee,
presented research indicating that
in the UK, 75 per cent of children
participating in sport had experienced
emotional harm and three per cent
had been harmed sexually.
UNICEF described its work in
the development of universal child
protection standards by outlining its
ongoing international safeguarding
project. This project has designed
and implemented a set of globally
applicable child protection standards
that are currently being piloted by
about 50 organisations around the
world, and independently evaluated
by child protection experts at Brunel
University in the UK. Preliminary
results from this study are expected
to be available in 2014/15.
It was remarked that increased
international efforts to tackle crime
and child abuse will inevitably result
in an increase in reported cases; as
detection, reporting and prevention
Ton Koene/Alamy
Sport integrity issues, specifically
match-fixing and children’s rights,
were discussed at a conference in
Geneva on 6 November.
The meeting, organised by
the Italian and Qatari Permanent
Missions to the United Nations Office
at Geneva, along with the ICSS and
Lega Pro, aimed to evaluate the
nature of criminal acts and abuse
occurring within a sporting setting,
and their threat to the potential of
sport to promote positive benefits.
The positive values of sport are
built upon foundations of integrity,
equality and ethical competition.
However, these foundations are at
risk of being eroded by the increasing
prevalence and significance of
instances of abuse and criminality.
The conference noted that
these twin threats to sport’s
integrity are genuine, substantial
and global, and that multi-agency
collaboration is required to
challenge them effectively.
A key theme was the need for
the international community to pay
greater attention to child protection
issues within sport. This was
underlined by the presentation of the
summary of a 2010 UNICEF report
that noted the global significant
violence and sexual exploitation of
children within the sport domain.
The international community has been advised to pay greater attention to child protection in sport
8
strategies become more effective and
widespread, the figures will actually
start to look worse. Therefore, it was
considered that any collective effort
towards prevention should embrace
detection and should operate
without castigation or blame so
as to promote unity between a
diversity of sectors that currently
work in vastly different ways.
Several other key themes emerged
from the panel presentations:
■■ The ultimate responsibility
for crime lies with the
state, governments and law
enforcement authorities.
However, sport authorities
do have a key role to play
in detection, sanctioning
and prevention.
■■ The protection of sport’s
integrity is a collective
responsibility.
■■ There is a fundamental
need for collaboration
and dialogue in order
to ensure maximisation
of effectiveness and
minimisation of wasted
effort and resources.
Participants supported a
proposal by HE Sheikh Saoud Bin
Abdulrahman Al-Thani to designate
an International Sport Integrity Day
to build upon the work of the IOC
by providing a sustainable forum
for collaboration between sport,
key stakeholders and government.
There was also backing for
the ICSS Save the Dream project
that promotes ethical standards for
individual and social development
through sport. In Geneva, Save the
Dream was represented by former
Olympian Penny Heyns, who spoke
about her role as an ambassador for
the project and the opportunity it
provides to unite young people with
ethically sound role models. It was
agreed that the twin initiatives of
International Sport Integrity Day
and Save the Dream would help to
solidify the foundations of ethical
sport and raise awareness for
sporting integrity and human rights.
The atmosphere among supporters
at English Premier League football
matches was criticised by a
number of club managers, among
them Chelsea’s José Mourinho and
Arsenal’s Arsène Wenger, in the
latter months of 2013.
In an Observer article on
16 November, Owen Gibson noted
that muted or apathetic supporters,
and a lack of stadium ‘atmosphere’
could eventually effect the “overseas
television revenue that contributed
to a £5.5 billion windfall for clubs
for the three seasons starting with
2012-13. One of the key factors that
helps make the Premier League the
most saleable commodity in world
football is its noise, pageantry
and atmosphere”.
Gibson quoted the Premier
League Chief Executive, Richard
Scudamore, saying fans were an
integral part of the ‘show’ being
sold around the world: “Unless the
show is a good show, with the best
talent and played in decent stadia
with full crowds, then it isn’t a
show you can sell.”
The causes of the change in
atmosphere is a matter of debate:
some blame it on all-seater stadiums;
others point to the ‘gentrification’
of supporters and more families
attending games; some suggest
that this gentrification has gone
hand-in-hand with increased ticket
prices, resulting in the financial
exclusion of younger fans.
“We’ll never go back to where
we were in the 70s and 80s. You
could pay on the gate, it was much
cheaper and you could congregate
together,” Tim Rolls, Chair of the
Chelsea Supporters Trust told Gibson.
“Also, there are more tourists, it’s
an experience and they’re there to
capture it on their iPad rather than
interact … There’s a definitely now
a big element of ‘here we are, now
entertain us’ with many fans.”
The debate surrounding the
atmosphere in stadia has renewed
calls for a return to some standing
areas, as well as initiatives to
increase supporter interaction
within stadia. Some of these
come from fans themselves,
while others are being pushed by
the clubs. Whatever their origin,
telecommunications and social
media are playing a significant part
in the initiatives: the question for
clubs is whether such media are
going to get the crowds singing or
just watching their smartphones.
New WADA code signals a time for change
A new anti-doping rulebook was
ratified at the World Conference on
Doping in Sport in Johannesburg,
South Africa, on 12-15 November
2013, increasing the ban for
first-time doping offences from
two to four years.
The 2015 World Anti-Doping
Code, drafted by the World
Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) in
consultation with sports federations,
anti-doping experts and governments,
also introduced measures to
encourage athletes to blow the
whistle on doping activities in their
sports, enabled greater leniency
in cases of inadvertent doping,
and granted increased powers to
sanction coaches or other support
staff found to be abetting doping.
“The new measures are an
excellent step forward and the IOC
welcomes any improvement in the
fight against doping,” said the IOC’s
newly appointed president, Thomas
Bach. “It is a much-improved code,
but it alone is not enough.” Bach
also urged more research and
technological developments.
Sir Craig Reedie, who was
elected to the presidency of WADA
during the conference, said he hoped
“that the higher sanctions become a
much more regular fact of life”.
The outgoing president, John
Fahey, commenting on the incentives
to share information on doping
with sport authorities, said that
“if you can bring about a greater
good with the cooperation you
give, then there ought to be some
encouragement for you”.
A further move, reflected in
various changes to the rulebook,
was to put greater emphasis on
investigations into doping and
not to rely solely on analytical
testing of samples.
In a sense, this would bring
anti-doping and anti-matchfixing strategies somewhat closer
together; certainly there is a
growing consensus for international
harmonisation of legislation,
oversight, information exchange,
and investigation in both problem
areas. “Investigations, in particular,
are seen as essential if we are to
do what we must do as effectively
as we can,” said Fahey during the
WADA conference.
At a subsequent conference
between the main sports governing
bodies hosted by FIFA at the end of
November, Dr Mario Zorzoli, chief
medical officer of the Union Cycliste
Internationale, said: “We have to
find new ways of testing athletes,
but also have to strike a better
balance between the cost and the
effectiveness of the fight against
doping. The exchange of ideas with
authorities such as police and customs
must continue to be promoted.”
FIFA’s chief medical officer,
Professor Jiri Dvorak, said at the AntiDoping in Sports Consensus Meeting:
“Approximately $300-400 million [is]
invested in the fight against doping
in sport every year ... We’re therefore
discussing potential cost-effective
and deterrent strategies. The time
may be right for the development
of a customised system which takes
account of the risk assessment in
each different type of sport and also
has to be cost efficient.”
9
News digest
UNESCO and ICSS join forces on integrity project
UNESCO and the ICSS have agreed
on a strategic partnership to work
together on building the international
capacity to combat match-fixing
and corruption within sport. The
agreement was concluded in Paris
on 10 December.
Alexander Schischlik, team leader
of UNESCO’s Anti-Doping and Sport
Programme, said: “Individual nations
can’t prevent international threats to
sport integrity, but collectively they
can. With its international expertise,
the ICSS is a strategic partner for
UNESCO in the area of manipulation
of sport competitions. Together
we can enhance our scientific,
multi-stakeholder approach to
this problem.”
Match-fixing is a complex,
transnational crime and efforts
to minimise its impact require a
concerted approach to international
capacity building, including the
dissemination of methodologies
for sport integrity standards and
good practice; mechanisms that are
designed to enhance cooperation and
information sharing; and educational
programmes, executive training, as
well as public awareness raising.
ICSS President, Mohammed
Hanzab said: “The UNESCO-ICSS
10
partnership will enable us to
drive forward the sport integrity
agenda. Through UNESCO’s
intergovernmental mandate and
influence, the ICSS’s commitment to
the eradication of corruption in sport
now takes a significant step forward.”
In line with the aims of UNESCO’s
MINEPS V Declaration of Berlin on
Preserving the Integrity of Sport, the
collaboration will seek to mobilise
government support for agreed
principles on sport integrity, building
on the current work developed by
the ICSS and Université Paris 1
Panthéon-Sorbonne.
Representatives from the ICSS,
Sorbonne and the Council of Europe
also took part in a Sport Integrity
Forum at the European Parliament
in Brussels on 5 December.
The forum, which was opened
by Androulla Vassiliou, European
Commission Commissioner for
Education, Culture, Multilingualism,
Sport, Media and Youth, explored
the threat of match-fixing and its
economic and social consequences
for European countries.
The event highlighted a
number of initiatives that could be
introduced to safeguard the integrity
of sport, alongside the introduction of
the Council of Europe convention
on match-fixing, which, for the first
time, will provide legally binding
standards for governments across
Europe and potentially beyond.
The forum also stressed the
importance of European Union
initiatives, such as Erasmus + and
the European Sport Day as vehicles
to promote ethical values in sport to
young people. It discussed a number
of programmes at international
level, such as Save the Dream – a
joint initiative of the ICSS and the
Qatar Olympic Committee, as well
as projects that will be introduced
at a national level in order to promote
and protect sport integrity values
among young people.
Santiago Fisas Ayxela, a member
of the European Parliament, said:
“I decided to host this event given
the current focus on the human
rights dimension of violations to the
integrity of sport. We need to work
on a comprehensive approach,
including the development of
international legal standards,
information exchange mechanisms
and, perhaps most importantly,
educational programmes to protect
belief in sport’s core values, and the
dreams of children for fair sport.”
America’s Cup falls short on economic impact
In 2010, the Bay Area Council
Economic Institute (BACEI) and
Beacon Economics published a
report estimating the economic
impacts of holding the 34th
America’s Cup in San Francisco Bay.
The report noted that there were
various uncertainties surrounding
any such event, but by comparison
with previous cups in Aukland,
New Zealand, and Valencia, Spain,
it estimated that hosting the 34th
America’s Cup in San Francisco
would result in a total economic
impact of $1,372,414,635.1
The report breaks this down by
type of contributor: the event owners’
expenditures, that of syndicates, local
visitors, non-local visitors, media,
infrastructure spending and so on.
Syndicates, the teams that race their
yachts, were predicted to produce a
total economic impact “on [sic] the
order of $368 million, resulting in
the creation of 2,287 jobs”.
The report also considered
the effect on local government
funds, setting out its estimates
and including several caveats, and
concluding that the city’s General
Fund stands to benefit by more
than $13 million.
The report’s summary noted
that “a great deal of uncertainty
exists surrounding the format of
an America’s Cup on the Bay. It is
possible that the extent of racing will
be less than that assumed here. This
will naturally reduce the economic
impact. However, the bulk of the
benefits come from the activities of
the Cup management and syndicates.
Most of these expenditures will occur
regardless of the duration or format
of the event.”
In December 2013, BACEI
released draft figures of the actual
economic impact of the event. These
were reported by Associated Press
(AP)2 as being about $364 million in
increased economic activity, rising
to $550 million if the construction
of a new cruise ship terminal is
factored in. Calculating the difference
between increased local government
expenditures and increased local
Karl Mondon/PA Images
Remy De La Mauviniere/PA Images
News digest
The America’s Cup winners, Oracle, cross the finish line in San Francisco in September 2013
tax revenues associated with the
event, the San Francisco Chronicle
estimated that the races cost city
taxpayers more than $5 million.
The biggest single reason for
the difference between the 2010
estimates and the draft figures was
that only four syndicates eventually
decided to take part in the 2013
races, instead of the 15 that the
report had assumed in its estimates.
Apart from the direct reduction in
spending by syndicates, this clearly
had a knock-on effect on other
types of contribution, including
non-local tourism.
It shouldn’t be forgotten that
the 34th Amercia’s Cup was a
fantastic event, positively portrayed
in the global media, and bringing
reputational benefits for San Francisco
as well as the $364 million in new
economic activity.
However, the consequences of
a projected positive impact on local
government funds turning negative
shouldn’t be ignored either. AP began
its report with: “The America’s Cup
sailing races this year generated
far less economic activity in the
San Francisco Bay Area than
projected, and have cost taxpayers
more than $5 million”.
Could such negative press have
been avoided? As cities increasingly
look to benefit from major sporting
events, such as the America’s Cup,
local authorities need to look closely
at the downside risks of events as
well as the real social and economic
upsides. Taking a ‘negative’ view of
prospects is not always a popular
position, but ‘red teaming’ proposals
should be built into decision
processes so that downsides
can be mitigated.
Many citizens enjoy the
atmosphere that major sporting
events bring to a city, but all citizens
tend to complain if their taxes rise.
References
1.
www.bayareaeconomy.org/media/files/
2.
www.abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory/
pdf/San_Francisco_America_Cup_
americas-cup-economic-impact-
Economic_Impact_Report.pdf
projections-21164297
11
Comment
Comment
The evolution of
sport and stadia in a
hyper-interactive world
Mapping
Shaun McCarthy reviews the impact of technological advances on
security and crowd surveillance, and explores how future technologies
may change sports fans’ viewing habits and the design of stadia
12
refreshments, VIP areas and even internet access
in order to enable stadia operators and support
personnel to communicate and reach fans.
Investors in stadia expect to reap positive returns
on their investment and sports clubs derive revenue
from ticket sales, media and sponsorships and
commercial activities ranging from merchandising
to players’ fees for premium player transfers. Sport
is one of the few economic activities consistently
growing in revenue generation year on year.
Modularised stadia
With increasing concerns associated with public
expenditure on stadia construction, we are starting
to see the introduction of modularised sports stadia.
Such stadia allow capacity size to be decreased
following mega sporting events, cutting major event
venues down to manageable sizes that can be more
effectively utilised after these large-crowd events.
Mmdi/Getty Images
F
or the consumer rather than the participant,
sport is essentially an unscripted form of
entertainment for enthusiastic supporters
(fans), who either travel to a venue where their
favourite teams are competing, or who gather round
their television sets to watch a fixture in the comfort
of their own home, or maybe at their local bar.
When fans flock to stadia to watch the game and
support their teams, crowd size and exuberance are the
key ingredients that create the special atmosphere and
spirit. This also creates the need for stadia operators
to ensure that the events are held in hospitable and
friendly environments while simultaneously making
sure that all are safe and secure.
The popularity of a sport, a team and a fixture
generally dictates the number of supporters, and
numbers have been the central factor driving larger
stadia and more accompanying facilities; to cater for
the needs of the public. These needs include parking,
A number of new technologies are being
developed for sport-stadium applications,
including unmanned aerial vehicles,
which could be used for surveillance if
regulatory hurdles are overcome
13
Comment
The redundant modules can then be made available
to cities or countries that need help to host events or
develop stadia. This concept has yet to become widely
adopted, but it is a step in the right direction.
In the past five to seven years, we have seen the
introduction of a range of technology-driven safety and
security measures designed to help secure sporting
events. In order to be relevant and effective, security
technology needs to be rooted in the application of
scientific knowledge but practically applicable in order
to secure and protect people, assets and information
during sporting events, while also ensuring the integrity
and value of sport. The key characteristics that define
security technology are:
■■ risk and impact based (relevant to some
perceived or real threat);
■■ flexible – as unobtrusive as possible
but able to increase with rapid speed
and, therefore, scalable;
■■ proven, based on tried-and-tested technology; and
■■ affordable, with the ability to integrate and function
seamlessly with other technology and systems.
Comment
Millimetre-wave technology, which is currently used
in airport scanners such as the one shown here, is
being developed to screen large groups of people
Video surveillance technology on display at a trade show.
Facial recognition software such as this enables security
personnel to identify individuals known to be disruptive
Caro/Alamy
Embedding all of this technology is not always possible
at the outset, when a facility is designed. The technology
often becomes obsolete or redundant with the introduction
of more integrated or systemic solutions. Although, where
possible, the security and safety by design principle should
be adhered to, and continual technological innovation and
development will require upgrades and retro-fit as some
of these new progressive technologies are introduced.
Underpinning the technology, however, are a set of
standards and best practices that include: venue security
and safety by design; facility hardening and vehicle-borne
explosive device mitigation systems; crime prevention
through environmental design; and, of late, as the
realisation regarding the growing problem of sedentary
lifestyles grows, the inclusion and the encouragement
of physical activity by design.
Technology will facilitate the screening
of larger clusters or groups of people
The most prevalent security technologies used in
securing stadia can be categorised as access-control
and technical security systems.
Access-control systems typically have comprised
barriers such as doors, locks, booms, turnstiles and
fences. However, as Tracey Caldwell points out in
this edition (see page 18), UEFA 2013/14 key venue
requirements for Champions League matches specify
that “modern electronic access controls and mechanical
counting systems must be installed, delivering real-time
analysis of data on crowd flows and spectator attendance”.
Technical security systems consist of access-control
systems, intruder detection, surveillance and people and
goods screening systems, including chemical biological
radiation and nuclear detection.
These demands are stimulating research and design
into a range of security solutions, giving birth to emerging
technology outcomes, such as:
14
Millimetre-wave technology: take, for example, the
emergence of mass non-intrusive ‘stand-off’ screening.
This technology will facilitate the screening of larger
clusters or groups of people, improving on the current
system whereby fans are screened one by one. Although
still under development, we believe negotiations are under
way to introduce this during the 2014 Brazil World Cup.
Facial recognition: closed-circuit television systems
with powerful digital enhancement and facial recognition
capabilities have significantly augmented the security
services’ abilities to control access to events and to
identify known dangerous and/or disruptive individuals
and deny them entry to an event.
Mobile-telephone technology and smartphone
biometrics: government-mandated security measures
that monitor mobile phone and internet transmissions are
also being enhanced and deployed. For example, in Russia
the mobile operator Rostelecom is installing ‘deep packet
Jerry Lampen/Reuters
Strong security technologies
inspection’ (DPI) systems on all of its
mobile networks, technology that allows
the FSB to monitor and filter all traffic.1
Another development is the use of
biometric data available on smartphones,
which can be cross-referenced with the
data uploaded at the time of ticket purchase (GPS and
so on) and with the physical person present, essentially
eliminating ticket fraud, expediting the ticket checking
process and assisting with personal identification.
Smartphone access control: technology is already
available to enable fans to use the smart card or even the
mobile phone-based ticket that they used to access
the stadium for cashless payments. Stadia owners are
able to confer different access rights through software, so
one smart card, for example, can control access for staff,
visitors and supporters to different parts of the stadium
and also enable a secure PC log on for staff. In time,
the combination of mobile phone and radio-frequency
identification (RFID) technology could be used to guide
fans to their pre-purchased seats, and shortly prior to kickoff, stadia operators could assess the number of unused
premium seats, offering fans, by way of text messages or
online (mobile) marketing, the opportunity to upgrade
their seats at a discount. These prolific technological
enhancements will undoubtedly attract customers and
make their experiences more convenient, safe and secure.
Cooperative fans could also be enlisted to assist in the
securing of an event by enabling them to text reports of
incidents anonymously to a central command system for
venue operations centre (VOC) consideration, thereby
enhancing the real-time event management system.
Real-time sport-event incident-management systems:
these integrate an entire range of information sources in
real time to provide the VOC with a overview of every
facet of operations during the event. This includes safety,
security, utilities, environmental and related personnel
availability and whereabouts (location) status. VOC
commanders would know the precise location of the
overhead drones, for example, and could redirect them to
trouble spots in the stadia or the surrounding approach
or egress routes from the stadia.
15
Comment
Comment
Caracterdesign/iStock Images
During the 2014 Brazil World Cup and at the Sochi 2014
Winter Olympics, we can expect to see the use of blimps
and drones equipped with powerful thermal-vision cameras
as well as digital feature-recognition technology. As the
cover of this journal illustrates, drone and enhanced
surveillance technology could help stadia operators detect
a potential troublemaker located deep within the spectator
base of an opponent team and assist marshals to respond
with pin-point accuracy and extract the transgressor.
Potential profit
Given this surge in technological advances, investors
can be forgiven for being excited about the potential
to generate healthy returns from their investments in
stadia and their associated assets. However, the advent
of technology could, in time, prove to be a double-edged
sword for those investing in bricks and mortar stadia.
The incessant march of technology is poised to change
behaviours, perhaps not immediately or overnight, but
certainly with some significant impact in the next decade.
Let us consider the following, quite probable, advances:
■■ increasing computing power that enables
improved virtual reality capabilities;
■■ development of a techno-expectant generation;
■■ 3D and holographic imaging technology with larger
and significant bandwidth
speed services; and
■■ significant increases
in online gambling.
only create their own avatar players and virtual football
teams, but also to set up and run their own virtual leagues
and facilitate online betting, all from the comfort of their
college dormitory or home? Would the development of
holographic and virtual reality capabilities result in a
greater usage of stadia? For stadia operators this could
introduce increased usage of an expensive physical
asset, as fans could view a match in their home-stadia,
even though the sporting event was being played on the
opposite side of the globe. Or, alternatively, will virtual
reality and computing power and increasing bandwidth
capabilities lead to a marked decline in fans who
physically attend sports events in stadia?
The first possibility could result in a situation
whereby existing stadia would be granted extended
use as live matches are beamed on to football fields in
multiple stadia simultaneously. However, the alternative
scenario could result in diminished demand for large,
physical stadia and infrastructure. Would the losers in
this scenario be those investors who expect to derive
a positive return for their investments into large stadia
as opposed to the winners who have invested in what
we call ‘studio stadia’ – media broadcast facilities that
are only just large enough to house a football field,
but with state-of-the-art television and broadcasting
To augment static sensors, mobile robots
could be deployed to detect explosives
It is likely that, in time, technological advances in
areas such as virtual reality and holograms will
alter the way in which spectators view sport
Real-time analytics of water consumption, wastewater and refuse generation and ecological footprint
data could be made available. In her article, Caldwell
emphasises the utility of such a system when combined
with spectator or customer relationship management
systems to arrive at a better understanding of spectator
patterns, movements and behaviour in the stadia and
facilities prior to and during an event so that operators
can improve the customer experience.
Robots: in order to augment static sensors, mobile
robots could be deployed to detect explosive materials.
The potential replacement of bomb dogs by robotic
canines, however, would have to balance greater robotic
accuracy versus cost-effectiveness.
Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) drones: these will
be used with increasing frequency, should the necessary
regulations and air traffic control issues be resolved.
16
In the previous edition of ICSS Journal, Dr Ann Rogers
noted the current limitations created by flight-path
restrictions, as well as those that exist primarily due
to public safety. Nevertheless, these unmanned craft
can be fitted with increasingly sophisticated surveillance
cameras, high-resolution streaming video, explosivedetection devices and chemical-detection sensors.
Furthermore, prices are dropping, making UAVs more
affordable. However, more work would need to be done
to reassure spectators that these craft are reliable and
safe. In 2013, a drone suddenly lost its link with the
controller and plunged into the crowd at the Great Bull
Run event in Virginia, US, injuring one spectator.
Notwithstanding one or two mishaps, this versatile
technology should not deter security personnel from
deploying drones during major sports events once the
regulatory environment catches up with the technology.
In addition to enabling a more
effective and unobtrusive approach
to securing sporting events,
technological advances could also alter the way in which
spectators start to view sport. Over time these new ways
of viewing sport could also have a profound impact on
the design and economics of sports clubs and stadia.
What would happen if the above ‘advances in
technology’ combine to expedite the ability of broadcasting
firms to project holographic images of a major sporting
event held in São Paulo on to a football pitch in Tokyo?
Indeed, Japan has raised expectations in this respect
by claiming that it was ready to do this if it had been
awarded the 2022 World Cup.
Japan demonstrated holographic display technology
during the 2009 National Association of Broadcasters
show. However, Professor Seth Riskin, Manager of the
Emerging Technologies and Holography/Spatial Imaging
Initiative at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(MIT) Museum, believes Japan’s proposal would be
unworkable due to the imbalance across the world in
bandwidth availability and transmission speeds.
Professor Riskin points out that today, Japan has
three times the internet speed available in the United
States. Only time will tell, but if there is one lesson
we have learnt from our most recent history, it is that
progress on the technology front consistently surprises us.
Let us examine another scenario – what could happen
when the next generations of sports fans are able to not
equipment so that matches can be televised without
the need to host a large crowd of spectators?
Of course, traditional fans would probably be horrified
at the thought of this second scenario, and quick to
point out that what makes a sporting event so special
is the distinct atmosphere that can only be generated
by an exuberant fan base. Traditional supporters would
also no doubt point out that the technology that is being
discussed above has a long way to go before it will
become ubiquitous and free of glitches. That may well
be true, however, if we consider how short a time it took
for society to ditch public phone booths in favour of
mobile phones, and letter writing in favour of email,
then the above scenarios are not that implausible or
far out in time. We cannot foresee the breakthroughs
across a wide range of interconnectivity and related
technologies that could give rise to the next major
social and economic disruptions.
Dr Shaun McCarthy is the Director of Research
and Development at the ICSS
References
1
Borogan, I., Soldatov, A. and Walker, S. As Sochi Olympic venues
are built, so are Kremlin’s surveillance networks, The Guardian,
6 October 2013
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If the face fits:
business and safety
benefits of stadia
access-control systems
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to fans and market to fans who have not been attending
recently. For example, fans may be given access to
executive areas of the stadium if they have upgraded.
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The primary function of access-control systems is to
enable secure and safe access to people who have a
right to enter an area because they have paid for a ticket
or pass, or are staff or legitimate visitors. Technology
is evolving and access-control systems are becoming
more intelligent. Traditionally, they have been linked to
alarms that trigger on forced entry, or if a guard patrol
does not present their card credentials at the right
location. Increasingly, the systems are linked to CCTV
in order to track persons of interest as they enter and
leave zones of the stadia. This is perhaps becoming
more pressing in view of the ongoing threat of terrorism.
The UK’s National Counter Terrorism Security Office
(NaCTSO) recommends that stadia have measures in
place to limit individuals’ access to parts of the stadium
and incorporate appropriate access-control measures.
NaCTSO recommends keeping “access points to a
minimum and make sure the boundary between
public and private areas of your building is secure
and clearly signed. Invest in good quality access
controls such as magnetic swipe identification cards
or proximity card systems”.
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Technology is evolving
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A
ccess-control systems are key to ensuring
that tens of thousands of people can enter
sports stadia safely and securely within
minutes. These are core systems for stadia,
with massive built-in resilience and redundancy.
However, many stadia are now looking beyond the
basic access issues and are putting access-control
technology to work to improve the fan experience.
Champions League-level stadia in the UK have to
comply with UEFA 2013/14 key venue requirements,
specifying that “modern electronic access controls
and mechanical counting systems must be installed,
delivering real-time analysis of data on crowd flows
and spectator attendance”. Many stadia, of all sizes,
are also considering how best to use that data more
widely in order to market and cross-sell to attendees.
The technology is already available to enable fans
to use the smartcard or even mobile phone-based
ticket that they used to access the stadium for cashless
payments as well. Stadia owners are able to confer
different access rights through software so that one
smartcard, for example, can control access for staff,
visitors and supporters to different parts of the
stadium, and also enable secure PC log on for staff.
