45. gt - sociology of constitutions

ANAIS
CONGRESSO DO MESTRADO EM DIREITO E
SOCIEDADE DO UNILASALLE
GT – SOCIOLOGY OF CONSTITUTIONS
CANOAS, 2015
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FROM NATIONAL TO GLOBAL SETTINGS: IS THE SOCIOLOGY OF
CONSTITUTIONS “ON THE MOVE”?
Alfons Bora,
Henrique Carvalho,
Pablo Holmes,
ABSTRACT: Social research about the emergence of constitutions in a globalized
context deserves prominence among the developments, which claims that
sociology of law is “on the move”. This is so, because they differ from traditional
understandings of state constitutions (Luhmann 1964, 1993; Habermas 1992),
from the ones related to the self-constitution of specific social groups in national
states (Sciulli 2010), and from the studies of pre-modern constitutions (Thornhill
2011). This shift relates to thesis of constitutional fragments (Teubner 2012),
transconstitutionalism (Neves 2013), transnational Law (Viellechner 2013) and
constitutionalism in the global realm (Kjaer 2014). The session focuses on two
aspects of this shift: How the movement relying on the basis of global
constitutionalism may be sociologically described, and, if and how constitutions
beyond the state may emerge as a consequence of this movement. Pablo Holmes
advances a critical approach to answer these questions: To him, central to the
emergence of legal and political structures in the age of global governance qua
global constitutional arrangements, was its imposition from American and
European countries under the label of development. Instead of setting up the
emergence of constitutions beyond the state, the result of such a movement is
described as the tentative substitution of the political by science and/or economy
in processes of collectively binding decision-making, which leads to the political
exclusion of considerable parts of world’s population. Henrique Carvalho points
that as in national states norms arise in the global realm as a reaction to existing
demands. As all legal norms, constitutions possess a normative and a social
dimension, which integer dynamically the realms of Law, Politics and other
specialized social fields. They differ from others, as they correspond to the specific
structural support, which guarantees the autonomy of one legal order. Hence,
constitutions in the globalized world society, be it of a national State, of an
international organization, or a NGO, may be described, as long as these dynamic
arrangements are identifiable. Alfons Bora discusses the technocratic production
of collective binding decisions (Holmes), and the thesis of constitutional
Dimensions (Carvalho) by covering its elementary dynamics in the perspective of
Regulation. By addressing post interventionist approaches he develops a concept
of societal regulation as any operation of a social system that intentionally aims at
3767
deciding, defining, or setting the state of another system (target system) with
regard to the production of the commonweal (Gemeinwohl), which allows to
analyze post-national decision-making and constitutions as specific forms of
regulation.
KEYWORD: constitutions; globalization; expertise-based decision-making; legal
norms; regulation.
1 INTRODUCTION
Sociologically
oriented
discussions
related
to
the
emergence
of
constitutions in a globalized context have deserved in the last decades a
prominent position among the developments, which suggests the characterization
of a sociology of law “on the move”. This is so, because they differ from
understandings of constitutions within theories of society (Luhmann 1993,
Habermas 1992), which are mostly focused on state constitutions. It advances
also a step beyond theories of legal pluralism related to the self-constitution of
regulatory settings vis-a-vis specific social groups within national states (Sciulli
2010), and even from the studies, which focus on the identification of constitutions
or constitutional structures in pre-modern epochs (Thornhill 2011).
At least in two perspectives a commonality related to the studies of
constitutions in a global or transnational context may be highlighted: The first one
says, that all these theories and empirical studies take as point of departure, that a
shift from national concentrated actions, communications, discourses, processes
and structures to these, which go beyond states territory might be seen as a
reality. This may be illustrated by thesis of Governing beyond the State (Zürn
1997), post-national Constellation (Habermas 1998), the Law of open States (di
Fabio 1998), constitutional fragments (Teubner 2012), transconstitutionalism
(Neves 2013), constitutional evolution in times of global governance (Holmes
2013), transnationalization of Law (Viellechner 2013) and constitutionalism in the
global realm (Kjaer 2014).
The second commonality of these theses addresses the question, if real
constitutions may be already pointed out in contexts beyond the state. When the
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major fields are on the one hand concerned with the progressive identification and
consolidation of structures and institutions with constitutional quality, which are
self-described
as
global
constitutionalization
(Peters
2006,
Dunnof
and
Trachtmann 2009), and on the other are the interests focused on the develop of a
constitutionalizing agenda for actors beyond the state, which involves a breaking
with the paradigm of national settings, also known as global constitutionalism;
there are until this moment not quite a lot efforts, which points out where are the
transnational constitutions.
Taking these commonalities as starting points, the proposed session
focuses on basal aspects of this shift of constitutional thinking. From a sociological
perspective are the discussions in this panel oriented by the following questions:
Firstly, how the movement relying on the basis of global constitutionalism may be
sociologically described? With this first question it is not intended to repeat the
ideas, that globalization relates with the worldwide connection of communications,
discourses or practices. Beyond that it is for this group relevant, to research if and
how this changes relate to a – using the congress terminology –, “move” of the
legal to arenas beyond the state. Secondly, focuses this panel on the question, if
and how constitutions beyond the state may emerge as a consequence of the
movement, which is addressed in the point above. Hear it is intended, not only to
question if a global, transnational, international or regional constitution may be
pointed out, but to address how is it happened, and also how is the emergence of
these new constitutions relates to the “move” in the social structures.
2 CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERS BEYOND THE STATE? TRANSNATIONAL
CONSTITUTIONAL PLURALISM, ITS ENLIGHTENMENTS AND PITFALLS
In today’s world society, constitutional theories1 seem to converge in
assigning an emerging role to legal forms of regulation not bound by political
systems. Several approaches try to grasp the diversity and multiplicity of different
layers, levels and stake-holders which constitute the post-national constellation of
See: Holmes, The rhetoric of legal fragmentation and its discontents, Utrecht Law
Review 7, 2011, p. 117-119.
1
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constitutional orders in today’s global law. Some point out to the “state-making
dimension of private law” 2 on the transnational level3, others prefer not to assign a
privilege for the private dimension of transnational law, rather assuming the
hybridity of transnational forms which cannot be described on the basis of that
national-centered distinctions.4 And, yet, some others refer to an inflationary talk
about the “transnational” that would miss the point in its description of those
constitutional changes in course in our days, by dismissing too quickly the
National-State as an important actor on the global realm and within a still existing
international system.5
As I understand it, there is an evident paradigmatic shift within constitutional
theory that has partially to do with an ongoing crisis of representative politics and
liberal democracy.6 Indeed, the paradoxes of national constitutionalism became a
pervasive concern in legal and political thought7, what seems to have resonance
also in the social movements of the last decade. And, although the limits and
contradictions of the Keynesian-Westphalian arrangement8 can be traced back in
some measure to political struggles within the nation states, important limitations
for the scope of action of the state clearly arise from the pressures of a
2
See, for example: Wai, The Interlegality of Transnational Private Law, p. 107-127;
3
Zumbansen, Law after the Welfare State: Formalism, Functionalism and the Ironic Turn
of Reflexive Law, Verfügbar im Internet: http://www.comparativeresearch.net/papers.jsp
(last visit: 11/06/2011); Caruso, Daniela: Private Law and State-Making in the Age of
Globalization, in: NYU Journal of International Law and Politics 12, 2007, S. 1-74
4
Heyvert, Veerle: Hybrid Norms in International Law, in: LSE, Law, Society and Economy
Working Papers 06/2009, London School of Economics, 2009, verfügbar im Internet:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/wps1.htm (Last visit: /05/12/2011); Sand, IngerJohanne. Hybrid Law – Law in a Global Society of Differentiation and Change, in:
Calliess, Gralf-Peter/ Fischer-Lescano, Andreas/ Wielsch, Dan/ Zumbansen, Peer (Org.),
Soziologische Jurisprudenz. Festschrift für Gunther Teubner zum 65. Geburtstag, Berlin,
De Gruyter, 2009, p. 871-886.
5
Marcelo Neves, Transconstitucionalism, 2009; Kjaer, Constitutionalism on the Global
Realm.
6
. Siehe: Fischer-Lescano/Teubner, Regime-Kollisionen, S. 57-65.
7
Hans Lindahl, Constitutent Power and Reflexive Identity: Towards an Ontology of
Collective Selfhood, in: Martin Loughin & Neil Walker (Orgs.). The Paradoxes of
Constitutionalism, 2008, p. 9-25; Emilios Christodoulidis, Against Substitution: The
constitutional Thinking of Dissensus, in: Idem, p. 189-209.
8
This expression was conceived by Fraser. See: Nancy Fraser, “Reframing Justice in a
Globalizing World“. New Left Rewiew, Vol 35, pp. 69-88, 2005.
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transnationalizing economic system.9 Besides, we can easily notice the
emergence of a theoretical consciousness within constitutional thought about the
transnational character of social communication in a world society that can only be
understood from a global perspective.10 The proliferation of global legal regimes
beyond the territorial boundaries of the national constitutional regimes11 shapes an
emerging theoretical vocabulary that acknowledges the evolving dynamics of
fragmented normative orders on the transnational realm.12 And such a new
arrangement
can
barely
be
described
by
the
semantics
of
national
constitutionalism, and even less by the vocabulary of the old European
“democratic” traditions, be it in its Jacobin-inclusive or in its liberal elitist-versions.
Moreover, this emerging transnational legal constellation constrains the operation
of national and international normative orders.13
National-centered constitutionalism faced several critiques in the last
decades.14 According to its critics, it would wrongfully nurture an excess of
expectations vis-à-vis the constitutional legal vocabulary, as if the constitutional
order could translate the totality of social complexity into the language of law,
making it possible for the state to interfere in every social sphere such as
contractual market relations, technological development, risk assessment etc.15
Further, national constitutionalism would suffer from an ethnocentric (not to say
Eurocentric) bias, being caught into the pitfalls of its way to frame social conflicts
in thoroughly different realities according to the narrow political vocabulary of a
9
John Ruggie (1998), "Globalization and the Embedded Liberalism Compromise: The
End of an Era?" In: STREEK, Wolfgang (org.). Internationale Wirtschaft, nationale
Demokratie. Herausforderungen für die Demokratietheorie. Frankfurt, Campus, pp. 7998
10
There are though good reasons to believe that one of the reasons of the crisis of
national constitutioanlism can be
11
Somek.
12
Teubner, Globalzivilverfassung: Alternative zur Staatszentrierten Verfassungstheorie,
in: Neves/Voigt (Hrsg.), Die Staaten der Weltgesellschaft, Niklas Luhmans
Staatsverständnis, S. 119-122.
13
For many examples and cases, see: Neves, Moritz.
14
Zu diesen Kritiken zusammenfassend: Walker, The Idea of Constitutional Pluralism,
The Modern Law Review 65, 2002, S. 320-33.
15
For the paradoxes of juridification, see: Gunther Teubner, Juridification: concepts,
aspects, limits, solutions. In: Gunther Teubner (org.). Juridification of social spheres: a
comparative analysis in the areas of labor, corporate, antitrust and social welfare law.
Berlin, De Gruyter, pp. 3-48.
3771
very specific and peculiar – north-Atlantic – social context. This limitation would
lead to a misconception of different political realities as lacking “adequate
constitutionalization”,
making
furthermore
invisible
the
historical
colonial
asymmetries which shaped these scenarios.
In this piece, I will face the challenge of theoretically conceiving of the
transnational constitutional constellation of today’s world society, following the
thread let by Gunther Teubner’s theory of transnational constitutional pluralism.
From my point of view, this is in many ways one of the most well succeeded
theoretical endeavors on this subject. Transnational constitutional pluralism
pictures the plurality of legal orders as emerging constitutional orders beyond the
state. Further, it brings the concept of constitution to its limit, broadening its scope
to the manifold transnational regimes operating beyond and “beneath” the
territorial boundaries of national states.16
According to its pluralist standpoint, the proliferation of normative global
villages and its emergence as global constitutional fragments would correspond to
the radical functional differentiation of a world society which, in the last decade,
has become more and more a-topical17, relying its reproduction mainly on rapid
and flexible communication media as money and scientific knowledge, as they are
produced and managed within – also atopical – private organizations.18 Therefore,
it would be at least misleading to confine the concept of legal validity to the
territorial limits of politically constitutionalized legal orders. Transnational
constitutionalism claims, with support on systems theory, that the concept of legal
constitutions must be for once and for all decoupled of its political roots,19 being
extended to the increasing transnational – private, hybrid of semi-public –
Albert, Legalisation or Global Law Formation. On Evolution of Law in World-Society.
Presentation at the CENTRAL-conference on »Transnational Business in the Age of
Globalization« Münster, 26 October 2001. Verfügbar bei der Working Group on WorldSociety, Universität Bielefeld. Kritisch zur Möglichkeit eines entterritorialisierten Rechts:
Lindahl, A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal Boundaries, S. 32ff.
17
Teubner, Constitutional Fragments, Willke, Atopia.
18
Fischer Lescano/Teubner, Fragmentierung des Weltrechts, S. 37ff.; kritisch dazu:
Brunkhorst, Die Legitimationskrise der Weltgesellschaft, in: Albert/Stichweh (Hrsg.),
Weltstaat und Weltstaatlichkeit, S. 68-76.
19
Teubner, Globale Zivilverfassungen, S. 119.
16
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normative orders that operate as self-contained legal regimes responsible for the
respective internal management problems regarding legal validity. 20
Teubner’s description is undoubtedly very creative. And, although I deem
his diagnose as accurate with regard to the fragmentation and privatization of
transnational law as well as to his perception of the shortcomings of the Statecentered semantics of constitutionalism, it seems that the consequences he draws
from his interpretation are not as appropriate. The assumption that selfconstitutionalizing transnational regimes, as they operate in world society, can
foster an internal dynamics of responsivity, able to function as an functional
equivalent to the inclusive dynamics of democratic national politics seem to me to
lack sociological explanation. This becomes explicit if we accept the premise that
social exclusion as a problem of access to functional performances cannot rely on
an equivalent to the positive outputs of the political State on the global Realm,
needing to be faced by the responsive operation of self-constitutionalized legal
regimes. In what follows, I will present sociological-structural arguments to support
the assumption that the transnationalization of law without politics in today’s world
society seem to radicalize the pervasive exclusionary tendencies of modern
functional differentiation, without presenting the functional equivalents to the
inclusive forces of political constitutionalism.
3 CONSTITUTIONS AS LEGAL NORMS IN THE GLOBALIZED WORLD
SOCIETY21
In order to grasp the change, which lays behind the shift from exclusive
national to global settings, I firstly advance a discussion in the realm of
globalization theory, specially related to its connections to the social fields of
Fischer-Lescano, Luhmanns Staat und der transnationale Konstitutionalismus, in:
Neves/Voigt (Org.), Die Staaten der Weltgesellschaft, Niklas Luhmanns
Staatsverständnis, S. 100f.
21
The arguments developed in this section represent a short version of Henrique
Carvalho’s PhD thesis, which will be available as book still in 2015. See “Verfassungen
in der Weltgesellschaft. Ein systemtheoretischer Beitrag zur Verfassungssoziologie”.
Nomos, 2015 (Forthcomming).
20
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politics and of law. So as Ulrich Beck22 argues that the national state is a victim of
globalization, which destabilizes it, once it has destructive consequences to the
fulfillment of its functions, addresses Saskia Sassen23, that neither occupies the
national state such a passive function, nor leads the globalization to the end of the
national state. Quite on the contrary it might be learned from Sasken‘s theses, that
the national State in the 70’s stimulated and paved the path, through it
communications, practices and structures from a variety of social realms crossed
the states boarders24. As triggers of globalization the states did not have shoot
their own feet, they remain as leading actors in the global stage.
To be a leading actor means that national states are no longer alone on the
global stage. This affirmative leads to the question of, who are the new political
and legal actors of the globalized world, as well as to the one of, how the
development of politics and law beyond the state took place? A first clue may be
gained by the analysis of Anne-Marie Slaugther‘s thesis about the disaggregated
state25, in which organizations beyond the State emerge. These new subjects
possess autonomy when faced with States, so that their decisions are
independent from a single State and at the same time are binding to those, which
are organizations members. In that sense it is more than plausible from a
functional perspective to assure, that such organizations are political decisionmaking actors, once their decisions are binding to its members. They fulfill as well
the legal function, as long as these decisions stabilize demands on normative
expectations by their congruent generalization. Beyond that the emergence of new
autonomous actors means a rupture with traditional forms of international public
and private law, as well as with the international relations, once these fields are
state-centered and based of the dialogical and negotiating form of decisionmaking.
It remains open the question about why political and legal communications
break with the limits of states territories and develop in transnational or global
realms. Following Michael Zürn’s lead, that a governmental crisis occurs because
22
See Beck 1998.
23
See Sassen 2008.
24
See Sassen 2007.
25
See Slaughter 2004.
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the political answers to political demands with a considerable delay26, I advance
the argument, that not only politics, but also the law, only expand the horizons,
where its communications take place, where there is previously a demand on
political or legal decision. So my answer to the question to the posed question may
be so formulated: Law and Politics are social realms, which are characterized by a
reactive form of operating. So the function of producing collective binding
decisions27 depends on, that divergent political position firstly appears. The
function of law, as to congruently stabilize normative expectations28, needs as
well, that incongruent expectations of such a form, or otherwise formulated:
conflicting counterfactual expectations already exist. And in that sense, political
and legal structures and institutions – short: organizations – emerge beyond states
borders as a reaction to the political and juridical demands, which results from the
globalization from other social sectors.
Or with other words: Politics and the Law participate in the process of
globalization. This leads to the conclusion that the assumption, that these realms
are only organized in the form of states, deserves to be actualized. So instead of
talking about a world society (Weltgesellschaft)29 we speak of a globalized world
society (globalisierte Weltgesellschaft) when the internal differentiation of politics
and law includes, together with national states, other actors, so for instance: the
autonomous international organizations.
This account serves as a setting the scene, on which the second question
of this panel might be discussed: So possible constitutions beyond the state (a)
evolves the realms of politics and law, which (b) react to transnational or global
demands, (c) might originate new autonomous segments – be it regimes,
assemblages, organizations, orders –, and (d) co-exist with national states.
One way of addressing all these themes at once, on the level of a national
state and of organizations beyond the state, may be the assumption that
constitutions are legal norms. This sets at first a generalization, so bills (Gesetze),
See Zürn 1997.
27
See Luhmann 2000.
28
See Luhmann 1993.
29
Luhmann 1997. To new discussions about this concept of world society, see also:
Neves 2012; Teubner 2012; Kjaer 2014; Thornhill 2011.
26
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Orderings (Verordnungen) from the Executive and Decisions from Tribunals
(Rechtsprechung) might by placed on the category of legal norms. That means for
the sociological systems theory to look for structural couplings: on one side at
least to a social sector, and on the other to organs, e.g.: tribunals, parliaments and
executives. These constitute and reciprocally settle the limits, which might
contribute to the analysis of national and transnational constitutions. Following this
path it might be addressed that the European Union and the World Trade
Organizations are constitutional orders.
4
SHAPING
SOCIETIES
–
THE
REGULATORY
DIMENSION
OF
CONSTITUTIONS
If we talk about constitutions on the “move”, the aspect of regulation gets
increasingly relevant. Constitutions often have been observed as legal instruments
limiting affluent political power and as guarantee for human and civil rights,
enabling these rights to prevail and pertain. Both functions can be viewed at from
the perspective of regulation, namely as instruments which allow for shaping
societal conditions. Recent debates, also labeled as “New Constitutionalism”, have
made this additional emphasis more visible. They demonstrate that by enabling
certain social phenomena or structures and by limiting others, constitutions have
become important media for the regulation of modern societies.
To be sure: This aspect of shaping or moulding society is only one among
others, when we observe legal structures in general and constitutions in particular.
No claim is made here with respect to any kind of priority for this aspect.
Nevertheless, the reconstruction of the regulatory effects of constitutions might
help understanding their role in the multifold manifestations of the social on local,
regional and global levels.
In order to put forward my argument, I will briefly touch three points of view:
A brief reminiscence is necessary in order to understand the path from steering via
reflexive law to governance and to become sensitive to the theoretical oblivion of
regulation that took place during this process. These deliberations will then point at
the regulatory aspects, which are present in all constitutions, or constitutional
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fragments. Some examples will finally try to support my theoretical suggestion.
Ethics councils, procedures and commissions of Transitional Justice, and the
regulation of Corporate Social Responsibility can be interpreted as instruments of
constitutional pressure on social systems.
1. The scholarly debate on constitutionalism that emerged roughly a decade ago
has influenced both legal and sociological thinking in a significant way. In a certain
sense, this debate regenerates and invigorates the interdisciplinary co-operation
between more normatively oriented jurisprudence and legal theory on the one
hand and the empirically based sociological theory, not least as regards sociology
of law and political sociology.
Constitutionalism has become prominent in legal and political theory,
especially in studies on the European Union and phenomena of multi-level
governance provoking questions of legitimization. Christian Joerges, and many
others have promoted this line of argument. With respect to the EU, arguments of
legal, rather constitutional pluralism have been put forward and the relation
between the different levels of the EU governance have been critically discussed
(Pernice, Walker, MacCormick, and others). Often normative claims have been
raised for certain standards of co-operation between European states or for a
higher degree of supra-national integration (cf. for the following: Carvalho 2015,
manuscript p. 57 ff.)
Beyond the narrower range of the EU, with a more general impetus and
with theoretically far reaching implications, the role of the state in world society
becomes ambiguous and contested (agaIn: Carvalho 2015). As a consequence,
the relation between politics and law, the normative legitimization of politics
become subject to theoretical renegotiation (Slaughter, Zürn). Accordingly,
normative theories of the state providing concepts of legitimation for political power
in the shape of legal or philosophical constitutional theory gain a strong position in
current constitutionalism. Prominent names in this respect are, for instance, Dieter
Grimm, Jürgen Habermas, Hauke Brunkhorst and others. Habermas speaks about
a post-national constellation demanding for a constitutionalisation of public
international law. Grimm, on the contrary, insists on the undissolvable connection
between state and constitution. An intermediary position is taken by Anne Peters:
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compensatory constitutionalisation of international law. Yet another normative
model: Cottier and Hertig, who study constitutional thinking as a necessary
prerequisite for the preservation of normative standards in a global world. In his
book on »Transconstitutionalism« Marcelo Neves (2013) has suggested the notion
of a transversal constitutionalism, which still refers to states as the basis of
constitutionalism, but adds the idea of a certain type of rationality that can be
exchanged between the different normative spheres of states, supra- and
international structures and legal cultures within the realm of state law.
A quite different source of current constitutionalism can be seen in
sociological steering theory of the 1970ies and 1980ies and its development under
the label of governance. The starting question, the "initial puzzle", as Marc
Mölders (2015) has called it, was the question, whether the objects of steering “reorganize themselves and adapt to operational criteria which they define
themselves, how is mutual influence, intervention or even regulation possible?”
(Febbrajo & Teubner 1992, pg. 11). A famous reaction to that question can be
found in Teubner's and Willke's essay on "Reflexive Law" (1984), where they
applied theories of self-organization and self-regulation to the theory of law. Some
of the current contributions to the new constitutionalist debate, as I will argue, are
directly attached to concepts of reflexive law that had emerged as a reaction to the
impasses of early steering theory and first order cybernetics. Christian Joerges, for
instances, claims that Teubner's constitutionalism is a response to certain
concerns with new governance models, which for their part, already had been
reactions to certain impasses of steering theory (Joerges 2004, pg. 351.)
After the decline of rather simple and, to a certain extent, naïve theories of
societal steering, in the 1970s and 1980s political scientists, lawyers and
sociologists developed more sophisticated approaches in order to understand,
how social institutions or systems might be open to influence from different forms
of intervention. Debates on regulation often conceived of intervention as state
activity affecting private subjects, whereas governance was understood as a multiactor and multi-level activity. Post-interventionist theories and concepts of pluralist
societies had raised questions that the idea of governance promised to answer by
replacing more rigid concepts of social steering by new ideas of cooperation,
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negotiation, coproduction, hybrid communication, and self-regulation. Originally
stemming from economy (Coase 1937, Williamson 1975), where it was mainly
used to focus on »good governance« in organizations, the semantics of
»governance« spread over the political sciences – especially international
relations (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992, Rosenau 2000) and policy research
(Mayntz 1998). In this tradition «governance» is being understood as a form of
statehood mainly characterized by »negotiation« and »co-operation«, in contrast
to »hierarchical structures«, which were understood as properties of the
democratic national state (Héritier 2002; Kooiman 2002, Rosenau 1995,
Schuppert and Zürn 2008, Blumenthal 1995, Willke 2006).
Last but not least general sociological theory, namely political sociology and
sociology of law build a source of constitutionalism in trying to explain the role or
function of constitutions in modern society. I would mention Chris Thornhill (2011)
and Poul Kjaer (2014) as examples of this approach, because they are primarily
interested in the reconstruction and explanation of the social function of
constitutions.
These are only some of the main influences that coined the field of New
Constitutionalism. Their plurality and heterogeneity causes, to a certain extent, an
impression of complexity and obscurity of constitutionalism.
2. Nevertheless, more or less two large fields can be distinguished: a normative
debate about the legitimization of constitutions in a post-national world and an
empirical perspective asking for the emergence of constitutions and their
regulatory capabilities, their suitability for enabling, shaping, and limiting social
phenomena. As mentioned above, I would like to draw your attention to the fact
that these approaches are often rooted in theories of societal steering and
planning, which later-on have been transformed into concepts of reflexive law,
societal self-regulation and governance.
In order to make this interpretation plausible, let us briefly recapitulate
Gunther Teubner’s intellectual move from reflexive law to constitutional theory. His
book on »Constitutional Fragments« (2012) is the one of the main references in
the current debate. Starting from a critique of the main stream in constitutionalist
debate, it argues against normative approaches and against the strong accent on
3779
public law. In so doing it argues from a private law and sociological perspective,
strongly influenced by Niklas Luhmann's sociological systems theory.
Starting with an account of the crisis of contemporary constitutionalism and
with the position of societal constitutionalism Teubner criticizes the propositions of
transnational constitutionalism by developing the idea of constitutional fragments,
i.e. legally constituted social areas such as functional systems, networks, hybrid
regimes. In this world of constitutional pluralism, constitutions fulfill a twofold
function (Teubner 2012, pgs. 25/26, 36/37, 46, 120 ff.). They enable and limit the
emergence and stabilization of the social areas just mentioned. The enabling
function safeguards the autonomy of societal areas. The limiting function prevents
them from endangering other areas by their respective »centrifugal« and
»expansionist« (46) tendencies. This double role of constitutions very clearly is an
aspect of societal steering, intervention, or governance. As a »hybrid meta-code«
(169 ff.) constitutional structures encroach on the operations of the entangled
systems and regimes. And this does not only relate to states and the political
system. Constitutions – or constitutional fragments – are in Teubner's view equally
important for the regulation of the relation between non-state actors, organizations
and individuals. (»Drittwirkung« – third-party effect in German legal theory, now in
Teubner's terms: »horizontal effects (or force)« 214 ff.).
The mechanism, through which the autonomous social systems pass
through the process of constitutionalisation, is: self-constitutionalisation. Selfconstitutionalisation works by the exercise of external pressure which loads social
systems with »capillary power« (135), thus triggering internal constitutionalisation.
This figure, again, refers to the core idea of "reflexive law". The conditions, under
which these capillary constitutions emerge, are twofold, namely of external and
internal nature.
Externally, the self-constitutionalisation of social systems is determined by a
situation of a »dynamic disequilibrium« (125 ff.) With their respective expansionist
tendencies, systems put other systems in their environment under pressure, in a
way they endanger their normal operations. Inflationary production of symbols
leads to »pathological growth« creating »horizontal threats of integrity« (125). The
3780
relation between the system reaches a »turning point« (»Umschlagpunkt«), where
»institutions combating horizontal threats of integrity become imperative.« (125)
Internally, self-constitutionalisation is triggered by systemic crisis, by an
imminent break-down of the structures. Such a near catastrophe is understood as
the »constitutional moment«. In contrast to horizontal threats of integrity, the near
catastrophe is an interpretive frame of a single system. Whenever such a system
describes itself as approaching a break-down, this self-description becomes a
sociological fact for the observing system.
In other words, societal constitutionalism emphasizes the possibility of an
external power or pressure to trigger operational or structural responses in
autonomous social systems via constitutions (Sciulli 2001; Teubner 2012). It
explicitly conceives of constitutions of means for influencing and shaping social
systems. From this perspective, both the limiting and the enabling functions of
constitutions, become instruments of regulation.
3. The term »regulation« has various sources. It has gained a certain prominence
in political economy (cf. e.g. the works of Hirsch, Jessop, Aglietta, Boyer and
others). From this angle »regulation« stands for the task of taming modern forms
of capitalism. Insofar, it is dealing with a very specific aspect that is mainly situated
in the relations between politics and economy, firstly, and that is built upon a very
particular kind of social theory. In contrast to these approaches, I take the position
of sociological systems theory that allows for a broader variety of inter-systemic
relations and that also takes into consideration the fact that modern society is not
rather poly-centric and so much centred around one single system, be it politics or
economy.
Against this background, I understand »regulation« as any operation of a
social system that aims at deciding, defining, setting the state of another system
(goal system) with respect to the production of the commonweal (Bora 2002, Bora
2014, Bora 2015, Bora and Münte 2012). The latter term is meant to represent the
German word »Gemeinwohl«, covering approximately the semantic field of
common welfare, public weal or public good in a broad sense. This specification
operates as confinement of the definition, which would be merely formal and
limitless otherwise. Thereby it should become clear, that regulation in our context
3781
does not refer to the sheer control over machines or objects, for example, but
always implies a social dimension, namely the (self-) shaping of society, its
subsystems and organisations.
According to this theoretical concept, »regulation« is not restricted to control
and intervention in the sense of regulative law. It encompasses limiting and risk
minimizing instruments as well as promoting and enabling ones. Julia Black
speaks about »regulation as facilitation«, Sabel and others (2012) have been
working on »experimentalist governance«, and German legal scientists are
interested in »regulation fostering innovation« (Eifert and Hoffmann-Riem 2009).
Schuppert accentuates the fact that governance »largely is regulation« (2008,
395).
4. If we look for examples that might help making the idea of regulatory effects in
constitutions plausible, state constitutions are a more or less clear case in this
respect. But also the more fluid and hybrid forms of constitutions, which are
currently in the centre of theoretical interest, can be described from the proposed
perspective of regulation. Some examples may shed light on this point.
Corporate Social Responsibility
A prominent example is DIN/ISO 26000 regarding corporate social
responsibility. Such standards might well be understood as social constitutions in
Teubner's sense. The standard intends to assist organizations in contributing to
sustainable development and in going beyond legal compliance. The aims of ISO
26000 represent common goods that usually are not in the focus of technical
standardization in the exchange between economic actors. These actors rather
consider such common goods as »externalities«. The consequences of the
externalization of common goods have been described as »tragedy of the
commons« (Hardin 1968). Therefore, the law usually has a decisive role in the
regulation of commons, as for instance Elinor Ostrom has shown (Ostrom 1990).
Against this background, ISO 26000 describes a strategy between strict legal
regulation and cultural commitment. The latter was an important answer to the
problem of the commons in small communities of medieval and early modern
times. Later, the law succeeded to the task of regulating the commons under the
more complex conditions of modern society. The new »cultural« standards, such
3782
as ISO 26000 for instance, are softer than positive law, on the one hand, and
harder than cultural bonds on the other. In a certain sense, they have a
»constitutional« character, as Grahame Thompson (2012) has noted correctly.
They do not have direct steering effects, due to their voluntary character.
However, they generally have the ability to create and stabilize systemic trust in
individual firms and in the market as a whole with respect to their aptitude to
safeguard common goods. Establishing such kind of systemic trust seems
particularly profitable in a situation, where observers speak of the »moralization of
markets«: »In the world of goods and services, not only social relations find their
expression, but also societal values and norms become manifest in services and
goods or in the reputation of a producer and provider. The economy is not only an
exchange of valuable good, but also an exchange of values (Georg Simmel)«
(Stehr 2008), 12). Altogether, such standards can be read as constitutions. They
couple politics and law – and be it only "soft" law – with economy in order to
regulate external effects of the latter with respect to common goods as a goal of
regulation.
Ethics Councils
Rather prominent examples in this respect are also national ethics councils.
The main point of this constellation is that – in spite of the ethical reference of
these institutions – the law serves as the framework and bottleneck, through which
every recommendation of the council has to pass, i.e. as point of reference and as
a semantic reservoir for the task of integration and compatibility.
Ethics councils have been installed in many states in order to support policy
and the respective regulation of socially contested scientific and technological
developments. Ethics, as the underlying argument suggests, is supposed to be
able to integrate the diverse communications around scientific and technological
innovations and thereby to support sound science policies. This development has
been described as »ethicisation of technology controversies« (Bogner 2011), »a
renaissance of ethics« (Pruzan und Thyssen 1994).
Ethics councils usually are established as independent entities, hosted by
either ministries or academies of science. In either a presidential/governmental
(France/US) or in a mixed model (Germany since 2008), they are mostly
3783
appointed by government. Such councils are usually responsible to government, in
some times also to parliament (Germany, NL, Sweden, e.g.). They either have an
advisory function, as in most western European Countries, or perform a specific
role in drafting legislation, as in many new member states of the EU. Their size
varies from five persons in Urugay to over forty in France or Italy (Fuchs 2005,
Ahvenharju et al. 2006).
If one takes a closer look at the communications of such bodies, it is not so
much ethics in most cases, but rather the law, more precisely: constitutional law
that integrates the heterogeneous validity claims. The law is the bottle neck,
through which all semantics relevant to the respective regulation of science and
technology have to pass. It creates a strong framing of the case. This framing is
unproblematic only insofar, as in the process of decision-making politics opens the
semantic frame again, treating the ethics council's opinions as a form of
»coordinated dissent« rather than as an anticipated political decision (Bogner
2011). This political reaction, however, strongly depends on the role of the ethics
council in the respective constitutional context.
The function of the law, on the other hand, seems to be stabilization again,
namely making sure that »ethical advice« is not vanishing in the plurality of moral
standpoints and the exuberant multiplicity of preferences and values, neither in the
arbitrariness of decisionism. It thereby also fulfils the function of assuring politics
that »ethical advice« is politically useful, because it is legally – and, via the
bottleneck of the law: scientifically – approved. As a result, the law reduces
complexity for politics insofar, as it minimizes the risk of constitutional failure.
On the other hand, this configuration also increases the political risk, insofar
as it affects political sovereignty, because in this case, law positions itself »before«
politics. For political sovereignty as procedure, as the realization of political
communication, this is to a certain extent, a paradoxical constellation. From this
theoretical point, it is then easy to understand, why ethics councils do not tend to
communicate extensively their influence on legislation.
Ethics, against this background is not so much the frame constituting the
communication within the council, but rather a rhetorical figure making the paradox
3784
relation between law and politics invisible and thereby enabling both sides to
smoothly operate.
After all, law in ethics councils filters all kinds of semantics, which are
assembled under the topic of »ethics«, in a way that makes the communication
suitable for the political game. It offers a more or less stable frame of reference for
the highly complex relations between diverse validity claims in this hybrid type of
intermediary institution. In so doing, it couples politics, science, economy and the
law by developing constitutional semantics in order to regulate processes and
structures in the respective fields.
Transitional Justice
Transitional Justice, last but not least, can be seen as a phenomenon of
world society (Kastner 2015) that is deeply rooted in the tradition of Human Rights
and a constitutional debate on the level of world society. According to its rather
diffuse, value-oriented, but not very explicit semantic content it can be used in
transitional societies as a means for creating new social identities. Among the
examples mentioned, Transitional Justice is perhaps a very clear case of a
regulatory effect of constitutional structures.
Pablo Holmes's example of the imposition of constitutions
Holmes addresses the issue under a specific perspective: the imposition of
constitutions in a colonial and post-colonial process by American and European
countries. Here we find the regulatory dimension again, in an even stronger sense.
One could assume that processes he point at deal with regulation instead of selfregulation, leading to the political exclusion of considerable parts of the world’s
population. Insofar, Holmes's argument seems to fit very into my concept.
Constitutions may be used even in an "anti-constitutional" sense, as he suggests.
5. The intention of this paper is not in any way to replace or deny any of the
theories of new constitutionalism. Rather, I wanted to hint at an additional aspect,
a dimension in constitutions that seems to be neglected sometimes. Regulation, in
other words, always has been one, if not the effect that norms and law are
delivering to all societal fields. This point also holds true with respect to
constitutions.
3785
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(2006): Comparative analysis of opinions produced by national ethics councils.
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Helsinki: Gaia Group.
BLUMENTHAL, J. Von. 1995. Governance – Eine kritische Zwischenbilanz.
Zeitschrift für Politikwissenschaft 15, 4, 1149-1180.
BOGNER, A. 2011. Die Ethisierung von Technikkonflikten: Studien zum
Geltungswandel des Dissenses: Weilerswist: Velbrück Wiss.
BORA, A. (2002): Ökologie der Kontrolle. Technikregulierung unter der Bedingung
von Nicht-Wissen. In: ENGEL, C.; HALFMANN, J.; SCHULTE, M. (Hrsg.):
Wissen, Nichtwissen, unsicheres Wissen. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 253–275.
BORA, A. (2014): Rethinking regulation: What governance is all about. In:
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BORA, A. 2015. The Shadow of the Law: Intermediary Institutions and the Ruling
Part of Governance. In: HARTMANN, EVA and POUL F. K. (eds.), The Evolution
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materialen Rekonstruktion von Erscheinungsformen neuer Staatlichkeit. BadenBaden: Nomos. Studien zur Politischen Soziologie 19.