If the access-control system is linked to the
customer relationship management system, then
the stadium can promote in-stadium special offers
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Tracey Caldwell examines the technological advances in access-control
systems for sports stadia, highlighting the benefits they can bring to the business
as well as security, but noting the challenges that exist for implementation
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Technology
Evgeny Dubinchuk/Alamy, Peepo/IStock
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Technology
19
Technology
Technology
Manchester City FC is a trailblazer for the potential
of access-control technology, with a smartcard-based
system that can admit up to 1,200 people each minute
Access control applies to vehicles as well as people,
and larger, more high-profile stadia in particular are taking
steps to use access-control systems to protect against hostile
vehicle-borne attack. Chris Rowlands, Managing Director of
APT Security Systems, observes that the “threat of terrorism
remains serious throughout the world, and hostile vehicle
mitigation (HVM) is just one method of managing such risk”.
APT Skidata, which supplies car access-control
equipment, has worked with Manchester United FC since
2006. The club’s home ground, Old Trafford, has a seated
capacity of more than 75,000. In 2011, having had an
APT turnstile access-control system in operation for five
years, Manchester United commissioned APT Skidata to
provide access-control software for 7,000 match day car
park spaces. The people and car access-control system
was integrated, with match-day tickets and season cards
controlling entry to various car parks.
As we head towards 2014, APT Skidata considers
integration with customer relationship management
(CRM) systems to be the most pressing issue affecting
stadia owners, along with achieving cost savings from
tickets sent to smartphones or ‘print@home tickets’.
The company is focusing on the use of access-control
technology to capture fans’ data when they enter
stadia for the purpose of activating CRM promotional
activity, such as upselling merchandise or food and
beverages, and links to loyalty programmes through
the recorded fan attendance data.
Insight into customer ticket usage
Ticketmaster is also seeing strong interest from stadia
management in leveraging customer data from accesscontrol systems. Mark Yovich, president of Ticketmaster
International, tells the ICSS that: “Attendance data and
arrival trends are invaluable for stadia
managers. Understanding arrival
patterns helps with staff planning
as well as creation of incentive
programmes to entice customers
to arrive at more desirable times to
avoid bottlenecks leading up to event
time.” Yovich adds: “The insight into
customer ticket usage is invaluable for real-time marketing
and loyalty. Particularly in sports where it is unusual for
season ticket holders to use their tickets for every single
game in the season, loyalty schemes can tie attendance
to rewarding people for ticket usage.
“Perhaps even more valuable is the knowledge of your
fan base that is not in attendance; marketing opportunities
exist for these customers to offer auxiliary services, such
as ticket transfer or resale, to increase the opportunity for
those tickets to get to fans who will attend the games.”
Attendance data and arrival trends are
invaluable for stadia managers
The original installation for stadium access now has
140 access points controlled by readers. Subsequently,
two more car parks were fitted with the same readers
that were linked to Skidata car park barriers. Both the car
parks and the stadium access controls can be accessed
using the same data carrier – ticket or season card. Often,
the car parks are used for VIP or corporate hospitality
guests, and previously this involved preprinted car hangers
and other material, which was expensive and operationally
difficult for the club to manage.
20
Clive Brunskill/Getty Images
SKIDATA AG
APT Skidata access-control gates.
Feeding data captured from such
technology into CRM systems can
facilitate upselling activities
Ticketmaster provides access control for more than
1,500 venues globally, inclusive of stadia, arenas, theatres
and clubs such as White Hart Lane, where Tottenham
Hotspur is based, and Scottish rugby stadium Murrayfield.
Yovich believes that the primary challenge around access
control is cost, but in terms of it being balanced against
the opportunities: “Installing and maintaining networking
infrastructure and access-control hardware carries a
capital cost, which can seem prohibitive. Older stadia
in particular require the back-fitting of modern network
technology to buildings that were not designed with
electronic access control in mind.
“As stadia managers aim to offer a superb in-venue
experience for fans, access-control technologies become
vital to that desired experience, while providing insight
into customer behaviour for continuous improvements.
Finding a balance between the capital investment in the
required hardware and the potential return in customer
spend and propensity to visit the venue again, can be
difficult,” Yovich adds.
There is huge opportunity in this space for accesscontrol systems, which will increase personalised
experiences, according to Yovich, who says Ticketmaster
is focused on “understanding the increasing trends in
terms of mobile usage in Europe – opportunities to have
tickets rendered for mobile phones and associated systems,
like Apple’s Passbook, are areas we are investing in”.
Aston Villa FC’s Villa Park stadium in Birmingham
and its Bodymoor Heath Training Ground in Warwickshire
have been experimenting with staff access-control options.
The number of staff and visitors on a non-match day is
typically around 1,000; on a day with a big game this can
swell to more than 5,000 people at the training site.
The club has a long-standing relationship with TDSi,
which has supplied access-control technology for about
100 access points. “Using TDSi’s access-control products
and software has given us a highly flexible approach to our
access control; we can easily add additional access control
on a selected door and integrate it into the rest of the
network,” says Josh Tooth, maintenance manager.
The human factor in system selection
However, providing staff with an acceptable access-control
system has not been easy, mainly due to human rather
than technological factors: “At the training facility they
don’t like carrying the cards. We have tried cards, we
have tried fobs, and RFID [radio frequency identification]
wristbands, but they leave them behind or forget them,
so we tried biometrics,” says Tooth.
Tooth planned to roll out TDSi’s facial recognition
reader as a next-generation access-control system, but
has hit difficulties: “We have tried fingerprint and facial
biometrics. They work perfectly in our test room, but
when we put them in the field they are not quick enough.
21
Technology
People are just too impatient and you have got to stand
in the right position for the system to let you through”.
Tooth adds: “The club is trying to put the onus on
staff that they have to swipe the card in the morning.
If they don’t swipe in they don’t get paid, so that is the
incentive to bring the card.” He acknowledges that this
approach could also work in mandating that staff use
biometric access: “We have a cleaning company that
uses a fingerprint reader for the cleaners. If they don’t
sign in they are not getting paid and that works for them.”
Tooth has seen the possibilities opened up by the
latest access-control technology in other stadia: “Man
City’s new complex is very impressive – their door access
CCTV can physically track people around the stadium.”
“We are not that confident yet to integrate our CCTV
with our door access control. TDSi do CCTV and the
software would incorporate the CCTV, but [we] are still
running on old digital video recorders – all the feeds go
to digital video recorders. We have branched out into
IP cameras, but they are just far too expensive. We have
95 normal cameras and eight IP cameras.”
Manchester City FC is something of a trailblazer for
the potential of access-control technology. Its stadium was
built for the 2002 Commonwealth Games. In 2003, the
stadium was converted into a football stadium to replace
Maine Road stadium and has a smartcard-based accesscontrol system that can admit up to 1,200 people a minute.
As far back as 2008, Manchester City piloted issuing
season-ticket holders with a reloadable, contactless
MasterCard, both to gain access to the stadium on match
days and to buy items inside and outside the ground. It has
also achieved new revenue streams, from ticket upgrades,
for example, using data from its access-control systems.
In contrast to the new-build Manchester City stadium,
the 42,785-seater Villa Park stadium has been the club’s
home since 1897, and since then has seen numerous
expansions and changes. Tooth observes: “The trouble is, at
Aston Villa, it is four independent buildings and to rip it out
and put new systems in would be a major cost for the club.”
Biometric identification systems
Biometric access control for stadia has seen some success
at the construction stage. Before the London 2012 Olympic
Games started, UK officials were reported to be travelling
the world to take fingerprints and face scans of Olympic
athletes and their coaches, according to UK newspaper
The Independent, but biometric
identification seems to have been
confined to construction staff in
the London Olympics, despite hand
readers being used as long ago as
1996 to protect parts of the Olympic
Village during the 1996 Summer
Olympics in Atlanta, United States.
Biometric hand and iris scanners were used during
the construction of the Olympic stadium, with most
of the systems installed by UK companies Human
Recognition Systems (HRS) and Reliance High-Tech.
HRS is now back on site for the transformation stage
Albert Dickson/Getty Images
Technology
Meeting the needs of disabled and elderly
attendees is essential if stadium staff are
to cater effectively for all of their customers
of the Olympic Stadium into a football stadium for
West Ham. Simon Meyer, HRS operations director,
tells ICSS: “We will likely be there until they finish
the stadium in 2015. At the moment, we are working
with BAM Nuttall and Careys, both of whom are involved
in the next phase of the park transformation, providing
the secure access to various parts of the park. As the
perimeter moves, how we use our system changes.”
Each individual worker uses biometrics to enter
the site and they have to go through an enrolment and
induction process. As part of that, their construction
accreditation is checked. In this way, the access-control
system checks not only that the person is who they say
Biometrics provides that surety of identity,
which a card-based system just can’t do
22
they are, but also that they have the training they need
to be on that part of the site. “Biometrics provides that
surety of identity, which a card-based system just can’t
do. It adds an extra layer to have a card and biometric
solution. You have to have a card to access the site then
use the biometric in tandem, so it made it that much
more secure as people weren’t able to pass cards
between workers,” says Meyer.
Facial-recognition technology
Biometric technology is improving in leaps and bounds.
Globally, law enforcement authorities, perhaps more
so than stadia management, have been interested in
facial recognition from CCTV, but the challenge was
always the quality of the CCTV technology. Now that
the quality of the cameras is significantly improved,
the ability to start integrating facial recognition has
improved significantly.
In the US, the Department of Homeland Security
is reported to have used CCTV footage captured at
a hockey match at the 6,000 seat Toyota Center in
Kennewick, Washington in September 2013 to test
a new facial recognition system.
In Argentina, the Argentine Football Association
(AFA) has introduced a biometric system, in place of
paper tickets, to address hooliganism. The scheme, which
reportedly cost the AFA €47 million ($64 million), will use
biometric scanners as well as electronic cards containing
the supporter’s name, address, photo and fingerprints.
Stadium owners considering leveraging data from
access-control systems to market to attendees will
have to keep in mind the legal ramifications from both
the physical means of access control they choose to the
data they store. In the UK, the Disability Discrimination
Act 1995, the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Human
Rights Act 1998 all apply.
Catering for an ageing population
Phil Downs MBE, Disability Liaison Officer at the
Manchester United Disabled Supporters’ Association,
points out that responding to the needs of disabled
and elderly attendees is essential if stadia are to cater
effectively for an increasingly ageing population: “As the
population gets older, it becomes part of the business case
and could be the solution to retaining a lot of the seasonticket holders for as long as possible,” Downs says.
“If the journey through the stadium for people with
mobility or disability problems can be made smoother,
just as easy as it is for anybody else, the match day
experience will probably stay quite positive for them.”
For example, ensuring that people with mobility
issues have unimpeded access to lifts is critical: “These
aspects are crucial in terms of persuading people not
to ditch their season ticket,” he says.
Downs believes technologies such as biometrics
or RFID cards could go some way to addressing the
access-control issues faced by people with disabilities:
“Ultimately, it is going to be easier for somebody with
some sort of mobility deficit which means it might be
hard for them to get a card out of the wallet or pocket.”
Downs cautions against over-reliance on smartphone
technologies to enable access or book access facilities:
“We would like to see these companies evaluate the best
way of making those kinds of things accessible to disabled
people, bearing in mind that some of them have physical
disabilities that mean they can’t use a touchscreen device.
“Are they going to work on the assumption that speech
technology is going to become so advanced that it is not
going to make any mistakes? I don’t think we are anywhere
near that yet,” he adds.
Clubs that fail to address these issues could find
that a rival stadium that makes access easier will
attract more people in the long term. “They will lose
fans to somewhere else or they will take their kids
somewhere else; it is all about retention, as well as
bringing in new people,” says Downs.
The NaCTSO’s Good Practice Checklist – Access
Control and Visitors points out that entry and exit
procedures should allow all legitimate users to pass
without undue effort and delay. Crucially, it also points
out that safety is more important than security when
it comes to access control. If safety can be assured,
with security coming a close second, access-control
systems’ integration with systems focused on customer
experience and upselling can enable stadia to retain
valued customers and mine rich new revenue streams.
Tracey Caldwell is a business technology journalist
who writes regularly on information communications
technology security, mobile and networking advances
23
Technology
Technology
A typology
of cyber threats
Chris Aaron examines the different types of group that might be
motivated to conduct cyberattacks against a major sporting event, and
considers the potential impact of each kind of attack
C
ybersecurity is an increasingly important
issue for all organisations, including those
that plan and operate major sporting events.
The technical and organisational aspects of
cybersecurity have been and will be examined in other
issues of the ICSS Journal, but it is equally important
to understand the types of group that might attempt to
mount a cyber assault on a sporting event.
State threat
State-sponsored cyberattacks on major international
sporting events are highly unlikely due to the global
negative response that the perpetrator could expect,
and the significant lack of any positive advantage to be
gained. Even if a state could disguise its responsibility
for an attack, it is difficult to see what it would gain from
disrupting a sporting event. While the United Kingdom,
United States, China, Russia and Israel could probably
deploy the most advanced cyberattacks, they have little or
no motivation to do so in the domain of sporting events.
There are some fears, however, that cyber expertise
developed by state bodies could proliferate and be taken
up by non-state actors. This has been a concern with the
research into the Stuxnet worm, and may also apply to
specialist programming skills leaking from the state
to non-state sector. In both cases, however, such
specialist abilities would more likely be deployed
against higher-value targets than a sporting event.
Esolla/Getty Images
Terrorist groups
24
A terrorist attack on a major sporting event is obviously
one of the highest security concerns, but cyberattacks are
an unlikely vector for a terrorist group, intent as they are
on achieving political ends through violent action. While
a cyberattack might be able to disrupt power supplies or
lighting and heating systems, and this would be a major
incident for emergency services, it would not achieve the
aim of high-impact violence that terrorist groups pursue.
That said, cyberattacks might be used by a sophisticated
group to disrupt the response to a physical attack, or to
grant them access to sensitive information or areas.
This might aid them in achieving their prime mission
of physical destruction. Reports of the attack on the Taj
Mahal Palace Hotel in Bombay, India, indicate the use
of modern technology to coordinate terrorist operations;
this is only likely to become more sophisticated with time.
A terrorist group is probably the most likely type
of attacker to seek sensitive floor and design plans and
access-control information by means of a cyberattack.
Criminal gangs
While there is evidence of increasing cyberattacks related
to sporting events, these tend to be directed at fans and
visitors more than the facility, organisation or event itself.
Criminal groups are seeking low-risk/high-reward attack
vectors and targets, and these are more likely to be found
through phishing attacks on individuals, as outlined below.
It is possible that criminal groups might seek to steal
personal data (for example, credit card details) or designs
for use in counterfeiting, but these are well-known threats
to all ticketing organisations.
Similarly, a criminal group might seek to disrupt a
sporting event in order to manipulate its outcome for the
purpose of betting fraud. If this were possible through
some form of cyberattack (for example, by turning off the
lights or activating stadium alarms), the only questions
would be how much the attack would cost to implement
and whether the reward would be worthwhile. The threat is
well understood and the technical challenges are high, so
while this would be a high-impact attack, it remains quite
unlikely. That said, the cyber theft of power-line plans,
lighting systems or staff rotas might aid a sophisticated
group in planning a physical disruption of an event.
Protest groups
Increasingly, major sporting events are being used as a
platform for political protest of various kinds, and a cyber
intrusion would be an effective attack vector for various
groups. If the biggest sporting events, such as the FIFA
World Cup and the Olympic Games come to be seen as
25
Technology
Michael Kemp/Alamy
Technology
In the domain of major sporting events, the classic
insider described above is the greatest threat. As staff
are recruited to operate systems for the relatively short
period of a major sporting event, there is always a risk
that someone seeks a post for a nefarious purpose. This
is one of the reasons why security needs to be considered
holistically, and cybersecurity should not be separated
from the normal, physical security milieu. The importance
of design plans and their security is also something to
be considered in the whole, and not just as a physical
or data security issue.
Targeting fans
As noted above, much sport-related cyber criminality
targets fans rather than venues, infrastructure or
event data. Internet security company Trend Micro has
published a review of different techniques that it has
seen where sport has been used as ‘bait’ with which to
scam fans.2 These techniques include phishing scams,
spammed email, website exploits and blackhat search
engine optimisation attacks.
Phishing: according to Trend Micro, a scam claiming
tickets had been ordered from the online marketplace
StubHub for the 2011 Manny Pacquiao v Juan Manuel
Márquez boxing match was used to lure boxing fans.
Users who mistakenly clicked on the link were taken
Much sport-related cyber criminality
targets fans rather than venues,
infrastructure or event data
Cybercrime surrounding sporting events
tends to be targeted at fans. Security
company McAfee observed ticket-sale
scams during the London 2012 Olympics
over-commercialised, they also risk being targeted for
embarrassment by certain groups. The likelihood of a
protest group being able to take control of a large instadium display or broadcasting channel is vanishingly
small. However, sporting organisations’ websites would
be easier to hack in order to leave messages; something
that would be widely reported.
Access to floor plans, security system designs, access
controls and staff rotas would also be valuable to a protest
group wanting to mount a phsical demonstration. The
Greenpeace demonstration against Gazprom at Schalke
04 football club, for example, required some layout and
access information.
While protest groups are not likely to have a
destructive impact on a sporting event, they are likely
to be active in attempting to subvert event-related
communications to their own ends, and this may
have harmful organisational and economic impacts.
Thrill-seekers
A 2011 symposium, Keeping the Nation’s Industrial Base
Safe From Cyber Threats1, held at the Carnegie Institution
for Science, includes thrill-seekers among potential threat
sources in the cyber domain. This identifies an individual
26
sports event as the subject. The messages are a variation
of the recipient being declared as a winner of a prize in
a lottery drawn by the committee of the particular sports
event in the subject. The message is purportedly signed by
a committee member. Some of these messages even have
PDF attachments to explain the event and the mechanics.
All of these scams end in asking for personal information.”
Website exploits: Trend Micro has also observed
cybercriminals using fake websites in order to serve
malware to New York Jets fans, Super Bowl fans and
Arsenal fans. These compromises have led to the
download of malware to the computers of users who
accessed the compromised websites.
In addition to the website compromises, some of
these reported cases used exploits in MS Windows
components. In Trend Micro’s investigation of the New
York Jets and Super Bowl fans sites compromises, several
Windows exploits were used in order to download malware
on the vulnerable systems.
Blackhat SEO attack: Trend Micro also spotted
attacks that were related to the 2010 Winter Olympics in
Vancouver. In that case, cybercriminals poisoned search
results to host two different malware: a backdoor and a
FakeAV variant. “Search results that lead to the download
of BKDR_INJECT.ANI were fronted by a bogus download
of Windows Media Player update. Other poisoned search
results that led to the download of
a FakeAV component leads to the
installation of the rogue antivirus
known as Security Antivirus,” the
company claims.
Internet security company McAfee
also observed scams relating to ticket
sales, events and sporting-themed
lotteries at the London 2012 Olympics,
and commented on the security of
mobile devices in sports venues.
“There are some very simple steps that everyone can
take to protect themselves and their devices from cybersporting scams,” says Raj Samani, Chief Technical Officer,
EMEA at McAfee. “Firstly, think twice before jumping on
a public Wi-Fi connection – they’re hotbeds for data theft
and scamming. Secondly, turn off file-sharing when you
are on the move to prevent hackers from stealing sensitive
data from your mobile device. Thirdly, turn off geo-tagging
on your mobile device before posting photos on sites like
Facebook so your location information won’t fall into the
wrong hands. Finally, if it looks too good to be true, it
normally is. Be wary of phony websites, emails, texts and
pop-ads offering deals on tickets to sporting events.”
or networked group that attempts to infiltrate a computer
system purely for the challenge of breaking through the
security. Such attackers are unlikely to seek a destructive
impact, but they may have disruptive effects on systems as
they try to penetrate defences without a specific purpose.
The symposium report also drew attention to threats
from ‘insiders’, who could belong to any of the groups
delineated above, but have privileged access to systems.
The report identified three types of insider:
■■ the classic insider who has already been tasked
to do damage and seeks a position with a specific
organisation to carry out that task;
■■ the disgruntled insider who joins an organisation
with the best intentions but later becomes
dissatisfied. That dissatisfaction causes them to
decide to do damage after they are in place; and
■■ the careless insider, who is probably well-meaning
but can create dangerous vulnerabilities. This
is the individual who inadvertently introduces
malware by carelessly connecting personal
storage devices or accessing untrusted sites and
files, who simply leaves a system on when going
to lunch, or who writes down a password and
leaves it in the top desk drawer.
to a phishing site that gathered information entered by
the users. In 2008, the company discovered a similar
scam website supposedly selling tickets to the 2008
Beijing Olympics. The site invited users to create an
account, enter personal information and buy tickets
to specific events. That particular phishing scheme
garnered an undisclosed number of victims, and the
Los Angeles Times reported that the victims lost a
significant amount of money. Trend Micro’s discovery
led to the website being shut down.
Scams and spam: in May 2010, Trend Micro
identified several spammed messages that used the
2010 FIFA World Cup as bait. In both cases, the users
were purportedly winners of a lottery and were asked
to send money to a contact before they could claim the
supposed lottery prize. This is typical of 419 type scams.
The company also saw several scams using the
London 2012 Olympics and the Beijing 2008 Olympics
logos or banners asking users to reply to the message with
their personal information in order to claim a prize. Users
who fall for this type of trap may end up as money mules
for cybercriminals. According to Trend Micro, “such scams
usually start via a spammed email message, with the
Chris Aaron is the editor of the ICSS Journal and
former editor of Jane’s Intelligence Review
References
1
Cyber Threats to National Security, Symposium Five:
Keeping the Nation’s Industrial Base Safe From Cyber
Threats, CACI International, September 2011
2
Lagrimas, D.K. bit.ly/SportsBait
27
Security and safety
Security and safety
Spanish football clubs
aim for ultra security
Javier Santos Núñez reports on how security operations within Spanish
stadia have developed over recent years, and examines how Spanish clubs
are starting to crack down on ultra groups
clubs with average attendance over 30,000 in 2013;
Italy had seven, but the biggest club only managed
a 47,250 average; England had 11 and Germany had
12 clubs with gates averaging more than 30,000.
The rapid growth and modernisation of football
in Spain over the past 20 years has forced the LFP to
improve safety and security measures and controls
at all Spanish stadia, effectively upgrading the entire
security environment within clubs.
Take a seat
In the early 1990s, most Spanish stadiums had fences
around the pitch, but these have disappeared as more
modern and effective technical measures, such as
surveillance cameras, checkpoints on access to the
stadium and sophisticated emergency control systems
have been installed. La Liga clubs now have all-seater
stadia, and in recent years, more than €200 million
Andrea Comas/Reuters
S
pain, which perhaps has the strongest football
league in the world, and where football is
treated almost as a religion in many cities,
is a good example of the long-term effort to
improve safety and security at football matches. How
approaches to policing, crowd management and fan
relations have evolved in Spain is also informative.
The Spanish National Professional Football League
(LFP) includes two of the most powerful and famous
teams in the world – Real Madrid and Barcelona –
as well as a second-line group of clubs of huge local
importance and tradition, including Atlético Madrid,
Valencia CF, Sevilla FC and Athletic Bilbao. These
teams attract thousands of fans with fierce rivalries.
Eight teams in La Liga had average attendance figures
of more than 30,000 in 2013, with Barcelona and
Real Madrid averaging gates of 78,296 and 73,878
respectively. For comparison, France had only four
Real Madrid supporters throw barriers at riot police outside the
Santiago Bernabéu stadium ahead of a match in 2002. Since
then, Spanish clubs have taken a harder line with radical fans
28
29
Security and safety
Security and safety
Average Spanish football match attendance compared with rest of Europe, 2013
30,000+
The attendance
of eight teams in La Liga
78,296
Barcelona
73,878
Real Madrid
Spain
($275 million) has been invested by clubs and the LFP in
modernising security systems. The LFP imposes minimum
safety and security requirements without which clubs
are not admitted to the competition. All clubs are also
required to invest 33 per cent of revenue from match
betting (la quiniela) on improving security.
The LFP, National Sports Council (Consejo Superior
de Deportes) and police regulate and oversee clubs’
emergency and evacuation plans. Each club has a security
coordinator to liaise with police and there is close contact
between the two, especially in the days before matches
that are perceived to be high-risk.
Spain has extensive experience of high-risk matches
that involve large contingents of away fans: Real Madrid
v Barcelona, Sevilla v Real Betis and Atlético Madrid v
Real Madrid are all good examples, as well as the final
of the Copa del Rey.
In the early 2000s, there were several violent
incidents at such matches that pushed clubs to further
enhance their security systems. Today, it would be difficult
to repeat the massed throwing of dangerous objects that
occurred in the Barcelona v Real Madrid 2000 game,
or to witness the kind of events that happened during a
Sevilla v Real Betis game in 2002, when a security guard
was assaulted and a fan tried to punch the Real Betis
30
goalkeeper in the middle of the match, or indeed the kind
of brawl that occurred between Real Zaragoza players
and several fans on the pitch of Villarreal’s El Madrigal
stadium, also in 2002.
The results of improvements to safety and security are
obvious: violence inside stadiums in Spain has virtually
disappeared, reduced to some sporadic cases of individual
violence, such as a lone fan throwing an object from
the stands. Even these types of incident have declined
significantly due to video surveillance systems and
coordination between the police and private security
companies. The LFP punishes clubs for the misbehaviour
of their fans; forcing them by way of severe penalties
to intensify their security measures, and control and
keep track of their most problematic fans.
Interacting with ultras
One factor that has changed dramatically in recent years
is the relationship between club management and ultras
– the most dedicated, and sometimes violent, fans.
In Spain, close relationships have traditionally
existed between club presidents and their more radical
followers. This still exists in large part, and it is considered
commonplace for presidents to gift free entrance and the
use of facilities to ultras in exchange for their support.
47,250
Inter Milan, Italy
45,429 Paris SaintGermain, France
80,508 Borussia
Dortmund, Germany
75,164 Manchester
United, England
Across Europe
The power of the ultras group has accordingly become
strong. In 2013, just hours before his presentation to
the public, the club Celta de Vigo informed the former
player Salva Ballesta that he would not be able to take up
the post of assistant coach at the club. Protests against
Ballesta’s appointment had been made on social media
networks by the team’s ultras, who were against the new
coach’s political ideology, although
the club president, Carlos Mouriño,
denied that this was the reason
behind its decision.
Something has changed in the
past decade in the consciousness of
the clubs. In 2003, the president of
FC Barcelona, Joan Laporta, banned
the far-right Boixos Nois fans from Camp Nou. He refused
to let them use facilities in the stadium, isolated their
stands with security glass, and finally got them out of the
stadium. Laporta’s stand came at a cost, with personal
threats and even an attempted assault. But his decision
was applauded by all sectors of Spanish football, and such
measures have been encouraged by new laws that have
been introduced by UEFA and FIFA that force clubs to
remove privileges from ultras, preventing their use of the
facilities within grounds.
The relative strengths of management and ultras were
tested during a similar situation at Sevilla FC in 2012/13.
The then club president, José María del Nido, tired of
fines and the club’s bad image resulting from the ultras’
behaviour, decided to take extreme measures to control
access to the Sánchez Pizjuán stadium and prohibit entry
to fans with a history of infringements.
Something has changed in the past
decade in the consciousness of the clubs
For most of the season, the most radical fans went
‘on strike’ and refused to enter the stadium. After several
meetings between club officials and representatives of
the ultras, the radical fans promised to control their most
unruly members, at least inside the stadium. As a result,
control measures were relaxed somewhat.
As the ICSS Journal went to press, it was reported
that Real Madrid also wants to reduce the privileges of
its ultras, widely regarded as the most unruly in Spain,
from the Santiago Bernabéu stadium.
31
Security and safety
Security and safety
Riot police stand guard during clashes with Atlético Madrid
supporters in 2013 after their club won the Copa del Rey
final against Real Madrid. In Spain, the biggest threat now
comes from violent individuals denied entry to stadiums
they will not get in. The system also requires fans
with a serious record of violence to remain at the
local police station before, during and after games –
a measure that can also be invoked in other countries,
including Spain. Dutch and English clubs have also
increased their private security staff, meaning that
fewer police are needed inside the stadium.