CARNEIRO CARVALHO, H. (2015): Verfassungen in der globalisierten
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1971, 18-33.
EIFERT, M.; HOFFMANN-RIEM, W. (Hg.) (2009): Innovationsfördernde
Regulierung. BerlIn: Duncker & Humblot.
FEBBRAJO, A.; TEUBNER, G. (1992): Autonomy and Regulation in the
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Giuffrè, pp. 3–16.
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FUCHS, M. 2005. National ethics councils. Their backgrounds, functions and
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HÉRITIER, A. (ed.). 2002. Common goods: reinventing European and
international governance. Lanham, Md. u.a.: Rowman & Littlefield.
JOERGES, C., I.-J. S., und GUNTHER TEUBNER, Hrsg. 2004. Transnational
Governance and Constitutionalism. International Studies in the Theory of
Private Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
KASTNER, F. 2015. Transitional Justice in der Weltgesellschaft. Hamburg:
Hamburger Edition (forthcoming)
KJAER, P. F. 2014. Constitutionalism in the Global Realm: A Sociological
Approach. Routledge Research in Constitutional Law. London [u.a.]:
Routledge.
KOOIMAN, J. (2002): Governance: A Social-Political Perspective. In:
Grote/Gbikpi 2002, 71-96.
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In: Gunnar Folke Schuppert (ed.), Governance-Forschung (Governance research),
Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 11–20.
MÖLDERS, M. (2015): Publicity as a Medium of Intended Change Towards a
Concept of Irritation Design. Maunscript. Bielefeld.
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Collective Action. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions. Cambridge
[u.a.]: Cambridge Univ. Press.
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Ethical Accounting Statement. Educational Technology 34: 23–28.
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HELD, D.; MCGREW, A. (eds.), The Global Transformations Reader.
Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 181-190.
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Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge
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SCHUPPERT, G. F.; ZÜRN, M. (Hg.) (2008): Governance in einer sich
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Selbststeuerung durch reflexives Recht. Zeitschrift für Rechtssoziologie 5 (1):
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3788
SOCIOLOGY OF LAW BETWEEN NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS AND WORLD
SOCIETY
Laura Appignanesi
Matteo Finco
ABSTRACT: According to the luhmannian paradigm of world society,
policontestural and characterized by functional differentiation, a regional idea of
society should be rejected. However, it is clear that there are still strong
differences in national political and legal subsystems, particularly with regard to
the fundamental rights recognized to individuals and their effective protection. In
particular rights and values recognized by international treaties are often
incompatible (see M. Neves, 2013). This work will be compared with the
contributions on this issue by N. Luhmann (fundamental rights are institutions that
emerge to allow social differentiation, protect it from the expansionist tendencies of
the political subsystem and assign individual rights outside of the norm of
reciprocity) and by G. Teubner (according to him it is necessary to distinguish
between institutional, personal and human rights, the latter "understood as
negative limits imposed on societal communications, where the physical and
mental integrity of the individuals is undermined by a communicative matrix").
These contributions are representing a sociology of constitutions at present widely
discussed in Latin American countries. In order to avoid an anti-humanistic
approach, which considers the individuals outside the inter-systemic
communication, we need to take into account that, in a contemporary world
characterized by less and less differentiated systems, the multisystemic
environment is subject to dynamism and reflexive communicative channels
(strukturelle Kopplung) between subsystems. Constitutions could be thus combine
closure and openness of the legal system by resorting to strategies of
institutionalization of internal self-reflection and external communication.
KEYWORD: sociology of constitutions; transnationalism; functional differentiation,
structural coupling; fundamental rights; world society.
1 INTRODUCTION
Nowadays we can see an increasingly evident worldwide hyper-connection,
both in economic-financial aspects and in socio-cultural ones. In this context the
issue of fundamental rights becomes more and more important, while the
3789
contemporary constitutionalism, anchored to the territoriality of nation-states,
shows its limits in the matter. In the first place, it is clear that there are
considerable differences in the legal systems of different socio-political contexts;
on the other hand, it seems to become more insistent the request to achieve an
universally valid legal threshold, concerning the recognition of these rights but also
their actual protection.
From a legal sociological perspective, we might ask questions such as: is it
possible (and if yes, how) to achieve a global governance of fundamental rights in
the present complex changing context? What kind of contribution could Sociology
of Constitutions (and sociological theory in general) provide in the whole
framework of world society?
The starting background seems to be a society characterized by less and
less differentiated systems (according to Luhmann, we could say a "overintegrated" society). Moreover, within the legal national sphere, at the
constitutional level, there are differences that sometimes come into conflict30.
Therefore, we focus on the discrepancy between the normative side of the
legal system (Charts and International Treaties that institutionalize the "selfreflective" recognition of "global" values and rights) and the concrete reality,
namely the environment of the system: individuals that move in an increasingly
complex and fragmented context.
By dealing with the subject (fundamental rights), that seems to highlight
better the tension between localism and universalism of law, we try to abstract
theoretical arguments, useful to contribute to the general debate on the
relationship between law and society.
From a methodological point of view – without forgetting the theoretical
roots of classical legal sociology – this analysis uses a systemic approach and the
conceptual toolkit provided by the social system theory of Niklas Luhmann. In
particular, through the concepts of "operational closure" and "functional
See M. Neves, Transconstitutionalism, Trasleted by K. Mundy, Hart, Oxford and
Portland Oregon, 2013.
30
3790
differentiation"31, we will try to understand the current relationship between
different subsystems of society and the links between them. Although the concept
of "relationship between autopoietic systems” is not present in the Luhmann
theory, founded on operational closure, systems are not isolated units. They are
connected to each other by a constitutive link with their environmental conditions:
in this sense the notion of "structural coupling" (strukturelle Kopplung)32 is a
pivotal concept.
The argumentative structure starts from the current state in evolution of the
material dimension (with the related difficulty of contemporary constitutionalism),
and it develops by identifying theoretical references, as the contribution of Niklas
Luhmann himself and Gunther Teubner in this field. The analysis is enriched by
the description of the “transcostitutionalism” provided by Marcelo Neves.
In the frame of their homogeneity of systemic approach and conceptual
toolkit, we have three different perspectives, that constitute a space of pluralistic
theoretical debate. Through this analysis we can try to find an hermeneutic path,
useful to understand and to interpret the current crisis in terms of constitutional
guarantees of fundamental rights, for trying to identify possible answers.
In particular, it seems important to establish conceptual connections, to
emphasize the links and to stress the different ideas that emerge within the same
systemic vision.
From now on, some problematic aspects might be originated, on one hand,
from the different speeds of the cognitive process, more and more fast thanks to
globalization, and, on the other hand, the lower speed of the regulatory process,
anchored in the territorial space of distinct states. The institutionalization of the
social reflection at a global level, made by the legislation of supranational treaties,
does not seem to operate as an effective structural coupling, between the political
See various works by N.Luhmann, e.g. Theory of society, Translated by R. Barrett,
Stanford University Press, Stanford California, 2012.
31
32
It is a sociological concept that indicates the connection that can promote and filter the mutual
influences and pressures between the different autonomous systems, connecting them in a
durable and stable way, but without that the systems lose autonomy. See many works by
N.Luhmann, e.g. Theory of Society, vol. 1, op. cit. (2012), pp. 54-56.
3791
subsystem and the legal one, to which we could add the systems of
consciousness in the issue of fundamental rights. In sum, the current transition of
society towards a model of world society, involves the question of how it is
possible to predict (or rather hope) developments in the field of constitutional
matters, in the light of the current challenges.
2 FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND THE DIFFICULTIES OF CONTEMPORARY
CONSTITUTIONALISM
During the XXth century the global legal system has been enriched by a set
of rules and principles established to protect a set of rights defined as
fundamental33. They are provided by various documents (treaties, agreements)
internationally established and recognized. In this sense, those rights were born
with different purposes, and each of them has different validity and strength.
In this regard, we can have two preliminary considerations: in the first place,
beyond what it is written in these documents, it is evident that their concrete
application is something different (it depends on the existence of specific
organisms able to detect conflicts and violations, of specific courts, and so on).
Moreover, the plurality and heterogeneity of the rights recognized every time,
reflects the different sensitivities of the respective socio-spatial contexts, which,
however, are increasingly in contact to each other in a global scenario (the so-
33
We choose not coincidentally the expression fundamental rights (instead of human rights). First
of all, in fact, we intend to limit the discussion to the effective rules and principles in a specific
legal context (basically: those provided by Constitutions), then by invoking a strictly legalistic
conception of rights. On the contrary, for example, A.K. Sen talks about human rights with a "not
legally, but ethically founded" approach (Identità, povertà e diritti umani, in Giustizia globale, Il
Saggiatore, 2006, p. 16). He conceives them as ideal-legal rights, statements that should ideally
be legislated. Moreover, as pointed out by G. Palombella (Diritti fondamentali. Argomenti per una
teoria, in «Filosofia Politica», 1999, disponibile online: http://lgxserver.uniba.it/lei/filpol/glp.htm),
while the expression human rights concerns strictly human beings, fundamental rights may also
be referred to societies, legal or moral systems, and so on. So a theory of fundamental rights
“obliges us to focus also on that which is capable of contributing to the existence of a society” (Id.,
From Human Rights to Fundamental Rights. Consequences of a conceptual distinction, EUI
Working Paper LAW No. 2006/34). Finally we point out that the treating of fundamental rights
from a sociological point of view, on the basis of N. Luhmann, leaves aside any dogmatism,
instead questioning on their function, to find their sense of reality in terms of their substitutability
(Grundrechte als Institution: Ein Beitrag zur politischen Soziologie, Duncker & Humblot, 1965).
3792
called world society34). This matter, often, in the international context poses
problems of dialogue and could create conflicts between the various parties
involved35.
G. Teubner36 highlights other obvious difficulties regarding the effect of
fundamental rights within transnational social spaces : as it happens regarding the
topic of a possible global governance, the discussion usually remains anchored to
the national state, lacking a truly transnational inspiration. Moreover, when the
authors of violations of fundamental rights are private transnational actors (such as
multinationals), they usually are not called to respond to them consequentially, but
it is always the community of states that must provide protection with respect their
violations37.
Basically there is a problem of fragmentation of the world society and its
related law: fragmentation due not only to the aforementioned regional differences,
but also to the functional differentiation of society38. Fragmentation thus leads to
conflicts of rationality, or to non-harmonic relations between different functional
subsystems39.
We are facing the problem of a global constitutionalism which is struggling
to define itself and that it seems to decline himself in an “horizontal” perspective40,
in respect of obligations that go imposing itself, as well as to state authorities, also
for the private actors. The question therefore is “whether the autonomy of the
function systems might not lead to mutual burdens to the limits of their structural
34
We use this term according to Luhmann. See. N. Luhmann, Globalization or world society: how
to conceive of modern society?, in «International Review of Sociology», Mar 1997; Id., Theory of
society, vol. 1 and 2, Stanford University Press, Stanford (CA), 2012; Luhmann N., De Giorgi R.,
Teoria della società, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1992. See also E. Morin, Quelle « autre
mondialisation »? in «Revue du MAUSS» 20, 2002.
35
Cfr. M. Neves, Transconstitutionalism, Hart, Oxford, 2013.
36
Cfr. G. Teubner, Nuovi conflitti costituzionali, Bruno Mondadori, Milano, 2012.
37
Ibidem.
38
We are referring here to the separation (which is the final step in the evolution of the society’s
structures), between the various functional systems, operationally closed, each one characterized
by a different communicative medium (money, knowledge, law, medicine, technology, etc.) and
inclined to overcome territorial boundaries, building own autonomous global systems.
39
G. Teubner, Ordinamenti frammentati e costituzioni sociali, in Il diritto frammentato, Giuffrè,
Milano, 2013.
40
Cfr., in addition to the already cited works by Teubner, see also Constitutionalising
Polycontexturality, in «Social and Legal Studies» 19, 2011 and Transnational Fundamental
Rights: Horizontal Effect?, in «Rechtsfilosofie & Rechtstheorie», 2011 (40) 3.
3793
adaptability with their very differentiation”41. In this way, Teubner advocates to
connect in a network the respective constitutional fragments – nations,
transnational regimes, regional cultures – for a constitutional “right of collisions”42.
This, of course, does not prevent to consider the issue of the constitutional
autonomy of subsystems and their coordination, namely the problem of a latent
tension between functional systems, which are not bound to the land, and their
constitutions, which instead are43.
From these theoretical considerations important practical consequences
derive. They arise not only the attention of lawyers, philosophers and sociologists
of law: we have not only to conceive fundamental rights as institutions able to
protect the autonomy of the individual from states, limiting the action of the latters,
ensuring the participation in the communication of the former44, but also – because
it is no longer possible to identify the state with the society, or at least the state
“as societal
organizational form, and politics as its hierarchical co-ordination”,
when other “highly specialised communicative media (money, knowledge, law,
medicine, technology) appear to gain in autonomy other highly specialized
communicative media”45 – to deal with threats coming from the various
subsystems. Such as those already highlighted by Marx (relative to the economy)
or by Foucault (discussed in reference to models and dynamics of various types:
total institutions, governance, etc ..). Problems then arises, Teubner writes,
“in numerous social institutions, each forming their own boundaries
with
their
human
environments:
politics/individual,
economy/individual, law/individual, science/individual. Everything
then comes down to the identification of the various frontier posts,
so as to recognise the violations that endanger human integrity by
their specific characteristics. Where are the frontier posts? In the
various constructs of persons in the subsystems: homo politicus,
oeconomicus, juridicus, organisatoricus, retalis, etc. These may
only be constructs within communication that permit attribution, but
they are at the same time real points of contact with people ‘out
there’”46.
41
Cfr. N. Luhmann, Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1997, p. 1087.
G. Teubner, Nuovi conflitti costituzionali, Bruno Mondadori, Milano, 2012, p. 22.
43
Ivi, p. 25.
44
N. Luhmann, op. cit., 1965.
42
45
G. Teubner, Transnational Fundamental Rights: Horizontal Effect?, in «Rechtsfilosofie
& Rechtstheorie» 2011 (40) 3, pp. 207.
46
Ivi, pp. 208-9.
3794
Therefore we have to face concrete issues, that affect the freedom of action
and the integrity of the individuals, both regarding communication and in respect of
processing of their personal experience and most basic needs47.
3 LUHMANN AND TEUBNER ON FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS: COMPARATIVE
CONSIDERATIONS AND INSIGHTS
Before pondering on the possible “dialogue” between constitutions and on
the influence that different subsystems of the society have to each other, we
should try to observe the effects that the operations of the system of law and,
more generally, those of the overall social system, have on the individuals,
considering them not only as persons – namely from a strictly communicative point
of view – but also in their irreducible bio-psychic, and therefore symbolic, part48. It
is also possible to do this within the tradition rooted in systems thinking and that
finds in Niklas Luhmann its main representative, despite the superficial objection
that this is an “anti-humanistic” sociology, in which the role of individuals is
underestimated or anyway subject to the emerging social “impersonal” level49.
Luhmann defines fundamental rights as “institutions” , namely expectations
of behavior, realized in the context of a social role and relying on social
consensus50. Their function lies in the stabilization of the differentiation of the
political system, specialized in production of binding decisions. For making this
possible, it is necessary that it remains separate from other subsystems
(economics, law, etc.) – each subsystem of society, in fact, is always subject to the
47
In this regard, we will refer later to the luhmannian distinction persons/bodies.
We use this term with the meaning of E. Cassirer. See An Essay on Man. An Introduction to a
Philosophy of Human Culture, Yale & New Haven, 1944.
49
Not only it is possible to trace in that tradition resources and insights for treatments that could
take into account the different elements of individuality (As P. Stenner did in Is Autopoietic
Systems Theory Alexithymic? Luhmann and the Socio-Psychology of Emotions. In «Soziale
Systeme» 10 (2004), 159–85). But, above all, it is necessary to try to understand better
modernity in its most different aspects and concrete phenomena, including those that relate more
closely individuals in their specificity and in the most different expressions of this specificity:
cognitive, affective or normative: see C. Baraldi, Il disagio della società. Origini e manifestazioni,
Franco Angeli, Milano, 1999.
50
“Le istituzioni sono aspettative di comportamento generalizzate nella dimensione temporale,
materiale e sociale e, in quanto tali, formano la struttura dei sistemi sociali.”: N. Luhmann, I diritti
fondamentali come istituzioni, Dedalo, Bari, 2002, p. 45 (Fundamental Rights as an Institution: A
Contribution to Political Sociology, 1965; translated in english by us).
48
3795
risk of dedifferentiation – guaranteeing to individual a degree of autonomy and
independence from the action of state: fundamental rights are necessary to
prevent that
“All communications are oriented to specific purposes of the state
bureaucracy, making possible the rationalization of these purposes in the sense of
a provision functionally specified that must always presuppose the existence in the
social order of other benefits, of other systems to pursue of interests, other
sources of power and social prestige”51.
Fundamental rights, therefore, ensure chance of communication, but at the
same time they adjust communication “in such a way that it remains available for
differentiation”52, specifically that of the political system. They emerge in a specific
historical era of social evolution (in this sense are not ‘eternal’ and immutable),
characterized by high complexity and functional differentiation: their function is
precisely to stabilize the social structure by
maintaining the differentiated
autonomy of the political system and its separation from other subsystems.
This is done by preventing the political system from ‘invading’ other spheres
of social reality (individual personality, socialization, economics, etc.) and by
preventing disorientation from its specific function (precisely to establish binding
decisions). The separation of the law system from other subsystems is therefore a
systemic need for the maintenance of differentiation of the social order: the
fundamental rights therefore represent a guarantee towards regression to previous
stages of development of society. Therefore they are positive rights: in fact the
“separation of the law from religious, moral and scientific representative contexts
and its positivization are an acquisition of the modern age”53: the increasing
complexity of society corresponds to an increase of the internal complexity of the
law, which frees itself from religious and natural law’s ties (legitimacy of divine
nature disappear) becoming contingent, changeable. The law is not, however,
blind to such contingency: the difficulty in placing values on a continuing basis (just
because of the loss of legitimacy of natural law) in a complex reality (the modern
51
Idem, p. 60.
Idem, p. 59.
53
Idem, p. 82.
52
3796
one), so it represents the premise to institutionalize tolerance and availability to
compromise, as long as it is possible to reach “in a vast temporal horizon, a high
pace in the changing of preferences of values”54. Each value and any rule become
reversible, but they must remain valid until they will be replaced by others: for this
reason, the law must be generalized in time, that is any legal decision “should be
taken, in principle, independently of the moment in which it is assumed”55.
Law, however, doesn’t decide which are the rules to apply: it must enforce
them and stabilize expectations. Political system is the one that establishes valid
standards – and can change them. It is responsible for the production of binding
decisions, necessary to ensure order and lasting peace: for this it is necessary to
establish fundamental rights, so they can limit the expansionist tendencies of the
political system, in a way that the exercise of physical force and decisions remains
legitimate (and therefore accepted), but at the same time allowing sufficient space
and dimensions of freedom to individuals. This also explains the distinction
between judicial and legislative function (the separation of powers of the state,
another evolutionary achievement of modernity): law and politics must remain
separate, because only in this way it is possible to rely on lasting and legitimate
(however rebuildable) rules. In this sense, constitutions are the structural coupling
between political system and system of law56.
54
N. Luhmann, Il tempo scarso e il carattere vincolante della scadenza, in S. Tabboni (a cura di),
Tempo e società, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1985, pp. 120-137, p. 132 (Die Knappheit der Zeit und
die Vordringlichkeit des Befristeten, in “Politiche Plannung”, 2 Aufl., Westdeutscher Verlag, 1975,
pp. 143-165).
55
N. Luhmann, op. cit. (2002), p. 247. Law has the function to stabilize over time expectations and
behavior, to turn rules in a rational order, so that even if they are disappointed, they will not lose
their validity. Law is a kind of immune system: it develops rules to solve conflicts, which are
generalized and maintained. The system in this way generates a past that serves in the present
as a guide for the future.
56
“The constitution serves the dual function of including and excluding reciprocal perturbations of
political and legal operations. Its two-sided form of including and excluding influence maintains
the separation of the systems and allows for separate autopoietic reproduction without any
confusing overlap. It also characterizes the ways in which the legal system (and on the other side,
the political system) avoids isolation (which means entropy) and constructs on its internal screen
what can serve within the system as information.”: N. Luhmann, Operational closure and
structural coupling, in «Cardozo Law Review» 13 (1991-1992): 1419–1441, p. 1437. See also G.
Corsi, On paradoxes in constitutions, in ???, Ashgate, Farnham, 2015. Especially this excerpt:
“The idea is that the constitution was invented to regulate the relationships between law and
politics, once these two systems are differentiated once and for all and there remains no
possibility of polyfunctionality. The concept employed by systems theory to clarify the function of
the constitution is that of structural coupling. […] This concept indicates the capacity – and the
3797
According to Luhmann fundamental rights therefore are not statutes, eternal
and inviolate values, but tools that ensure the inclusion of individual in society,
socialization, ie participation in the social context as a communication partner,
ensuring a successful outcome of individual’s self-representation, conceiving it as
a character, as form person, “able to report their actions to multiple social systems
and to bring together in a personal behavioral synthesis their conflicting
demands”57. The modern social order in fact puts the individual in front of an
unprecedentedly rich range of possibilities for action, choices, opportunities: the
emancipation from traditional constraints based on wealth, on belonging to a
defined social class (that characterized functionally layered societies), the
increased possibility of movement, they make possible to choose which profession
or trade is to undertake and membership in different circles and social groups,
allowing access to differentiated roles among the various contexts. However, it is
difficult for a single to develop a variety, because it is constantly called to staring
purposes and to act accordingly. So the individual is called to be otherwise
(contingency)58: in order to do that, however, he needs a correct selfrepresentation as individual. Dignity and freedom, as defined in a functional sense,
intervene at this level: they indicate the basic conditions for the success of selfrepresentation, they are preconditions for the socialization of man as an individual,
as a partner of the interaction. Beyond their claim as historical values/rights in
liberal Western tradition, dignity and freedom for Luhmann are institutionalized as
unlimited capacities of contacts (a requirement for inclusion in the communication).
They act on the outside (freedom) and on the inside (dignity) of self
necessity – on the part of a system to develop specific kinds of awareness towards sectors in its
environment, while remaining indifferent to all the rest. The systems theory defines these kinds of
awareness as “irritations”, in the sense of disturbances or interferences, so as to underline that
they are not cases of input coming in from outside, but of points of contact inside the system itself
that generate effects that depend on its own structures and not on those of the irritating factor”.
57
N. Luhmann, op. cit. (2002), p. 99.
58
Contingency as fundamental character of modern society means that safety becomes
improbable, that everything could be otherwise. This is true in every field, also in interpersonal
relationships: we are not facing an impersonal mass society, reminds Luhmann. Modern society
differs from previous configurations for greater chances of impersonal relations and more intense
personal relationships: the differentiation of personal and social systems becomes for people
more and more a reason to re-interpret their difference with environment on the basis of own
person. See, N. Luhmann, Amore come passione, Bruno Mondadori, Milano, 2008 (Liebe als
Passion Zur Codierung von Intimität, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1982).
3798
representation: freedom means that “social action does not end in the fulfillment of
the action, but is included in the processes of symbolic attribution”59. It means, in
other words, that we have the right to a free development of personality as a selfconscious individuality, to a space of personal action, protected from external
interferences and violations (first of all those of the state). Dignity instead means
that the roles to which we adhere are reconciled with a self-representation worthy
of consideration: it is the knowledge that you can express what you are that lets
you
identify
with
your
own
person.
It
“indicates
the
successful
self-
representations”60; therefore it must be built and nurtured. His loss marks the loss
of personality, and consequently of the social role61.
Freedom and dignity are products of functional differentiation, not
‘inalienable human rights’: the differentiated social order institutionalized them
precisely to ensure the inclusion of the person. The overall social system and the
various functional subsystems are oriented in fact to the inclusion of the entire
population”62.
Obviously every subsystem operates according to its own logic, and
decides “how far one can do”63: any individual relates in different ways to different
subsystems, in dependence of its aspirations and abilities, but also in dependence
on external conditions: citizenship is attributed to the individual based on place of
birth and family, as well as the availability of money depends, even more than by
the individual talents and commitment to their work, by familiar legacy; and so on.
In principle, however, each one should have the opportunity to participate:
freedom serves to this. But also another fundamental right, that of equality, fulfills
the same purpose: it “creates the preconditions for enlargement of the possibilities
of communication because it frees the act by the differences that limited the
59
N. Luhmann, op. cit. (2002), p. 115.
Idem, p. 119.
61
“L’uomo non può usare la sua personalità, se la sua autorappresentazione non ha successo, se
non ha dignità. Se non è in grado di effettuare un’autorappresentazione sufficiente, recede da
partner della comunicazione e la sua scarsa comprensione delle esigenze del sistema lo conduce
al manicomio.”: idem, pp. 120-1.
62
“There is no obvious reason to exclude someone from the use of the money, from the legal
capacity or from belonging to a State, from education or marriage, nor to let depend everything
62
that from licenses or special conditions outside the system” : N. Luhmann, Oltre la barbarie, in
«Sociologia e politiche sociali», n. 3, 1999.
63
Ivi.
60
3799
generalization and that bound the possibilities of self-representation in
predetermined social positions”64.
Equality is not an individual right or value65, but a systemic necessity: in this
way, it becomes possible “taking decisions on internal problems of the system,
about what is equal or unequal” 66, at the same time forcing the political system to
relate to citizen regardless of his class, meaning with an equal treatment of
individuals. The right to equality therefore does not exclude inequalities:
nevertheless they must be justified, motivated. Discrimination can no longer
depend on the decision maker, according to his feelings, his preferences, but must
be based on objective reasons: the positivised law does not oblige to compliant
conduct, but protects those who adapt them; likewise it does not guarantee justice
and fairness67, does not prevent the rise and the development of inequalities: it
makes unequal treatments possible “as long as sufficiently motivated”68. Human
rights of freedom and equality, therefore, are not grounded on ‘human nature’: in
modern society, where is no longer possible to define the social context in which
everyone have to take action, their (latent) function lies on keeping the future open
to further possibilities69.
Then, if it could make sense toclaim for a just society – or at least ‘fairer’ –
and universal values (whether freedom, equality, tolerance, peace, democracy,
etc.), it is possible from a ‘civic’, ‘human’ point of view. Even for this, as already
explained, we do not speak of ‘human rights’70 but of ‘fundamental rights’: modern
64
R. De Giorgi, Modelli giuridici dell’uguaglianza e dell’equità, in Disuguaglianze ed equità in
Europa, edited by L. Gallino, Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1993, p. 369.
65
N. Luhmann, op. cit. (2002), p. 249.
66
N. Luhmann, op. cit. (2002), p. 259.
67
“In un ordine sociale pienamente differenziato le pretese di un agire giusto ingenerano
complicazioni enormi e ricche di contraddizioni.” N. Luhmann, op. cit. (2002), p. 267.
68
R. De Giorgi, op. cit., p. 365.
69
N. Luhmann, Theory of society, vol. 2, Stanford University Press, Stanford (CA), 2012 (original
edition 2007), p. 301.
70
About ‘human rights’ social sciences were traditionally skepticist, starting by philosophers and
th
th
sociologists of XVIII and XIX century (as, for example, Karl Marx: he tought that they were only
a façade, masking economic and social inequalities. Rights originated by private property, that
clouded social relations arising from the capitalist mode of production. See On the Jewish
Question, in Deutsch-Franzosische Jahrbucher, 1844). Cfr. G. Sjoberg, E.A. Gill, N. Williams, A
th
Sociology of human rights, in «Social Problems» Vol. 48, No. 1, 50 Anniversary Issue, Feb.,
2011, pp. 11-47; P. Hynes, M. Lamb, D., M. Waites, Sociology and human rights: confrontations,
evasions and new engagements, in «The International Journal of Human Rights» Vol. 14, No. 6,
3800
society – in luhmannian terms – is made of communication71. Society is not
‘unjust’: it simply works at another level than that of individuals72.
Stating that does not mean to be cynical, being blind to inequalities and
social distress: but is not useful keeping on describing exclusions in the different
functional systems through a semantics that uses terms such as ‘exploitation’,
‘social oppression’, ‘marginality’. Instead of an impossible claim (precisely from a
systemic point of view: the inclusion must be understood as a form of two sides:
the other side is precisely the exclusion, where individuals count only as bodies73)
for a total inclusion of everyone or looking for guilty ‘subject to blame’74, theory
must try to describe “facts a little better than does the optimistic-critical tradition of
our discipline; and precisely the facts that society itself builds”75.
In addition to those shown here, Luhmann analyzes other rights, on which
we cannot dwell: the right to property (which allows the individual to participate in
the economic system), to vote (which offers citizens a role for participation in the
political system), the legal protection of marriage and family, and so on76. What is
described above, however, reveals what it means to analyze fundamental rights
not from the point of view of legal dogmatics, but from the one of sociological
theory, functionally-structuralist inspired: it could open the possibility of a more
extensive and detailed understanding of legal and political systems, thus allowing
November 2010, 810-830; Bryan S. Turner, Outline of a theory of human rights, in «Sociology»
Vol. 27, No. 3, August 1993, pp. 489-512.
71
“the distinction between individual and society – since the mid-nineteenth century also individual
and collectivity – is external to society.”: N. Luhmann, op. cit. (2012), p. 295. People therefore are
in the environment; they are not part of the system. Society requires people, representatives that
could communicate. Individuals as psychic systems are in relationship with social system through
structural coupling, but this is a contact that occurs at the level of their respective structures.
Biological and emotional-sentimental components (and consequently a number of needs of the
individual) are not matter of society. It cannot take charge of them in the reproduction of its
operations.
72
That is communication, the only genuinely social operation. See N. Luhmann, R. De Giorgi,
Teoria della società, Franco Angeli, Milano, 1992, p. 26.
73
N. Luhmann, op. cit. (2012), pp. 16-27.
74
A research starting by the idea of a stratified society: See N. Luhmann, op. cit. (1999).
75
Idem, p. 127. O, with different words: “Theory not only formulates what we know but also tells us
what we want to know, that is, the questions to which an answer is needed. Moreover, the
structure of a theoretical system tells us what alternatives are open in the possible answers to a
given question. If observed facts of undoubted accuracy will not fit any of the alternatives it leaves
open, the system itself is in need of reconstruction.”: see Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social
Action. A Study in Social Theory with Special Reference to a Group of Recent European Writers,
The Free Press, Glencoe (Illinois), 1949, p. 9.
76
N. Luhmann, op. cit. (2002).
3801
a more aware and responsible formulation of social problems, primarily those that
underlie fundamental rights77. Instead of conceiving fundamental rights merely as
values, we look them as institutions, therefore,
“it is possible explain our involvement in certain constellations of problems,
which let appear as meaningful only a limited range of action”78.
The contribute of Gunther Teubner to the discussion on fundamental rights
moves from Luhmann’s legacy. However he adds some critical and purposeful
ideas: they could be suitable for an operative use: this is especially true if we
consider his tripartite distinction of fundamental rights.
Teubner, starting by Luhmann, takes note of the problematic expansion of
political system in modern society, which tends to cross boundaries of other social
subsystems and at the same time impinge the individual “in his attempt to control
both the body and the mind of people”79. Also he highlights the “expansionary
effects” of other, specialized and autonomous functional systems: so we have to
face a “multiplicity of anonymous and now globalized communicative processes”
80
, a society that can be described as an “anonymous matrix” of codified
communications, which tends to expand itself without regards of human beings.
So fundamental rights should defend the individual not only from the state, but
also by the intrusion of other social subsystems, and should protect the autonomy
of the various systems function81.
Therefore Teubner proposes a tripartite division of the dimensions relating
to the protection of fundamental rights, distinguishing them between institutional,
77
Idem, p. 307.
Idem, p. 311. Values therefore are points of view for certain preferential consequences of action.
They remain valid, fair, even if action or actors disappoint expectations: “I valori sono, cioè,
aspettative stabilizzate in modo controfattuale ed in questo sono simili alle norme giuridiche […]
Le norme giuridiche implicano un’alternativa chiara tra legalità e illegalità. Nell’universo dei valori,
al contrario, non può essere introdotta una tale struttura di alternativa […] Chi si orienta ad un
valore, trascura gli altri.” (p. 312).
79
G. Teubner, Ordinamenti frammentati e costituzioni sociali, in Il diritto frammentato, a cura di A.
Febbrajo, F. Gambino, Giuffrè, Milano, 2013, p. 386.
80
Idem, p. 389.
81
Fundamental rights, as R. Prandini told, commenting on Teubner, are “contro-istituzioni moderne
poste dentro ai sottosistemi funzionali per limitarne il potere. La loro funzione non è
semplicemente quella di proteggere l’individuo, bensì anche quella di mettere in sicurezza
l’autonomia delle sfere sociali, contro le tendenze espansive di altri sottosistemi.”: R. Prandini,
Distinguere aude! Il Grand Récit sociologico di Gunther Teubner, in Il diritto frammentato, edited
by A. Febbrajo, F. Gambino, Giuffrè, Milano, 2013, pp. 240-1.
78
3802
personal and human rights. Institutional rights handle with the autonomy of the
“social discourses” (such as religion, art, science) against the totalitarian
tendencies of the communicative matrix: they work as “conflict of law rules”
between different partial social rationalities, trying to protect the integrity of art,
family, religion against totalitarian tendencies of science, media or economy82.
Personal rights instead concern the autonomy of communication: they protect
people as “fictions”, communicative artifacts, ie individuals as they are included in
the systems function. Human rights, finally, are “negative bounds on societal
communication, where the integrity of individuals’ body and mind is endangered by
a communicative matrix crossing boundaries.”83
They are those that concern the individual in its most genuine, less social,
aspect, related to his bio-psychic endowment.
The operative, already mentioned, potential of this tripartite division lies in
the fact that a clear distinction of referents, the rights’ ‘holders’ – or at least of the
different dimensions in which it is necessary to establish spaces and actions for
protection – facilitates the task of those who are called to design and place actions
for protection and preservation of rights. In other words, they become more
obvious targets to reach and, together with them, the obstacles to face. Social
policies, humanitarian claims, but perhaps also most general instances by groups
and organizations, can benefit from a sort of ‘disillusionment’, which, instead of
pushing to classify projects with the label of idealism, strengthens them, because it
makes more aware their promoters. Just one example: affirming the importance of
a particular right and at the same time recognizing it as human, in the sense of
Teubner means clearly distinguishing what we are facing not only as ‘citizens’, but
also as human beings, as members of the specie: beyond their citizenship, the
state in which they are located, their possibility to pay, and so on. This leads us to
focus attention on essential data and to exclude from the discussion claims and
fears that don’t have anything to do with dimensions that is intended to preserve.
Of course the contribution that this tripartite division can provide cannot overcome
the intrinsic limits of law: institutional and personal rights in general are more
82
83
G. Teubner, The anonimous Matrix, in «Modern Law Review», 69, 2006.
G. Teubner, op. cit. (2013), p. 390.
3803
easily recognized in judicial system than human rights. In this sense, Teubner
says, we are faced by “a strictly impossible project” 84 because society cannot “do
justice” to real people, as “people are not its parts but stand outside
communication” 85. For Teubner, only
“the self-observation of mind/body – introspection, suffering, pain – can
judge whether communication infringes human rights. If these self-observations,
however distorted, gain entry to communication, then there is some chance of
humanly just self-limitation of communication.”86
This is a significant shift of paradigm, a purely sociological approach, aware
of the inevitability of inequalities and exclusions, that are natural and obvious in a
functional differentiated society. On this basis, it is therefore necessary to
introduce “new devices of re-inclusion” able to “distinguish between the empirical
and existential concreteness of the individual”87, which is more than the person88.
Fragmentation of world society imposes this and other challenges: in fact,
when rights are established, it needs both referents able to enforce them (such as
national, international and transnational courts), and clear information on those
who must respect them and have to answer for it in case of violation. This fact is
not always clear. What are, for example, duties of transnational private actors who
violate fundamental rights? Usually national states are called for the protection of
84
“All the groping attempts to juridify human rights cannot hide the fact that this is a strictly
impossible project. How can society ever “do justice” to real people if people are not its parts but
stand outside communication, if society cannot communicate with them but at most about them,
indeed not even reach them but merely either irritate or destroy them? In the light of grossly
inhuman social practices the justice of human rights is a burning issue, but one which has no
prospect of resolution.”: G. Teubner, The anonimous Matrix, in «Modern Law Review», 69, 2006.
85
Idem, p. 393.
86
G. Teubner, op. cit. (2006). Human rights therefore represent a great challenge for contemporary
society, which could be faced redefining them as ecological rights: “Ciò significa che il diritto della
società non deve porsi come finalità l’impossibile inclusione giuridica dell’uomo, bensì
l’improbabile relazione con esso, senza alcuna pretesa di risolverlo/ridurlo attraverso
comunicazioni giuridiche”, R. Prandini, op. cit. (2013), p. 223.
87
“La matrice sociale deve invece essere capace di riconoscere che l’individuo è sacro e
intoccabile e che, proprio per questo, va ricostruito semanticamente all’interno della società in
quanto persona.”: Idem, p. 224.
88
It is worth noting that in this sense is at stake not only a general individual “health” or “harmony”,
but foremost the validation by people of their individual identity, in its specificity and difference
from the one of the form person, exclusively communicative and therefore “always proper”:
people do not coincide with consciences, with corresponding psychic systems. See E. Esposito,
Identità
e
persona
nella
teoria
dei
sistemi
sociali,
manuscript,
url:
www.cisi.unito.it/hal9000/ricerca/tsais/Resposito.doc.