Pablo Blazquez Dominguez/Getty Images
A method for study
Although the risk of violent incidents inside stadiums
has fallen close to zero, the risk of violence remains
outside the stadium. According to a study conducted in
2012 by security solutions company ADT, entitled Citizen
Security, 70 per cent of Spanish fans feel unsafe when
going to a football game and consider the level of security
to be too low. Most fans believe that going to a football
match is much more dangerous than going to any other
type of public event. Respondents were concerned not only
by the threat of physical violence, but also by the level of
verbal abuse, which they considered equally important.
Putting a stop to violence
Some security experts and members of the Spanish police
have said that security operations would be much easier
if stadiums were located on the outskirts of cities, and
police insist that clubs should do more to improve security
around the stadium as well as inside. Legally, however,
responsibility for suppressing violence outside the stadium
falls to the law and to the police. Spanish laws are now
tougher than ever in this regard, and the Spanish police
have gained a reputation for tough, efficient policing and
expertise in monitoring the activities of ultras.
Whatever the legal delineations, collaboration and
coordination between clubs and the police is the key
to developing and improving the security environment
further. The importance of such cooperation, and the value
32
of professional security management, was demonstrated in
2004 when a bomb threat was made during a Real Madrid
v Real Sociedad match. In eight minutes, 80,000 people
were evacuated from the Santiago Bernabéu stadium.
“The security team treats all matches at Real Madrid
as high-risk events,” Julio Cendal, Real Madrid’s former
security manager, explained in an interview in Seguritecnia
magazine. “For special matches we have even used
bomb-sniffing dogs. For such matches we have about
1,000 people in our department, counting volunteers,
private security guards and club staff.”
José Castro, the newly appointed president of
Sevilla, who has overseen security at the club for the
past 10 years, said: “Foreseeable risks are managed
and controlled. It is the unpredictable event that is
most concerning; a lack of relevant information [about
a threat]. Communication between clubs and other
public and private organisations is important.”
Communication between clubs and federations is
increasingly common and has helped to improve security
when two teams from different countries meet. Relevant
legislation is also gradually becoming harmonised across
Europe. The UK government introduced the Football
(Disorder) Act 2000 after a series of violent clashes
involving England fans occurred at the UEFA Euro 2000
tournament. Under this law, the police had the right,
for the first time, to prohibit the presence at some games
of fans suspected of engaging in violent actions, even if
they had no previous record of offending.
How Spanish security measures up
One of the major changes in the Spanish situation
has been a recent amendment to the Sports Act (Ley del
Deporte), broadening the scope for action on prevention
and increasing the punishment for violent actions.
Holland and England have in recent years become
a benchmark for security operations around stadia. The
Dutch model is strict: all fans who want to attend a match
must have a club card for identification, and without one
So, how does security in La Liga compare with other
countries? “Security in Spain is at the same level as any
European country we visited with Real Madrid,” Cendal
told Seguritecnia. Castro shared that view: “I do not have
a complete overview at the European level, but I have
good information about countries like England, Italy
and Germany, and I am sure that we are at that level.”
The Spanish system is not as strict as its counterpart
in Holland, but access control is comprehensive and
can be ramped up when needed. “The Spanish state
created specific legislation relating to sporting events
in the early 1990s, thereby providing the legal tools to
achieve a very high level of security. Development and
improvement has been constant since then. Continuous
contact and working relationships with professionals from
other clubs, contact with European competitions, and
meetings bringing together counterparts from different
countries, point us in the right direction,” says Castro.
Improvements to Spanish stadium security operations
in recent years have placed it in the top rank of European
countries from a security perspective, to the extent that
the LFP now promotes its methods for study by other
countries. A particular improvement has been the creation
in each club of a working group dedicated to security,
and led by a coordinator who is in constant contact with
government agencies and the police.
The process of security improvement has also
taught personnel how to adapt stadia to modern needs
and technological advances. Nearly 2,000 surveillance
cameras are installed in La Liga stadia. Research into
fresh means of meeting new and existing challenges is
constantly under way.
Within stadiums in Spain, the security environment is
now very good. Outside the stadium, the biggest concern
is with violent individuals who have not, or cannot, enter
the stadium, many of whom are from groups with extreme
political ideologies and have only a secondary interest
in football. For example, the new leader of Real Madrid’s
Ultras Sur has acknowledged being a fan of Atlético
Madrid, Real’s eternal rival; something inconceivable
from a football fan’s point of view.
The future challenge for the
football sector in Spain will be to
maintain a high level of training
and specialisation for security
personnel. Football, as a mass
spectator event, has particular
characteristics, requiring specially
trained staff and managers, both at
football clubs and in the police. While the majority of fans
are genuine team supporters who only want to enjoy a
great match, football in Spain remains a locus for some
small, violent groups who see it as an opportunity to use
violence that is not tolerated in other areas of life.
Within stadiums in Spain, the security
environment is now very good
Javier Santos Núñez is a freelance sports journalist
based in Sevilla, Spain
33
Security and safety
Security and safety
Threats, designs and
predicting the future
Part two: building on the strategy
In the second of his two-part article on designing and building safe and secure
sporting infrastructures, Roger Cumming considers how to anticipate the
challenges that will be faced during the construction and operation of a venue
Gary Woods/Alamy
P
34
art one of this article, published in ICSS
Journal Vol 1 No 3, proposed four strategic
guidelines that should influence the design,
build and operation of a sporting venue:
■■ consider the security aspects at the beginning
of the design process, not as something to ■
be added at the end;
■■ place these security considerations in ■
a wider context, for example as part of a ■
national government’s overarching security
strategy or policy;
■■ take an impact-driven approach to the ■
design, for example focus on the impact ■
of a hostile event, such as a terrorist attack
taking place, not its likelihood;
■■ consider security from a holistic perspective. ■
All security is a combination of people,
procedures and technology, but a holistic
approach goes further, balancing the physical
and cyber considerations and developing a
positive culture among the staff so that their
everyday actions contribute effortlessly to a
safe, secure and enjoyable celebration of sport.
In part one, early engagement between the security
professionals, designers and architects was stressed
as being essential. This can save money in the long
term and produce a design that enhances the spectator
experience by inducing a greater feeling of safety and
security for both them and the competitors.
Part two of this article considers the importance of
continuing this process of engagement throughout the
construction phase as the real venues start to emerge
and the number of people involved in the project
increases. This throws up a different set of challenges,
but most – if not all – of the same guiding principles
apply, combined with the need for good communication
between those with the original vision and those
responsible for making it happen.
Getting the security requirement right
Architects and designers of sporting infrastructure
should seek to build security features into the very
fabric of the structures themselves. The best security
is usually the most discreet, but there will also be
occasions when more overt measures will provide a
deterrent to those with malicious intent, as well as
reassurance and comfort to competitors and spectators.
Further, there will also be times when security features
separate from a main building will be necessary. The
most obvious example of this is a perimeter fence.
Perimeter security measures at London’s Olympic
Stadium. Continuous engagement between security
professionals, designers and architects can save
money and ensure that security enhances an event
35
Security and safety
Security and safety
sensitive to the weather – those designed to function well
in wet or damp conditions may not perform so well in ■
hot and sandy conditions, and the reverse is also true.
The residual risks and weaknesses in the proposed
solutions should then be considered. A fence might have
sensors to detect when someone has cut it or is scaling it,
but what happens then? How are resources mobilised to
respond to the intrusion and how quickly will they arrive?
In the case of surveillance, the effectiveness of this could
be reduced during heavy rain, fog, snow and sand storms.
The next question is: what are the interdependencies
between various system elements? This is a simple
question, but the answers might be complex and take a
long time to work out. This article is not long enough to
tackle this in anything other than superficial detail, but as
an example, the level of security a fence provides needs to
be matched to the response time of the manned guarding.
The shorter the delay the fence can provide, the faster
the manned guarding needs to respond. This may require
more guards at shorter distances from the perimeter.
It is important that rigour is applied to the
specification of ORs and the focus is not allowed to ■
drift back to thinking in terms of solutions. It is unlikely
that the fundamental requirement for a security feature
will change much (if at all) over the lifetime of the
infrastructure, whereas the technologies that might be
employed to achieve a particular outcome could change
considerably. It is important that the replacement
technologies do not weaken the overall security stance ■
Fisht Olympic stadium under construction for the 2014 Sochi Winter
Olympics. When selecting security solutions, such as perimeter fencing, it is
important to consider the desired operational outcome, and how that connects
with wider security arrangements, for example the availability of guards
Alexander Demianchuk/Corbis
All stadium systems should be designed and
installed in a way that maximises through-life flexibility to
support both changing operational needs and emerging
technology. To achieve this, it is important that all relevant
stakeholders agree on a structured mechanism to capture
requirements for the functioning of system components.
The temptation at this stage is to think in terms of
solutions rather than requirements, but this is a false
economy. Take the simple example of a perimeter fence.
The designer may ask for a fence of a certain height; but
on what is that decision based? Is it just because a similar
stadium had a fence of a certain height surrounding it, ■
or was that fence the most prominent in a catalogue? ■
It is important that rigour is applied to the specification ■
of security components based on what they are seeking ■
to achieve in the environment in which they will operate. The generally agreed best approach to this issue is
through the drafting of an Operational Requirement (OR)
for a security component. This is a statement of need
based upon a thorough and systematic assessment of ■
the problem to be solved and the hoped for solutions. ■
A structured process for the development and agreement
of ORs has been successfully used to deliver the security
systems for numerous parts of the UK’s infrastructures
and many permanent and temporary sporting venues.
Among the questions to be answered during the
preparation of an OR are: what is the output desired of ■
the system/component? For example, in general terms ■
‘a fence’ is a solution rather than a requirement. Is the
objective to demarcate a■
particular area from another; ■
to give one area more
protection than another; or ■
to channel people in a certain
direction? All of these aims
could be solved in a number of
differing ways. It is also worth
remembering that it is a mistaken belief that fences will
keep people out of a certain area. While this is true for
most law-abiding people, the same does not apply for
those determined to enter a restricted area. In this case,
the fence will only delay their entry (as it is climbed,
burrowed under or cut through), although sensors will be
able to detect this activity and alarms will be raised. If the
fence was required for surveillance, was this for constant
coverage of a particular area, or only at certain times?
The next question is: what are the options by which
the output could be achieved? For example, fences come
in all shapes and sizes. Some are hard to climb; others
difficult to cut. Sensors to detect this activity can be
discreet (sounding silent alarms) or noisy (triggering
klaxons and spotlights). Also, surveillance, can be
achieved through the deployment of people, technology ■
or a mixture of the two.
Another key consideration is the environmental and
technical requirements for system components. Harsh
environmental conditions will affect the materials that a
security component is made from, especially if it is part
of a permanent structure. CCTV cameras are particularly
All systems should support changing
operational needs and emerging technology
36
or remove features that were present in the original ■
build. The best way to achieve this is by focusing on ■
the requirement rather than the solution.
Designing for the future
Once the ORs and interdependencies of security-system
components are understood and agreed, the system can
be designed and installed. However, remembering that
any form of permanent sporting infrastructure will last a
considerable number of years, it is necessary to adopt ■
a strategy that seeks to maximise the capabilities of new
technologies as they emerge and minimise the disruption
and change required to embrace them. Such a strategy is
likely to include the following principles:
■■ Modularity – systems will be specified and
delivered in a way that makes it easy to
upgrade one element without changing
numerous other components.
■■ Internet Protocol (IP) based – the historical
separation between the physical and logical
worlds is no longer applicable as so many of ■
the physical entities in a stadium (including ■
■■
entry gates, CCTV monitors, public address
system and display screens) will all be controlled
across communications networks based on IP.■
Modern stadia can all be flood-wired with
IP networks to achieve this. Such networks
will be flexible and able to adapt to changing
requirements of the terminating equipment.
However, care needs to be applied in the way
in which such networks are configured and
protected to prevent them becoming a weakness
that can be exploited via cyberattack, rather than
a strength that delivers flexibility and adaptability. Based on open protocols – wherever possible,
system components will be specified to use
open, rather than manufacturer-proprietary,
protocols for interfaces and data transfer. This
will be particularly important for the control of
numerous physical entities, as discussed above.
It is inevitable that the degree to which a cyber
environment is used to control physical entities
will only increase over time. Similarly, the
number of manufacturers offering products in
this area will also increase.
■■
Flexible at the security-management system level
– this is the point at which the inputs from the
various systems are combined and then presented
to the system operators.
Ongoing operator training is an important element
of the process that is often forgotten or minimised after
system commissioning has been completed. Ongoing
refresher training programmes need to be planned
and executed in order to ensure that operators remain
conversant with the latest aspects of the system. These
programmes will also be the best route through which ■
to introduce new capabilities.
Designers of security systems need to devote time ■
to keeping themselves up to date with developments in ■
the technology market through a mixture of:
■■ attendance at trade shows, exhibitions ■
and conferences;
■■ ongoing dialogue with suppliers and
manufacturers in order to understand new ■
uses, improvements to existing as well as ■
new products, and capabilities that are ■
in development.
37
Security and safety
Security and safety
the market for goods and services against the exposure of
potentially sensitive information through the same route.
It is important that the ISP covers the protection
of the numerous industrial-control systems that are
necessary for the operation of physical systems at the
venues, or that a separate policy is written to address
these risks. A modern venue will have innumerable
systems – including those for crowd access, lighting,
air-conditioning, display screens and many aspects of
security (command and control rooms, CCTV networks) –
which will be controlled via data networks and electronic
infrastructures. Complete or partial loss of control of any
of these systems would result in serious consequences ■
for the safe and secure operation of the venue.
The challenges of securing these systems from
cyberthreats are brought into sharp focus when
considering the projected life of the control units that ■
turn cyber commands into real action on the ground. ■
On average, an item of corporate IT equipment (such as
a desk computer) will have a refresh or replacement rate
of about four to five years. A typical industrial control
Stuart Franklin/Getty
Security office operations at the Millennium Stadium,
Wales, during the 2012 Olympic Games. Surveillance can
be achieved with a mixture of people and technology –
assessing the options is key to a successful security outcome
Information security standards
There are numerous internationally recognised information
security standards and frameworks that could be adopted.
These include the standards set by the Geneva-based
International Organization for Standardization – ISO 27001■
and ISO 27002 – and the 800 series from the United States’
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), in
particular NIST 800-53 and 800-82 for industrial control
systems. There may also be applicable standards from the
US-based International Society of Automation (ISA) and
others, such as ISA 62443, which covers the protection of
plant networks. Most national governments also provide
protective security advice through specialist organisations.
The engagement of security
specialists as part of the multidisciplinary design team will ensure
that all the physical infrastructures
are inherently secure and resilient,
and make it relatively easy to
search for suspect devices prior
to the public being admitted.
Once construction of the infrastructure is under way, it
is important that there is a controlled process to review
proposed design changes from a security perspective. This
process needs to encompass both substantive changes to
the building’s construction (for example, the redesign of a
layout), and changes to elements such as the cladding to
be applied to a wall. Such cladding could easily be seen
as ‘cosmetic’, but might have been selected for the way
it resists explosive blast. However, this is unlikely to be
known to the supply chain, who might propose a similarlooking material that is less resistant to blast.
During the construction phase it is important that:
the site is physically segregated from the wider world; the
workforce has been vetted prior to being allowed on site;
goods and materials are screened prior to site admission;
and frequent verification visits are undertaken. There are
a number of models that could be adopted to achieve this,
one of which is described below.
An appropriate perimeter barrier, with supporting
technology, will be specified to separate the construction
site from the surrounding areas. A typical set-up for a
major sporting venue or site would consist of a perimeter
fence, supported by CCTV, lighting, perimeter intrusion
and an operational guard force around the whole of the
construction site. Individual areas within that, for example
the main stadium, would have their own construction ■
site boundaries. A central construction command-andcontrol location should be specified to be responsible ■
for monitoring installed systems (for example, CCTV ■
and intrusion detection) and managing the guard force.
It is important to review proposed design
changes from a security perspective
■■
Regular engagement with relevant government
or national bodies responsible for research and
applied science and technology – each national
government will have slightly different structures
and processes to cover this. In the United
Kingdom, the Home Office’s Centre for Applied
Science and Technology is responsible for testing
and assessing security equipment. The Centre for
the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI),
part of MI5, provides advice to the companies
that run the UK’s infrastructure on how to protect
themselves from national security threats.
This engagement will allow the designers of sports
infrastructure to understand the strengths and weaknesses
of products as assessed by independent experts, as well
as aiding the implementation of current best practice.
This will enable a judgement to be made as to whether
an emerging capability offers a significant improvement
(both technically and financially) over those currently
proposed. This kind of activity could be swept up in the
design-integration meetings that often take place in major
projects when each engineering discipline determines how
it is affected by security requirements and vice versa.
A structured approach
It is during the design and construction phases that the
layers of security for venues will be specified and installed.
Once this phase starts and the number of people involved
in the project begins to rise significantly, it is important
that a structured approach to the handling of information
38
defending against the inevitable attempts to compromise
its operations. It is impossible to prevent all compromises
from internal and external threats, but an effective ISP
will: support a security architecture necessary to create a
resilient operation; respond to incidents effectively; learn
from security breaches; and, most importantly, manage
risk within proportionate tolerance levels.
is introduced. The importance of this was highlighted in
part one of this article. Information in many forms will be
vital to the successful design, construction and operation
of all major sporting venues for the many years of their
legacy use. The protection of information will normally
be achieved by the definition and implementation of an
Information Security Policy (ISP) that needs to be written
in collaboration with all relevant stakeholders. This should
be designed to ensure that sufficient information relating
to security systems is incorporated into master designs,
but that sensitive information (for example, camera fields
of view) is only released on a need-to-know basis.
To facilitate this process, a single authority should
be established with the responsibility for writing the ISP
and also deciding the relative sensitivity of information
to be disseminated. This authority should specify how
sensitive information will be marked, stored, transmitted
and handled by users. Different countries will have their
own established processes for this, such as some form
of national protective marking scheme for sensitive
documents (for example, restricted or confidential).
The ISP needs to cover appropriate elements of
the supply chain. The challenge here is to ensure that
information is appropriately cascaded down the chain to
facilitate the purchase of the right goods and services, but
without exposing the overall security posture of the venue.
This will be particularly tricky when dealing with overseas
suppliers or organisations with an unknown or weak cybersecurity posture. This is a new area that may require the
venue designers and builders to seek specialist advice ■
to ensure that they can balance the advantage of going to
unit may have a refresh rate of 20 to 25 years. The cost
of replacing the remote control units and the disruption
to essential services while this happens are among the
reasons for this sharp difference in refresh rates. Over
that period of time, it is impossible to predict what
cyberthreats may emerge. This is why it is important to
adopt an impact-driven approach to security as described
in part one. Focusing on a threat that cannot be judged
so far in advance may ultimately lead to an inaccurate
assessment of the risks, resulting in either inadequate ■
or over-specified security features.
It is certain that those who wish to compromise
information assets belonging to a sporting venue will be
imaginative in their approach. In response, it is necessary
to understand the threat to assets and build solid defences
against incidents that could ultimately impact the security
of venues and/or supporting infrastructures. In particular,
the ISP needs to have a flexible response that adapts to
changing technologies and attack methodologies. The
pace of change in information systems is such that it
will be necessary to keep the designs flexible and able to
integrate appropriate new technologies as they emerge.
But new threats also emerge at a significant rate. The ISP
should ensure that venue owners can be confident they
are able to manage their risks effectively throughout the
lifetime of the venues. This reinforces the need to adopt
an impact-focused, risk-based approach that will build
the appropriate information security controls (for cyber
and other mediums) into the fabric of the venue. This
will ensure that it is capable of deterring, detecting and
39
Security and safety
Security and safety
Renovation work taking place on Maracanã Stadium
for the 2014 Brazil World Cup. It is important, for
security reasons, to separate construction sites from the
wider world, vet the workforce and screen materials
If deemed necessary by a threat assessment, measures
to guard against vehicle attack will be installed to protect
the construction site. However, such measures need to
be considered carefully to ensure that the barriers are
suitable for that environment and their installation will ■
not impede the required flow of construction vehicles.
Deliveries of construction plant and materials should
be controlled through the use of a delivery management
system to record details of loads, delivery vehicles and
their drivers. To minimise risk to the construction site, ■
one or more off-site centres should be used to process
and check vehicles, drivers and their loads before they ■
are sealed for final delivery to the site.
Checks on vehicles should then be undertaken at the
boundary to the construction site. For vehicles entering
the site, the checks should confirm that the vehicle and
occupant details are as expected and that the load has ■
not been tampered with since the off-site checks. For
vehicles leaving the site, the checks should confirm ■
that no unauthorised goods are being removed.
Throughout construction, verification and assurance
visits should be undertaken to confirm that potential
issues are identified early and addressed quickly. This ■
will include a process for certifying that voids are in ■
fact empty before they are sealed.
It should now be obvious that the number of people
working on the project, either in offices or on site, has
risen dramatically from
the levels involved at the
pure design stage. This
means more people have
access to information
(some of which may be
sensitive) and more people
have access to sites and
systems that may be
vulnerable to malicious
activity. It is therefore necessary to consider carefully the
personnel aspects of the overarching security strategy.
This is very often overlooked, with attention being focused
on the physical and cyber elements, while the people who
operate both are forgotten. It is wrong at this stage to
suggest that all staff need to go through comprehensive
vetting in order to establish their good faith and levels of
integrity. That is unnecessary and too time-consuming and
expensive. However, care should be devoted to ensuring
that, as a very minimum, the true identities of all staff and
contractors are fully established, and that they all have
the appropriate right to work from the host country. Some
staff and contractors will require extra clearance if they
are to have access to more sensitive data.
This is an area where the importance of taking a
holistic approach and not operating in silos cannot be
overstated. The venue’s security professionals should take
an active interest in this area and not simply leave the
matter to the human resources or personnel department.
High-quality leadership from the organisation’s top
management layers will be necessary in order to articulate
a vision of how the everyday actions of all staff involved
in infrastructure and delivery contribute to the overall
security of the event. If the leaders are clear about the
type of event they want to achieve, then it is much easier
for the staff to understand what they need to do. So often,
weak or absent leadership will be filled by staff doing
what they feel is right. Quite often, they will get the tone
wrong and this could adversely impact the overall security
stance, or inhibit the spectator experience.
Let the games begin
Security does not end when the building phase is over.
Towards the end of this, and prior to the venues being
used, there needs to be a final process of assurance to
test whether the various security infrastructures and
systems are fit for purpose. This is when their operation
is tested against the original OR. The quality of finish
should also be examined. If the processes described here
were followed, there should be minimal need for remedial
action or reconstruction, but this is not always the case.
If security has been integrated into the very fabric ■
of the building then it will also support the handling of■
incidents or emergencies. An integrated design will
enable the event organisers, police, emergency services
and others to respond to security incidents, disruptions
and threats. The way that security is designed into the
structure should aid this and produce an integrated
response to a wide range of circumstances, for example,
through the careful
location and functioning
of control rooms. This is
the point at which people,
processes and technology
should all come together
in perfect harmony.
Very often, security
is considered as an
afterthought – something
to be applied once the design is complete. Not only can
this be expensive, but frequently it will fail produce the
desired levels of protection. By considering security
aspects at the beginning of the design process, taking
a holistic approach, thinking in terms of impact and
involving relevant experts throughout both the design ■
and building phases, it is possible to take discreet yet
effective security measures at reasonable cost. This can
deliver high levels of assurance to event organisers, and
others, that the competitors, spectators and the venue
itself will be protected against malicious activity.
Adopting the approach outlined in this article takes
dynamic leadership from general management, supported
by appropriate security professionals. By working together
from the very beginning of a project, they can ensure that
security enhances a sporting event, rather than being seen
as a tax upon it.
Sergio Moraes/Reuters
Very often, security is an
afterthought – applied once
the design is complete
40
Roger Cumming is the Technical Director of security at
Atkins – a design, engineering and project management
consultancy involved in the design of the infrastructure
for the London 2012 Olympic Park and temporary venues
41
Security and safety
Security and safety
Sochi: potential threats
and security preparations
O
n 7 January 2014, full-scale security
measures will come into force in preparation
for the XXII Winter Olympic Games, which
will be hosted by the Russian Federation
between 7 and 23 February. Most indicators suggest
the Sochi Games will be conducted successfully and
free from major security incidents. If this is the case,
it will be in large measure due to the significant
security precautions that Russia, along with its Olympic
Organising Committee and its international partners
and supporters have taken in order to ensure that the
Winter Olympics is not disrupted.
The importance of a visibly safe and friendly event
is twofold: in addition to bolstering Russia’s prestige,
it will reassure sport governing bodies and politicians
that future major sporting events (MSEs) can be held
in areas with some level of instability and risk.
Potential security concerns
International criticism of the Sochi Winter Olympics has
not been particularly vocal since the city was selected
in 2007 by the International Olympic Committee (IOC).
Criticism that has arisen has focused primarily on
alleged corruption in Russian government, corporate and
legal structures, and more recently on security concerns.
In June 2013, Russian officials announced a planned
increase in the security regime around Sochi. According
to an official order dated 28 March 2013, 95 sites were
to have increased security measures in place by 1 June
2013, and an additional 523 sites’ security status was to
be verified or secured no later than 1 September 2013. The
order also indicated a significant increase in security
protocols, including a no-fly zone enforced by Pantsir-S
air defence missile systems, from the 7 January 2014
to the end of March for the Paralympic Games.
Part of the security problem will include individual,
non-violent criminal behaviour, such as pickpockets and
con artists seeking to steal from visitors for immediate
cash benefits. Additionally, as with local protests in
Brazil during the Confederations Cup in 2013, security
issues may arise from local residents and migrant
workers expressing dissatisfaction about negative
impacts from construction and security practices
during the preparations for the Sochi Games.
The security problem expands to the possibility
of protests regarding a number of controversial issues
highlighted over the past few years: claims of a
Circassian genocide dating from the mid-19th century,
environmental damage and Russia’s recent anti-lesbian,
gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) legislation. While
Dmitry Lovetsky/PA Images
Nathan Barrick reviews security preparations for Sochi, assessing the
threats and potential impact of any disruption to the 2014 Winter Olympics
Going for gold: security preparations have been meticulously planned for the
Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics, which will take place from 7-23 February
42
43
Security and safety
any such demonstrations are likely to be non-violent
protests intended to embarrass the Russian government,
the possibility of violence due to crowd reactions or heavyhanded police dispersal tactics cannot be discounted.
Additional security concerns were highlighted by the
August 2008 Russia-Georgia conflict and the April 2013
Boston Marathon bombing. A gradual normalisation in
the tense relationship between Russia and Georgia since
2008 can be attributed to both countries’ anticipation
of the Games and the possible economic and prestige
benefits. While the April 2013 Boston Marathon bombing
does not appear to have affected Russia’s pre-existing
planning efforts, the Boston Marathon bombers’ linkages
to the North Caucasus highlighted the regional threat
to the Sochi Winter Olympic Games, and certainly
energised the attentions of both the international
community and Russia’s security officials.
In July 2013, Doku Umarov, the leader of the
‘Caucasus Emirate’ terrorist band, threatened to renew
terrorist attacks in Russia after a brief suspension of
operations, reinforcing security concerns over the Sochi
Olympics. Umarov supposedly granted his ‘moratorium’
to allow Russian political opposition to protest Vladimir
Putin’s election to a third term as president in relative
safety. Refocused global attention on the Chechen problem
in Russia after the Boston Marathon bombing, combined
with notable failures by the Russian political opposition to
mount effective actions against Putin and the approaching
Winter Games in Sochi, gave Umarov the opportunity to
Security and safety
re-declare war on Putin’s Russia. The fact that the Russian
government continued to prosecute anti-terror campaigns
across the North Caucasus, especially in Dagestan,
probably contributed to Umarov’s ‘change of heart’.