3804
violations. That is, Teubner explains, a “thorny issue”
89
regarding global
constitutionalism, called for the challenge of “connecting each other in a network
constitutions from global fragments – nations, transnational regimes, regional
cultures – , in a constitutional law of collisions”.90
This fragments exist due to the affirmation of different transnational
regimes, separated from each other but that can try to govern itself internally,
independently, until they ‘positivate’ their standard of fundamental rights, through
the decision-making practice: it is the case, for example, of ICANN (Internet
Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers) or the WTO (World Trade
Organization)91. This fragmentation however generates numerous occasions of
conflict between the various constitutional systems, as Teubner highlights. More
generally, also, should not be ignored a socio-cultural problem: it is questionable,
in fact, if the global order (however you define it: post-national, global, and so on),
which is based on heterogeneous elements such as pressure groups, NGOs,
social movements, courts, etc., will succeed “to combine itself with some
conventions on minimum standards and values, which do not require strict
adherence to liberal social contract of Western modernity”92.
If we consider threats to individual integrity provided by this fragmented
reality, we can see that they don’t come only from political system, but also by
various social institutions: economics, law, science, and so on. The research of
Michel Foucault on micro-power, biopolitics, governmentality or the ones of Karl
Marx in the economic field93, represent valuable contributions in this sense. All
these arguments lead us to accept the inevitability of violations of individual
89
G. Teubner, op. cit. (2012), p. 19.
Idem, p. 22.
91
The authority designated to appoint IP addresses and Internet domains. See G. Teubner, op. cit.
(2012), op. cit. (2006).
92
A. Appadurai, Modernità in polvere, Raffaello Cortina, Milano, 2012 (1996), p. 35 (Modernity At
Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
93
G. Teubner, op. cit. (2012), p. 167. “There is not just one single boundary political
communication/individual, guarded by human rights. Instead, the problems arise in numerous
social institutions, each forming their own boundaries with their human environments:
politics/individual, economy/individual, law/individual, science/individual, medicine/individual”: G.
Teubner, op. cit. (2012). About the examples cited: references are to the overall work of Marx and
on Foucault’s researches on total institutions and biopolitics. See, among many others, La
volontà di sapere. Storia della sessualità 1, Feltrinelli, Milano, 1988 (Histoire de la sexualité, 1: la
volonté de savoir, Gallimard,1976).
90
3805
integrity in a social system that, in order to maintain the self-renewal of its
environmental difference, absorb physical and psychic energy from individuals,
through selective perturbative cycles of selective requests and selectively
conditioned responses94.
We can now try to identify some problematic issues to which theory could
be applied.
We have seen Teubner’s attention for the protection of bodies and minds:
they have therefore, as noted by Prandini95, latent intrinsic rights. We can see, in
comparison with Luhmann, a difference: the german sociologist, in fact, dealing
with fundamental rights, still maintained a systemic reference, looking at the
person as a construction of the social system, which uses it as their own
environment. Teubner instead asserts the value and the inevitability of individuals
in their concrete difference from society, even if he recognizes that only when
psychic and mental suffering are able to irritate communication they could reclaim
their validity.
The modern challenge, then, is to make systems responsive, that is, at the
same time, able to “manage the difference” between system and environment and
“respect it, putting it in the conditions to be stay-different”96. The challenge thus
consists in a permanent success in distinguishing between social and non-social,
and to safeguard the latter, be it psychological, organic, natural. In order to do this
are necessary devices, especially policies, able to operate a re-entry, to enter the
system/environment distinction again in itself, thus building “a space of mediation
between a growing social matrix and an increasingly biological-psychic
individual”97.
In any case, if we identify fundamental rights as institutions with a specific
function – and therefore not as absolute and in this sense not necessary – we
have to accept their generality and non-specificity, without classifying them,
however, as useless: if fundamental rights don’t determine the actual content of
94
G. Teubner, op. cit. (2012), p.165.
Rights to conceive as tendencies to self-subsistence and integrity inasmuch different from
societal: R. Prandini, op. cit., p. 228.
96
Idem, p. 266.
97
Idem, p. 267.
95
3806
potential new rules, but they are merely limited to exclude some possibilities, to
delimit the scope of intervention, to keep open possibilities for the future, for
situations that might be important98, it means that they represent both a resource
that could continuously stimulate planning of those who promote the discussion
inside legal system, and a tool for theoretical reflection on boundaries between
functional subsystems and their definition.
Of course the attempt, from a sociological point of view, to develop a critical
theory on fundamental rights must use observations – produced by sociology and
by other fields of research – on this issue and on the safety of individual’s
psychological well-being. In this sense, it is necessary to take into account, for
example, the evolution of semantics of rights and human dignity99; semantics of
the relation beetwen identity and its public and private dimensions100; and also
philosophical research on social order; studies on the correlation between cultural
phenomena and psychological and social processes101; theoretical studies on the
crisis and the future of Western civilization102; the proposals of a specific sociology
of human rights.
98
“It has to establish fundamental rights that are not just an historically recent invention, but are
also the product of decisions, so contingent like any other norm. This means that they are
fundamental because they are not necessary. […] In the form they have take on today, values
and fundamental rights are formulated to be substantially generic or even a-specific. […] These
values’ universalism thus seems to oblige them to be semantically empty. […] These rights
declare themselves to be unalterable, because that is the only way that they can claim to
legitimise the future, while at the same time waiving the right to define it in advance.”, G. Corsi,
op. cit. (2015).
99
See, among others, M.C. Nussbaum, Giustizia sociale e dignità umana. Da individui a persone, il
Mulino, Bologna, 2012.
100
See T. Dumm, Loneliness as a Way of Life, Harvard University Press, 2010.
101
See, among others: M. Benasayag, G. Schmit, L’epoca delle passioni tristi, Feltrinelli, Milano,
2004 (Les passions tristes. Souffrance psychique et crise sociale, Editions La Découverte, 2003);
B.-C. Han: La società della trasparenza, Nottetempo, Roma, 2014 (Transparenzgesellschaft,
Matthes & Seitz, Berlin, 2012), Eros in agonia, Nottetempo, Roma, 2013 (Agonie des Eros,
Matthes & Seitz, Berlin, 2012), La società della stanchezza, Nottetempo, Roma, 2012
(Müdigkeitsgesellschaft, Matthes & Seitz, Berlin, 2010); G. Piazzi: Julie, Quattroventi, Urbino,
2009; Teoria dell’azione e complessità, Franco Angeli, Milano 1988 (1984); G. Manfré: Le radici
culturali del disagio contemporaneo, I libri di Emil, Bologna, 2014; Ripensare l’identità: nuove
prospettive di teoria critica, in «Studi Urbinati, B - Scienze umane e sociali», vol. 81, 2011.
102
On current era, characterized by a global financial and economic crisis that affects individual’s
state, see, among many others, J. Brassett, N. Vaughan-Williams, Crisis is governance: subprime, the traumatic event, and bare life, in «Global Society» 26:1, 2012, pp. 19-42. On ‘crisis’,
see D. Baecker, Culture crisis, in The Financial Crisis in Constitutional Perspective. The Dark
Side of Functional Differentiation, edited by P.F. Kjaer, G. Teubner, A. Febbrajo, Hart Publishing,
Oxford, 2011; M. Augé, Futuro, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 2012; L. Gallino, Finanzcapitalismo. La
civiltà del denaro in crisi, Einaudi, Torino, 2010; Z. Bauman, Vite di corsa. Come salvarsi dalla
3807
All these phenomena, in the proposal that is made here, are processed
within a framework based on the awareness that in a society characterized by
functional differentiation there isn’t - and couldn’t be – a system able to direct all
the others, with the resulting “lack of symbolic production capable of holding
together the different systems”103. If it is true that modern society in its relation with
the complexity of the environment always seems to find new opportunities for
adaptation, at the same time we know that sometimes these opportunities do not
include the human factor, since society is functionally oriented104. We have to
consider: is this a fact that must be taken for granted? Probably yes, but it should
be noted, on one hand, the limits of semantics, of conceptual heritage used by the
observers, and the constant delay of semantics in the description of the structures
of society105; on the other hand, we have to consider the unpredictability of the
future, produced by structural conditions106.
Not least, it should be noted that nowadays human dignity and the rights
attached to it represent prejudices of modernity, inviolable values, tools through
which humanity reflected “looking for his most profound unity”107: the emergence
of hyper-global value of human dignity would seem to indicate “a road, in the
middle of a barbarity that sometimes seems to exceed the ability of a containment”
108
. This could be seen as the product of the reaction of (human) environment
towards unacceptable outrageous incidents, inconceivable barbarity, that must be
rejected, not only from a moral, but also from an aesthetic point of view109. But it is
also necessary to evaluate as the strategic result of contingent and recursive
structure of society, that can generate ‘own values’ (eigenvalues), ‘inviolate levels’
tirannia dell’effimero, il Mulino, Bologna, 2009 (Consuming Life, 2008); D. Fusaro, Essere senza
tempo. Accelerazione della storia e della vita, Bompiani, Milano, 2010.
103
Paolo F., Crisi della struttura o crisi della semantica, in «Imago. Rivista di Studi Sociali
sull'immaginario», Anno II, n. 2, 2013, pp. 18-49, p. 21.
104
Idem, p. 43.
105
Idem, pp. 26-7.
106
See note 13. see N. Luhmann, op. cit. (2013).
107
See Introduzione, in N. Luhmann, Esistono ancora norme indispensabili?, Armando Editore,
Roma, 2013 (Are there Still Indispensable Norms in Our Society?, in «Soziale Systeme», 14,
2008, 1, pp. 18-37), p. 31.
108
Idem, p. 38.
109
Idem, p. 35.
3808
corresponding to their organizational archetype110 able to “block the thinking”,
allowing the law and society to give themselves “indispensable norms”.
4 TRANSCOSTITUTIONALISM IN A MULTICENTRIC SOCIETY
Now we can consider the contribute provided by Marcelo Neves, who
adopts, like Luhmann and Teubner, the systemic approach for theoretical
speculation. The Brazilian constitutionalist focuses on the new size of the demand
for fundamental rights111 as it emerges from world society. In fact, this issue is
increasingly becoming relevant to more than one legal order and to different social
systems at the same time.112 Thus, from a constitutional perspective, problems of
fundamental rights have a shared value and a dimension that concerns the
relations between different permanent cross-cutting relationships among legal
orders and between them and other subsystems.
We might say that the cognitive aspect seems to insist on a space much
larger and more complex in comparison to the normative classic constitutionalism,
which traditionally is rooted on a defined history and territory.
Starting from this premise, Neves first of all rejects the widespread
tendency to a metaphorical use of the term “constitutional”. Also he rejects the
consequent invitation to create a new constitution whenever new social need
arise113. Rather, Neves limits the use of the term “constitution” in its strict semantic
and
historical
sense,
and
he
proposes
a
new
model
called
“transcostitutionalism”114.
For his theoretical work, Neves borrows from Wolfgang Welsch and
develops the concept of “transversal reason”115, conceived in the context of a
110
111
112
N. Luhmann, op. cit. (2013), p. 67-8. See also Id. (2012), pp. 301-305.
On this, see M. Neves, op. cit. (2013), pp.157 ssg.
Ivi, p. 2.
Ivi, pp. 5 ss.
114
Ivi, pp. 74 ss.
115
For a deepen treatise, see W. Welsch, Gesellschaft ohne Meta-Erzählung, edited by W.
Zap, Die modernisierung moderner Gesellschaft: Verhandlungen des 25. Deutschen
Soziologentages in Frankfurt am Main 1990, Frankfurt am Main/New York: Campus,
1991; W. Welsch, Vernunft: Die zeitgenössische Vernunftkritik und das Konzept des
transversalen Vernunft 2nd edn, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996.
113
3809
multicentric society, with reference to language games116. It consists of “an ability
not to impose decrees but to make transitions”117. Thus, it is a reason that is not
incorporated in the language games but, on the contrary, is involved in the bonds
that operate as “bridges of transition” among heterogeneous groups of
language118. In other words, it is a meta-narrative, not oppressive but liberating.
Welsch proposes the concepts of “all-encompassing transversal reason” and
“postmodern supraordered metanarrative”, but according to Neves, they are
questionable under the conditions of reproduction of a world multicentric
policontestural society119.
Therefore, Neves affirms that social pressures to different modes of
communication, due to mutual distinct relations (claims of autonomy, selfdescriptions) are difficult to reconcile with the idea of an all-encompassing reason
and the related meta-discourse. In fact Neves focuses on the development of
stable mechanisms of mutual learning and mutual influence between spheres of
communication. From this thought, he develops the concept of “partial transversal
rationalities”, able to support constructive relationships between the rationalities of
each system of language games. Each partial transversal rationality is structurally
coupled with the corresponding particular rationality and it acts as a specific
“bridge of transition”120.
The existence of structural couplings between subsystems is a necessary
but not sufficient condition for the existence of a “transversal rationality”, which
thus constitutes an additional concept, and not a substitute. Transversal rationality,
integrating the concept of structural coupling, seems to express the cognitive
aspect of the legal system, for which, according to Neves, there must be the
According to the interpretation by Neves, this means that there is not a higher-level
discourse imposed as ruler. In fact, the imposition of one of the fields of language on
others would mean the destruction of the heterogeneity of the discourse spheres and of
their communication systems. See M. Neves, op. cit., p. 28.
117
W. Welsch, op. cit.,1996, p. 759; W. Welsch, Unsere postmoderne Moderne, 6th edn,
Akademie Verlag, 2002, p. 296.
118
W. Welsch, op. cit.,1996, p. 754.
119
See M. Neves, Transcostitutionalism, op. cit., 2013, pp. 28 e ss.
116
120
Ivi, p. 30.
3810
possibility of emergence of transversal rationality, considered a scarce resource in
a multicentric society.
The integration of concept of structural coupling, developed by Luhmann,
with the new concept developed by Neves, thus leads to the construction of a
theoretical tool, able to convey the cognitive aspect of constitutional law, which
must necessarily be associated to the normative aspect. In summary, the
mechanism consisting of structural couplings and transversal rationalities enables
interactive communication between systems, which appear less closed and less
differentiated, so that we can hypothesize the transition from “functionalism of
distinctions” to “functionalism of links”121. At this stage, thus, it seems important to
wonder what is the optimal combination of openness and closure of the system,
namely the intensity and frequency of transmission of nerve impulses, as well as
identify connective tissue diseases.
First, we can focus on what Marcelo Neves calls “the two sides of the coin”
of structural coupling and “transversal rationality”. In a strictly luhmannian
reasoning, based on operational closure, a total system openness would lead,
through the mechanism of structural coupling, to “systemic corruption”122, which
implies the prevalence of a system on one other, that would prevent the
autopoiesis of the latter. Neves identifies the opposite faces, the “downsides” of
transversal rationality, calling them “atomization” and “imperialist expansion”123 of
the system. The atomization resulting from the closure could lead to “autism” or
“idiot specialization”124, whose antidote would be just to build some functional
links. In fact, while the internal consistency becomes something of absolute, the
harmonization with the environment fails125. On the opposite side, transversal
rationality could lead, according to Neves, to “imperialist expansion”, that is the
weakening of the system code of communication because of the excessive
strength of the other, which does not necessarily coincides with systemic
121
A. Febbrajo, Introduzione a Law and Intersystemic Communication, edited by A.
Febbrajo and G. Harste, Ashgate, Farnham, 2013, p.1.
122
M. Neves, op. cit., p. 32.
123
Ivi, pp. 32-33.
124
Idem. See also W. Welsch, op. cit.,1996, pp. 433-5.
125
Excessive external adjustment would produce instead irrationality. See M. Neves, op.
cit., p. 32.
3811
corruption, that is, with a rupture of internal communication within a given system
due to external blocks.
Rather than the two sides of the same coin, it seems appropriate to connote
“atomization” and
“imperialist expansion” as the endpoints of a continuum126,
representing a range of intermediate situations between the total openness and
the total closure of system127.
5 FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
In a multi-level or multi-center legal system, the issue of “fundamental
rights” is directly or indirectly connected to the so-called “transcostitutionalism”.
Multidimensional transcostitutionalism of fundamental rights would acquire
meaning through the transversality of the different legal systems, by stimulating
both cooperation and collisions. For this reason, it is desirable to have a
transcostitutional “conversation” through “bridges of transition”, that allow mutual
learning of the involved legal systems. The core of the problem seems then the
attempt to limit the Teubner’s claim illustrated above, concerning the fragmentation
that leads to conflicts of rationality, or to non-harmonic relations between different
functional subsystems128.
On the one hand, we could say, there is a “demand” for rights protection,
that emerge quickly from a global galaxy of social interconnected subsystems; on
the other hand, we are facing what Teubner calls the “fragmented law”129, made
up of legal systems often autistic in a double way, in their relationships and in the
relationships between the legal subsystem and the other ones.
A. Febbrajo, op. cit., 2013, p. 1.
127
“Autopoiesis appears to be an amphibius concept which as such combines, in variable
degrees, the ability of social sustems to change in order to properly react to external
impulses (openess), and the ability to save their own identity to remain recognizable in
spite of the changes occurred (closure)”. Ivi, p. 2.
128
M. Neves, op. cit., 2013.
126
129
See A. Febbrajo, “Dal diritto riflessivo al diritto frammentato. Le tappe del neo-pluralismo
teubneriano”, in Il diritto frammentato, A. Febbrajo, F. Gambino (a cura di), Giuffrè, Milano, 2013.
3812
In summary, while there is a trend of global society towards a process of
diminishing differentiation, within the legal sphere of the single states, at a
constitutional level, remain differences which often are in conflict130.
Using concepts that belong to economics, we might apply to the Sociology
of constitutions the theoretical model of market analysis, in order to identify the
issue of fundamental rights as a space where operators produce a rigid supply of
constitutional guarantees (because of the substantial aspect regarding the link with
their legal culture, and because of the formal aspect regarding the
complex
procedural process required for adaptation to social changes. By contrast, the
demand of users, detected by sociologists, is elastic, depending on environmental
changes. In other words, there is an elastic demand in terms of protection of
fundamental rights, which is resilient according to certain variables inherent to the
social evolution, and there is a supply of normative production
more rigid,
represented by constitutional systems of different states.
According to this scheme, to stabilize the system, we could say that the
demand of fundamental rights by world society must meet the supply of
constitutional protection. In our case, the offer must adapt to the demand. That is,
to get closer to a balance point, we must find a way to make more flexible the
normative offer and therefore adequate (or adaptable) to the demand.
The problem is then to understand how to do it, since the cognitive process
seems to follow logics of global communication that are different from a selfreflective process of the operational closed constitutional system.
The answer might lie in the study of mechanisms of connection, which,
potentially, are capable of achieving the “trancostitutionalism”.
Here, then, the functionalism of links could be modulated along a scale that
start from the atrophy and ends with the hypertrophy of the links themselves. This
could be the strategic key by which to pass, in the “law of collisions” of Teubner,
from conflicts to cooperation.