Security services and expert observers don’t doubt
the capabilities or willingness of Umarov’s Caucasus
Emirate to conduct horrific attacks. In October 2013,
a female suicide bomber blew up a bus in Volgograd,
Russia. A couple weeks later, Russian security forces
killed the woman’s husband, who was believed to be a
bomb-maker in an anti-terrorist operation. While Umarov
did not initially claim responsibility for the attack, the
methodology matches attacks on Moscow’s subway in
2010 and Moscow’s Domodedovo airport in January 2011.
According to Robert Pape, Director of the University
of Chicago’s Project on Security and Terrorism, which
recently completed an 18-month study of terrorist
incidents, the Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus is
now more willing to attack civilian targets. Pape assessed
that Russia’s counter-terror operations have driven the
Caucasus Emirate to consider more desperate measures.
Security preparations for Sochi 2014
techniques that have ensured security at similar MSEs
and has publicly acknowledged its willingness to accept
security-related assistance from the United Kingdom,
United States and Georgia. What distinguishes Sochi
2014 from previous events is the existence of a threat
in geographic proximity and with dedicated intent
to cause the host government pain as
well as embarrassment.
In July 2013, Russia’s Interior
Minister Vladimir Kolokoltsev vowed
to set up a multi-tiered security
system in Sochi in compliance with
IOC requirements. The multi-tiered
approach envisages:
■■ National-level ministerial support in Sochi,
the North Caucasus, and key transportation
nodes throughout the country.
■■ Augmentation of regional and municipal
government agencies with necessary
personnel and equipment to address
increased security responsibilities.
■■ The planning and coordination for venuespecific and important site security roles.
Complete details of Russia’s security preparations for
Sochi 2014 have been kept guarded, but public statements
have offered insights that the security measures will rely
on multiple layers of security, overt and discreet security
presences, venue access controls and sophisticated
technological tools. Russia will utilise most of the same
This multi-tiered approach is mirrored in geographic
layers to provide perimeter security by the relevant
agencies, with further layers surrounding transportation
hubs and key Olympiad locations. For example, Russian
authorities are designating a vast mountain area above
Sochi as a ‘restricted zone’ and attempting to control
border access with neighboring Abkhazia. Checkpoints
have been established in key transportation nodes outside
Sochi and at random and strategic locations along roads
and rail routes into the area. In preparation for Sochi 2014,
Russia has equipped its security forces with the latest
Port facilities will have improved
security, including the use of drones
technology, including remote-control drones, thermal
imaging, ultrasound scanners, infrared sensors,
specially trained dogs and improved border control
procedures. The Russian government also purchased
snowmobiles and sleds to provide special operations
and border-guard forces with improved mobility.
Russian security services will be monitoring all
local communications. The regional telecommunications
network has been upgraded with technologies that
allow encrypted communications for command and
control. In June 2013, Rostelecom, Russia’s national
telecommunications operator, launched a 4G LTE network
around Sochi, pledging the fastest Wi-Fi networks in
Olympic history. The Federal Security Service (FSB) will
probably use ‘deep-packet inspection’ systems to allow
Potential security concerns for Sochi 2014
■■
Terrorist acts ■
High-profile attacks, suicide bombers, car or truck
bombs, improvised explosive devices, hostage
taking, targeting infrastructure or VIPs
■■
■■
■■
Protest activity with higher possibility of violence
Grenades or small explosives, assassinations,
vandalism, suicides, sewing mouths shut, same
symbolic gestures as in peaceful demonstrations,
but perhaps more bloody or gory.
■■
44
Regional terrorism (most likely)
•
Caucasus Emirate (Doku Umarov); and
•
other jihadist groups (several smaller regional
groups exist, often unknown until claiming
responsibility, and frequently claim affiliation
to Caucasus Emirate after the fact).
International terrorism (less likely)
•
Al-Qaeda; and
•
Al-Nusra Front (Syria) or Syrian
Islamist opposition sympathisers.
Circassian genocide (more likely)
Dozens of Circassian groups in Russia and
globally demand recognition for alleged genocide;
150th anniversary of Circassian collapse at
Krasnaya Polyana; unfair representation of
■■
■■
nationality at Olympics events; prior protests at
Istanbul Marathon on 17 November and in New
York City on 21 November; 14 March is National
Language Day for Circassians; many Circassians
relocated from Syria to areas near Sochi.
Migrant workers (less likely)
Tens of thousands employed as labour for
Sochi 2014 construction; inadequate housing;
attempted relocation of tens of thousands
prior to Olympic Games; desperate situations;
demanding wages; claim to be victims of
discrimination and repression; large numbers
of Central Asians, who have also experienced
violence from Russian ultra-nationalists.
Peaceful demonstrations
Posters and placards, social media cartoons,
viral videos, graffiti, flags, T-shirts, disrespect
for national anthems, symbolic gestures.
■■
LGBT activists (almost certainly)
International furor by pro-LGBT rights groups and
individuals against Russia’s anti-LGBT propaganda
legislation; many activists calling for protests both
against the Russian government and IOC; expect
rainbow symbology among athletes and visitors.
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
Sochi residents (more likely)
Multiple drivers for protest; many lost housing
and claim they were not compensated fairly or
timely; power outages; rising prices; improper
rubbish disposal; damage to water lines and
sewer systems due to construction; concern about
future energy exploration efforts in the Black Sea.
Environmentalists (more likely)
Claim repressive tactics by government when
activists attempted to draw attention to ecological
damage related to Sochi construction; concern
about future energy exploration efforts in the sea.
Reporters without borders (more likely)
Seek to draw international attention to the
plight of reporters and reprisals against
journalists in Russia, especially covering
the North Caucasus violence.
Animal rights (less likely)
International concern about methodologies used
on stray animals in Kazan Universiade and in
preparing for Sochi 2014 Olympics.
Olympic boxing (less likely)
Popular sport in Russia and former Soviet
republics and many are upset at the IOC’s
decision to remove boxing from the Olympics.
■■
■■
■■
Criminal activity
■■
■■
■■
Abkhazia (less likely)
Dissatisfaction with Russian promises; not
allowed to participate in Winter Olympics
as a national team.
Corruption (less likely)
Many Russians and international groups
concerned about corrupt practices in Russian
government, corporate, and legal structures.
Many believe Russian elites garnered too
much profit from the historic expenditures
on Sochi 2014 (more than $50 billion).
Narcotics trafficking.
Petty crime (pickpockets and con-artists).
Possible catalysts
■■
■■
■■
■■
Warm weather highlighting challenges
of hosting the Games in Sochi.
Power outages indicating lack
of infrastructure preparation.
Traffic jams (vehicular, pedestrian)
and transportation hub delays.
Earthquakes (faulty construction) or
storms resulting in possible flooding.
45
Security and safety
Security and safety
Timeline of terrorist events relevant to Sochi 2014 security
(This is not exhaustive list, and does not include terrorist acts in Dagestan and Chechnya,
or attacks that caused fewer than 10 casualties)
1 August 2003
A suicide bomber
driving a truck filled
with explosives blows
up a military hospital at
Mozdok in North Ossetia.
Fifty people are killed.
1996
21 October 2013: A female
suicide bomber, the wife of an
Islamist militant, carries out a
suicide bombing on a bus in
Volgograd and kills at least six.
1995
1999
February 2012: Doku Umarov proclaims
a moratorium on terrorist attacks against
Russians to allow political opposition to
protest against the government in “safety”.
May 2012: Russian authorities discover
10 weapons caches in Abkhazia. Terrorists
possibly pre-positioned the weapons and
planned to stage an attack during the Sochi
Olympics. The caches reportedly included
three portable air defense missile systems,
two anti-tank missile systems, a mortar with
36 shells, 29 grenade launchers with hundreds
of grenades, 12 improvised explosive devices,
15 kilograms of TNT, 15 anti-tank and
anti-personnel mines, a sniper rifle, automatic
weapons and ammunition and topographic
maps of the area.
2014
2013
29 March 2010
Two female suicide
bombers, wife/
widow of terrorist
leaders, blew up in
two Moscow metro
stations killing 40 and
wounding more than
100. Doku Umarov
claimed responsibility.
24 January 2011
A suicide bomber killed
37 at Domodedovo airport
in an attack conducted by
the Nogai Steppe Battalion
subordinate to Doku
Umarov’s Caucasus Emirate.
2011
1998
June 2013: Doku Umarov
re-declares war on Russia,
claiming the Sochi Games
games are “satanic dancing” on
the graves of Muslims and urges
all jihadists to use maximum
effort to attack the Games.
2007
6 November 2008: Vladikavkaz,
North Ossetia – a suicide bomber in
a taxi exploded in the marketplace,
killing 12 people.
27 November 2009:
A bomb on the Nevsky
Express train between
Moscow and Saint
Petersburg exploded, killing
27 and injuring 95, with one
wounded by a secondary
explosion caused by a remote
detonation the next day.
6 February 2004
A suicide bomber blew himself up on a metro
train in Moscow, killing 41 people.
14-19 June 1995: The Budyonnovsk hospital hostage
crisis took place when a group of up to 200 Chechen
separatists under Shamil Basayev took hundreds
hostage in Budyonnovsk. At least 140 people were
killed and more than 400 wounded. The incident
caused a political crisis for the Russian government.
17 August 2009: A suicide
car bomber attacked police HQ
in Nazran, Ingushetia. At least
25 people were killed.
24 August 2004
Two passenger planes were blown up by
Chechen suicide bombers after taking off from
Domodedovo airport, killing 89 people.
15 April 2013: Boston
Marathon bombing kills three
and injures hundreds of others.
2006
2010
46
2005
1-3 September 2004
Beslan school hostage crisis in North Ossetia where
rebels demanding Chechen independence took
more than 1,100 children and teachers hostage.
They killed 334 hostages, including 186 children.
23-26 October 2002
The Nord-Ost siege took place when a
group of 40 terrorists, including suicide
bombers, attempted to take several
hundred hostages in a theater. More
than 130 hostages were killed, and all
40 terrorists, when security forces used a
strong dose of knockout gas in the assault.
1997
2004
2009
2000
5 December 2003
A suicide bomber struck
on a commuter train
in Stavropol Krai, killing
46 people and
leaving many injured
2003
2008
2001
2002
2012
47
Security and safety
Security and safety
Kai Pfaffenbach/Corbis
Security staff working on the site of the Sochi 2014
Winter Olympics. Access to Sochi will be restricted
from a month prior to the Games until 21 March
them to monitor and filter all internet usage. SORM,
Russia’s technical system for intercepting communications
and internet traffic, will likely be significantly updated and
secretly employed around Sochi. The most recent SORM
upgrade is believed to be capable of collecting information
from all forms of communication and providing longterm storage, including actual recordings and geographic
details. Russia’s security services are also expected to
employ electronic ‘jammers’ for radio-controlled bombs.
Stepping up preparations
Port facilities will have improved security, including
the use of drones and SONAR to monitor restricted
offshore areas. Additional inspection vessels with
modern technologies and multi-purpose fire-rescue
boats are supplementing the coastal security effort.
Russia has participated in several large-scale antiterrorist and national security exercises over the past
three years, for example ‘DonBass-Antiterror-2011’ and
‘Don-Antiterror-2012,’ integrating Sochi Olympic Gamesrelated security objectives into the training. According to
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu (previously the
long-time head of the Ministry of Emergency Situations),
military exercises in 2013 tested the combat readiness
of more than 160,000 troops and numerous weapons
platforms and military equipment.
While not directed exclusively for securing Sochi,
Russia’s training and leadership focus in all security
services has yielded dividends for providing security
during the Olympics. For example, in July 2013, two
mountain brigades of the 49th Army in the Southern
Military District conducted training directly related
48
to performing security tasks for Sochi. Also in July,
the Ministry of Emergency Situations conducted a
surprise readiness check for disaster relief in the
Southern Federal District.
Disrupted terrorist plot
Earlier, in May 2012, Russian authorities claimed to
have disrupted a plot targeting the Olympics when they
uncovered 10 weapons caches in Abkhazia, including
anti-aircraft missiles capable of taking down low-flying
planes. The FSB believed terrorists had pre-positioned
the weapons in a plan to move them to Sochi to stage an
attack during the Olympic Games (see box story, page 32).
From 7 January 2014, a month before the Winter
Olympic Games, until 21 March 2014, one week after
the completion of the Paralympic Games, access for
people and vehicles to Sochi will be restricted. Everyone
will be required to wear badges and carry appropriate
documentation for inspection. Demonstrations and rallies
will be permitted in designated protest zones and only
authorised meetings will be permitted. Vehicles will
require special registration and only approved vehicles
will be allowed near venue locations. Spectators using
vehicles will have to park in designated, distant areas
and use public transportation to travel within the Olympic
areas. Armed guards are likely to be located at hotels
and checkpoints at major intersections. Plain-clothed
policemen will continue to patrol the city. Uniformed
patrols will be accompanied by professional translators
to assist in handling incidents and contacts with foreign
visitors. These measures are the culmination of extensive
preparation over the past several months.
The sale of weapons, ammunition, explosives and
selected industrial materials and poisonous substances
have been restricted. In the immediate areas of Olympic
venues, security forces have conducted house-to-house
searches and attempted to gradually lock down the area
by registering residents, merchants and workers and
removing migrant labourers who do not have official
documentation. Police have increased security awareness
through a heightened presence and security training
exercises. The exercises have included improving populace
awareness and willingness to report suspicious behavior.
At the student games, Universiade in Kazan in July
2013, the Ministry of the Interior concentrated 24,000
Interior Ministry troops and police. At Sochi, these forces
are expected to reach up to 50,000. According to the head
of the Southern Regional Centre, Igor Oder, the Ministry of
Emergency Situations will provide an additional 1,000
personnel with modern equipment to the security effort.
The large number of security personnel reflects the
objective to provide security, but also impacts another
stated objective – to limit the obvious presence of security
personnel and avoid a ‘fortress-like’ aura that could
diminish the visitor experience of the Games. The size
of force involved is testimony to the
scale of the geographic effort and to
the establishment of layered security
around the Olympic sites, at venues,
hotels, and other high-traffic or
high-importance sites. The personnel
will be augmented by thousands
of surveillance cameras and drone
use. Contrary to some media reports
about drone use at Sochi being an
Olympic Games first, drones were
used in London 2012 and to enhance
border security at the Vancouver
Winter Olympics in 2010.
attacks elsewhere in Russia. Any attack on the Winter
Olympics would harm international citizens and Russia’s
prestige, but the consequences would be worse for the
Caucasus Emirate by raising international sympathy for
Russia and its problem with Islamic violent extremism.
At present, many international observers criticise Russia
for its handling of North Caucasus issues and have
been less than sympathetic to Russia’s claims. A major
terrorist event carried out at Sochi would arguably shift
international sympathy towards Russia.
However, a terrorist attack elsewhere in Russia
during the Sochi Olympics is a possibility, and this
is something that the Russian security services are
undoubtedly working to prevent.
Likely legacies of Sochi 2014
Major international sporting events organisers are clearly
trying to select host countries that expand the global
character and quality of these events, but obviously with
important attention towards that country’s economic
ability to host the event. Security is an important aspect
in that decision, but not usually the deciding factor.
A terrorist attack at Sochi would elevate security
further as a consideration for
subsequent MSEs. For example,
security would rapidly become a
significant problem for the 2018
FIFA World Cup, currently scheduled
for Russia. The 2014 Brazil World
Cup, the Rio 2016 Olympics and
Tokyo 2020 Olympics, do not
have similar terrorist threats at
this time, but security costs would
inevitably rise in the wake of any
attack on an MSE.
A further impact of any attack
in Sochi would be felt in Kazakhstan, which hopes to host
a Winter Olympics in 2022. This would be the first time
that a predominantly Muslim country had hosted any
Olympic Games. Although Kazakhstan has the economic
and sports infrastructure ability to host the Olympic
Games, the spectre of a growing security problem with
violent extremists in western Kazakhstan (bordering the
North Caucasus) might be considered a negative factor.
The security issues associated with the Sochi 2014 Winter
Olympics will be closely scrutinised by the IOC and
Kazakhstan’s security professionals, not just because
of the common threats to Sochi 2014 and potentially
Almaty 2022, but because of the similarity in security
approaches by the host countries and their cooperation
in security matters.
It is worth noting that the IOC selection of candidate
cities for the 2022 Games will not occur until July 2014,
several months after the Sochi Games, so once again
there is much riding on Sochi’s security success.
Demonstrations
will be permitted
in designated
protest zones
Transportation hubs
Another challenge for the large number of security
personnel is the effort to prevent security procedures at
transportation hubs from disrupting the flow of visitors.
Traffic flow will have to account for more than 2,000 trucks
a day delivering food supplies. Siemens electric Desiro
trains will operate at five-minute intervals, transporting
up to 12,000 passengers an hour. Sochi International
Airport has purchased additional buses as well as mobile
stairways to handle 4,000 passengers an hour. The Adler
railway station has added more than 50 additional exit
screening systems to allow rapid passenger travel. Railway
stations at other parts of the route to Sochi and Adler have
also been upgraded with improved security procedures.
In addition to the transportation hubs, numerous metal
detectors have been installed at entrances to Olympic
venues, requiring further manpower in order to ensure
smooth visitor access to venues.
If rational calculus governs the Caucasus Emirate’s
attack planning, it would probably decide not to attack the
Sochi Winter Olympic Games itself, but instead conduct
Nathan Barrick is an experienced international security
cooperation consultant with an expertise in Eurasian
and Middle Eastern security issues
49
Security and safety
Security and safety
Pitching in: fans
struggle for control
of public space
I
n February 2012, the deaths of more than 70 fans
of Cairo-based club Al Ahly SC hardened public
attitudes towards the military and security forces,
and accelerated the Egyptian military’s desire to
turn power over to an elected government.
Eighteen months later, protests involving Muslim
Brothers, non-Brothers and militant, street battlehardened football fans decried the military ouster of
elected president Mohammed Morsi and the subsequent
brutal crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood. The
ingrained resistance to military rule and arbitrary security
forces among many soccer fans and youth groups has
been reinforced by what many Egyptians perceive to be
a restoration of repressive features from the Mubarak era.
The stance of football fans in Egypt, one of the
country’s largest civic groups, is based on more
than their normal anti-military attitudes, and reflects
50
widespread qualms about the military’s disruption of the
democratic process (despite Morsi becoming unpopular
after only a year in office). Their influence is also evident
in various forms of pro-Morsi protest, including jumping
up and down while chanting, a typical way for militant
soccer fans, or ultras, to support their club, and the
waving of flags with a skull and crossbones emblem.
Their stance takes on significance as Egyptian fans,
like their counterparts in Turkey, struggle to maintain
their power and identity in the face of government
suppression; a struggle that, in Egypt, is taking
place in the shadow of the military’s campaign to
repress the Brotherhood.
The polarisation of opinion in Egypt, as well as
the crisis in Egyptian football that was accelerated
by the 74 Port Said deaths, has not left militant soccer
fans untouched. While the ultras as organisations have
Mohamed El-Shahed/Getty Images
James Dorsey tracks the involvement of ‘ultras’ in popular protests in
Egypt and Turkey as militant fans seek to distinguish their ‘political’ and
‘football’ identities against a backdrop of social unrest
Supporters of Al Ahly SC demand the release of members of its
ultras group. Banners held by demonstrators reflect the death
toll of riots that followed a football match in Port Said in 2012.
The incident hardened fans’ attitudes towards security forces
51
Security and safety
Egyptian protestors run away from a burning bus during
violent clashes between supporters of then-President Morsi and
opposition demonstrators. The country’s ultras tried to remain
non-affiliated as groups, but individual members took sides
Several months after Morsi’s downfall, the UWK made
a statement emphasising that they were not a political
organisation, irrespective of the political leanings of
their members. This echoed statements made during
anti-Mubarak demonstrations in 2011, when the UWK,
alongside Ultras Ahlawy, stressed its non-political nature,
but said its members were welcome
to participate in the anti-Mubarak
protests. UWK said it represented
“the entire Egyptian people, with
some members who are supportive
of the revolution and others who
are against it. The membership
of many of our members in the
Islamist current does not trouble us …. We are not an
organisation with a specific ideology.”
UWK leaders said privately that they had issued
the statement to counter efforts to undermine their
credibility by identifying them as a group that supported
Morsi and the Brotherhood. Their statement came amid
The Ultras White Knights position
themselves as non-political
“I’m afraid of the return of the military state. That
is not what I fought for in the stadiums and on Tahrir
Square. I’m also afraid of the Brotherhood. It’s a choice
between two evils. If you ask me now, I’d opt for the
military, but that could well change once this is all over,”
the former ultra said.
52
Ed Giles/Getty Images
refrained from joining the fray, many of their members
and leaders have taken part in pro- or anti-Morsi
demonstrations, reflecting the gamut of political views
that exists across their ranks.
Many Ultras White Knights (UWK), the fan group
of Cairo club Zamalek SC, joined the pro-Morsi protests.
Their arch rivals, Ultras Ahlawy, the fan group of Al Ahly
SC, issued its first anti-Brotherhood statement soon
after Morsi was ousted. The statement ended the group’s
silence with regard to the government while Morsi was
in office. By refraining from attacking the government,
Ahlawy had hoped that harsh verdicts would be served in
the trial of those who were responsible for the deaths in
Port Said. The group got only partial satisfaction. While
21 supporters of Port Said’s Al Masry SC club were
sentenced to death, seven of the nine security officials
involved were acquitted.
“The ultras have become fascists. Like Egypt, they
have collapsed. They have no values and no real beliefs,”
said a former ultras leader who left his group in disgust
at the political turn it had taken.
In a perverse way, the difficulty of Egyptian as well as
Turkish ultras in defining themselves is not dissimilar from
that of the Brotherhood. Neither can decide what it really
is. The Brotherhood has yet to make up its mind whether
it is a social or a political movement. That decision may
become easier if it survives the crackdown and emerges
strong enough to negotiate terms of a political solution to
Egypt’s crisis, a prospect that appears increasingly unlikely.
The Egyptian and Turkish ultras refuse to acknowledge
that they are as much about politics as they are about
football. Their battle in Egypt for freedom in the stadiums
and their prominent role in the toppling of Mubarak, the
opposition to the military rulers that succeeded him and
the Morsi government, made them political by definition.
Yet, those who populated their rank and file were united
in their support for their club and their deep-seated
animosity towards the security forces, but in little else.
The ultras’ fate could change if Egypt continues down
the road on which it has embarked – towards a police state.
Repression with little more than a democratic facade could
turn stadiums into political battlefields against military
control (whether overt or behind the scenes), brutal and
unaccountable security forces, and autocratic government
masked by hollowed-out democratic institutions.
Security and safety
a campaign in pro-military and pro-government media
asserting that the ultras, who pride themselves on their
financial independence, were financially beholden to
political interests. The UWK, like other Egyptian ultras,
as well as their counterparts in other parts of the world,
position themselves as non-political, despite their antiauthoritarian bent and hostility to law enforcement, in a
bid to reduce their vulnerability.
Ultras chanting for freedom
The UWK insists that its focus is support for its club.
Their militant club support nevertheless led to years of
confrontation with security forces in the stadia during
the Mubarak era, in what amounted to a battle for control
of the pitch in a country that sought to control all pubic
space. The UWK and other ultra groups constituted the
only group that challenged the government’s right to
control public spaces. They did so in the belief that as the
only true supporters of the club they were the real owners
of the stadia. “We were confronted by repressive regimes
just because we dreamt about living,” UWK said. It said
its “battle for survival … [was] our motivation for chanting
for freedom.” The group charged that the military and the
government were cloaking themselves in the mantle of
the 2011 revolution to justify another round of repression.
“Nothing has changed, we’re still the terrorists we
were before the revolution ... we are still demanding what
is right and fighting for it, laying down our own lives to
fight some ignorant people, for whom suppression is a
way of life and whose imagination is sick. Amr Hussein,
we restore your rights or die like you,” the group said,
in a reference to the post-Morsi regime’s attempt to
criminalise them. “It doesn’t matter how hard they
hit us. We have been steeled in resisting repression
and abuse. We have demonstrated our resolve,” a
UWK member said.
His words echoed sentiments from across the
Mediterranean, in Turkey. Like its Egyptian counterparts,
Turkey’s foremost group of ultras, Çarşi, which supports
Beşiktaş JK, has a massive following across the country.
53
Security and safety
Security and safety
Oktay Cilesiz/Getty Images
Fans of Turkish club Beşiktaş JK clash with riot police after
a Super League match. The ultra group associated with the
club, Çarşi, positions itself as an anarchist organisation
It traces its roots to the far-left and positions itself as
anarchist. Yet, despite having wholeheartedly embraced
massive protests against Turkish Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdoğan in June in Istanbul’s Taksim Square,
Çarşi and other groups of ultras stress the apolitical
nature of their organisations; particularly in response
to the charging of 20 members of the Beşiktaş support
group with belonging to an illegal organisation.
Tough security measures
Nevertheless, neither the government nor the ultras are
under any illusion that this will end the confrontation. The
Erdoğan government has adopted measures that could
have been taken from the playbook of Egyptian military
chief, General Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. They include replacing
54
private security forces in stadiums and on university
campuses with police forces; banning the chanting of
political slogans during soccer matches; obliging clubs
to get spectators to sign a pledge to abide by the ban
before attending a game; and cancelling scholarships for
students who participate in anti-government protests.
To drive home the message that protest equals
terrorism, a video issued by Turkey’s Anti-Terrorism
Office and the police warns that protests are the first step
towards terrorism. The 55-second video featuring a young
woman demonstrator turned suicide bomber cautioned
the public that “our youth, who are the guarantors of our
future, can start with small demonstrations of resistance
that appear to be innocent, and after a short period of
time, can engage without a blink in actions that may take
the lives of dozens of innocent people.” Throughout the
video, the words ‘before it is too late’ are displayed.
Critics charge that Erdoğan is employing the same
carrot-and-stick tactic he used to tame the media. The
impact of Erdoğan’s effort to restrict media independence
and limit critical reporting was evident in June 2012, when
television stations broadcast soap operas and penguins
instead of pictures of mass anti-government protests on
Istanbul’s iconic Taksim Square as football fans joined
the demonstration. The fans may, however, be tougher
to crack than the media. They have already defied the
ban on the chanting of political slogans, rejected
attempts that have been made by clubs to force them
to sign pledges to abide by the ban, and ridiculed the
government’s campaign to equate protest with terrorism.
Fans reminded the government that the battle was
not over and may have just begun when they chanted
“Everywhere Is Taksim Square! Everywhere Is Resistance!”
and demanded the prime minister’s resignation during
a recent match. It’s a slogan the Brotherhood adopted
in practice with its launching of regular smaller scale
protests across Cairo and the rest of Egypt rather than
massive demonstrations that risked a renewed bloodbath.
Mounting tensions in Egypt
“People should not ruin their lives, should not have
criminal records,” Turkish sports minister Suat Kilic
warned in an ironic twist, given that Turkey with its
history of military coups and the Erdoğan government’s
crackdown on the media has scores of intellectuals and
55
Security and safety
Al Ahly striker Ahmed Abdel-Zaher celebrates scoring a goal
against the Orlando Pirates with the four-fingered Rabaa sign.
Showing the pro-opposition sign resulted in his suspension
Security and safety
journalists with police records. Among those is Erdoğan
himself, who spent four months in prison in the 1990s
for reciting a controversial poem. In Egypt, the mounting
tension, deepening polarisation and political activism
of fans has not only expanded into universities, but also
beyond supporters to include athletes who effectively
sided with their supporters. Prominent Al Ahly striker
Ahmed Abdel-Zaher was banned from representing Egypt
by the Egyptian Football Association (EFA) and put up for
sale in November, despite having another four years on his
contract, for showing the four-finger sign of the opposition
after scoring a goal in a match against South Africa’s
Orlando Pirates that helped earn the club its eighth
African club championship title. This followed a statement
by Egyptian sports minister, Taher Abouzeid saying that he
expected the EFA to “suspend and fine Abdel-Zaher”.
The sign, known as Rabaa (fourth) in Arabic,
symbolises Rabaa al Adawiya Square in Cairo, where
opponents of the military camped out for weeks in
summer 2013 in protest against the ousting of Morsi.
Hundreds of people were killed in mid-August when
security forces evicted the protesters from the square
as part of a brutal crackdown on the Brotherhood.
mired in contentious politics, with clashes between fans
and security forces even before Abdel-Zaher made his
statement. The clashes put an end to conciliatory efforts
by the government designed to co-opt the fans.
Flashpoints for confrontation
Days before the match, security personnel allegedly shot
a member of the UWK, who died of his injuries, when the
group tried to storm the club’s headquarters demanding
the resignation of its president. In a bid to pre-empt
further confrontation, the government conceded that fans
would be allowed to attend the Al Ahly match against the
Pirates, the first time Egyptian fans had been allowed into
the stadium since the Port Said massacre. It also released
25 Al Ahly fans who had been arrested a month earlier
when they attempted to storm an arrival terminal at Cairo
International Airport. In defiance, fans commemorated
the Port Said dead in chants during the match and put
up posters in remembrance of the incident. The stadium,
secured by some 4,000 police officers with armoured
vehicles, was lit up with bright red flares and fireworks
set off by fans, as security forces threw tear gas.
Flashpoints for confrontation between fans and
security forces continue to multiply.
Unrest in Port Said looms on the
horizon as a court prepares to retry
11 militant supporters of the city’s Al
Masry SC, who had been sentenced
to jail terms ranging from 15 years
to life for their role in the February
2012 incident. Last year’s sentencing
to death of 21 of their colleagues by
a court in Cairo sparked an uprising
in Port Said and other Suez Canal-based cities. If the
sentences against the 11 are upheld, renewed protests are
likely. By the same token, a reversal will probably spark
protests in Cairo by Al Ahly supporters.
A new protest law adopted in late November has
mobilised youth groups, soccer fans and students who
see it as a return of the police state they had sought to
destroy with the overthrow of Mubarak. The law gives
security forces rather than the judiciary the right to cancel
or postpone a planned protest or change its location. It
obliges organisers to provide authorities with details of
the planned protest in advance, including the identity of
the organisers and their demands. It further bans protests
within a 100 m radius of government buildings.
As more protests have been sparked in universities,
fuelled by the sentencing of 21 girls to prison sentences
of up to 11 years for holding an anti-government rally, and
with football fans joining youth groups in demonstrations
in major cities, the April 6 youth movement warned:
“Time will not go back to the era of rulers issuing laws
to silence their opponents.”
A new protest law adopted in late
November has mobilised youth groups,
soccer fans and students
Khaled Elfiqi/Corbis
Abdel-Zaher was the second athlete in as many
weeks to be penalised for showing the anti-military
four-finger sign. Kung Fu fighter Mohamed Youssef was
suspended in October for a year for showing the sign
after he won a gold medal in the Sports Accord Combat
Games competition in St Petersburg.
Egypt’s autocratic rulers, as well as their associates
in sports and club management, traditionally penalise
players when they express anti-government sentiments
publicly, but never when they express pro-government
opinions. Players in Mubarak’s time largely endorsed the
president because he showered them with gifts when
they were victorious. It was Mubarak’s way of associating
himself with Egypt’s most popular form of popular culture
in the hope that some of the game’s glory would counter
his increasingly tarnished image.
In the latest manifestation of the region’s nexus of
sports and politics, Egypt’s military had hoped that the
country’s national team would counteract polarisation
and weakening popular support by making it to the World
Cup finals in 2014. The team needed a victory over Ghana
in November to ensure qualification. Those hopes were
dashed when they lost 6-1 at the away leg in Accra.
Al Ahly’s success in becoming African champion
offered the military and the government little solace. The
decisive match against South Africa’s Orlando Pirates was
56
James M Dorsey is a senior fellow at the S Rajaratnam
School of International Studies, co-director of the
University of Würzburg’s Institute of Fan Culture, and the
author of The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer blog
57
Security and safety
Security and safety
Security and the
commercialisation
of ‘fan fests’
Simone Eisenhauer examines security and rights-protection arrangements
for the FIFA Fan Fest in Cape Town during the 2010 FIFA World Cup
D
uring the South Africa 2010 World Cup,
official FIFA ‘fan fests’ were staged in seven
international cities – Berlin, Mexico City, Paris,
Rio de Janeiro, Rome and Sydney – extending
the concept of the remote public viewing area (RPVA)
beyond the territory of the event itself.
Despite this extension overseas, attendance at all fan
fests during the 2010 World Cup reached only five million,
which is small compared with the 18 million fans who
attended the 12 fan fest locations in Germany during the
2006 World Cup. While this seems surprising, attendance
may have suffered from cold weather in South Africa
during the southern hemisphere’s winter, as well as the
games being broadcast on national television. Germany
2006 may also have been an exceptional event, as it
enjoyed perfect weather, a successful performance by
the German team, an affluent
catchment population,
and easy access to the RPVAs.
Despite relatively low attendance
figures, event organisers in South
Africa have stated that RPVAs were
one of the big success stories of the
2010 World Cup. President Zuma
told the South African parliament in August 2010: “our fan
parks were so huge that they resembled mini-stadiums,
which had not happened in other host countries”. FIFA
President, Sepp Blatter, stated: “The public viewing events
became a symbol of the power and charisma of football,
the pictures of the millions of fans from all over the world
celebrating at public places across the entire country was
the image that went around the globe.”
coastal sites of Durban, Cape Town and Nelson Mandela
Bay/Port Elizabeth, which saw 741,533, 557,483 and
276,742 visitors respectively over 25 operational days.
Fan numbers were measured and calculated based on
helicopters taking video-footage.
Ensuring access for foreign visitors
From the outset, the City of Cape Town (CoCT) World
Cup business plan stated that its RPVA was intended to
ensure that non-ticket holding international visitors had
access to the World Cup.
Chris Haber, Director of Media and Marketing for
World Sport, and a member of the consortium that ran
the Cape Town RPVA, predicted before the event that the
Cape Town FIFA Fan Fest would be the ‘iconic Fan Fest’
of the entire 2010 World Cup, situated as it was on the
Football fans gather in Long Street’s Fan Walk
during the South Africa 2010 FIFA World Cup.
Designated Fan Walks enabled visitors to approach
stadia on foot from the Central Business District
58
Nikki Rixon/Alamy
The main aim of the FFF was to provide
a secure area for international visitors
Cape Town’s fan fest
In South Africa in 2010, there was one official ‘FIFA Fan
Fest’ (FFF) in each host city, apart from Johannesburg,
which organised two sites. According to Namibia Sport,
the best attended FFFs were the three, mostly sunny,
Grand Parade, with the historic images of City Hall
and Table Mountain in its picture-perfect backdrop.
The main aim of the FFF was to provide a safe
and secure viewing area for international visitors, and
organisers stated that the target audiences for the FFF
were soccer fans, families, supporter clubs, local foreign
communities, company staff members, and corporate
VIPs. However, FIFA’s media FAQ guide also stated: “We
believe that all South Africans of all backgrounds will be
caught up in the event and attend the FIFA Fan Fest in
large numbers, similarly, they provide a safe, recognised
and exciting environment for visitors who have limited
comparable alternatives ... We therefore believe that the
FIFA Fan Fests will be a cultural melting pot.”
59
Security and safety
Security and safety
2010 FIFA World Cup Organising Committee South Africa via Getty Images
Crowds gathered at the FIFA Fan Fest in Cape Town. Private security
firms checked bags at the entrances for prohibited items, which included
beverage containers that were not products of FIFA or the event’s sponsors
In practice, the FFF in Cape Town was dominated
by middle-class patrons, most of whom were locals. In
a case study on the female experience at RPVAs by Bob
and Swart (2010), it was found that the majority of FFF
attendees were host city locals (close to 80 per cent).
This was confirmed to the author by a FFF event organiser,
who reported that not many international fans attended the
FFF on the Grand Parade in Cape Town “except when
the Netherlands played and the Dutch fans were present.
We had many people from suburbs and townships”.
At a post-event conference organised by the Institute
for Security Studies, Dr Jonny Steinberg from Cape Town
University observed that, in Cape Town, “the middle class
had, through the World Cup, rediscovered their city bowl”.
He noted that, “most of the time ... middle-class South
Africans move from bubbles of guarded security to other
bubbles of security. What the World Cup did was bring
people to spaces where people would usually feel unsafe.
60
That was created by the event. This was easy to police
because it required focusing on specific places.”
The author’s personal observation at the FFF in Cape
Town confirms Steinberg’s claims. Not only was the FFF
visibly policed, but there was little evidence of workingclass citizens or noticeably poor patrons. Compared with
the municipal RPVAs on the fringes of the city, the FFF
featured Cape Town’s (mainly white) middle-class and
some foreign football supporters. Thus, the FFF embraced
the tenets of inclusiveness in its urban design, but there
was minimal uptake by Cape Town’s less affluent citizens.
Design features
The Cape Town FFF was situated on the Grand Parade
in front of the City Hall and the Castle, close to the main
railway station with a view of Table Mountain. The Grand
Parade is the city’s oldest public space and one of its
best-known heritage sites – the late Nelson Mandela
made his famous first public address there following his
release from prison in February 1990. The fenced FFF was
surrounded by these historic sites, while an enormous
74 square-meter screen provided a football-specific
viewing space. These structural elements also veiled
views of the uglier parts of the neighbourhood and
any third-party advertisements surrounding the event
precinct. Moreover, the Grand Parade was refurbished
by the CoCT at a cost of some R22 million. The entire
area was resurfaced with paving stones that matched
the colour of City Hall, while a double row of trees
(stone pines) was planted around the perimeter,
with lighting masts installed.
The FFF was themed with the FIFA brand and
sponsors’ commercial messages. The logos of FIFA’s
corporate partners adorned the advertising boards
surrounding the FFF, which consisted of two main
areas: a reserved area and a general area. The reserved
area was exclusively for sponsor advertising and sales of
FIFA merchandise, including the Official World Cup shop.
It was the prime area around, in front, and behind any
giant screen and the main stage of the FFF, in particular
the main screen, and within line of sight of the screens
and stages, as determined by FIFA. The general area
was defined as the remaining area of the FFF. In this
space, it was possible for other CoCT entities (thirdparty exhibitors) to establish a modest on-site presence,
so long as their products and services did not compromise
those of FIFA sponsors. Cape Town also had the opportunity
to develop additional on-site branding (for example
promoting tourism), under FIFA’s supervision.
The FFF could safely host up to 25,000 people. The
goal was to enhance fans’ experience through the delivery
of entertainment, food, beverages, and merchandise in a
controlled and secure environment. This was pursued by
offering a range of hybrid consumption activities: watching
61
Security and safety
FIFA Fan Fest (FFF): the primary official public viewing
area (PVAs) for the 2010 FIFA World Cup. ‘Public viewing’
simply means the television broadcasting of sporting events
in public places.
Fan Walk: since ticket holders were not allowed to drive
to the stadium on match days, fans were meant to reach
the stadium using either the shuttle service from the main
transport hub in Hertzog Boulevard, outside the Civic
Centre, or by foot from the Central Business District (CBD),
via the Fan Walk.
Municipal PVAs: four municipal public viewing areas were
set up on the outskirts of Cape Town to alleviate some of
the transport and visitor impact concerns within the Cape
Town’s CBD by reducing the need to travel to the City in
order to experience the atmosphere.
Commercial Restricted Zones (CRZs): these are areas
subject to a variety of special regulation and policing
methods, as competition is restricted to those businesses
legally authorised to sell and advertise. Thus, their
purposes were to:
i
regulate advertising;
ii regulate special events and the management
of neatness of public open spaces;
iii adopt appropriate traffic management
procedures; and
iv regulate street trading.
live match broadcasts, laser light displays, an interactive
activity zone, popular local bands, entertainers and DJs,
food and refreshment stalls, art and crafts, and branded
merchandise at the official FIFA Fan Store.
Reports in the Cape Town business news before
the tournament claimed that the FFF would provide
an opportunity for small businesses and for promoting
local artisans. Shameel Ho-Kim, the local city coordinator
of the FFF, stated that it ‘would definitely have a Cape
Town flavour’ (Barnes, 2009). Despite FIFA’s Rights
Protection Programme (RPP), Cape Town was able to
include areas within these spaces for vendors offering
traditional African handicrafts, food and beverages, and
local (non-competitive) companies were able to promote
themselves within the FFF. However, in practice, only a
handful of traders and artists were observed.
Different levels of hospitality
Within the FFF fenced-off zone, other sections were
demarcated as being ‘special’, such as dedicated areas
for meet and greet, drop off and pick up, private and group
hospitality, a catering service and a beer area. Further,
the FFF organisers planned to provide different levels of
hospitality, such as ‘private’ (exclusive pre-event cocktail
reception), ‘tribune club’ (reserved match viewing seat
and food/drink voucher on the FFF main area covered
grandstand), ‘super fan club’ (reserved match viewing
seat on a big screen and food and drink voucher in the
62
City Concert Hall) and ‘castle’ (private lounges and
function facilities with private parking). In practice, few
businesses signed up for this opportunity. According to
the Operations Director of the event company contracted
to organise the FFF, “We tried to target businesses to
whom cooperative functions at the stadium were too
expensive. Hence, we wanted to offer them something.
However, it wasn’t demanded much.”
Wareham.nl/Alamy
Some definitions of FIFA spaces
Security and safety
Security strategy and policies
The following key stakeholders were responsible for safety
and security in and around the FFF during the event:
■■ CP Event Security: a private security company
that was contracted to supply a total of 210
security officers experienced in special events.
Their roles included helping with access control
and searches, exits, and patrolling the FFF.
■■ World Sport: a Cape Town-based event organiser,
which managed the logistics, including security
around the FFF.
■■ South African Police Service (SAPS): responsible
for minimising crime and gang activity and
enforcing visible policing in and around the
event area (FIFA 2010 Grand Parade Fan Park
Emergency and Contingency Plan, 2010). SAPS
officers were trained to identify perceived
attempts at ambush marketing alongside
other crowd control measures.
■■ CoCT Traffic Services: responsible for controlling
traffic flow in and around the FFF space and
manning road closures for the duration of the
Grand Parade Fan Park.
■■ Metropolitan Police Service: responsible for
police vehicles and mounted police to assist with
traffic services and to help with ‘ordinary’ law
enforcement in the area. They were empowered
to enforce the RPP, including provisions relating
to the 2010 event-driven by-law.
■■ The FFF Contingency Plan, which required
Central City Improvement District-supplied
officers in Cape Town’s Central Business
District to assist whenever they were needed.
■■ CoCT Disaster Management unit: this
group deployed its officers and volunteers
to give support to the medical team and
communications, monitored crowd behaviour,
and assisted with evacuation procedures.
■■ Other private security companies:
•
Bolt Security, which carried out most
of the entry searches;
•
DC Security, which involved one man
observing the entry and searches (from the inside); and
•
Usana Security, which consisted of three
men near the exit between the toilets.
An event manual compiled and distributed by the
Parliamentary Monitoring Group outlined how to run
a FFF. For simple crowd management, the location of
Police officers were present at 2010 World Cup fans fests
to deal with breaches of criminal law. They were also
empowered to enforce FIFA’s Rights Protection Programme
the FFF had to be ‘sufficiently far from the Match Venue’.
This was in order to ensure that the spectators going to
the match venue and those heading to the fan park did not
merge, thus minimising traffic congestion on match days.
FIFA also prepared a document entitled General Public
Viewing Guidelines, which were underscored by FIFA’s RPP.
Special advertising guidelines also applied to a 100 m
radius around the FFF. A linkage between FFF security and
commercialisation was apparent in the Prohibited and
Restricted lists, which were issued in the official 2010 FIFA
World Cup South Africa Fan Guide. Weapons were listed
in the same category as food and drink. Not only was
pointing devices, pyrotechnics, sticks, poles, or umbrellas
longer than 40 cm, food and beverages. Despite private
security exercising this task, the police were the primary
‘enforcement’ agent, with authority to charge people for
breaches of the various criminal laws and by-laws and
instigate proceedings for ambush marketing violations.
Liquor licensing and control
There was some controversy surrounding the policy
governing liquor sales at RPVAs, with event organisers
and executive officers expressing divergent views. Before
the tournament, the Operational Commander for the
Safety and Security Directorate of
the Local Organising Committee,
Rhode, said that “as it stands,
people in fan parks will not be
able to drink because of legislation
governing public drinking”.
In the end, liquor consumption
was permitted within temporarily
privatised, demarcated event spaces only, such as RPVAs,
but not in other non-fenced public spaces.
South African Brewery (SAB), a sponsor of the
national football team, Bafana Bafana, was given a
contract to serve beer at official fan parks after the
FIFA sponsor, Budweiser declined to exercise its right
because it wanted to concentrate on its presence inside
The location of the FFF had to be
‘sufficiently far from the Match Venue’
there a zero-tolerance approach to any non-sponsoring
brands, but also to people who carried the brands. Private
security checked bags for the following items that were
not allowed to be taken into any of the fan venues: aerosol
cans, bottles, cans, cups, vacuum flasks, or any beverage
containers other than official FIFA containers or sponsors’
products, glass, weapons, flagpoles, banner poles, laser
63
Security and safety
Security and safety
Franz Marc Frei/Getty Images
at, for example, municipal RPVAs. These structures
were used on a daily basis and it was very successful.”
Children under the age of 14 had to be accompanied
by an adult, and during the event social workers assisted
with issuing children with a plastic/temporary tag in the
FFF and municipal RPVAs for ‘easy identification purposes’
and to ‘safeguard children’ (Department of Social
Development). Altogether, 6,249 children were tagged in
RPVAs in the Western Cape Province. During the event in
Cape Town, 21 children were deemed to be neglected –
street children, 13; begging, two; neglected children, two;
abused children, two; assaulted children, one; substance
abuse, one. Tagging children under the age of 14 will
remain a legacy project at all major events in Cape Town,
according to the city’s Department of Social Development.
Defining objectionable language
Within FIFA event spaces, there was enforcement of
the requirement that: ‘no person shall use abusive or
otherwise objectionable language or behave in an abusive,
objectionable or disorderly manner’ (2010 CoCT By-law,
2009, p 20-21). According to one observer, (Bond 2010), a
Durban police superintendent responded to the question:
‘What if I say ‘Viva Argentina!’ in the fan park?’ ‘No
Children under the age of 14 had to be accompanied
by an adult in 2010 World Cup fan fests, and social
workers were on hand to identify neglected children
stadia. However, FIFA’s exclusive contract with Budweiser
meant that SAB could not overtly brand the beer it served
in FIFA’s space. Accordingly, SAB provided the beverage,
but it gave it unbranded to customers.
The Public Viewing Areas Liquor Control Policy was
drafted by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI),
setting the framework in which the trading of liquor was
controlled during the event. This policy was greeted by
a public outcry, especially from the hospitality industry.
They were critical of a requirement for existing liquor
licence holders to obtain a costly special licence during
the event; the draft policy’s wording required venues
hosting ‘any public viewing event’ where matches are
broadcast ‘to the general public or otherwise’ to obtain
a special licence. This caused widespread confusion,
and fear of prosecution for infringements may have
reduced the number of pubs and schools and other
non-commercial public viewing areas from really getting
involved. Zodwa Ntuli, the Deputy Director-General of the
Consumer and Corporate Regulation Division at the DTI,
said that the policy was not intended to stifle business, but
was intended to maintain security, and control the trading
of liquor during the World Cup. The DTI then explained
that this policy would only require a special licence in
respect of commercial public viewing events, for example
those that charged an admission fee or similar surcharge.
At the FFFs, the municipalities and host cities were told to
apply FIFA’s endorsed liquor policy as well as a fee for the
special liquor licence and a levy of two per cent of turnover.
64
In the end, though, bars and restaurants did not need
to obtain a special licence, and the policy did not become
part of the Host City agreement. In other words, no liquorcontrol policy was implemented in Cape Town, and no
RPVA organiser, including the FFF, Fan Walk and municipal
RPVAs, had to pay any percentage of alcohol sales to FIFA.
Nevertheless, the sale and consumption of liquor at RPVAs,
as well as the opening and closing of the liquor premises,
were monitored by security forces and a zero-tolerance
policy for intoxicated spectators was applied.
Security operations
FFFs were planned to have the same level of security as
the World Cup stadia. To enter the Cape Town FFF, visitors
needed to pass through security check points positioned
in Darling Street and at the corner of Buitenkant and
Longmarket streets. The chairperson of the Planning
Committee stated that at the security check points,
standardised access control was administered, which
included checking bags for items that were included on
the Prohibited and Restricted items lists.
At the FFF in Cape Town, where entrance was limited
to 25,000 fans, Bob and Swart (2010) observed spectator
frustration outside the perimeter when the FFF was closed
due to this limited capacity. However, the Operations
Director of the event company contracted to organise
the FFF stated: “Every time we were full to capacity,
we communicated on radio to trains and buses that
people should look for alternatives to watch the games
violence had previously been reported in any of the
FFFs worldwide. During the World Cup, in the 1.5 km
radius around the FFFs, 1,712 incidents were reported
to the police. Inside the various FFFs, 76 incidents
were reported to police, representing 0.005 per cent
of those in attendance.
However, this level of crime, reported in the official
statistics, was contested in the media and on internet
sites. As one blogger wrote in response to a community
newspaper article in the TygerBurger: “I find your
statistic very interesting, stating that there has been
no violence whatsoever in fan parks in South Africa. I
work as a doctor in an emergency unit in Kwazulu-Natal,
South Africa and have worked on many nights during
matches. I have treated one man who was stabbed in
the heart during one of the Bafana Bafana matches and
many others who attended fan parks during that time.
Possibly your reporting only covered fan parks in heavily
touristy areas, as I assure you that the reality in the
majority of South Africa has been far from violence-free
during this period. I would be very interested to find out
where you acquired your statistics from.” It is therefore
very difficult to ascertain the extent of injuries and
incidents in the various RPVAs from this combination of
official and unofficial information.
The government‘s policies,
decisions, and actions associated
with staging of the 2010 FIFA World
Cup reflected new and exemplary
commercialisation in concert with
intensified levels of policing and
securitisation. The measures taken
to combat ambush marketing were of particular note.
FIFA’s requirements for the host city drove decisions
about public and private spaces that redefined public
policies and rules. The lessons that could be learnt from
the policing during the World Cup primarily lay in the
organisational strategy that involved integrating national
security and law enforcement issues, as well as specific
safety arrangements based on FIFA safety instructions
(Pruis, 2011). Future studies might investigate whether
the lessons learnt and the recommendations made about
security legacies are effectively captured and form part of
a knowledge-transfer process to other event organisers.
FFFs were planned to have the same
level of security as the World Cup stadia
problem’, the police officer answered. Bond then asked:
‘What if I say ‘Phansi FIFA phansi! [Down with FIFA!]?’
‘Then you’re wrong. You can’t say Phansi FIFA phansi’, the
SAPS officer replied. Without wanting to exaggerate the
point, such reports do suggest the power of FIFA’s brand
protection strategy, even over police in a commercial
space. The fact that people were unable to openly criticise
FIFA indicates how far organisers and police were prepared
to accommodate the sensitivities of the event owners.
While in Cape Town, the author observed that the FFFs
and municipal RPVAs were intensively policed, with large
numbers of officers visibly on duty. However, according to
one of the FFF organisers, the officers did not have a great
deal of crime to deal with: “The only challenge I think we
really had was people illegally handing out flyers or other
marketing material”. Other reports by the Cape Town
Partnership noted: “A handful of lost children (all reunited
with their families); a few minor injuries when people
tripped and fell, and one pedestrian knocked over by a
scooter driver after jaywalking when she should not have”.
Indeed, despite the large crowds, there were only a
small number of incidents reported in Cape Town’s Central
Business District and surrounding areas. According to
the Department of Health, a total of 779 patients were
treated at the FFF, of whom 40 had to be transferred to
hospital. According to Ralph Straus, Head of FIFA Business
Development and New Media, no serious incidents of
Dr Simone Eisenhauer is a researcher specialising in
sporting event commercialisation and security issues
References
1
Bob, U. and Swart, K. The 2010 FIFA World Cup and women’s
experiences in fan parks, Routledge and UNISA Press, 2010,
volume 24, no 85, pp85-96
2
Barnes, C. Fan parks get local flavour for 2010, The Cape Argus,
Cape Town, 28 September 2009, p4
3
Bond, P. FIFA forbids free speech at World Cup Fan Fest,
Transnational Institute, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, 2010
4
Pruis, A. Policing the FIFA World Cup: What lessons can be
learned for policing in the future?, in Policing in South Africa: 2010
and beyond, Dissel A. and Newham G. (eds), ISS, 2011, pp13-16
65
Security and safety
The role of fan projects
in avoiding conflict at
football matches
Bongarts/Getty Images
Richard Giulianotti and Peter Millward discuss the findings of European
research into football-related violence prevention – in particular, the part played
by fan projects in mediating between supporters and security staff
66
Security and safety
F
aced by perceived issues of aggression, violence,
discrimination and extremism among supporters
at football matches, the most common response
from state and football authorities is a repressive,
‘law and order’ approach, such as the use of riot police
and extensive surveillance to control spectators.
However, several European nations have tried to adopt
alternative strategies, centred on a preventative approach,
involving dialogue and education that offer better prospects
for long-term security and safety in and around stadiums.
To help develop such strategies, the European
Commission funded a recently completed project that
sought to promote education and dialogue among
supporters in order to reduce the risk of negative
behaviour at football matches. The project – entitled
‘Pro Supporters: Prevention Through Empowerment’ – was
led by the Vienna Institute for International Dialogue and
Cooperation (VIDC)/FairPlay, with participants coming
from two national football associations (the Republic
of Ireland and Northern Ireland), Football Supporters
Europe (FSE), FIFPro – the professional footballers’
union, the authors of this article and representatives
of Fan Projects and movements from Austria, Czech
Republic, Germany and Poland.
The end-of-project symposium in May 2013 was
attended by these groups, as well as officials from UEFA
and the Austrian Ministry of Sports. The project saw
the production of the FSE’s Handbook on Supporters
Charters in Europe1 and VIDC/FairPlay’s Handbook:
Socio-preventive Fan Work in Europe.2
The authors’ involvement centred on the role
played by ‘fan projects’ in engaging with young
supporter groups. Fan projects operate at a city level
and work with the ‘fan scenes’ at individual football
clubs. Fan projects emerged first at SV Werder Bremen
football club in 1981, and since then have grown to
become particularly prominent in Germany, where there
are now 51 fan scenes receiving this professional support.
Hansa Rostock fans cheer amid smoke from fireworks
during a match against FC Carl Zeiss Jena. Fanproject workers can help to diffuse tension and broker
agreements between spectators and the authorities, for
example to limit the use of pyrotechnics at games
67
Security and safety
Security and safety
does not get out of hand. For example, if a dangerous
rumour circulates among fans, or if a fan is arrested by
police, then the fan-project worker should be in a position
to obtain reliable and authorised information, and pass
that on in order to calm the situation. Hence, fan-project
workers need to have good links with a wide variety of
key people, including police spotters, police officers,
stadium security personnel, club officials, SLOs and
fan-project workers from other clubs.
One of the earliest successes in terms of mediation
occurred in 1982, after a young Werder Bremen fan was
killed during an attack by SV Hamburg supporters – the
first such fan death in Germany. The Bremen Fan Project
helped to organise a meeting between rival supporters,
which in turn served to reduce tensions and the
possibilities of further violence over the longer term.
Our research saw us engage with six fan projects,
spread across four different countries. These projects were
associated with: WKS Slask Wroclaw (Poland), FC Slovan
Liberec (Czech Republic), SV Austria Salzburg (Austria),
FC Wacker Innsbruck (Austria), Werder Bremen (Germany)
and FC Carl Zeiss Jena (Germany). The selection of
fan projects ranged from those that were long-standing
(Werder Bremen and Carl Zeiss Jena), to those that were
new and emerging (Slovan Liberec) and even those where
no fan projects currently exist but their development is
being explored by some supporters (Austria Salzburg).