The teubnerian oxymoron of a globalized fragmentation of law is explicated
in the statement about the need of “connecting a network of constitutions
M. Neves, op. cit., 2013.
130
3813
belonging to global fragments, in a constitutional law of collisions”131 and it
expresses, at the same time, the discrepancy between a unique coherent concept
of law, and the pluralistic presence of social rules internal and external to the
states.
Without pretending to provide a comprehensive answer, we could conclude
that the law seems to react to social changes through dynamics of the legal
systems that identify a boost, still potential, to increase transnational processes,
and thus intersystemic communication.
First of all, it seems appropriate to identify the mechanisms that make up
the connective tissue between the two interacting systems: the material one and
the legal one, namely the cognitive aspect and the normative one.
The cognitive aspect (exemplified by media) and the normative aspect
(represented by constitutional dispositions), have different rates of change. This
speed difference creates tensions and therefore instability in the complex system
constituted by a galaxy of subsystems that, albeit basically operational closed and
autopoietic, are bound together by structural couplings, that are
increasingly
important in a context in which differentiation and closure, by contrast, are
progressively losing their constructivist value. Referring once again to economic
models, we can remember how the single currency can work in conditions of
stability only when the different monetary “structurally coupled” systems have
similar rates of inflation. A very different rate would blow the mechanism, because
of the rigidity of the currency that could not, for example, be devalued or issued in
an expansive sense by an autonomous country.
Similarly, between different legal systems or between different social
subsystems, the structural coupling of constitution seems to have to acquire
degrees of flexibility enabling the institutionalization of self-reflection within the
legal system; that is, making it possible to adjust the normative supply to the
demand of fundamental rights.
Then, the problem seems to establish adequate bridges between the
various subsystems, flexible and thus resilient to change, not rigid and susceptible
131
G. Teubner, op. cit., 2012, p. 22.
3814
to breakage, with the consequent result of detaching the normative process and
the cognitive one and therefore preventing institutionalization
of internal self-
reflection and external communication.
The theoretical instrument generated by the integration of structural
coupling with transversal rationality (through the assignment of an active valence
to cognitive operations of the structural coupling) could, in theory, provide a
plausible answer. That is, it could be a mechanism to solve the problem of the
right combination of opening and closing, in a complex system where the
subsystems are not autistic but incorporated into a framework of relationships that
make up a new scenario based no longer, or not only, on autopoietic
communication, but also on the inter-system intersystemic communication.
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3820
THE IDEA OF PARTICIPATION IN VENEZUELA AND BRAZIL:
THE SPACE AS A CORE DIMENSION IN POWER DYNAMIC QUESTIONS
Alessandra Maia Terra de Faria
Mayra Goulart Silva
RESUMO: O objetivo deste artigo é discutir a perspectiva do espaço e sua
intersecção com as dinâmicas de transformação do poder, através da
comparação entre os casos de Venezuela e Brasil. Conforme a hipótese que
orienta este trabalho, na Venezuela, a ideia de participação traduziu-se no
empoderamento do cidadão comum, sem mediação de instâncias representativas,
um processo que levará a uma radical reconfiguração territorial, um Estado
Comunal. No Brasil, o mesmo ímpeto includente fora conciliado à ênfase nas
estruturas de representação funcional, dando origem a diferentes instituições
participativas relacionadas à implementação de políticas públicas, ligadas à
organização da vida nas cidades, como é o caso dos Conselhos de Saúde. Deste
modo, recorrendo ao conceito de "fricção do espaço" (Harvey, 2005), buscar-se-á
contrastar as formas pelas quais o ímpeto constituinte de transformar as relações
de poder se enraizou espacialmente, engendrando novas dinâmicas para a
participação popular.
PALAVRAS-CHAVE: participação; representação;
constitucionalismo; brasil; américa latina.
instituições
políticas;
ABSTRACT: This paper aims to discuss the intersection of space and power by
comparing the cases of Venezuela and Brazil, considering a set of political
changes outlined in the light of the concept of democracy. According to the
hypothesis that guides this work, the idea of participation becomes the core of
democratic demands in Venezuela, leading to an ordinary citizen empowerment
movement, whose political inclusion dispense the mediation of representative
bodies. This movement unfolds into a radical process of reconfiguration of the
space-power issue, reaching its peak in the enactment of a Communal State in the
country. In Brazil, on the other hand, the same democratizing yearning is reflected
in the emphasis of mediated processes and functional representation, giving rise
to different participatory institutions related to the implementation of public policies,
which are closely connected with the organization of city life, such as Health,
Education and Social Assistance Councils. Thus, using the theoretical background
provided by the concept of "friction of distance" (Harvey, 2005), will be compared
3821
these two ways in which the constituent impetus to transform power relations are
rooted spatially, generating new dynamics and spaces for citizen participation.
KEYWORDS:
Participation;
Representation;
Political
Institutions;
Constitucionalism; Brazil; Latin America.
1 INTRODUÇÃO
Segundo observa David Harvey, o domínio do espaço reflete o modo como
indivíduos e grupos poderosos dominam a organização e a produção do espaço
mediante recursos legais e extralegal. Isso se dá no intuito de exercer maior
controle sobre a distância entre espaços (acessibilidade e distanciamento –
«fricção da distância», Harvey, 2005: 202) e sobre a forma pela qual o espaço é
apropriado por eles mesmos ou por outros. Por outro lado, a apropriação
sistematizada e institucionalizada pode envolver a produção de formas
territorialmente determinadas de solidariedade social, seja na ocupação do
espaço por objetos, como casas, fábricas ou ruas, seja nas atividades (como o
uso da terra), ou por indivíduos, classes ou outros grupos sociais. Seu argumento
pondera que toda luta para reconstituir relações de poder envolve uma batalha
para reorganizar as bases espaciais.
Se observado o contexto prévio ao momento constituinte no Brasil e na
Venezuela, é possível ilustrar como a dinâmica de movimentação social por maior
participação na política trouxe a equação entre representação e participação para
a pauta do próprio processo de discussão constituinte, que contou com ampla
participação popular. A participação social seria consolidada enquanto um
princípio constitucional que entra nas pautas de discussão constituinte, a partir da
pressão popular e da mobilização social no país.
Todavia, se a aporia entre democracia e representação é constitutiva da
relação conceitual entre ambos, na contemporaneidade ela se agrava, visto que
se configura um contexto no qual o processo de individuação é cada vez menos
coordenado por instâncias de socialização e agregação das vontades. Como é o
caso dos partidos, dos sindicatos e até mesmo das famílias. Ocorre, então, a
configuração de um panorama de crise mundial nos mecanismos representativos.
Deste modo, conforme assinalado por quase todos os trabalhos sobre o tema,
3822
agrava-se ao longo do século XX, o problema da multiplicação das identidades e
da “dessubjetivação” do povo enquanto totalidade. No final deste período, tal
fenômeno fica, contudo, mais visível, uma vez que os partidos políticos perdem a
“centralidade outrora ocupada na ordenação das identidades e preferências dos
eleitores, do mesmo modo, mudanças no mercado de trabalho tornaram instáveis
e fluidas as grandes categorias populacionais, que acabaram perdendo a
capacidade de efetivamente representar os grupos em virtude de sua posição na
estrutura ocupacional e social” (LAVALLE, HOUTZAGER e CASTELLO; 2006:
49).
Essa crise nas instâncias de agregação e associação dos indivíduos cria,
contudo, um impasse para as formas de governo democráticas. Pois, somente ao
se agregarem os anseios da população tornam-se passíveis de serem
transformados em políticas públicas. Em sociedades de massa, as vontades dos
cidadãos participam do processo político de tomada de decisões apenas quando
se tornam vontades de grupos, posto que só estas são capazes de se fazer
representar na esfera pública. Os partidos políticos durante muito tempo
desempenharam inequivocamente esta tarefa, agrupando os eleitores em função
de concepções ideológicas, pertencimentos de classe, identidades culturais e
religiosas e etc. Porém, em uma situação na qual as preferências políticopartidárias e a identificação sócioeconômica por meio de classes não são mais
capazes de mobilizar e reunir de modo determinante os indivíduos em grupos de
interesse comuns, a maioria dos partidos políticos entra em decadência e os
eleitores acabam pulverizando-se em um agregado de vontades particulares e
dispersas. Neste mundo em que o espaço para o comum, para a vida associativa
e para a política se encontra cada vez mais restrito, a representação, cujo
pressuposto é a existência de vontades compartilhadas, entra em crise. Sendo
este um dilema que assombra todos os sistemas políticos contemporâneos, que
têm no ideal democrático sua fonte de legitimidade.
A ideia de utilizar as Constituições de Brasil (1988) e Venezuela (1999)
como ponto de partida da pesquisa aqui exposta, espelha a hipótese de que
ambas se caracterizam pela intenção de lidar com essa crise no universo da
representação, ampliando os espaços de participação e, por conseguinte, o
3823
envolvimento dos cidadãos na política. Ainda que a participação, segundo Adrian
Lavalle e Ernesto Isunza (2011), padeça do excesso de expectativas nela
depositadas, do dissenso sobre os efeitos esperados em relação à sua efetivação
e do fato de que qualquer tentativa de ponderar o valor da participação pela sua
utilidade equivale a desvalorizá-la ou torná-la secundária em relação ao efeito
almejado. Neste contexto, a participação seria ao mesmo tempo uma categoria
nativa da prática política de atores sociais, uma categoria teórica da teoria
democrática, e um procedimento institucionalizado com funções delimitadas por
leis e disposições regimentais (LAVALLE e ISUNZA, 2011, p. 101).
No caso da Constituição brasileira, a proposta do trabalho é argumentar
que a solução encontrada passaria principalmente pela pluralização das esferas
de representação e pela flexibilização do dogma sufragista. Isto permitiria à
população, quando não satisfeita com a representação situada nos Poderes
Executivo e Legislativo, a possibilidade de recorrer a outras instâncias,
principalmente àquelas engendradas pelo Judiciário. Quanto à Constituição
Venezuelana espera-se constatar que a solução apresentada seja algo diferente.
Em vez de flexibilizada, a lógica sufragista é, de certo modo, aprofundada a partir
da multiplicação dos mecanismos de consulta e participação direta da população
na política. Buscar-se-á, todavia, uma contraposição em relação às análises que
apresentam a tensão entre democracia representativa e democracia participativa
como um antagonismo entre termos excludentes ou como uma ameaça de
recrudescimento autocrático, pela via de uma democracia plebiscitária.
Para tanto o artigo realizará uma comparação entre o tratamento jurídico
dado nos dois países aos experimentos participativos. Na Venezuela, serão
escrutinados especialmente a Constituição de 1999, a
Lei dos conselhos
Comunais, de 2006, e a Lei de Comunas, de 2010, que declara o país um Estado
Comunal. No Brasil, por sua vez, serão analisadas a Constituição de 1988, os
dispositivos jurídicos de previsão de participação e representação, e os princípios
constitucionais que originaram a legislação dos Conselhos de Saúde, Educação e
Assistência Social, ao permitir a estruturação de Conselhos e Fundos nas esferas
federal, estadual e municipal como forma de acesso aos recursos enquanto caso
exemplar da perspectiva conselhista no país. A natureza jurídica dos conselhos
3824
está presente nos dispositivos constitucionais que instituem e asseguram a
participação popular na gestão da coisa pública, na formulação e no controle das
políticas, na defesa dos direitos humanos e na distribuição e alocação dos
recursos. Os conselhos constituem-se em uma das formas de participação e
controle social assegurados nos dispositivos constitucionais, e serão tratados a
fundo na discussão sobre a saúde que se estende da esfera nacional à esfera
estadual a partir das Leis orgânicas do Sistema Único de Saúde n.º 8080 e 8142,
de 1990, e posteriores legislaçoes complementares.
Com esta intenção, o contraste entre esses mecanismos será ilustrado
através de tabelas que comparem os diferentes dispositivos jurídicos. Esse
exercício será feito em três partes. Deste modo, tratar-se-á, respectivamente, (i)
dos direitos econômico-sociais; (ii) dos dispositivos que engendram uma
participação direta da população e; por fim, (iii) daqueles que possibilitam tal
alargamento por meio de uma ampliação nas esferas de atuação das instâncias
de representação funcional.
Deste modo, a comparação entre esse conjunto de dispositivos jurídicos,
realizada neste artigo foi o método escolhido para responder a um
questionamento, qual seja: no tocante às relações entre democracia e
representação como acontece a espacialização da participação? Nesta medida,
as hipóteses que orientaram o trabalho remetem as suas premissas iniciais, que
apresentam a participação direta da população em um sistema de autogoverno
como um ideal inalcançável que funciona, porém, como fundamento de
legitimidade e mito de origem de qualquer regime democrático.
Para contemplar tal propósito, a primeira e a segunda seção tratarão,
respectivamente, da dinâmica histórica recente da democracia no Brasil e na
Venezuela; ambas as análises dedicadas à trajetória delineada pelo conceito de
participação no século XX. O propósito de tal divisão é suscitar uma comparação
que ressalte as diferenças entre ambos os percursos, de modo a demonstrar a
hipótese que estrutura nosso trabalho. Esta, por sua vez, diz respeito à
impertinência de associações que, mediante uma aproximação dos dois casos,
visam criticar os mecanismos participativos adotados (ou propostos) no Brasil,
tendo em vista uma possível ameaça aos parâmetros da Democracia
3825
Representativa, como de fato ocorre na conjuntura atual venezuelana. Tal
associação, por fim, será,exemplificada em breves comentários acerca da
repercussão da proposta de modificação de alguns mecanismos participativos
(dos conselhos) delineada no decreto 8.243, de março de 2004, no Brasil, a nível
de conclusão a partir dos argumentos apresentados.
2 PARTICIPAÇÃO E DEMOCRACIA NO BRASIL
Quando nos voltamos ao caso brasileiro, observa-se que o marco da
discussão sobre a participação se deu em concomitância com a representação
política, se tomado o passado recente.
Nesse sentido, é possível afirmar que a discussão sobre a participação
acompanhou em alguma medida a retomada da democracia no país, a partir dos
anos 1970. Segundo observa Claudia Faria (2010) tal processo ocorreu de forma
ancorada por um conjunto de crenças que vinculavam seu fortalecimento à
consolidação das instâncias tradicionais de participação (e que cotejavam a
representação), entre elas o voto, as eleições diretas e os partidos políticos; bem
como uma nova perspectiva, a ampliação de canais participativos que pudessem
fortalecer os laços societários e estreitar a relação entre a sociedade e a
formulação e controle das decisões coletivas.
Se observado o contexto prévio ao momento constituinte no Brasil, é
possível ilustrar como a dinâmica de movimentação social por maior participação
na política trouxe a equação entre representação e participação para a pauta do
próprio processo de discussão constituinte, que acabou por contar com
significativa participação popular. Não que isso estivesse dado desde o primeiro
momento. A participação social foi consolidada enquanto um princípio
constitucional, mas ela aparece ao lado da representação. É significativo
considerar que a trajetória de sua entrada nas pautas de discussão constituinte,
se deve em grande medida à presença de pressão popular, decorrente de
mobilização social que atravessou o país, e que foi acolhida e debatida nos
3826
trâmites dos representantes no decorrer da Assembleia Constituinte, cujos
contornos foram parlamentares132.
Nesse período dos últimos trinta anos, é possível destacar ao menos três
momentos diferentes, no tocante à participação e sua interface com a
representação no Brasil. Esse esforço de identificação dos momentos se faz útil
na medida em que consideramos a participação contemporânea, segundo um
determinado feixe de preocupações, como observado por Adrian Lavalle e
Ernesto Isunza (2011). A participação seria a um só tempo “categoria nativa da
prática política de atores sociais, categoria teórica da teoria democrática, e
procedimento institucionalizado com funções delimitadas por leis e disposições
regimentais” (Lavalle & Isunza, 2011:100).
Portanto, ao elencar três ênfases e momentos no tocante à participação, o
que aparece muitas vezes na literatura sobre o tema, sugere-se que eles estão
contiguamente relacionados à forma de sua institucionalização, à dimensão
territorial que adquirem no país, bem como às expectativas em relação aos
resultados da própria participação. Longe de considerar que os termos propostos
exaurem as questões a esse respeito, apresentá-los assim visa facilitar o seu
estudo e os critérios a ressaltar.
Num primeiro momento (1) a marca forte era a polarização com a
representação, uma aposta na autonomia dos atores que se traduzia
principalmente na oposição ao regime militar, que vai dos anos 1970 a 1988. Esse
foi talvez o momento que mais aproximou o Brasil do caso venezuelano, mas
dentro do próprio processo constituinte no país é possível destacar como a ideia
de participação por aqui se amalgamou à representação. Um dos exemplos
contundentes a esse respeito foi o movimento Diretas Já (Bertoncelo, 2009),
quando muitos desejavam eleições diretas e com ampla participação popular,
mas para ensejar o sistema representativo e os poderes executivos e legislativos
no âmbito da federação.
Em
seguida
o
momento
(2)
de
institucionalização
dos
arranjos
participativos, e a perspectiva de controle social do Estado por parte da
Ver PILATTI, 2008; CITTADINO, 2009; FARIA, A., 2014.
132
3827
sociedade, ao longo dos anos 90; aonde a participação ocorre no esteio de
elaboração das políticas públicas. Nesse momento ela toma feições que acordam
com princípios constitucionais de representação funcional, paritária e estando
previsto o controle social para temas setoriais, que estarão, mais uma vez
organizados acompanhando as três esferas da representação no plano federativo:
municipal, estadual e nacional.
O momento (3) de autocrítica dos arranjos participativos, seria aquele que
começa a partir dos anos 2000, e culmina com a proposta recente de decreto
presidencial n. 8.243 de maio de 2014, que visava oficializar a Política Nacional
de Participação Social (PNPS) e o Sistema Nacional de Participação Social
(SNPS).
Em relação ao primeiro momento, ressalta-se que poucas associações
existiam no Brasil antes da década de 1970.133 Isso porque, no Brasil, a
passagem para o mundo moderno e a internalização consciente dos processos de
modernização
tiveram,
como
pré-requisito
institucional,
a
afirmação
da
prevalência da comunidade sobre o indivíduo liberal, na forma decidida pela
Revolução de 1930 até meados de 1964.134
Assim, enquanto no período de 1930 a 1964 pairava um consenso de que
o público deveria ter primazia em relação ao privado, durante a ditadura militar a
lógica se inverte, e ganharam espaço práticas sociais centradas no puro interesse
econômico. O autoritarismo posterior ao golpe de 1964 e o período de ditadura
militar se modificou com a progressiva incorporação de parte significativa da
população pobre do país junto a associações populares urbanas na luta por
direitos.135 Essa situação se intensifica no limiar dos anos 80, culminando com a
diminuição do domínio militar na política, momento de negociação da transição
política. Nesse contexto, a participação era percebida como parte de um
movimento espontaneísta, ligado à perspectiva de autonomia. As interpretações a
133
CONNIF, 1975 descreveu como a tendência a formar associações voluntárias para
ajuda mútua e proteção que atingiu o médio proletariado e organizou grupos de
interesse em torno do trabalho nos anos 30, foi desarticulada com o Estado Novo (1937
-1945), o que perduraria até o início dos anos 70. Sobre a ausência de participação civil
e política da população pobre no Brasil nos anos 70 ver KOWARICK, 1980.