The selected fan projects showed substantial diversity
with regard to their positions in their respective football
leagues: Werder Bremen, Slask Wroclaw, Wacker
Innsbruck and Slovan Liberec are in their top national
divisions, while Carl Zeiss Jena and Austria Salzburg
compete in the regional divisions.
Werder Bremen fans unfurl a banner before a
Bundesliga match against Hamburg. In 1981,
the club became the first to have a fan project
Joern Pollex/Getty Images
Practical examples of fan projects
Fan projects are little known in many countries,
so it is worth detailing their histories, broad aims and
backgrounds. It is important to state that fan project
workers are not Supporter Liaison Officers (SLOs) –
since the 2012/13 season, it has become mandatory
for professional European football clubs to employ
an SLO (under Article 35 of the UEFA Club Licensing
and Financial Fair Play Regulations). The two roles
may be complementary, in practice sometimes being
occupied by the same person, and they share a goal
of promoting better communications between the fans
and other stakeholders, but fan project work is not
enshrined within UEFA legislation.
Fan projects come in different shapes and sizes.
Crucially, some of the largest and most established
projects, such as those in Bremen, have long-term
68
funding, enabling them to support two or three professional
social workers, some administrative support and offices.
Others are largely based around a single social worker,
with fewer separate facilities and support structures.
Substituting riot police for social workers
Fan-project workers are professionals trained in social
work, youth work and community education. In establishing
football as a legitimate site for social work intervention,
fan projects substitute the riot police officer and the
magistrate for the social worker and the educator. Fan
projects are most active within the social spaces and
scenes of young supporters, particularly in stadiums
and en route to away football matches.
Fan-project workers engage fully with local fan
cultures, helping to organise events and campaigns,
assisting in creative activities, and facilitating links with
other fan groups at national and international levels.
Thus, fan-project workers look to dissuade young fans
from drifting into violent confrontations with rival
supporters; educate supporters on issues of racism,
sexism, and homophobia; and help ensure that any
ambiguous or problematic interaction with police does
not deteriorate into disorder and police intervention.
One long-term aim, as a fan worker explained to us, is
to ensure that young fans are able to have fun without
being criminalised, so that, when they are older, a criminal
record does not restrict the activities open to them.
One key element of the fan-project worker’s role
relates to communication and mediation – in passing on
information and acting as a go-between – with the aim of
ensuring that a potentially tense or problematic situation
Fan projects may be a strong advocate for the protection
of the fan scenes at different clubs. For example, in the
early 1990s, the Werder Bremen Fan Project was at the
forefront of opposition to plans by the German football
association to remove standing areas or terraces inside
stadiums. The fan project was instrumental in developing
a successful campaign that sought to retain standing
areas in order to safeguard the strong fan culture and
atmosphere in the stadium. That now appears far-sighted,
as the large terraces, boisterous atmosphere, low admission
prices and huge attendances in many Germany stadiums
are envied by clubs and supporters in other nations.
Our fan project visits showed us numerous elements
of good practice. However, not all fan projects operated
in the same way, with differing strengths of relationships
with local security authorities (including both police
and private security firms) and supporter groups. Fanproject delegates generally thought that the stronger
the relationships were between supporters and security
agencies, the more effective their role could become.
A challenge that was immediately presented was that of
developing the most effective communication channels.
Across the project, we gathered large volumes of
data, which demonstrated how fan-project work might
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Security and safety
perform an effective role in dissuading fans from violent
and intolerant actions. For instance, at a league match
we observed at Carl Zeiss Jena, a well-established
member of the active supporter group had passed away
earlier that month at a young age. Many of his friends
who had moved away from the German city returned
to mark his passing at the match. The Carl Zeiss Jena
supporters negotiated with the security officials through
the fan-project workers that they would set off only one
pyrotechnic at the start of the match, in his honour. They
stated that if this were tolerated, no ‘disorder’ would break
out. The request was agreed and a potentially emotional
match passed with very little supporter violence. Later,
in engagements with supporters, we were told that they
believed that the fan-project worker had acted on their
behalf, as a representative to the police. However, the fanproject worker said that he had reduced violence because
he had also represented the security staff/police to the
supporters. The maintenance of trust in both relationships
is evidently crucial to the success of the fan-project worker.
Security and safety
in a critical condition to the regional hospital, where he
received intensive care treatment. Criticism emerged that
his recovery was not helped by the security, who appear
not to have helped with extricating the fan. [Translated]”3
Preventing communication problems
The incident, as observed by one of the authors, raised
some important points. The chant leader was in the fenced
area of the terraces when he suffered his seizure. Once he
collapsed, many supporters loudly banged on the cages
to gain the attention of the private security firms. Those
working for the private security firms misunderstood the
panic of these supporters as a sign of aggression and
refused to open the security gate in order to allow the
injured supporter to gain rapid medical attention. This
negative response intensified the sense of panic among
many supporters, which turned into collective anger that
a member of their fan group was not being tended to. In
turn, this prompted an increasingly hostile approach from
the security staff, and so the issues related to supporter
violence deepened. In this case,
if a fan-project worker had been
employed, the worker could have
called the head of the private security
firm at the very start of the incident,
and treatment could have been
provided more rapidly.
We would argue that a critical
value in any sphere of social work
relates to the independence of the
social worker. From these incidents – and our wider
research on the project – we drew upon this idea to
suggest that it is important for fan-project workers to
highlight their independence and to build the long-term
trust of young fan groups. To demonstrate independence,
in some contexts, where possible, it may be better if the
fan project is at least primarily funded by local or national
government rather than solely by the football club.
Overall, we found that there is no ‘one size fits all’
model for fan-project work; instead, the work is adapted
to the context and to the methods favoured by the fan
workers. For example, some fan workers emphasise the
importance of observing and respecting particular rules
of conduct; hence, these workers do not engage with fans
that are actively involved in violence. Other fan workers
indicate that they have links with such fans, in part to
facilitate opportunities for mediation and education
over the short and long term.
The point here is that there is no ‘right or wrong’
method for how fan-project workers should engage with
such fans; instead, it is more beneficial for these workers
to share their experiences and to learn from each other in
order to understand what may be more or less appropriate
or successful in different circumstances.
In the light of the findings of our investigation, we
would highlight five main ‘next steps’ that might be taken
to assist the work of fan projects. First, the exchange of
knowledge and expertise across fan projects should be
fully pursued. Over the past three decades, a rich pool
If a fan is arrested, the fan-project
worker should be in a position to obtain
reliable and authorised information
Furthermore, we observed Wacker Innsbruck’s homematch draw against SK Rapid Vienna. At the final whistle,
some Wacker Innsbruck supporters ran on to the pitch.
The strong relationship that existed between the local
fan-project worker and the head of the private security
firm meant that a response was brokered that saw pitchinvading fans peacefully ushered back into the terraces
and stands rather than being forced to do so using more
punitive sanctions. No violence broke out as a result of
the invasion and the supporters left the pitch after no
more than a couple of minutes.
The potential of fan projects
These actions are then compared with a situation where
no fan project currently exists, at Austria Salzburg. This
club is fan-owned and emerged from the buyout and
renaming of the original Austria Salzburg club in 2006
(bought by the Red Bull drink manufacturers and renamed
Red Bull Salzburg). We observed Austria Salzburg’s visit to
its former stadium – the Red Bull Arena – to see the team
play FC Liefering, which is financially supported by Red
Bull, in a match that played an important role in deciding
which of the two teams won the Austrian Regionalliga
West title. FC Liefering won the match – and the title.
At the end of the match, the Austria Salzburg chant
leader collapsed. The Salzburger Nachrichten reported
that: “After the end of the game, there was a dramatic
incident. The ‘whip’ [chant leader] of Austrianer [Austria
Salzburg] suffered a seizure and collapsed. He was taken
70
Five steps to assist the work of fan projects
Exchange Knowledge
Increase dialogue and the exchange
of expertise between fan projects
1
EXTEND RANGE OF Stakeholders
Engage with a wider cross section of supporters
and build up links with police and security staff
2
Try new means of communication
Utilise social media to publicise messages and campaigns
rather than relying on action days and educational events
3
Explore scope for Dialogue between fans and police
When fans’ cultural practices come into conflict with security considerations,
dialogue between fan-project workers and security staff can resolve tension
4
Implement the fan-project model on an international scale
While fan projects have a big profile in some central European countries, resources need
to be found to facilitate the spread of this model across the continent and internationally
of knowledge and expertise has been built up at many
fan projects. While there are coordinating organisations
that facilitate this knowledge exchange – for example
Koordinationsstelle Fanprojekte (KOS) in Frankfurt –
there is a need for such dialogue to occur more
systematically, particularly at an international level.
Second, the range of stakeholders within these
initiatives should be extended further. Much of the work
conducted thus far has centred on the ‘fan scenes’,
particularly involving ‘ultras’ (groups of fans renowned
for their fervent support); future activities might engage
more fully with a much wider cross section of supporters.
Additionally, on the security side, more engagement with
police officials and private security staff might also make
fan projects more inclusive, while also having an impact
on the methods and strategies of these stakeholders.
Third, new means of communication and dialogue
should be explored. The messages and campaigns
involving fan projects have tended to employ relatively
familiar formats and techniques of communication, such
as action days, educational events, posters and displays
by various stakeholders. New means of communication
might help to ensure that these activities and messages
do not lose their impact by becoming overly ritualised.
Social media is highly prominent within the fan scenes
in particular, hence more might be done to explore how
this form of communication may be used more effectively
to cultivate positive behaviours.
Fourth, the scope for dialogue should be explored
when the established cultural practices of the fans come
5
into conflict with recent security impositions. Inevitably,
tense relations with police or security officials will arise
when relatively popular and established aspects of fan
culture are subject to restrictions. One example is the
use of flares and fireworks inside stadiums. It may be
fruitful to explore how forms of dialogue involving fanproject workers, police and security personnel might
help to resolve these potentially difficult situations.
Fifth, the fan-project model should undergo wider
diffusion at an international level. Thus far, fan projects
have been limited in their spread through European
football. We have found much to recommend in this
model, and would therefore suggest that resources are
found in order to facilitate the strengthening and spread
of fan projects to different European countries.
Richard Giulianotti is Professor of Sociology at
Loughborough University and Professor II at Telemark
University College, Norway; Peter Millward is Senior
Lecturer in Sociology at Liverpool John Moores University
References
1
www.fsf.org.uk – for the full report, see bit.ly/1hmRBRz, and for
FSE Coordinator Daniela Wurbs’ discussion, see ICSS Journal,
volume 1, no 3, 2013
2
www.fairplay.or.at – for the full report, see bit.ly/1ikU1By
3
Öhlinger, G, 1 May 2013, accessed 29 November 2013,
www.salzburg.com/nachrichten/salzburg/sport/fussball/
sv-austria-salzburg/sn/artikel/fc-liefering-besiegt-austriasalzburg-10-57192/
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Commercial implications
of corruption in sport
C
urrent discussions on doping and matchfixing in sport tend to focus on the mechanics
of corruption, the severity of sanctions
that should be applied, and the means
of preventing and monitoring such activity. While
corruption is widely condemned as being highly
damaging to sport, little attention has been paid to
assessing the real impact of corruption on stakeholders
in the sports sector – including club owners, sponsors,
governing bodies and, indeed, the fans.
Sport has a long history of corruption. Back in
388BC, Eupolos of Thessalia achieved notoriety when
he won a gold medal in a fighting tournament at the
Olympic Games by bribing three of his opponents,
including the reigning Olympic champion Phormion of
Halikarnassos1. More recent names, once synonymous
with sporting excellence and achievement – including
Marion Jones, Juventus Football Club, Hansie Cronje
and Lance Armstrong – have been tarnished by
corruption. Each reached the pinnacle of their respective
sports, only to fall from grace for using performance
72
enhancing drugs (PEDs), fixing matches or selling
information to gamblers and fixers.
In 1919, the result of Major League Baseball’s World
Series was fixed by gamblers who paid players of the
Chicago White Sox – who became known as the Chicago
Black Sox as a result of the scandal – to lose the series.
Canadian sprinter Ben Johnson all but destroyed his
career in 1988, failing a drugs test after breaking the
world record in the 100 metres final at the Olympic
Games in Seoul, South Korea. Of the eight finalists in
this blue-riband race – which became known as the
‘dirtiest race in history’ – six sprinters faced accusations
during and after their careers of using PEDs, failed
drugs tests or were banned from the sport for supplying
illegal substances to other athletes.
In recent years, ‘Crashgate’ in Formula One,
‘Bloodgate’ in rugby, and the spot-fixing scandal
involving three members of the Pakistan cricket team,
not to mention the match-fixing allegations surfacing
almost continuously in football, have kept the issue of
corruption firmly in the media spotlight.
Andy Gehrig/Getty Images
Samantha Gorse reviews the impact that corruption cases can have
on various stakeholders in the sport sector, noting a greater activism on
the part of some sponsors to bring cheating in sport to an end
Match-fixing and doping scandals can have numerous
adverse commercial effects, including harming sales of
team-branded merchandise such as replica shirts
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Prominent sponsor ING terminated its association with the Renault
Formula One team after driver Nelson Piquet Jr was ordered to crash
deliberately to affect the outcome of the 2008 Singapore Grand Prix
There has been a vastly increased level of investment
in sports teams and events by sponsors, media and
consumers over the past 20 years. Global sports-market
revenues are estimated to hit $145.3 billion by 2015,
with sponsorship worth $45.3 billion, accounting for
28.8 per cent of the total sports market2. Television and
media exposure, attendance at live games and the sale of
branded merchandise across international markets has
ensured that sports, teams and, perhaps most extensively,
players have global appeal and an ever-growing consumer
base. Sports properties have become big business.
In turn, sport offers businesses and other
organisations a platform on which to enhance their
corporate image and reputation, build brand equity,
develop relationships with key stakeholders and enjoy the
benefits of positive image spillover through sponsorship
agreements, both parties in such agreements seeking
to benefit by capitalising on the values of competition,
performance and fair play associated with sport itself.
For fans, Whannel (1992) suggests that “sport offers
a utopia, a world where everything is simple, dramatic
and exciting, and euphoria is always a possibility… Sport
entertains, but can also frustrate, annoy and depress. But
it is this very uncertainty that gives its unpredictable joys
their characteristic intensity”3. This uncertainty in sport
relies upon the principle of opponents playing to the best
of their natural ability in order to win a sporting contest.
74
Lisa Hee/AP/PA Images
Jason DeCrow/AP/PA Images
Disgraced former Olympic champion Marion Jones
became one of the most high-profile examples of
cheating in sport following her imprisonment after
lying to a US grand jury about her use of steroids
Cheating to win, by using PEDs, or cheating to lose, in
the case of match-fixing and tanking (or point-shaving –
cheating to win or lose by a particular margin) undermines
this principle, removing an event from the world of sport
and condemning it to a world of fakery and fabrication.
Impact on sponsors
“Cyclist Lance Armstrong’s doping scandal is causing
sponsors to question their future in a sport that allows
them to reach mass audiences at a moderate price, but
risks tainting their brand.’’ 4
The reputation of professional cycling, and the
credibility of the sport’s top race, the Tour de France,
has been brought into question repeatedly by scandals
involving the use of PEDs. As a result, sponsors have
been forced to re-evaluate their involvement, recognising
that “in cycling, doping allegations can instantly tarnish
a sponsor’s reputation”5. Since 2006, sponsors including
Deutsche Telekom, Audi, Adidas, Nissan, Enovos, Liberty
Seguros, Phonak and, most recently, Rabobank have
pulled out of the sport, many citing the continuing threat
of doping scandals as the main reason for their withdrawal.
Sponsors of other sports have also been forced to reevaluate their investment as a result of corruption. Dutch
financial services provider ING immediately terminated its
association with the Renault team due to the ‘Crashgate’
scandal that occurred at Formula One’s 2008 Singapore
Grand Prix, as did fellow major team sponsor Mutua
Madrilena, suggesting that the scandal, while not only
compromising the integrity of the sport and the safety of
spectators, marshals and drivers, “could affect the image,
reputation and good name of the team’s sponsors”6. The
Pakistan team equipment supplier, BoomBoom, severed
ties with brand ambassador Mohammed Amir
as his involvement in the cricket spot-fixing
scandal in England in 2010 became clear,
stating that they couldn’t allow their brand to
be “associated with any whiff of corruption or
suspicion of foul play”7.
In the aftermath of the US AntiDoping Agency investigation into cycling
that revealed the “most sophisticated,
professionalised and successful doping programme that
sport has ever seen” within the US
Postal Service Pro Cycling team and, in particular, by
team leader Lance Armstrong, it was anticipated that
more sponsors would terminate their association with
the sport. This has not been entirely the case, however,
and a more complex reaction has ensued.
The Tour de France is one of sport’s biggest global
events, with some stages of the race attracting crowds
of up to one million people and extensive global media
coverage. For sponsors, such exposure is obviously a
powerful attraction that must be weighed against the risk
of a negative impact on their ‘image’ by association with
The risks of being associated with
cycling have put sponsors in a more
powerful bargaining position
doping. In fact, the risks of being associated with cycling
have put sponsors in a more powerful bargaining position
than they would find in other sports. For example, prior to
his company’s withdrawal from cycling in 2006, Phonak
(now Sonova Holding AG) co-founder and then-chairman,
Andy Rihs, stated “he was glad that doping was an issue
in cycling, because it scares off big corporations from
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Former Major League Baseball player Jose Canseco (left) and ex-sprinter
Ben Johnson (centre), both of whom used performance-enhancing drugs, join
entrepreneur and anti-doping campaigner Jaimie Fuller at a round-table discussion
cases in which governing bodies have been slow to get
to grips with transgressive behaviour, particularly in the
use of PEDs. Any perception of an inability to effectively
deal with corruption in sport presents a real challenge for
governing bodies in their pursuit of sponsorship revenue.
Sports fans’ reaction
Perhaps the most significant commercial implication
for both sponsors and governing bodies is the reaction
of fans to corruption scandals. If a significant number of
fans, television viewers and purchasers of sports-related
products react to a case of match-fixing or the use of
PEDs within a sport by withdrawing their support and
turning their backs on
sporting competition,
governing bodies will not
have an audience for their
sport and sponsors will
lose their target market.
The cost of attending
a Premier League football
match in England or an
NBA basketball game
in some cities in the US
can be in excess of $250
for two people, aside from any additional spending on
gambling or merchandise. If even the smallest part of the
match has been manipulated in any way, consumers are
spending this money under false pretences. The question
then becomes how long will it take for corruption scandals
to make fans withdraw their support.
There is currently little quantative research into
the impact of match-fixing or doping scandals on the
attendance at and viewing of sports events, or on
commercial viability. The chaos in Chinese football in the
period 1995-2005 is often cited as an example of how
match-fixing can drive fans away, but, in contrast, a series
of match-fixing scandals in Italy seems to have had little
effect on spectator numbers.
A survey of 500 Indian cricket fans earlier this year
reported that “82 per cent of cricket fans feel cheated for
having watched the domestic T20 league as a result of the
spot-fixing controversy”11. Two-thirds of respondents said
their confidence in cricket itself had been eroded, but only
37 per cent said they wanted the T20 tournament scrapped
entirely. Interestingly, the Board of Control for Cricket in
India (BCCI) garnered the most concerted criticism, with
87 per cent of those surveyed expressing feelings that it
was “not doing enough to curb malpractices in cricket”.
Given the cases of corruption in sport and the
increasing media interest in the issue, it is vital that all
key stakeholders – including sponsors, fans and governing
bodies – are aware of the
potential impact on the
image and reputation of
their brands. What is very
clear is that corruption
in sport has broad
implications for even
unsuspecting stakeholders
in the sport industry,
such as grassroots sport
and youth participation,
with a subsequent impact
on the very foundations of sport itself. The implications
for stakeholders should be examined more closely as
the debate about corruption in sport continues. As is
apparent from the example of Skins, these stakeholders
have a significant part to play in addressing the threats
that are posed by such behaviour.
REUTERS/Lucas Jackson
Sport is littered with cases in
which governing bodies have
been slow to get to grips with
transgressive behaviour
becoming sponsors, allowing smaller companies like
his to afford to be involved”8. Other sponsors, such as
BSkyB, have taken a firm stance against doping in cycling,
adopting a zero-tolerance policy towards the use of PEDs9;
this has allowed these organisations to benefit from the
exposure gained by being involved in the sport, while
also promoting their brands as ‘honest’ and ‘open’. US
technology firm Belkin announced its intention to replace
Rabobank as the title sponsor of a team just before the
2013 Tour de France, and airline Emirates decided to
extend its association with FIFA after feeling satisfied
that the football governing body’s officials were actively
addressing issues of corruption within the sport.
There are also examples, though limited, of sponsors
seizing the opportunity to enhance their reputations,
or at the very least protect their interests, by leading
the charge to change governance structures in sporting
organisations hit by scandals. Sportswear manufacturer
Skins established the pressure group ‘Change Cycling
Now’ in an attempt to force change in the governance of
the Union Cycliste Internationale (UCI), which ultimately
proved successful at the recent presidential elections.
Skins chairman Jaimie Fuller launched a new
Skins-sponsored anti-doping publicity campaign, called
Pure Sport, in September 2013. At the I Play Fair sportslaw conference in Cape Town in November, Fuller set out
76
the argument for greater corporate social responsibility
in the sport-sponsorship sector: “I believe sponsors can
no longer pay for the exposure a sponsorship package
will give them and then calmly sit back and simply wait
for the association to benefit their business. Sport these
days is such a complex, multi-billion-dollar business that
anyone who touches it is inextricably linked by a chain
of responsibility. Sure, as sponsors we want a ‘bang for
our buck’, but there’s no point in operating commercially
if you’re not prepared to stand up for every athlete and
sports fan who wants to watch or take part in a fair
contest. As I see it, what is the point of Skins selling
products to enhance performance and recovery to people
who compete at any level, if they believe the top-level
sport we’re supporting is rotten to the core? It’s guilt by
association and it makes no sense at all.” 10
Governing bodies
Governing bodies develop close relationships with other
stakeholder groups in sport, in particular fans and sponsors,
as well as governments and law-enforcement organisations.
The role of the governing body in managing the impact
of corruption in sport, to protect their own interests as
well as those of other stakeholders, and the manner and
speed in which it is dealt with, is crucially important for
the commercial impact of corruption. Sport is littered with
Samantha Gorse is a researcher at the Centre for the
International Business of Sport (CIBS) at Coventry
University in the UK. Her research is focused primarily
on corruption in sport – the implications of such activity
for all stakeholders in the sport industry, the education
of these stakeholders and the management of corruption
in sport across the world
References
1
Maennig, W (2005), Corruption in International Sports and Sport
6
Management: Forms, Tendencies, Extent and Countermeasures,
European Sport Management Quarterly, 5(2): 187-225
2
7
au/sport/cricket/boomboom-youre-sacked-as-pakistan-
market to 2015, http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/hospitality-
sponsor-dumps-mohammad-amir-over-betting-scam/story-
market-to-2015.pdf
e6frey50-1225913105790
8
Mason, DS (1999), What is the sports product and who buys it?
Marketing, 33(3/4): 402-418
5
organgrinder/2006/jul/31/sportssponsorsanddopingsca
9
Slater, M (2012), Team Sky strive for cycling’s moral high ground,
10
Hindustan Times (2013), http://www.hindustantimes.com/
Weir, K (2012), Cycling sponsors face doping dilemma
after Armstrong scandal, Reuters, http://uk.reuters.com/
Day, J (2006), Sports sponsors and doping scandals,
The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/media/
The marketing of professional sports leagues, European Journal of
4
Telegraph Australia (2010), http://www.dailytelegraph.com.
PwC (2011), Changing the Game: Outlook for the global sports
leisure/pdf/changing-the-game-outlook-for-the-global-sports-
3
Reuters (2009), Spanish insurer cancels Renault sponsorship,
http://ca.reuters.com/article/sportsNews/idCATRE58N47R20090924
BBC Sport, http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/cycling/20147726
article/2012/10/20/uk-cycling-armstrong-sponsorship-
Specials/Cricket/T20/Chunk-HT-UI-T20-SpotFixing/Cricket-
idUKBRE89J0AD20121020
fans-feel-cheated-after-spot-fixing-scandal-survey-finds/SP-
Casert, R (2007) Doping scandals leave sponsors wary, USA
Today, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/money/economy/
2007-12-15-1427767261_x.htm
Article10-1063066.aspx
11
http://watercooler.skins.net/2013/11/18/our-continuing-fightfor-sports-values/
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How major sporting
events can mitigate risks
of child exploitation
Professor Celia Brackenridge and Dr Daniel Rhind assess the risks of
child exploitation and abuse associated with major sporting events, and suggest
measures that can be adopted by event planners to protect children from harm
T
he relatively new field of security studies in
sport has examined many dimensions of major
events, from technology to on-field violence, but
has not focused closely on the abuse of children.
In the first issue of this journal, ICSS Research and
Development Director, Shaun McCarthy, presented a list
of ‘unacceptable political behaviours’ that might prompt
debate about protective actions in sport.1 The authors of
this article believe that harm to children associated with
major sporting events (MSEs) should be added to that list
because the plight of such children is a political blind spot
in current policy and practice. Drawing on a recent report
for the Oak Foundation, Child Exploitation and the FIFA
World Cup, this paper takes a critical view of the evidence
about risks to children associated with MSEs and presents
a case for collaborative action on harm prevention by
international sport organisations.2
A child at work on a construction project in front of
a stadium in India. Child labour may be the main
reason for human trafficking to sporting events
78
Daniel Berehulak/Getty Images
Sport and risks to children
FIFA, the IOC, governments and civil society, to anticipate,
prepare for and adopt risk-mitigation strategies and
interventions in relation to children. Leadership from
these culturally powerful bodies could prove decisive in
shifting hearts, minds and actions toward improved safety
for children associated with MSEs. Thus far, however,
and despite long-standing international agreements on
children’s rights, such as the United Nations Convention
on the Rights of the Child, child protective action has not
been a criterion of either bidding or social legacy planning
for most MSEs, rendering children invisible.
A shift towards protecting children’s rights at MSEs
would be timely, as it would complement ongoing work
being carried out by UNICEF, the IOC and other agencies
working in development and humanitarian environments,
to make sport safer for children3,4. However, the focus
of this article is on risks to children outside of, but
Children’s rights and activism work in
sport has historically been marginalised
Despite recent efforts to blend
sport and human rights, children’s
rights and activism work in sport
has historically been marginalised.
Perceived wisdom defines sport
as a site of fun, security, pleasure
and safety – a view reflected in the pervasive images
of joy presented by the media during the Olympic and
Paralympic Games at London 2012. The many benefits of
sport for child development – related to learning, healthy
lifelong physical activity, civic pride and multicultural
sensitisation – are also well documented. But the positive
‘social legacy’ of sport events frequently masks issues
such as gender-based violence, cheating and corruption
and, indeed, child exploitation.
There is an overriding need for action by those
responsible for commissioning and staging MSEs, such as
associated with, MSEs (see Figure 1). Risks emerge at
all levels of life – individual, family, community and society
(see Figure 2). These risks result from a combination of
social, economic, cultural, environmental and structural
factors that can disempower children and weaken their
protective environment.
Many assertions can be found in literature about
the sources of risk for child exploitation associated with
MSEs. In relation to the FIFA World Cup, for example,
some interviewees in the aforementioned report talked
about the ‘obvious’ risks of high numbers of people
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Figure 1: Children at risk in relation to MSEs
Children at risk
Major sport event
Children
Figure 2: Framework for analysing risks to children associated with MSEs
before
Society
during
Two residents of the building that once housed Rio de Janeiro’s
Indian Museum, near Maracana stadium. Those occupying the
site since its closure have protested against its redevelopment
After
Economic
such as commercial opportunities
Community
Social
Environmental
eg large gatherings
eg displacement
Major sport event
Family
Cultural
Structural
Individual
80
eg disinhibition through alcohol
eg lack of legal protection
Fabio Teixeira/PA Images
Child athletes
gathering in one place, opportunities for criminal activity,
violence and abuse through street round-ups, deceit by
pimps and agencies to drive women and children into
the paid sex workforce, trafficking for child labour, the
dangerous influences of paedophiles and increased alcohol
and drug consumption associated with the ‘soccer mood’.