134
WERNECK VIANNA, CARVALHO, 2004.
135
LAMOUNIER, WEFFORT, BENEVIDES, 1981; SANTOS,1993; CARVALHO, 2001.
3828
seu respeito consideravam que a participação promoveria uma mudança na
cultura política. E as críticas já presentes, indicavam que o caminho para a
democracia no país não poderia se desvincular da perspectiva da representação
para atingir seus objetivos.
O problema à época da Constituinte não era simples, como foi destacado
por Fabio Wanderley Reis (1986) no tocante a relação entre social e político. Se a
democracia social era fundamental para o estabelecimento de uma democracia
política, Reis destacava que, para haver eficácia seriam necessárias alterações
político-organizacionais que pudessem ser bem sucedidas do ponto de vista
institucional no sentido de lançar raízes democráticas no contexto social,
mantendo a perspectiva da representação.
Como ver-se-á na próxima seção, no Brasil, o tom se diferenciava daquele
observado no caso venezuelano, na medida em que a recusa ao corporativismo
ocorreu com empenho e fortalecimento das instituições da democracia
representativa, e o desenvolvimento da perspectiva participativa instituiu nexos
fecundos entre essas duas, bem como a perspectiva de regulação democrática
alicerçada na presença de associações e movimentos sociais como partícipes da
deliberação de políticas públicas a partir de 1988.
Segundo Lessa (2008), é possível destacar uma teoria da agência
democrática na nova Constituição. O sentido original de autogoverno direto teria
sido moderadamente recuperado a partir da adoção de institutos de ação direta.
Mesmo assim, observa: “A subordinação liberal da ideia de democracia ao
esquema da representação – para empregar a expressão de Madison – d,
evidentemente, mantida".136
Nela, o cidadão democrático seria um sujeito constituído por direitos que,
para serem plenos, dependerão de sua atenção e energia políticas e cognitivas
para pôr em movimento os mecanismos propostos de jurisdição constitucional.
Apesar disso, o autor é crítico das novas possibilidades de representação
funcional dos operadores do sistema de justiça. Seu ponto é. que eles
136
LESSA, 2008, p. 363-395.
3829
desestabilizariam o equilíbrio de poderes, deixando à margem a representação
partidária.
Nesse sentido, a Constituição de 1988 abriu o caminho para importantes
modificações no país, incluindo o acesso a direitos sociais e a criação de novas
estruturas participativas, dentro da própria estrutura do poder executivo. Cardoso
(2004) observa como novas formas de participação levaram os movimentos a se
relacionarem mais diretamente com as agências públicas. Esse processo
caracteriza o segundo momento da participação no Brasil, momento o qual
Lavalle e Isunza (2011) consideram que a participação teria sofrido um
deslocamento em seu uso, em virtude da diminuição da polarização entre
participação e representação. Avritzer (2009) considera que o Brasil passou de
um país conhecido pelos baixos níveis de participação política a um país
conhecido pelas suas instituições participativas.
Por outro lado, sabe-se que ao longo do tempo algumas concepções em
torno da participação tiveram maior atenção dos legisladores e operadores do
direito do que outras. Tais preferências, é possível afirmar, se desdobraram em
instituições participativas concretas. Pouco foram utilizadas, por exemplo,
possibilidades de participação previstas na CF como plebiscitos, referendos e
iniciativas populares de lei.
A perspectiva em que a participação teve maior desdobramento diz
respeito, em especial, aos conselhos e conferências por políticas públicas e por
sujeitos de direitos, como no caso de mulheres, negros, indígenas, cadeirantes,
idosos dentre outros. A literatura destaca, no caso brasileiro, uma forte trajetória
por políticas públicas específicas, como é o caso da Saúde, da Educação, e da
Assistência social. Se por um lado há no Brasil uma forte trajetória por políticas
públicas específicas, segundo pesquisa recente de Teixeira (2013) sua ênfase
tem sido em estruturar estas políticas a partir do direito, mesmo que muitas vezes
de forma fragmentada, e sem as devidas interconexões entre elas. A autora
relembra como a lógica do “direito a ter direitos” nos moldes de Hannah Arendt
(2000) conecta essa perspectiva com a forma de atuação dos movimentos sociais
brasileiros. Avritzer (2009) também observa que o perfil de enfoque em políticas
públicas do Brasil é um diferencial em relação a outros países, e com seus
3830
vínculos com o sistema político elegendo políticos que representam ou vocalizam
suas lutas.
A perspectiva de espaços participativos – conselhos de políticas públicas,
orçamentos participativos e conferências –surgiu no Brasil exatamente do
argumento de que a política municipal passava longe das demandas da
população. Era preciso, se pensada uma política pública consoante às
expectativas da população, que canais participativos fossem postos em prática.
Do ponto de vista da dinâmica territorial, é possível reforçar que o fato de haver a
conjugação entre participação e representação, teve como impacto a criação de
estruturas participativas a partir desse momento amplamente alicerçadas na
dinâmica federativa –ia lógica que parte do plano federal, desdobra-se no
momento estadual, e municipal. Essa lógica será diferenciada no caso
venezuelano, como será abordado na próxima seção. Esse marco, de
institucionalização, ocorreu ao longo dos anos 90, após a promulgação da Carta
Cidadã. Foi o marco também da territorialização dos conselhos no Brasil, e de
uma mudança em relação às expectativas depositadas na própria efetivação da
participação.
Tendo em vista a perspectiva municipal e sua dimensão territorial no Brasil,
é possível destacar a dimensão concreta de reorganização social que a
participação ensejou nos municípios. Segundo dados do IBGE de 2001, dos 5.565
municípios brasileiros, se tomados apenas os Conselhos Municipais gestores
mencionados como áreas estratégicas na Constituição, existiam nada menos do
que 5.426 Conselhos Municipais de Saúde, 4.072 de Educação e 5.178 de
Assistência Social137. A esses conselhos municipais se desdobram suas
instâncias nos planos estadual e nacional, consecutivamente. As conferências
nacionais se desenvolveram mais recentemente, mas também segundo o critério
territorial que acompanha o plano federativo: ciclos de conferências municipais e
137
Segundo dados atualizados na MUNIC 2011, os totais perfazem o avanço para 5.553
Conselhos Municipais de Saúde e 4.718 Conselhos Municipais de Educação. É possível
mencionar também avanço em outras áreas: Conselho Municipal de Habitação (3.240);
Diferentes Mecanismos de Controle Social de Saneamento Básico ( audiências
públicas, consultas públicas, conferências das cidades e órgãos colegiados) 2.450;
Conselho Municipal de Direitos da Criança e do Adolescente 5.446; Conselho Municipal
de Política para Mulheres 872; Conselho Municipal do Idoso 2.868.
3831
estaduais as precedem e trabalhos recentes relatam que entre 1988 e 2009 foram
realizadas ao menos oitenta delas (Santos; Pogrebinschi, 2010). Há ainda o
Orçamento Participativo, que entre 1995 e 2005 registrou em torno de duzentas
experiências no país (Baiocchi, 2003; D’ávila, 2000).
Assim, o processo que se estabeleceu ao longo dos anos 90 estava
apoiado em um consenso em torno da relevância da participação da sociedade no
que diz respeito às políticas públicas, processo que Evelina Dagnino (2002)
cunhou como “confluência perversa”. O problema diagnosticado por Dagnino será
o propulsor do terceiro momento aqui apresentado, de autocrítica dos processos
participativos. Ao tornar explícita a discussão em torno da disputa sobre o
significado da participação entre projetos políticos oponentes, Dagnino contribuiu
para o desenvolvimento de estudos sobre as experiências participativas
relacionando-as com seus respectivos projetos políticos, como é o caso dos
trabalhos de Tatagiba & Blinkstad (2011) e Almeida (2010), da crítica da
burocratização dos processos Durán (2013), bem como das questões envolvendo
a perspectiva do contexto econômico neoliberal como destaca Vera Telles (2001),
dentre outros.
A despolitização da perspectiva de gestão que aparece com frequência nos
ambientes participativos é destacada por Feltran (2006), e se faz presente em
estudos regionalizados e municipais, como no caso do Rio de Janeiro destacado
em Faria (2014), onde é possível encontrar o perfil “gestor” como uma tradição
com antigas raízes nos processos de reterritorialização impostos na dinâmica
histórica da cidade. Segundo observa David Harvey, o domínio do espaço reflete
o modo como indivíduos e grupos poderosos dominam a organização e a
produção do espaço mediante recursos legais e, que podem também possuir
caráter extralegal. Isso se dá no intuito de exercer maior controle, seja sobre a
distância entre espaços (acessibilidade e distanciamento –s fricção da distância”,
Harvey, 2005: 202), ou sobre a forma pela qual o espaço é apropriado por eles
mesmos ou por outros. Seu argumento pondera que toda luta para reconstituir
relações de poder envolve uma batalha para reorganizar as bases espaciais.
Nesse sentido, o capitalismo desterritorializa com uma mão e reterritorializa com a
outra.
3832
Portanto, nesse processo de autocrítica da participação, se tomado o
debate em torno da representação da sociedade que acontece nos espaços
participativos, Lavalle e Isunza (2011), por exemplo, atribuem à participação uma
feição das instituições do Estado brasileiro, ou seja, ela “transbordou o estatuto de
reclamo dos atores sociais e de orientação política programática de governos e
partidos –embora preserve esse caráter duplo –, atingindo um desenvolvimento
institucional sem paralelo em outros contextos138”.
É comum na literatura internacional, a menção à participação enquanto
uma instituição informal, como praticada nas instituições participativas no Brasil.
Lavalle e Isunza (2011) chamam de “experiências extraparlamentares de
participação”, - ou seja, o caso brasileiro, que conta também com a mediação
política de atores da sociedade civil -, visto que não compreende o aspecto da
autorização formal da sociedade via eleições.
Sabe-se que a literatura no Brasil sobre os formatos da participação, seja
pela diversidade, abrangência territorial e graus de institucionalização ao longo
dos diferentes níveis de autoridade da federação, se deparou no país com uma
dinâmica privilegiada para o estudo de tais mecanismos. A literatura, no processo
de entendimento sobre essas estruturas, acabou por desenvolver um amplo
debate sobre os ditos “espaços participativos”, o que produziu análises que
passaram a lidar com a perspectiva da chamada representação extraparlamentar,
e apontaram para o processo de pluralização da representação.139
Contíguo a tal processo passou-se a discutir sob o prisma teórico de uma
aproximação entre participação e representação, e não mais sob uma perspectiva
antagônica entre ambas; bem como a perspectiva de que a existência de espaços
participativos não tem por objetivo suplantar a democracia representativa, mas
lidar com a perspectiva de legitimidade ao incorporar um grupo maior de pessoas
no processo de elaboração de políticas públicas.
Para as pretensões desse artigo, destacar a recuperação de teorias da
representação para desenvolver análises sobre as dinâmicas participativas, é
mais um indício que reforça a ideia de que, diferentemente do caso venezuelano,
LAVALLE & ISUNZA, 2011, p. 121.
139
Ibid; LUCHMANN 2011; ALMEIDA 2010.
138
3833
a ser abordado na próxima seção, no Brasil não está presente esse antagonismo
entre participação e representação. Haja vista, que as práticas de participação
previstas na elaboração de políticas públicas atualmente existentes não possuem
como
premissa
a
superação
dos
parâmetros
do
regime
democrático
representativo rumo a um ideal de democracia direta, como argumentam por
vezes as críticas ao decreto 8.243, que será retomado na conclusão.
3 PARTICIPAÇÃO E DEMOCRACIA NA VENEZUELA
A origem da demanda por participação social também é longínqua na
Venezuela, onde desde o início da década de 1970 se observam nos centros
urbanos a criação de organizações comunitárias comprometidos com as
necessidades internas das comunidades. Estruturados em associações de
moradores e entidades de caráter local, a sociedade civil se organizava para lidar
com os problemas comunitários dos bairros e vizinhanças, lutando pela melhoria
de serviços públicos e se articulando em grupos de interesse voltados a questões
trabalhistas, feministas, ecológicas, desportivas, religiosas, dentre outras. Não
obstante, ao longo da década de 1980 essa efervescência entra em declínio em
função de uma crise sistêmica, tomando um rumo diverso do já mencionado no
caso brasileiro.
Ao longo da década de 90, era notória a crise que abalava a IV República,
regime político amparado, juridicamente, na Constituição de 1961. Socialmente,
por sua vez, esse sistema, celebrado no chamado Pacto de Punto Fijo140, se
enraizava por meio de pactos entre partidos (em especial, Ação Democrática e
Comité de Organização Política Eleitoral Independente, que se alternavam na
Presidência do país) e entre estes e as instâncias de organização social
(sindicatos, associações de empresários e etc).
Nas décadas finais do século XX, contudo, o arranjo que, por meio de
mecanismos de cooptação e repressão, alcançava grande parte das instituições e
140
Pacto celebrado em 1958 na Quinta Punto Fijo –9propriedade do líder copeiano Rafael
Caldeira e localizada no bairro caraqueño de Sabana Grande – entre os líderes da AD
(Rómulo Betancourt) do Copei (Caldeira) e da União Republicana Democrática (Jovito
Villalba).
3834
sujeitos coletivos do país já havia sofrido importantes deserções, responsáveis
por abalar sua frágil sustentação política. A crença da população na legitimidade
deste regime – alicerçada na ideia de democracia, cujo significado remetia aos
princípios de estabilidade institucional e justiça social – havia sido seriamente
comprometida141.
Cristalizada em mecanismos formais e informais, a relação entre
autoridades públicas e representantes da sociedade criou na Venezuela uma
dinâmica de troca entre: o governo, que oferecia o acesso privilegiado à maquina
estatal; e as organizações da sociedade civil que, em contrapartida, garantiam o
apoio de seus membros aos partidos no poder. Não obstante ser essa articulação
essencial para sua manutenção fática, era a ideia de democracia que funcionava
como fundamento de validade para o sistema político vigente em todo o período,
que se desdobra entre a promulgação da Constituição de 1961 e sua derrogação,
pela Carta bolivariana de 1999. No entanto, conforme se disseminava a
percepção de que o acesso às dinâmicas decisórias e aos benefícios do Estado
eram distribuídos em função da afinidade com aqueles que detinham o poder, o
puntofijismo foi tendo seu conteúdo normativo esvaziado.
Mesmo nas instâncias locais, a participação era condicionada pelos
interesses dos partidos no poder, que as usavam como lugar de disputa e
controle, o que levou por fim a desgastá-las. A descrença generalizada nos
partidos, sindicatos e instituições da chamada IV República desarticula, também,
as organizações comunitárias. O resultado é um tecido social com pouca
estrutura organizacional e capacidade para influenciar na dimensão pública,
aumentando o descontentamento face a uma dimensão política que não abria
canais de participação para a sociedade, praticamente o reverso do Momento
Constituinte de 1988 no Brasil, conhecido por uma conciliação entre participação
popular intensa e debate constituinte partidário.
Todavia, a longa crise de legitimidade que levou ao fim da IV República,
deu início a uma série de movimentações por parte da sociedade civil e de
141
Tal crise se deflagra, sobretudo, após os eventos que ficaram conhecidos como
Caracazo, ocorrido em 1989, quando milhares de cidadãos expressaram sua
indignação pelas ruas de Caracas, tendo sido fortemente reprimidos pelas forças de
segurança.
3835
autoridades políticas dispostas a oferecer novos mecanismos de canalização para
o descontentamento geral dos cidadãos. A princípio, estas dinâmicas se
organizavam em torno de alguns temas centrais: (a) Aprofundamento da
democracia nos partidos políticos; (b) Reforma da Lei Orgânica do Sufrágio; (c)
Eleição popular, direta e secreta para governadores e; (d) Reforma da lei
Orgânica Municipal. Por outro lado, tais iniciativas, que respondem a um
significativo crescimento das demandas por mecanismos de participação,
permitiram também o fortalecimento das paróquias, das juntas paroquiais e das
associações de moradores (Juntas Vencinales). Com este propósito, a Lei
Orgânica do Regime Municipal, de 1989, define as associações de vizinhos
enquanto comunidade concreta, unida para defender a qualidade da vida comum,
fundamentalmente centrada e originada por características ou problemas
específicos da cidade.
Estas novas instâncias previam procedimentos como assembleias
deliberativas e referendos para a tomada de decisões referentes ao interesse
geral (como, por exemplo, questões orçamentárias) e inclusive a possibilidade de
revogação dos mandatos dos prefeitos. Embora sua relevância tenha sido
limitada por estarem concentradas em bairros de classe média e alta, pelo menos
no tocante a estas comunidades, as associações de vizinhos conseguiram
funcionar como elemento de articulação entre os planos locais e nacionais.
É, contudo, fundamental atentar para a inserção dessa perspectiva em um
contexto nacional de ressignificação da democracia, instaurado pela perda de
credibilidade dos canais de representação (os partidos e sindicatos) que
ocupavam um lugar central no sistema democrático puntofijista. Deste modo, a
ideia de que a própria comunidade, por meio de sua participação direta, deveria
reunir-se para buscar respostas aos seus próprios problemas, emerge como
demanda vinculada ao ideal democrático e disseminada entre diferentes estratos
econômicos. Aqueles ligados à classe média encontraram, ainda nos anos
setenta, nas associações de moradores um lugar para expressar esse novo
entendimento. No entanto, a maioria da população, oriunda das camadas
populares, por enfrentar mais dificuldades e empecilhos para uma autoorganização com efetiva capacidade de execução, encontrará, apenas nos
3836
Conselhos Comunais, criados, amparados e organizados pelo governo chavista,
uma forma de estruturação efetiva da ação coletiva142.
Ainda que durante a IV República tenha existido um processo organizativo
de matiz corporativista englobando sindicatos, organizações de trabalhadores,
movimentos estudantis, camponeses e organizações não governamentais; é com
o chavismo que ocorre uma explosão na organização e articulação no plano
comunal. Outorgando, a partir do Executivo, um tratamento constitucional à
organização popular nos principais setores produtivos da comunidade143 (PONCE,
2011, p. 191- tradução nossa).
A despeito de consagrar os anseios de ruptura com relação ao regime
anterior, a Constituição Bolivariana de 1999, não assume feições revolucionárias,
embora seu texto possa ser considerado como o ponto de partida de um novo
paradigma no contexto do constitucionalismo regional. Nesta perspectiva, as
principais inovações, dizem respeito: (i) à ressignificação do ideal democrático,
que passa a ser definido pelo adjetivo participativa(o), termo que é)usado 8 vezes
ao longo da Carta (no preâmbulo e nos artigos: 6º, 18º, 84º, 86º, 118º, 171º e
299º) e nenhuma vez (como adjetivo) na Constituição de 1961; e (ii) à
implementação dos mecanismos de democracia direta, enquanto instrumentos
essenciais a esta nova acepção de democracia.