Yet, while these concerns sound alarming, they often rest
on weak evidence, propaganda from those with vested
interests and pre-existing social problems in the vicinity
of MSEs; causal associations with sport events have
rarely been demonstrated.
The very nature of child exploitation, however,
does not lend itself to conventional hypothesis testing,
and the illicit, sensitive, personal and hidden qualities
of exploitation problems render them difficult to reach
by researchers.
Despite this, it is clear that some child exploitation
does occur at MSEs. Four main categories of risk and
harm emerged in our research, often with functional
overlaps: child labour, displacement of children from
forced evictions for infrastructure projects and street
clearance, child sexual exploitation (CSE), and human
trafficking affecting children.2
Child labour – this is the longest-standing form of child
exploitation associated with MSEs and may be the main
cause of human trafficking to these events. It includes
involvement of children in the manufacturing of sporting
goods, the construction of stadia and forced begging or
street selling. In some localities, however, child labour is
regarded as ‘normal’, posing a challenge to those pressing
for an end to the practice.
Displacement – of street children and poor communities
as part of event ‘clean up’ for infrastructure development
has been a regular concern of child welfare advocates
and researchers at past MSEs. The literature surrounding
this is vague with regard to when displacement becomes
forced eviction, and even more so regarding when this
constitutes child exploitation. Child exploitation resulting
from forced eviction mainly affects children whose families
are already marginalised and vulnerable. Displacement
increases poverty, divides families and heavily impacts
on children, who sometimes witness their parents being
beaten and their houses torn down.
Child sexual exploitation (CSE) – hard evidence of CSE
occurring before and during MSEs is scarce. The examples
we uncovered indicated a risk of CSE, rather than actual
incidence, or their explicit connection to the event was
difficult to verify. Assumed links between measured
rises in prostitution among underage girls and MSEs,
for example, cannot easily be tested. Extended school
holidays during MSEs leave children unsupervised and
vulnerable to sexual violence and exploitation, as do
bans on street traders and hawkers, since the resultant
economic strain on families can lead to domestic violence
and increased risks of CSE for economic purposes. In
short, child sexual exploitation linked to MSEs appears to
be hidden behind other social problems, such as diverted
services, family stress, poverty and domestic violence.
Human trafficking for sexual exploitation affecting
children – very few of the studies we examined focused
only on sexual exploitation of children at or around
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MSEs, but significant attention has been paid to the
alleged connection of MSEs with street grooming, human
trafficking and prostitution more generally, with resultant
impacts on children. Researchers seem to agree that while
the ‘rationale for fear is logical’, there is little systematic
research that yields supporting evidence for the impact
of MSEs on sex work. It is difficult to judge whether this
evidence gap is a reflection of the success of mitigation
strategies, of the non-existence of the problem, or of
the weakness of monitoring and evaluating designs. The
absence of baseline data about CSE
also means it is not possible to know
whether prostitution figures during
MSEs are an increase on the norm.
Overall, we conclude that human
trafficking for sexual exploitation
associated with MSEs appears
to be adult-focused, responsive to
advocacy interventions and difficult to measure. Where
it does occur, it is probable that such trafficking masks
harms to children.
all other risks in relation to the attention, resources and
priority afforded to it by programmers, irrespective of the
relative significance of this risk for children. There is very
little material on programmes and advocacy related to
child labour, CSE and displacement, masking the fact
that children all too often become victims when the
adults who are close to them are exploited. However, the
corollary of this situation is that protective interventions
that are targeted at adults can also have important
prevention benefits for children.
Children all too often become victims
when adults close to them are exploited
Protective interventions
Responses designed to minimise the impact of risks for
children associated with MSEs are wide-ranging, but
dedicated child-focused responses are scarce. Very few
programmatic or advocacy interventions are age-specific,
and most of them address general rather than particular
risks. Also, human trafficking appears to overshadow
PROCEDURAL
■■ Failure to report abuses
■■ The difficulty of going from policy to practice
■■ Lack of a learning legacy shared
between MSEs
■■ Lack of involvement of children or
participatory approaches
■■ Lack of verifiable data
■■ Absence of policies and procedures
■■ Lack of risk assessments
■■ Lack of mandatory child protection
within MSE host-bid criteria
■■ Absence of continuous improvement
models of quality
■■ Lack of long-term planning
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■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
A range of factors appear to inhibit good childprotection work for MSEs (see Table 1), all of which
indicate that researchers and interventionists are working
on what one interviewee described as ‘soft ground’.
Multi-agency protective work includes law enforcement
interventions (such as special visa regulations and fasttrack courts) and child-protection strategies (such as safe
houses, holiday clubs, facilities for street children, mobile
telephone apps and HIV/AIDS awareness programmes).
The literature is clearly dominated by the issue
of human trafficking, yet this masks the exploitation of
Table 1: Factors inhibiting good child-protection work at MSEs
ATTITUDINAL
■■ Ignorance and a lack of
awareness and understanding
■■ Fear
■■ Secrecy
■■ Denial
■■ The taboo of sexual violence
Table 2: Main messages for MSE planners and advocates of child protection
ORGANISATIONAL
■■ Lack of leadership, especially by senior managers
■■ Political and legislative inertia
■■ Obsession with money
■■ Pressure on time, energy and resources
(‘no capacity for international lobbying
or collection of evidence’)
■■ Vested interests
■■ Jurisdiction (‘silo’ mentality, ‘not our problem’,
‘head in the sand’ approach)
■■ The sheer scale and complexity of some
of the organisations involved
■■ Difficulty in tailoring responses appropriately
to different types and sizes of organisation
■■ Insufficient data to persuade the private sector
to adopt the issue in their corporate social
responsibility and sustainability work
■■ Lack of transparency/democracy in governance
■■ Getting sponsors to pay attention to the issue
■■ Concerns about reputational risks of associating
with the issue
■■ Resource allocation skewed to elite
sport performance
■■ Partnership with inappropriate sponsors –
for example, alcohol companies
■■
Establish a coalition of all relevant partners as early as possible and develop a coherent strategy that
allocates clear responsibilities and avoids disrupting the everyday work of local NGOs
Secure a ‘memorandum of cooperation’, or similar, among all coalition partners to place the interests
of children above those of the partner agencies
Ensure that the exploitation of children is also made visible in all interventions
Make sure that, from the very beginning, all interventions have robust monitoring and evaluation plans built in
Ensure that monitoring and evaluation plans adopt multi-method designs that provide both quantitative (statistical)
and qualitative (experiential) evidence
Do not assume that no data means no problem
Broaden the gaze of policymakers, programmers and advocates to include potential child exploitation
associated with other MSE-related issues, for example displacement and construction labour
Hold MSE hosts accountable to their social development legacy claims through longitudinal
monitoring and evaluation
Adopt child-exploitation criteria and child-protection assessments as a requirement of bidding for all MSEs
Ensure that children are clearly targeted in any risk-mitigation activity
Involve and listen to children from a range of demographic backgrounds in the design and delivery
of all child-protective interventions
children that lies beneath the exploitation of adults. While
the risks of child exploitation per se certainly increased
during some of these events, the examples that we found
highlighted the universal rarity of reliable empirical data
concerning child exploitation surrounding MSEs. Robust
research designs, focused specifically on children, are
essential in order to verify these assertions.
Responding to risks
Neither absence of data nor moral panics are excuses for
inaction. Risks to children are clearly evident in the wider
context of MSEs, so there is a need to mitigate them, to
prevent them and to respond to harm. Good protective
interventions need not wait for research to catch up, but
the long-term prospects for funding and political support
for such work will depend on demonstrating that such
interventions are effective. In Table 2, we propose a set
of actions for event planners and advocates that will help
them to prepare risk-mitigation work at future MSEs.
Events such as the FIFA World Cup may not be
a direct cause of child exploitation, but they do present a
significant opportunity for MSE organisations to act as a
catalyst for the adoption of policies and practices by host
countries that will enhance child protection. Strategies to
protect children should not just be a temporary priority
attached to a single MSE, but part of a sustainable longterm plan, as has already occurred with environmental
standards. The social-impact assessments that are
already embedded in the criteria for many MSEs should
prioritise the voices, needs and rights of children.
The boundaries of moral and social liability are
contentious, especially where international sport
organisations such as FIFA or the IOC are perceived
to have unlimited funds and are therefore expected to
invest in resolving every conceivable social ill. Local
host agencies within host countries and cities must
decide exactly how to prepare in ways best suited to
their own conditions and state of readiness. For some,
cultural, historical, financial and legal limitations mean
that the delivery of risk mitigation is likely to be less
than ideal. However, there seems no reason why – at
least beginning at the level of vision and strategy –
governments, non-governmental organisations, human
rights groups and civil society in general should not
accept their social and moral responsibilities that align
with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Professor Celia Brackenridge is a Professorial Research
Fellow and Dr Daniel Rhind is a Lecturer in Youth Sport,
at the Brunel Centre for Sport, Health and Wellbeing at
Brunel University London
Acknowledgements: the authors would like to acknowledge the
co-researchers who worked on the project reported in this article –
Sarah Palmer-Felgate, Laura Hills, Tess Kay, Anne Tiivas, Lucy Faulkner
and Iain Lindsay – as well as the Oak Foundation for funding the work
References
1
McCarthy, S. Can sport and politics be separated? in ICSS
Journal, Newsdesk Media, London, 2013, volume 1, no 1, p13
2
Brackenridge, C H., Palmer-Felgate, S., Rhind, D., Hills, L., Kay, T.,
Tiivas, A., Faulkner, L., and Lindsay, I. Child Exploitation and the
FIFA World Cup, Brunel University London, Uxbridge, 2013
www.sportanddev.org/en/toolkit/latest_publications/?6320/ChildExploitation-and-the-FIFA-World-Cup
3
Brackenridge, C H., Fasting, K., Kirby, S., and Leahy, T. Protecting
Children from Violence in Sport: A Review with a Focus on
Industrialized Countries, UNICEF, Innocenti Research Centre, Florence,
2010, www.unicef-irc.org/publications/pdf/violence_in_sport.pdf
4
Brackenridge, C H., Kay, T., and Rhind, D. (eds) Sport,
Children’s Rights and Violence Prevention: A Sourcebook on
Global Issues and Local Programmes, Brunel University Press,
London, 2008 and 2012, www.brunel.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_
file/0009/259344/UNICEF-book-whole-text-6-12-12.pdf
83
Integrity
Integrity
Monitoring betting
at Olympic events:
lessons from
London 2012
Kevin Carpenter examines the UK Gambling Commission’s report
on the role of the Joint Assessment Unit in monitoring sport betting and
identifying possible manipulation during the London 2012 Olympics
Mandate and design
The focus of the JAU was to ensure that the UK was
prepared to receive and quickly assess information
relating to possible corruptible betting activity and
assist the primary decision-makers and stakeholders
84
in determining an appropriate response. In
essence, it was a mechanism for the collection,
collation and assessment of information. Key
stakeholders involved in the JAU were:
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
London Organising Committee of the
Olympic Games;
International Olympic Committee;
Gambling Commission and their
Sports Betting Intelligence Unit;
UK police;
Non-Olympic sports bodies;
Sports governing bodies and
international federations;
Betting operators and associations;
International Sports Monitoring
(a betting monitoring service);
Interpol; and
Media.
Prior to the Games, the JAU knew the challenge
would be twofold: to protect stakeholder interests and
to put theory into practice.
Early stakeholder engagement to gain agreement as
to high-level operating principles was vital. The delivery
model conceived during the feasibility process included
procedures designed to assess the JAU thoroughly
through scenario-based testing sessions prior to the 2012
Olympic Games. This raised key questions of capabilities
and competencies, both for the JAU and its stakeholders,
highlighting the importance of the depth of understanding
of all organisations involved. This meant that there were
photo: iStock Images
M
atch-fixing and sports betting received the
full attention of the Olympic movement for
the first time at the London 2012 Games,
when Jacques Rogge, then the president of
the International Olympic Committee (IOC), inserted a
sports-betting monitoring and cooperation clause into
the Host City Contract in order to combat the threat
of match-fixing. Rogge’s successor, the newly elected
Thomas Bach, has reinforced the commitment to tackling
match-fixing, stating when he took office that this was
one of his principal areas of concern. These words were
backed with action during the most recent Olympic
Movement Coordination Meeting, held at the beginning
of November in Lausanne – more of which later.
Being the first Olympic Games to include such
a clause, there was some uncertainty as to how the
operation would run during London 2012. The IOC decided
to establish a Joint Assessment Unit (JAU) to deal with
the threat. An evaluation of the JAU and lessons for Rio
2016, called Working together to protect the Integrity
of Sport: the Role of the Joint Assessment Unit at the
London 2012 Olympic Games, was published by the
Gambling Commission (GC), the gambling regulator in the
United Kingdom, in March 2013. For a quasi-governmental
body such as the GC, this report provides an unusually
thorough and frank insight into the JAU’s operations.
85
Integrity
Jamie Gray/Alamy
Michael Regan/Getty Images
Integrity
One of the 16 suspicious incidents logged at the 2012
Olympics was the case of eight women’s doubles
badminton players – including the Indonesian and South
Korean pairs shown here – who were accused of trying
to lose matches in order to secure more favourable draws
no surprises during the operational phase of the
JAU. Although the preparation and feasibility process
for the JAU began 18 months prior to the beginning
of the 2012 Games, the JAU was actually operational
from the day after the opening of the athletes’ village
until the day of the closing ceremony – 29 days in total.
The Joint Assessment Unit in action
During that period there were 16 reports/actions logged
with the JAU. One related to the farcical scenes that
accompanied the final round of group matches in the
change in the format of the badminton tournament for
future Olympics, so that there will no longer be ‘deadrubber’ matches, which are often the subject of matchfixing, as has been seen in Italian football for example.
Interestingly, the majority of the reports/actions that
were logged came from monitoring of the media. The fact
that the JAU acted as a ‘coordination hub’ meant that
stakeholders were notified of issues within a very short
period of time after they had been identified. All of those
incidents were logged by the JAU, leaving a robust audit
trail. This was despite the fact that none of the incidents
logged were ultimately found to have
been linked to any form of unlawful
manipulation. In the badminton
scandal, given the part of the world
where the players came from (South
Korea, China and Indonesia), with the
Far East being known both for matchfixing activity and illegal gambling
syndicates, there were some
suspicions voiced as to whether
there was a betting corruption element in addition to the
sporting motivations to fix the matches. Both the IOC and
the GC confirmed to the author at a conference in London
in October 2012 that, although it had been investigated,
there was no evidence found of the misdemeanors being
related in any way to suspicious betting or manipulation.
Based on the data that the JAU was able to capture,
the amount staked by customers or matched on betting
exchanges on Olympic sports during the 2012 Games was
Journalists often identified cases that
were unusual, or unsporting practices
that had allegedly occurred at the Games
women’s doubles badminton tournament, gaining infamy
in the sporting world. Four pairs, from China, Indonesia
and two from South Korea, who had all already qualified
for the knockout stages, played each other, and all
were accused of deliberately trying to lose to ensure
a favourable draw in the next round. The governing
body of the sport, the Badminton World Federation,
acted promptly, disqualifying all eight players from the
tournament the very next day. This scandal led to a
86
The majortiy of the actions logged by the Joint
Assessment Unit at London 2012 arose from
monitoring worldwide media coverage of events
at least £350 million ($545 million). This was 10 times
higher than the level seen for the Beijing Olympics in
2008. All of those figures may seem high in isolation, but
the report was at pains to stress that in comparison to the
normal levels of betting on major sporting events, they
were actually quite low. For example, the men’s Olympic
tennis final between Roger Federer and Andy Murray,
attracted only 20 per cent of the bets wagered on the
Wimbledon final between the two earlier in 2012. However,
it should be borne in mind that the report is not clear on
how much of the estimated market the JAU knew about,
and one suspects that there was a large amount of betting,
particularly in the Asian markets, not captured by the
International Sports Monitoring service used by the IOC.
Media management
As mentioned, the majority of the actions logged by the
JAU came from monitoring the media. This was because
journalists often identified cases that were unusual, or
unsporting practices that had allegedly occurred across
all the different disciplines during the Games. One such
example was controversial decisions that were made by
the judges in the boxing competition. In the report, the
GC says that the interactions between the JAU, the IOC
Ethics Commission secretary and the press were a key
factor in effectively determining the lines of enquiry, and
a means by which these could be disseminated clearly to
other relevant parties as quickly as possible.
Furthermore, the report notes that monitoring the
media offered crucial reassurances that corrupt betting
integrity was not the driver behind one suspicious
incident. This inclusion and encouragement of good and
close relations with the media is something the author
has advocated previously, and the media should not be
seen as acting contrary to the interest of sport – it is
(in the main) interested in maintaining sport’s integrity
and can use methods and resources not available to
sports governing bodies and federations.
The Learning Points section of the GC report is
undoubtedly the most important, and it lists 12 separate
87
Integrity
intelligence into suitable evidence. This is why a number
of investigations taken over by the police then collapse
and are passed back to the sport, sometimes years after
the allegations were made, by which time the reputation
and faith in the sport has been irreparably harmed.
However, an encouraging case has emerged recently
from the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS). The case
has shown that to overcome these evidential difficulties,
the CAS is willing to accept betting monitoring patterns
and expert evidence thereon as sufficient grounds for a
life ban from a sport for match-fixing, as well as the use
of anonymous witness evidence (CAS/2009/A/1920 FK
Pobeda, Aleksandar Zabrcanec, Nikolce Zdraveski v UEFA).
Globo/Getty Images
issues. In general, the view was that the JAU model was a
success and could be deployed and enhanced to provide
similar, or even more effective support, at future Games
and other major sporting events. Some of the Learning
Points deserve further discussion.
Learning Point Eight addresses the need to embrace
legitimate/licensed betting operators. It is in legitimate
operators’ interests to maintain the integrity of sport
because legitimate gamblers will not bet on events
that they believe are already predetermined. This point
highlights again the importance of good relationships by
ensuring that operators are listened to actively and are
reassured that their contribution and efforts are valued
and appreciated. Importantly, this applies not only to the
gambling regulator in the country that is hosting the
Games, but also to as many of the betting operators
themselves, and/or the gambling associations, in as
many jurisdictions as possible.
Learning Point 10 talks about the detailed profiling
that took place of each Olympic sport by the JAU to
find out their respective inherent risks and vulnerabilities
with the aim of ensuring that the resources of the JAU
were used as effectively and efficiently as possible.
Monitoring was therefore prioritised for those sports
that were more at risk of corruption and integrity
Integrity
Future Games
Shortly before the release of the report in March 2013, the
IOC passed stringent rules on betting for the Sochi Winter
Olympic Games in 2014 (Sochi Rules). Replicating the JAU
model in Russia is not mentioned; rather, there has been
the use of a cross-stakeholder working group.
The Sochi Rules themselves are very comprehensive
and seem to strike a good balance between detail and
flexibility. The Sochi Rules cover the principal offences
of: betting, manipulation of results in the context of
betting (for example match-fixing), corrupt conduct in
the context of betting and the use
of inside information.
The Sochi Rules also then
go on to cover other offences
that often arise in the criminal
law: attempts [to manipulate],
knowingly assisting or otherwise
being complicit in acts or
omissions, a failure to disclose,
and a failure to cooperate with
an investigation. Parties can abide by the disclosure
rule through the anonymous email address or telephone
hotline that are detailed in the Rules. Indeed, these lines of
communication were set up by the IOC for this purpose.
However, it has been shown time and again that
those people within the sport/competition covered by
the regulations often do not use integrity-reporting
mechanisms set up by the sport/competition itself due to
a lack of trust in the governance of that sport/competition.
It would be better for integrity-reporting mechanisms to be
operated by a truly independent service, which also aids
the paramount guarantee of anonymity and confidentiality
for those brave enough to get in contact.
In October 2013, the local organising committee
for the 2016 Summer Olympic Games in Rio de Janeiro
signed an agreement with INTERPOL for on-site support
from one of its Major Events Support Teams (IMESTs).
As part of this agreement, INTERPOL will also provide
training and investigative support in relation to illegal
betting and match-fixing activities.
Back in March 2011, under the auspices of the IOC,
the Founding Working Group on the Fight Against Irregular
and Illegal Betting in Sport was established. This was
designed to assist the IOC in its collaborations with public
The criminal threat – be it fraud, money
laundering, violence or human trafficking
– is underplayed and misunderstood
problems. This was assessed by examining previous
weak or compromised governance in the sport, or
previous doping or match-fixing issues.
Significant lessons
In the author’s opinion, Learning Points Four and 10 are
the most significant, as they highlight a major problem
in the fight against the ills of match-fixing. The report
says it would be prudent to ensure that law enforcement
investigators have an understanding of the type of criminal
threats posed by and associated with match-fixing.
This is certainly true from the author’s own experience,
and not only is the criminal threat – be it fraud, money
laundering, violence or human trafficking – underplayed
and misunderstood by both the police and the sports
governing bodies, but there is also an inherent lack of
understanding about how sports betting markets work.
Unfortunately, these twin misunderstandings result in a
lack of convictions, or even interest, from law enforcement
agencies in particular. In my opinion, this is because
match-fixing is often viewed as an ‘unglamorous crime’.
Linked closely to this, even if there is an impetus
to actually investigate and to try and obtain evidence,
there are currently significant hurdles in converting
88
Crowds in Brazil celebrate winning the bid to host the
2016 Summer Olympics. In 2013, the local organising
committee signed an agreement with INTERPOL for
assistance in combating illegal betting and match-fixing
authorities. The working group had its fourth meeting in
May 2013, with a number of recommendations being
set out formally under the three separate themes of:
1. Education and Information;
2. Monitoring, Intelligence and Analysis; and
3. Legislation and Regulations.
One of the key recommendations that the members
of the IOC, and the relevant national bodies, are being
asked to support is the draft Convention of the Council of
Europe Against the Manipulation of Sports Competitions.
This is an ambitious project, and although the author
applauds their efforts in principle, one questions how
many countries outside of the Council of Europe member
states, particularly high-risk jurisdictions for sports betting
integrity, will sign up to this in the medium to long term.
The working group is correct in saying that the
protection of integrity in sport cannot be waged by the
federations and governing bodies alone, particularly
where evidence of a criminal nature is required. However,
given the apparent reluctance and/or inability of law
enforcement agencies to deal with this transnational,
global issue, there needs to be more consideration
given to the need for concurrent sporting investigations
and criminal proceedings to take place so as to fully
protect the perception, image and integrity of sport.
Encouragingly, during the 82nd Interpol General Assembly
in Colombia in October 2013, the delegates endorsed a
resolution for a memorandum of understanding with the
IOC that would provide a formal structure for enhanced
cooperation between the two organisations, particularly in
relation to promoting integrity in sport.
In the author’s view, the key broker and leader in the
global fight against match manipulation through corrupt
sports betting practices can, and should, be the IOC, as
it is the only body with the necessary political, social
and sporting influence and strength to bring all the key
stakeholders together under a common umbrella, using
the experience gained with the JAU during London 2012
to provide a coherent, powerful and above all, effective
strategy for Sochi 2014 and beyond.
This is an updated version of an article first published
by the author on LawInSport.com
Kevin Carpenter is a sports lawyer at international
law firm Hill Dickinson LLP, specialising in regulation,
governance and integrity matters. He can be contacted
by email at [email protected] or
via Twitter @KevSportsLaw
89
Integrity
Integrity
Looking for betting fraud
David McCarthy examines the emergence of betting-monitoring organisations,
both within sports bodies and private entities, and reviews their progress
Monitoring systems often observe the opening of
new accounts, which, if occurring in large numbers,
can indicate attempts to place fraudulent bets
90
Westend61/Getty Images
“T
he regulator must play a central role in
fraud detection, taken in this context as
the detection of ‘irregular bets’. To do
this, the regulator must be cognisant
of developments in the market, the bets placed and the
concentration of bets in relation to competitions. In the
light of the very substantial growth in live betting, this
overview must be facilitated in real time. The detection
of irregularities will then enable warning levels to be set,
and the necessary measures to be taken in the event
of fraud. The regulator must serve as an interface and
centralisation point for data on fraud, to which end
the existing monitoring systems of some betting operators
may be used.” So read the 2012 Sports betting and
corruption: How to preserve the integrity of sport study by
the Institut de Relations Internationales et Stratégiques.
Sports betting monitoring systems have developed
rapidly over the past 10 years for two reasons. Firstly, as
a means to detect suspicious betting patterns that may
indicate match-fixing behaviour and fraudulent betting
activities. Secondly, as a means to improve efficiencies
for betting operators. These two existential motivations
explain why a range of betting monitoring organisations
exist. Some of them have originated from sports bodies,
such as FIFA, seeking to crack down on match-fixing,
while others have developed out of the gaming industry,
from their own internal business monitoring functions to
shared monitoring functions. Some betting monitoring
organisations are still tied to their founding bodies, while
others, such as Sportradar, are independent operations.
Monitoring systems typically observe the odds before
a match, how they change during the game, the number of
bets placed on a sporting event or aspects of the game, or
substantial bets placed in unusual circumstances. These
systems also watch client activity and the opening of new
accounts: spikes in new accounts can indicate attempts to
place fraudulent bets on rigged matches. The IRIS report
identified three types of betting monitoring organisation:
■■ Those created by each operator to develop
and protect their own business;
■■ Those shared between operators as a
common warning system and for
improved risk assessment; and
■■ Those created by sports organisations
for the targeted surveillance systems of
their own competitions.
Two further monitoring systems could be added:
private monitoring organisations, such as Sportradar, and
monitoring units set up within regulatory organisations,
such as the UK’s Gambling Commission.
Sport-based monitors
FIFA and the International Olympic Committee (IOC) are
probably the two most powerful single entities in sport,
and both have developed betting monitoring organisations,
although it was FIFA that led the way.
FIFA’s Early Warning System (EWS) is designed to
safeguard the integrity of the organisation’s tournaments
against the potential threats of sports betting. The system
functions through a combination of monitoring and the
analysis of betting patterns.
In the run up to the 2006 World Cup in Germany,
FIFA established a prototype early warning system. The
system was piloted to monitor, analyse and report on
betting patterns during the competition as part of an
overall strategy to combat the negative influences of
sports betting, which had been a particular concern in
Germany after the match-fixing cases in the Bundesliga
in 2005. The pilot was a success and FIFA decided to
formalise the unit, establishing the EWS GmbH as a
separate and independent entity in Zurich in 2007.
Since it was established, the company has expanded
its role with FIFA and has branched out to monitor
betting for other sports associations.
EWS has developed a three-pronged approach,
which includes monitoring and analysis, education,
and prevention operations. The company’s front line
monitoring and analysis operation collates and
analyses detailed information on betting activity and
trends. This operation breaks down into three functions.
Firstly, data provided by betting companies: EWS has
contractual arrangements in place with betting companies
to share data on betting patterns. The platform is secure
and companies that participate are protected against
reputational risk – otherwise, if news became public that
their systems had been targeted by fraudsters, it might
be damaging for those companies.
Secondly, data analysis: EWS has developed a system
to analyse betting patterns and identify those that are
suspicious. This system focuses on the range of betting
offers and odds. It is also designed to capture information
on surges of money being placed on sporting events.
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Integrity
Walter Bieri/Corbis
Integrity
FIFA President Sepp Blatter answers questions at a congress held by
the Early Warning System company in April. EWS helps to protect
FIFA’s tournaments from the potential threats of sports betting
Thirdly, market intelligence: EWS has developed
a wide range of contacts that provide information and
intelligence on sporting events, new trends within the
betting marketplace and persons of interest within
both sport and betting.
The education operation of EWS provides training
seminars and information to stakeholders, such as players,
officials and sporting organisations, on the threats that
they may face and some of the approaches they may
receive, as well as information on how to report such
instances. As noted in the round-up of recent match-fixing
cases in this issue of ICSS Journal (see Aaron, page 86),
such support for players and officials is essential in
preventing vulnerable individuals from being drawn
into fraudulent activities.
As part of its prevention operation, EWS has developed
links with various bodies, including INTERPOL. Under
a contractual agreement signed in 2011, EWS assists
in the formation of e-learning modules on integrity and
anti-corruption for stakeholders. Provided by INTERPOL,
these modules educate stakeholders on the nature and
consequences of corruption.
Since its establishment in 2007, EWS has refined
and expanded its monitoring of the sports betting market.
It has also extended its assistance to other sporting codes
and leagues. For example, EWS was commissioned by
the International Olympic Committee (IOC) to monitor
the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing. The company also
provides consultation and support services to national
football federations, as well as other sporting bodies,
and is represented on FIFA’s internal Betting Integrity
Investigation Task Force.
92
The IOC set up its own company, International Sports
Monitoring (ISM) GmbH, based in Meilen, Switzerland, to
monitor irregular betting patterns in 2009. The experience
of the EWS monitoring the Beijing Games in 2008, despite
the fact that no irregular betting patterns were detected,
encouraged the IOC to create the ISM to help monitor
qualifying competitions for Olympic events, as well as the
main Games themselves. The ISM’s approach is similar to
the EWS and other betting monitors, although it naturally
has to monitor developments across a big range of sports.
Information-sharing systems
Following the London 2012 Olympics, the IOC’s Founding
Working Group (FWG) on the fight against irregular and
illegal betting finalised a set of recommendations to
strengthen education, monitoring, exchange of information
and intelligence, and legislation relating to match-fixing.
In May 2013, the FWG called for the creation of a
permanent monitoring system based on the operation at
the London 2012 Olympic Games. In London, the IOC and
the UK Gambling Commission’s Sports Betting Intelligence
Unit created a Joint Assessment Unit to monitor betting
(see Carpenter, page 76). The new system could be used
by international federations during major competitions to
share information regarding suspicious betting activity.
The FWG also called on national sports betting regulatory
authorities to strengthen ties between themselves and
with sports organisations and betting operators.
“Irregular and illegal betting attacks the very
foundations of sport, and our efforts to combat the
threat require the commitment of a number of important
partners, specifically governments ... The setting up
of a common sports monitoring system still needs to
be discussed by the Olympic Movement, but the work
undertaken by the Founding Working Group is paving
the way forward and we have made significant progress
since our first meeting in 2011,” noted the former IOC
President Jacques Rogge.
The FWG urged governments and sports organisations
to adopt rules that are designed to combat irregular and
illegal betting at all levels. Countries that had not yet
done so were encouraged pass legislation modelled
on the convention against the manipulation of sports
competitions, which is currently being drafted by the
Council of Europe. Specifically, the FWG:
■■ urged states to create national platforms for
the development, understanding and exchange
of irregular betting-related information among
national law enforcement agencies, betting
regulators and operators, sports organisations
and other national bodies;
■■ recommended the creation
of national betting
authorities in states that
do not yet have them;
■■ encouraged crossborder
cooperation between
national betting authorities;
■■ proposed a permanent betting monitoring system
based on that used at London 2012;
■■ pushed for an improved mechanism for the
confidential reporting of match-fixing suspicions
by athletes, officials and others; and
■■ suggested the creation of a global forum on
match-fixing and fraudulent betting in order to
maintain a high level of awareness of the issues.
track betting movements based on pre-set criteria. A
deviation in expected odds can indicate that something
suspicious has occurred. Such events are reported to the
relevant association for investigation. The Fraud Scoring
Database monitors high-risk individuals who may have
some involvement in match-fixing, keeping track of the
countries, leagues and clubs in which they operate. Their
movements and signings are tracked so that new countries
or associations can informed of their potential activities.
The Sportradar analysts working on the FDS have
geographic and industry specialisms (for example betting
exchange or state lottery experience) to cover the range of
betting activity and patterns that may be suspicious. They
also maintain extensive contacts with researchers and
stakeholders who can provide them with local information
on sports integrity. Furthermore, the team has developed
relationships on an organisational level with sporting
associations and law-enforcement agencies, both in
Spikes in new accounts can indicate
attempts to place fraudulent bets
In November 2013, the IOC announced in a statement
that it would “set up a special unit to coordinate efforts
[on match-fixing and illegal betting]... This unit will work
on risk prevention and the dissemination of information
and will support the harmonisation of rules of the Olympic
and sports movements. These rules will be based on
examples from some of the international federations
already working on this issue, such as FIFA, which has
already applied severe sanctions.”
Since 2004, private, independent sport data provider,
Sportradar, has been supplying organisations such as
UEFA, the Confederation of North, Central American
and Caribbean Association Football, the French Tennis
Federation and German Handball League with betting
monitoring services through its Fraud Detection System
(FDS). In November 2013, Sportradar signed agreements
with several other sports bodies, such as the Asian Football
Confederation, and the English Rugby Football Union.
According to the company, the FDS uses betting
information provided by over 350 betting organisations
and gambling institutions on a 24/7 basis, and collates
other market information and data that can be relevant to
match-fixing. The Alerting System monitors the movement
of odds on a pre-match and real-time basis, and can
providing information to investigators and in learning
more about the matrix of match-fixing and betting fraud.
An eye on the future
All of the organisations discussed above have been
created in the past decade, and their development
has gone hand in hand with advances in information
technology that have revolutionised the betting world,
but have also led to a rise in betting fraud and
match-fixing. The power of modern computing and
communications means that data on irregular betting
patterns can be shared, stored and analysed in near
real-time, providing both betting operators and sports
bodies with alerts to illicit activity. This data can also
be compared with account profile information to track
criminals and bring prosecutions. There remain, however,
significant barriers to information exchange and the use
of data in international investigations, and these need to
be resolved at a governmental level.
It is likely that the betting monitoring sector will
continue to evolve with sports organisations, betting
operators and some independents such as Sportradar
running monitoring operations. Recent statements by the
IOC suggest that it will develop a significant operation to
cover a range of sports and manage information exchange
between stakeholders internationally, as well as in various
sectors (such as police, national betting authorities,
sports federations and betting operators). Given that the
IOC and FIFA are seeking very similar solutions, it will be
interesting to see how they work together.
David McCarthy is a freelance researcher focusing on
sport integrity issues related to betting and match-fixing
93
Integrity
Integrity
Match-fixing cases
underline need
for new laws
Chris Aaron reviews recent cases of match-fixing and the measures
that may be introduced to help combat increasing corruption
Photo: Kolvenbach/Alamy
E
94
stonian authorities arrested 11 men in early
December on suspicion of match-fixing.
Eight were professional footballers from the
Estonian clubs JK Narva Trans and JK Tallinna
Kalev, and had previously been suspended by their
clubs on suspicion of match manipulation. The men
are alleged to have fixed 17 matches in total during
the 2011-12 season, including 13 Estonian league
and cup matches, one Lithuanian league match and
three Europa League games.
In the same week, charges were brought by
UK police against several people on suspicion of
involvement in betting fraud. At the time of going
to press, four men had been charged: Singapore
national Chann Sankaran, 33, and Krishna Sanjey
Ganeshan, 43, who has dual UK and Singapore
nationality, along with Michael Boateng and Hakeem
Adelakun, both 22 and former Whitehawk FC players,
were charged with conspiring together and with others
“to defraud bookmakers by influencing the course
of football matches and placing bets thereon”,
according to the National Crime Agency in the UK.
The Daily Telegraph newspaper, which uncovered
the fixing, reported claims that a lower-league match
in England could be ‘fixed’ for £50,000. Betting monitors
believe that millions of pounds have been wagered on
non-league ties recently, out of all proportion to the
normal level of interest in such matches.
Meanwhile, investigators in Austria say that 20
players have been questioned about allegations of
fixing in at least 17 league matches since 2004, nine
of them in the Austrian first division. Investigators
say the players were questioned based on a list of
footballers’ names obtained from two Albanians,
who had previously been arrested for allegedly
coordinating match-fixing. Some of the games are
linked to Dominique Taboga, who was arrested in
November for alleged attempts to manipulate games
after he claimed former international Sanel Kuljic had
talked him into match-fixing to settle a personal debt.
So what do these latest cases tell us about trends in
match-fixing? Although the cases are all based around
European football, we need to be careful about cause
and effect. Football is obviously a target, as about
95
Integrity
Although football has seen the highest-profile
cases of alleged match-fixing, other sports –
including tennis, basketball and volleyball
– have not been immune from suspicion
Integri Integrity
70 per cent of betting is on football matches, and it is
betting fraud that drives most manipulation. But more
cases are turning up in Europe because authorities and
governing bodies have upped their game; not to mention
The Daily Telegraph, whose sting operation was apparently
behind the latest UK arrests.
As fixing in European football becomes more difficult,
the activity will displace to other regions and codes. In
fact, this is already happening. In January 2013 FIFA’s
head of security, Ralf Mutschke, estimated that “there are
about 50 different national leagues outside Europe which
are targeted by organised crime on the betting market”.
Suspicions of match-fixing have even surfaced around
StarCraft video-game competitions, which are extremely
popular in South Korea. So the nature of match-fixing should
not be judged only by the tip of the European iceberg.
Lower-league vulnerability
In the wake of the UK arrests, there was much talk about
the vulnerability of lower leagues, where players are not
so well paid and may therefore be more open to bribery.
Former Premier League chief executive Rick Parry
said lower-level games were “relatively below the radar”
and that it would be harder to fix a televised game, though
no one should be complacent as match-fixing allegations
“can very rapidly lead to a major loss of confidence”.
While it makes sense that criminals trying to manipulate
the results of games would seek lower-risk, less-expensive
targets, it is worth remembering Calciopoli in Italy,
where first division matches were manipulated, and
the fixing in Germany in 2005 that affected second- and
third-tier divisions. In these cases, referees were involved
in organising the manipulation rather than players.
Match-fixing is generally a conspiratorial crime, and
result manipulation for the purposes of betting fraud is a
conspiracy every time. In each of the cases above, there
is a connection between those trying to commit betting
activity. Such issues need to be handled carefully and
there should be recommendations for best practice.
Without them, individuals can be left feeling vulnerable
to subversion or turn a blind eye.
Mutschke noted in early 2013 that an informant had
told him: “Organised crime is moving out of the drug
trade and getting involved in match-fixing because of low
risk and high profit”. Similar patterns have been seen in
the rise of human trafficking, another crime considered
to be ‘low risk/high reward’. Betting fraud and fixing is
even less of a risk for criminals as there is no product to
transport, sell, have confiscated or be used in evidence.
Activities can be shifted rapidly geographically and
between the betting companies that are targeted for fraud;
that flexibility is only limited by the time required to
establish the relationships necessary to fix results and bets.
Given that this is essentially an ‘information crime’,
the pathways to detection and prosecution also rely on
information being available to authorities. In November
2013, Chris Eaton, Director of Sport Integrity at the
ICSS, said in a BBC interview that there should be “a
self-regulatory, cooperative approach from the totality of
the sports betting industry, at a global level”. He went on
to say that this should be underpinned by a data clearing
house for the exchange of information between sports,
betting and policing organisations, and might be based
on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) model.
Changing legislation
Sports betting generates revenues of about €750 billion
($1 trillion) annually, Torbjorn Froysnes of the Council of
Europe told politicians in Brussels in December 2013.
Illegal betting is estimated to represent about a third
of that. Froysnes told EU politicians that the Council of
Europe agreement to help combat match-fixing should be
ready for signing by September 2014, but that “in order
to make the involvement of law enforcement agencies
possible, the criminalisation of some
actions connected with match-fixing
offences is essential”. This would
mean changes to legislation and
improved oversight arrangements
in some EU member states.
According to Federbet, a Brusselsbased body funded by the gambling
industry, more than 50 matches around the world were
definitely fixed in the period August to November 2013,
while another 150 games were ‘suspect’. Problems were
particularly noticeable in Malta and Cyprus, Federbet
told Brussels lawmakers, where “the great majority of
matches are distorted by irregularities”. Lithuania and
Latvia were also badly affected, and there had also
been cases in Bulgaria, Sweden and Spain, according
to Federbet. The organisation also cited cases in China,
Indonesia and Georgia, and said the problem was not
limited to football, but had also been observed in tennis,
basketball and women’s volleyball.
More cases are turning up because
authorities have upped their game
Extreme Sports Photo/Alamy
fraud and someone who can manipulate the result of a
game. Further linkages can spread on either side of this
chain. On the betting fraud side, many chains now appear
to stretch back to Asian organised crime, but this may
change in future. On the fixing side, the chain can spread
among teammates or through business colleagues.
In most cases, the central connection is based on
greed (essentially bribery), however, there are other forms
of influence and even intimidation that can help to forge
the bond between fraudster and fixer. The nature of these
connections needs more study in order to understand
how criminals can lure players and officials. But all sports
codes and leagues should also emphasise the importance
of sharing suspicious approaches and reporting suspicious
96
Chris Aaron is the editor of the ICSS Journal
97
Legacy
Legacy
Tackling the dangers of
inactivity through sport
Iain Lindsay notes the threat to public health from low levels of physical exercise
in many populations around the world, and questions the efficacy of existing policy
and initiatives, particularly those built around major sporting events
Kirsty Pargeter/Alamy
P
98
hysical inactivity has been labelled the 21st
century’s biggest threat to public health.1
While this assertion may seem to clash with
images on television of mass participation in
marathons and an ample media diet of sporting events,
the statistics paint the true picture.
According to the World Health Organization (WHO),
in 2008, around one-third of the global adult population
was insufficiently physically active, with 3.2 million deaths
being directly attributable to inactivity. A highly visible
consequence of this inactivity, combined with changes in
diet, is the global obesity pandemic. International obesity
levels have increased exponentially in recent decades, and
are now responsible for up to 30 per cent of global deaths.2
The costs of obesity are enormous and growing: obese
patients’ medical costs are, on average, 30 per cent
higher than those of people with a normal weight. UK
government figures reveal that, in England, treatment of
health problems related to being overweight and obese
cost around £5 billion ($4.2 billion) annually.3 The latest
data available indicates that between 1993 and 2011,
England has seen a marked increase in the proportion
of adults that are obese: from 13 per cent (male) and
16 per cent (female) in 1993 to 24 per cent (male) and
26 per cent (female) in 2011, with childhood obesity levels
even higher (31 per cent of boys and 29 per cent of girls)4.
Obesity has been likened to a “runaway train with no
brakes”,5 with the underlying causes being decreasing
levels of physical activity and the over-consumption of
food.6 In 2013, the American Medical Association officially
classified obesity as a disease – ensuring that increased
focus will be placed upon both prevention and treatment.
However, unlike other major causes of preventable death,
such as HIV/AIDS or smoking, there are not currently any
robust examples of populations within which this epidemic
has been reversed through public health measures.
It must be acknowledged that obesity is by no
means the only negative outcome of physical inactivity.
Regardless of weight or body composition, physical
inactivity has significant detrimental effects on lifespan,
disability, quality of life and work productivity, which
combine to ensure the classification of physical inactivity
as the fourth leading risk factor in global mortality today,
according to the WHO. These outcome factors place
significant burdens upon a country’s economy, as well
as their population’s health, healthcare systems and
national productivity. This reality must be considered when
determining the most effective and cost-effective strategies
to improve any nation’s economic and physical health.
Sporting mega events and public exercise
Hosting sporting mega events is commonly considered an
effective way of increasing physical activity through eventgenerated opportunities and increased motivation as well
as inspiration. However, there is little evidence to support
the belief that this has any sustainable impact on physical
activity. This is due to the fact that elite sports legacies
are by no means comparable to community activity and
health legacies. This has been demonstrated in legacy
evaluations of some recent Olympic Games – events that
it was argued would be a means of increasing physical
activity and health, for example:
■■ Sydney 2000 – these Games had little impact
upon physical activity participation among
either Australian adults or Sydney residents;7
■■ Athens 2004 – there is no evidence to support
claims of increased levels of sport participation
or activity in the long term; and8
■■ Beijing 2008 – there is no clarity about whether
the purported legacy benefits attributed to the
hosting of the 2008 Olympic Games were
academically or methodologically robust or
generally applicable to other countries
Additionally, in 2013, an overview of systematic
reviews that considered the best data currently available
concluded that hosting an Olympic or Paralympic Games
does not lead to tangible increases in physical activity or
sports participation.9 Despite the lack of evidence, London
2012 was the first Olympic Games to explicitly combine
99
Legacy
Legacy
Radius Images/Alamy
projects that provide local opportunities for sustainable
physical activity. The approach is based on the premise
that innovative community sport projects can directly and
sustainably contribute to physical activity engagement
and beneficial health outcomes over the long-term.
This capacity building method is based on the removal of
barriers to participation, the introduction of educational
programmes and the guided implementation of ‘sport for
health’ initiatives in order to facilitate physical activity.10
Progress on an international level
Guidelines from the UK’s Department of Health recommend
that children do at least an hour’s moderate exercise a day
Olympic hosting with specific physical activity targets.
Organisers aimed to get two million more people active
by 2012. These targets were officially dropped by the
new British Coalition Government shortly after coming to
power in 2010. Moreover, in December 2011, some seven
months before the start of London 2012 Sport England
released official figures that demonstrated only ‘111,000
more people ... [had participated] in sport since 2007’,
just 11 per cent of the target they had been pursuing for
the previous four years.
The most comprehensive indicator of sport
participation currently available within the UK is the
In 2011, prior to the London Olympic Games, the UK
Department of Health presented national recommendations
relating to the volume, duration, frequency and type of
physical activity required for general health benefits in a
report entitled Start Active, Stay Active. This was aimed
at the National Health Service, local authorities and other
organisations that design services to promote physical
activity. These were the first UK-wide published guidelines,
intended to promote cohesion in advice within the country.
The report stated that everybody should aim to be
active on a daily basis. For adults, 150 minutes per week
is recommended, in bouts of at least 10 minutes, placing
emphasis upon overall amount
as opposed to type, intensity or
frequency of activity. Interestingly,
it also recommended that children
over the age of five engage in at least
60 minutes of moderate to vigorous
physical activity on a daily basis. How
can sport contribute to such targets?
The UK Department of Health states that increasing
physical activity levels will directly contribute to the
prevention and management of a number of diseases and
provide significant physical and mental health benefits.
Despite this increased focus, physical activity levels in the
UK now fall well below expected targets. In England, only
40 per cent of males and 28 per cent of females met or
exceeded these recommended levels of activity in 2011,
and these figures decline with age.
Global capacity building is needed to formulate
effective, local measures that governments and society
at all levels can implement rapidly and at a low cost. The
The American Medical Association has
officially classified obesity as a disease
annual national survey conducted by Sport England.
The most recent results demonstrate that between April
2012 and April 2013, despite a surge immediately before
the 2012 Games, there was an overall decrease in UK
sports participation. These findings, along with all the
other evidence cited above, indicate that strategies that
depend upon Olympic events (and other major sporting
events) to boost physical activity through increased sport
participation are ineffective in the long term. The question
therefore becomes how can sport in general, and major
sporting events in particular, be used more effectively to
increase participation rates?
100
failure of existing measures to reverse the trend of nonengagement suggests that a different approach is required;
an approach that sets out to understand and address the
reasons for physical inactivity. To these ends, there are
currently a variety of local-level research programmes and
global movements actively engaged in the development of
new strategies that may demonstrate progressive thought.
One example of a local/national initiative is that
currently being conducted by Brunel University in
conjunction with Sport England. The Health and Sport
Engagement (HASE) project aims to make a tangible
contribution to national policy that will reduce the number
of inactive people within the UK. It aims to accomplish
this through a diverse range of innovative sport for health
On an international level, some progress is being made
by organisations such as GAPA – the advocacy council of
the International Society of Physical Activity and Health
(ISPAH). GAPA is arguing for the inclusion of a global
target on physical activity in the WHO Global Strategy
on Diet, Physical Activity and Health. It is thought that
the inclusion of specific global targets will help facilitate
large-scale national strategies to increase physical activity.
The monitoring and surveillance of global targets, if
adequately measured, would enable lessons to be learnt
and policy to rapidly become more robust and efficient.
The problem remains that despite the large body of
evidence proving the health benefits of physical activity,
advice to improve health through physical activity is a
relatively recent phenomenon, and its impact is negligible.
It appears to be the norm that, despite the proliferation
of communication attesting to the benefits of exercise
and the consistent reminders of the costs of inactivity,
the advice is ignored.
It is an extremely complex task to reduce inactivity
levels when people are knowledgeable but remain
unwilling to change their behaviours. Therefore, success
in this field will require well-formed, but responsive,
strategies that can overcome a variety of barriers to
physical activity that exist within diverse local contexts
around the world.
Dr Iain Lindsay works for the ICSS and Brunel University.
His principal research focus is sport for socio-economic
development, physical activity and mega-event analysis
References
1
Blair, S.N. Physical Inactivity: The Biggest Public Health Problem
7
of the 21st Century in British Journal of Sports Medicine, 2009,
Levels of Reported Physical Activity in Australia, 1997, 1999 and
volume 43, no 1-2
2
3
Walker, A.R.P. and Wadee, A. World-Wide Rises in Obesity:
5
2000, Australian Sports Commision, Canberra, 2001
8
Increase in Grassroots Sport Participation? in Savery J. and
the Promotion of Health, 2006, volume 126, no 16
Gilbert K. (eds), Sustainability and Sport, Common Ground,
www.gov.uk/government/policies/reducing-obesity-and-
Illinois, 2011
9
Mahtani, K.R., Proteroe, J., Slight, S.P., Demarzo, M.M.P.,
NHS, Statistics on Obesity, Physical Activity and Diet: England,
Blakeman, T., Barton, C.A., Brijnath, B. and Roberts, N. Can the
2013, www.hscic.gov.uk/catalogue/PUB10364
London 2012 Olympics ‘inspire a generation’ to do more physical
Swinburn, B. and Egger, G. The Runaway Weight Gain Train: Too
or sporting activities? An Overview of Systematic Reviews, in
Many Accelerators, not Enough Brakes, in British Medical Journal,
2004, volume 329, pp736-739
6
Pappous, A. Do the Olympic Games lead to a Sustainable
Minimal Hopes of Control, in The Journal of the Royal Society for
improving-diet
4
Bauman, A., Ford, I. and Armstrong, T. Trends in Population
British Medical Journal, 2013, volume 3, no 1
10
Mansfield, L., Kay, T. and Anokye, N. The Health and Sport
Wald, N. and Willett, W. Reversing the Obesity Epidemic, Lancet,
Engagement (HASE) Project, proposal submitted for the Sport
2004, volume 364, p140
England/National Lottery Get Healthy Get into Sport Awards, 2013
101
Last word
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fusing perceptive and timely insights with sport-security issues that
are affecting the sporting generations of today, and of the future
The future of sport
ICSS
FOR SPORT SECURIT Y
Over the next six months, sport governing bodies will be watching anxiously to see
how the Sochi Winter Olympics and the FIFA World Cup Brazil are received by
sponsors and governments. Both events will test resilience, says Simon Chadwick
I
n Brazil's case, the costs of hosting the 2014 FIFA
economic integrity and financial sustainability. There
World Cup and the 2016 Olympic Games in Rio de
have been several notable incidents, of which Stephen
Janeiro have exacerbated civil unrest. This reached
Lee’s 12-year ban from snooker for match-fixing stands
boiling point during the summer of 2013, when
out. The stakes are not only rising for the fixers though,
hundreds of thousands of people demonstrated during
the pressure is increasingly on sport itself.
the FIFA Confederations Cup. While initial protests were
In October 2013, Puma ended its partnership
sparked by a bus fare price increase, other issues soon
with the South African Football Association (SAFA),
emerged: the Brazilian government's apparent granting of
following compelling allegations that SAFA had fixed
tax breaks to FIFA; exclusion zones and special privileges
games in the run-up to the 2010 World Cup, staged
being extended to commercial partners; concerns about
in South Africa itself. Despite the fact that Puma had
cost over-runs on stadium construction projects; lack of
been supplying equipment to SAFA for six years and
investment in other public infrastructure; and general
is strategically committed to football in Africa, the
cynicism about corruption.
company terminated the contract with immediate effect.
Similarly, Russia faces the challenge of hosting two of
Such action is part of a growing trend, with ING, Nike,
the world’s biggest sporting events in the next few years.
adidas and T-Mobile all withdrawing from or suspending
While a Brazil-style street protest is unlikely, these events
deals with sports where there has been evidence of matchare already exposing Russia to wider public scrutiny.
fixing or doping. While regulation and intervention can
Though not directly connected to the staging of the
be one way of addressing matters of sporting corruption,
2014 Winter Olympics, some groups, organisations and
market-led responses are becoming more prominent.
countries have nevertheless called for teams to boycott the
Governing sport
Games in response to Russia’s homosexuality laws. At
Several governing bodies continue to grapple with
the same time, Human Rights Watch has drawn attention
issues pertaining to internal corruption and governance
to the treatment of construction workers and immigrants
standards. The Union Cyclisme Internationale (UCI)
in Sochi, the host city of the Winter Olympics. Other
in particular has had a difficult year. After the Lance
civil liberties groups have highlighted the controls over
Armstrong doping debacle, professional cycling’s
communication that the Russian government is imposing;
reputation and its appeal as a commercial property
even social media channels are likely to be policed.
suffered further following an incredibly fractious
Russia has also become the target of Greenpeace
presidential election contest between incumbent Pat
activists in sport, with a recent UEFA Champions League
McQuaid and rival Brian Cookson. In the end, Cookson
match between FC Schalke 04 and FC Basel being stopped
emerged as victor to become new president of the UCI.
when protesters unfurled a banner protesting against
Stories have since emerged that within hours of his
Russian state oil corporation, Gazprom, and abseiled from
victory, Cookson ordered that UCI headquarters be sealed
the stadium roof down to the pitch. Schalke’s shirts are
and the corporate investigation firm Kroll Associates be
sponsored by Gazprom, which is also an official partner
called in. It would now appear that a ‘root and branch’
of the UEFA Champions League. The game was therefore
internal investigation of cycling is taking place.
used by the protesters to make a high-profile statement.
This is an interesting development: firstly for the way
Following another recent incident involving Greenpeace
in which it could impact on cycling and its commercial
protesters and a Gazprom gas rig in the Arctic, several of
contracts, and secondly for the engagement of Kroll.
the pressure group’s members were detained and charged.
N T E R N AT I O N A L C E N T R E
Rather than an incremental approach to changes in
All such protests and IFincidents
increase the risks and
OR SPORT SECURIT Y
governance practice and procedures, Cookson seems
uncertainties involved in the organisation and sponsorship
to have taken a revolutionary and hard-line approach.
of sporting events, but it is not only politics that is raising
For more
information
visit www.icss-journal.newsdeskmedia.com
Teams, sponsors and other sports governing bodies
the stakes; criminality is also
on the
rise.
will be paying close attention to how that strategy
Match-fixing and sport-fixing scandals pose a threat
plays out in the forthcoming months.
to the general integrity of sport and specifically to sport’s
ICSS
102
ICSS Journal
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icss-journal.newsdeskmedia.com
Editor
Consulting editor
Assistant editor, safety
Chris Aaron
Simon Michell
Marion Flaig
ICSS editorial director
Dr Shaun P McCarthy
ICSS Director Research & Development
Barry Davies
Jane Douglas
Emily Eastman
Editor-in-chief
Managing editor
Assistant editor
Art director
Art editors
Jean-Philippe Stanway
Herita MacDonald, James White
Production and distribution manager
Managing director
Chief operating officer
Chief executive
Chairman
President
Elizabeth Heuchan
Andrew Howard
Caroline Minshell
Alan Spence
Lord David Evans
Paul Duffen
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