É interessante observar, contudo, que a ênfase nos direitos humanos e
sociais era igualmente apresentada como diretriz do ordenamento jurídico
anterior, ainda que de um modo distinto. Esta diferença, diz respeito aos meios
para concretizar direitos socioeconômicos, constitutivos às duas acepções dadas
ao conceito de democracia, até porque ambas se referiam também ao plano
material. No sistema puntofijista, todavia, os principais instrumentos para esta
concretização eram os partidos e as corporações (sindicatos de trabalhadores e
patrões). No projeto chavista, por sua vez, é a participação direta do cidadão,
142
Após 2005, os Conselhos Comunais se tornam o núcleo do conceito de democracia
participativa e protagônica conformará a IV República.
143
No original: Aunque siempre existiu en Venezuela un proceso organizativo
como el cooperativismo, sindicatos y organizaciones de trabajadores , movimientos
estudiantiles, campesinos y organizaciones no gubernamentales (ONG); es en la década más
reciente y con el chavismo que ocurre una explosión en la organización y articulación de la
comunidad. Dando desde el Ejecutivo rango constitucional a la organización y participación
popular en los principales sectores productivos del país” (PONCE, 2011, p.191)
3837
compreendida como protagonismo do povo, que surge como alternativa do núcleo
normativo do projeto bolivariano.
O
ordenamento
jurídico
de
1961
enquadrava-se
no
paradigma
Neoconstitucional, que estruturava um Estado Democrático e Social de Direito
voltado ao bem-estar dos cidadãos, o mesmo que estruturará a Constituição
brasileira de 1988. Diante disto, é crucial mencionar o esforço, empreendido por
autores como Viciano Pastor e Martínez Dalmau, de conferir um caráter
paradigmático à Carta de 1999. Para isso, alguns de seus elementos são
transformados em atributos definidores do chamado Novo Constitucionalismo
Latino americano, sucedâneo do Neoconstitucionalismo, de origem europeia,
surgido neste subcontinente das Américas. Tais características, no plano formal,
dizem respeito, sobretudo, à ênfase no poder constituinte e na preocupação de
que sua vontade não seja bloqueada por eventuais ocupantes dos poderes
constituídos144.
Não obstante o reconhecimento de tais diferenças conquanto a ordem
anterior, é fundamental observar também os elementos de continuidade. Estes
dizem respeito, sobretudo, a uma trajetória de centralização de poder, enquanto
componente tradicional do hiperpresidencialismo venezuelano, cuja democracia
historicamente afasta-se do cânone liberal.
Tal viés se institucionaliza através de um mecanismo de delegação de
faculdades legislativas ao Executivo, amplamente utilizado durante a IV República
e previsto, na Constituição de 1961, pelo inciso 8°, do artigo 190°, que estabelecia
como atribuição do presidente da República: "ditar medidas extraordinárias em
matéria econômica ou financeira quando assim o requeresse o interesse público e
houvesse sido autorizado para isso por lei especial".
A despeito de suas pretensões transformadoras, a Carta de 1999
incorporou um instituto análogo dando prosseguimento a essa tradição de
centralismo no país. Delineado no artigo 203°, o instituto determina que: "São leis
habilitantes as sancionadas pela Assembleia por três quintas partes de seus
144
O que explica não apenas sua extensão, voltada à expressão detalhada de tal
vontade, de modo a orientar os processos de interpretação e aplicação judiciários; mas,
também a rigidez constitucional, isto é, a definição de critérios procedimentais que
visem dificultar a alteração do texto pelos legisladores ordinários.
3838
integrantes, a fim de estabelecer as diretrizes, propósitos e marco das matérias
que se delegam ao Presidente ou Presidenta da República com status e valor de
lei".
Ao ser mobilizado como principal mecanismo da transformações
executadas pelo governo bolivariano, as leis habilitantes viabilizam e atestam o
hiato entre os ideais de democracia e participação reverberados pelos discursos
chavistas e aqueles mobilizados pela tradição liberal. Sendo assim, é a partir
deste instituto que o governo venezuelano aprova, em dezembro de 2010, a Lei
Orgânica do Poder Popular LOPP) e a Lei das Comunas que iniciam, segundo a
hipótese delineada neste trabalho, a mais radical etapa do proceso de cambio
consagrado pela Carta de 1999. Com elas a ressignificação do conceito de
democracia puntofijista alcança o ponto máximo de ruptura, deslindando uma
efetiva transformação do modelo político-econômico e administrativo do país,
agora determinada pelo conceito de Socialismo, desprovido de qualquer
adjetivação suavizante (como, por exemplo, a alusão ao século XXI anteriormente
utilizada). Assim, por meio de duas leis redigidas pelo Executivo e aprovadas em
caráter excepcional, a Venezuela se declarou Socialista e Comunal145.
Essa nova forma de organização, embora diferenciada, pode ser vista
como uma radicalização do ideal federativo incorporado na tradição liberal, pois
mantém inclusive uma análoga preocupação com a divisão dos poderes
(Executivo, Legislativo e Judiciário) no interior de cada instância administrativa.
Ela conforma, portanto, um esquema representativo de tipo piramidal, que parte
da Assembleia de Cidadãos (definida no artigo 8º da LOPP), sendo que em cada
instância os membros escolhem, por sufrágio, os membros da instância superior,
A partir da leitura dos textos da Lei de Comunas e da LOPP percebe-se que o Estado
comunal é apresentado como um desdobramento do projeto de democracia participativa
e protagônica consagrado na Constituição. Esse argumento, sustentado pelas
lideranças chavistas, visa alicerçar a legitimidade da nova legislação em sua
continuidade com a Carta bolivariana que, diferentemente de ambas as leis, aprovadas
mediante lei habilitante, foi amplamente apoiada e sufragada pela população. Em
especial, esse argumento ganha força quando contemplamos o artigo 184º da
Constituição, que determina a criação de mecanismos abertos e flexíveis para que os
estados e os municípios descentralizem e transfiram às comunidades e associações de
vizinhos organizadas os serviços que estes administram e demonstram previamente a
capacidade de estar promovendo.
145
3839
havendo em todas elas a possibilidade de revogação de mandatos. Nesta
medida, com a aprovação da LOPP e da Lei de Comunas, na Venezuela,
passaram a conviver paralelamente dois sistemas de representação: um de
origem na tradição liberal, outro de origem na tradição comunista.
Essa convivência, segundo o argumento a ser aqui desenvolvido, não se
dá, contudo, sem prejuízo para as autoridades eleitas pelos mecanismos de
representação tradicional, que perdem espaço para aqueles ligados ao exercício
da democracia direta. Esse é o elemento determinante no contraste com a
trajetória dos mecanismos participativos no Brasil. Deste modo, quando
observados os novos dispositivos legislativos, fica claro o objetivo de que,
gradualmente, as instâncias federativas cedam lugar às instâncias do Poder
Popular.
Para regular essa transição, foi promulgada em 15 de junho de 2012,
através de Lei Habilitante, a Lei Orgânica para a Gestão de Competência e outras
atribuições do Poder Popular, cujo artigo primeiro declara: “O presente Decreto
com propósito, valor e força de Lei Orgânica tem por objeto desenvolver os
princípios, normas procedimentos e mecanismos de transferência da gestão
administração de serviços, atividades, bens e recursos, do Poder Público nacional
e das entidades político territoriais ao povo organizado”. Em seu artigo segundo,
por sua vez, o decreto deixa claro o compromisso do governo nacional em
“impulsionar o processo de planificação comunal como mecanismo de
participação das organizações do poder popular na construção de um novo
modelo de gestão pública”.
O esvaziamento dos poderes associados à Democracia Representativa se
estabelece, todavia, sob a lógica da restituição, uma vez que as capacidades
transferidas axiologicamente se originariam no povo, de acordo com a
ressignificação operada pelo chavismo nos conceitos de democracia e
participação146.
Esta intenção, por sua vez, é operacionalizada por uma dinâmica de “Transferência de
Competências”, definida pelo mesmo artigo como “processo mediante o qual as
entidades político territoriais restituem ao Povo Soberano, através das comunidades
organizadas e às organizações de base do Poder Popular aqueles serviços, atividades,
bens e recursos que podem ser assumidos e gestionados.
146
3840
No que diz respeito ao provimento financeiro de tais competências
concedidas às instâncias do Poder Popular, o artigo 15ºcda referida Lei Orgânica
para a Gestão de Competência estabelece que eles devem ser “postos à
disposição do sujeito de transferência receptor, até o término do exercício fiscal
correspondente, pelas entidades político-territoriais transferentes”. No entanto, o
mesmo artigo outorga ao Conselho Federal de Governo a responsabilidade prover
um montante adicional no “Fundo de Compensação Interterritorial”, com o
propósito de otimizar a designação de recursos necessários para financiar as
atividades transferidas.
Tal provimento, será realizado por meio de acordos entre “os órgãos e
entes do Poder Público Nacional e as entidades político territoriais, que adotarão
as medidas necessárias para que os sujeitos de transferência gozem de
prioridade e preferência nos processos de celebração e execução dos respectivos
convênios, para a transferência efetiva da gestão e administração de serviços,
atividades, bens e recursos”147.
Porém, uma vez que a legislação não esclarece quais serão os critérios
para a concessão de tais recursos adicionais, é possível sugerir que o governo
nacional possui uma ampla margem de discricionariedade. Esse panorama
apenas reforça o argumento original acerca do chavismo, ou seja, de que as
iniciativas de fortalecimento do protagonismo popular, através da incorporação de
mecanismos de democracia direta e autogestão, convive com a predominância do
Executivo148.
A leitura da LOSEC permite observar que os mecanismos de participação
cidadã não se encontram endereçadas somente ao plano político, uma vez que
dirigidas à implementação de um sistema econômico comunal. Entendido como
147
Conforme o artigo 15º da Lei Orgânica para a Gestão de Competência e outras
atribuições do Poder Popular.
148
Para reforçar tal argumentação, cabe observar o artigo 7º,da Lei Orgânica do Sistema
Econômico Comunal (LOSEC), promulgada em 21/12/2010, que define o Poder
Nacional como órgão coordenador e financiador dos projetos socioprodutivos. Do
mesmo modo a Lei Orgânica para a Gestão de Competência, em seu artigo 10º, atribui
ao Conselho Federal de Governo a tarefa de “resolver os conflitos que se apresentem
entre os sujeitos de transferência e os estados, municípios e órgãos do Poder Público
Nacional, em relação às solicitações de transferência da gestão e administração de
serviços, atividades, bens e recursos”.
3841
ferramenta fundamental para a construção de uma nova sociedade e de um
sistema de produção alternativo ao capitalismo, o ciclo produtivo comunal é
estruturado a partir de princípios socialistas como Democracia participativa e
protagônica, diversidade cultural, igualdade social e primazia dos interesses
coletivos.
Conforme determinado nesta lei orgânica, também promulgada sob a
forma de Lei Habilitante, o socialismo é definido como um modelo de produção
dirigido à satisfação das necessidades populares, através de novas formas de
geração e apropriação, baseadas na propriedade social, e orientado para a
eliminação da divisão social do trabalho, que caracteriza o capitalismo. Dessa
forma, o estabelecimento de uma correlação necessária entre o socialismo e as
iniciativas de participação cidadã também é um elemento determinante na
diferenciação com o caso brasileiro.
É inequívoco que a guinada venezuelana rumo ao socialismo, por ser o
resultado de um conjunto de decretos legislativos e não o produto de uma ampla
discussão no seio da sociedade, suscita diferentes críticas, sobretudo por parte
daqueles que, são marginalizados por apresentarem posicionamentos distintos.
Dessa maneira, há o perigo de que quando atrelados a um modelo produtivo
alternativo e socialista, os Conselhos Comunais se fechem àqueles que
apresentam interesses econômicos diferentes149.
Nessa
camponeses,
nova
configuração,
pescadores
e
apenas
instâncias
do
conselhos
Poder
de
Popular
trabalhadores,
devidamente
reconhecidas pela legislação e registrada no Ministério das Comunas (GARCÍA,
2013; p.71), são entendidas como entidades dignas do exercício da soberania, o
que certamente implica em uma restrição incompatível com os valores de
149
De acordo com os dados da Fundacomunal, em 2011, já haviam sido implementados
na Venezuela 37.665 Conselhos Comunais, número que alcança à surpreendente cifra
de 40.035, na contagem realizada pelo censo comunal de 2013 (inserir dados). Essa
grandiosidade, permite que os CCs sejam admirados como a mais importante
organização social da história do país (e quiçá(de toda América Latina); principalmente
quando se leva em conta a amplitude de competências a eles transferidas –mesmo que,
infelizmente, não esteja disponível um registro preciso e acessível que nos permita
quantificá-las. Sua importância, contudo, é posta em risco por um contexto polarização
política radical, fragilidade institucional e insegurança jurídica, que ameaça afastá-los da
sociedade civil, reduzindo-os a mero braço executor das políticas do governo.
3842
universalidade e pluralidade que permeiam o horizonte normativo das sociedades
modernas. Tal situação ainda se agrava em um contexto no qual esse
reconhecimento não está devidamente controlado por regras objetivas, o que
amplia o risco de discricionariedade, favorecimentos e restrições ao exercício do
Poder Popular. Ainda que não tenham sido colocados à disposição da opinião
pública internacional sinais inequívocos de que esta discriminação ocorra,
levando em conta que tais mecanismos são em grande parte boicotados pela
oposição, é preciso que o chavismo assegure o compromisso com a principal
conquista da revolução bolivariana: o empoderamento do cidadão comum. Este é
o seu legado e principal diferença face ao regime puntofijista que a precedera, no
qual a participação popular era limitada apenas àqueles vinculados aos partidos e
sindicatos ligados ao governo.
Sendo assim, a estratégia de engendrar uma profunda reforma no
ordenamento jurídico-político do país por meio de Leis Habilitantes, de acordo
com a argumentação aqui empreendida, deve ser entendida como continuidade
de uma tradição de hiperpresidencialismo, personalismo e desrespeito às
instituições liberais. Ela não é uma afronta apenas aos princípios do liberalismo
político, mas, à própria ideia de democracia participativa e protagônica que
aparece como leitmotiv dos discursos de Hugo Chávez e do proceso de cambio
por ele conduzido.
4 CONSIDERAÇÕES FINAIS
Nesta medida, conforme o argumento que estrutura este trabalho, o que
ocorre na Venezuela, em 2010, seria uma busca por alternativas aos mecanismos
representativos tradicionais –cuja perda de legitimidade precede a chegada de
Hugo Chávez ao poder. Essa tentativa foi desenvolvida por meio de uma
reconfiguração espacial das unidades políticas a serem representadas. Assim
sendo, se antes a Federação se organizava em municípios, estados e união, cada
um com seus representantes eleitos em suas circunscrições, agora se sobrepõem
a eles as comunidades e Comunas, também representadas por autoridades
eleitas. Com isso, a ideia de participação adquire um novo significado, cuja
3843
radicalidade almeja superar os parâmetros da democracia representativa, rumo à
implementação de um sistema de democracia direta. Esta mesma pretensão não
se observa na mobilização do ideal participativo por parte dos dispositivos legais
implementados no Brasil que, diferentemente do que atualmente se observa na
Venezuela, não se apresentam de modo concorrente ou antagônico face ao
regime democrático representativo.
No processo de autocrítica recente mencionado no caso brasileiro, são
inúmeros os desafios, que mostram como ainda são tímidos os alcances da
participação no Brasil. Algo a destacar é que além da variedade de resultados
sobre a participação nos estudos de caso, está presente o questionamento sobre
o fato de que a ampliação e diversidade dos espaços participativos não significa
que esteja superada a carência de qualidade ou eficiência da participação posta
em prática. Conforme sublinha a literatura, é possível perceber que os conselhos,
por exemplo, por sua dinâmica setorial, com frequência enfrentam uma
desarticulação entre os distintos lócus de participação. Em entrevista recente
sobre o assunto, Pedro Pontual (2014) declara como os conselhos setoriais não
necessariamente se articulam com as conferências, ou mesmo entre si, ou com
os debates que ocorrem nas audiências públicas, cujos respectivos graus de
legitimidade também podem variar muito.
Se analisada a proposta contida no decreto 8.243 de 23 de maio de 2014,
o objetivo apresentado é fortalecer e articular os mecanismos e as instâncias
democráticas de diálogo e a atuação conjunta entre a administração pública
federal e a sociedade civil. Seriam elas: conselho de políticas públicas; comissão
de políticas públicas; conferência nacional; ouvidoria pública federal; mesa de
diálogo; fórum interconselhos; audiência pública; consulta pública e ambiente
virtual de participação social. São propostos enquanto meios de articulação, a
maior parte deles de espaços já existentes e previstos constitucionalmente. Por
outro lado, fundamental a destacar, que atualmente no Brasil a grande parte dos
espaços participativos não possui poderes decisórios, apenas de monitoramento
das políticas públicas. Mesmo os que são deliberativos e, portanto, podem
formular resoluções, possuem fraco alcance administrativo como resultado de
suas propostas.
3844
É inegável que houve, em 2014 e no início de 2015, reações exageradas
veiculadas em meios de comunicação e, até mesmo, na Câmara dos Deputados,
onde reverberou com frequência a ideia de que a participação em questão seria
uma forma de ataque à democracia representativa. Conforme debatido na
primeira seção, a Constituição de 1988 estabeleceu as bases de uma democracia
que pretende amalgamar participação e representação, a qual vem sendo
institucionalizada por meio de diversos atos administrativos e legislativos, inclusas
emendas constitucionais, ao longo de diferentes governos. Os conselhos
existentes hoje no Brasil indicam a materialização institucional de preceitos
constitucionais e, nesse sentido, a literatura inclusive contribui para destacar que
não ameaçam em nada a democracia representativa, pelo contrário, seu objetivo
é arejá-la incluindo mais atores sociais nos processos de formulação de políticas
públicas.
O presente artigo visou contribuir através da discussão sobre a dimensão
territorial que assumiram ao longo do tempo as iniciativas participativas no Brasil
e na Venezuela. Buscou-se destacar que as estruturas que o decreto 8.243
propõe expandir no caso brasileiro, já existem e foram reguladas pelo país
mediante leis aprovadas pelos próprios poderes legislativos municipais, estaduais
e nacional, de modo que é difícil imaginá-las enquanto usurpadoras da
perspectiva de representação eleitoral. Por outro lado, não há como esquivar o
fato de que a proposta por decreto, fez com que a própria base dos movimentos
sociais olhasse com desconfiança a tentativa de promoção de uma rede de
integração entre os até então pulverizados conselhos setoriais. Deste modo,
demonstrou-se que a crítica responsável por associar participação a uma ameaça
aos mecanismos representativos tradicionais não faz sentido no Brasil, onde a
participação sempre foi vista como veículo de aperfeiçoamento do governo
representativo. Não obstante, atestou-se sua pertinência conquanto ao caso
venezuelano, onde a própria Constituição aponta para um sistema de
transferência de competências, regulamentado e radicalizado nos decretos
implementados por lei habilitante após 2010.
3845
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